Hansraj vs The State Of Chhattisgarh

2025 INSC 178 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1387 OF 2012

HANSRAJ …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. The appellant Hansraj is a convict for offence under Section

302 IPC1 for murdering Ramlal of village Ghotha Sakulpara

Bhanupratappur, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh and has

been awarded life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by geeta ahuja Date: 2025.02.10 18:04:55 IST Reason: 1 Indian Penal Code 1

2. The order of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court dated

19.12.2002 has been confirmed by the High Court in appeal

by the impugned judgment and order dated 30.07.2010.

3. The appellant preferred the Special Leave Petition with delay

of 653 days which was condoned and leave to appeal was

granted. Since the appellant had remained in jail for over 10

years, he was directed to be released on bail by this Court.

4. The case of the prosecution is based only on circumstantial

evidence and there is no eyewitness to the incident.

5. The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that

it is a completely false case and that even the circumstances

have not been proved conclusively to hold the appellant guilty

and there are stark contradictions in the testimonies of the

prosecution witnesses.

6. The incident is of 28.03.2002. It is alleged that the appellant

was residing with the deceased and was assisting him in his

work for the last over two months. On the fateful day the

appellant at 7:00 am in the morning left for his native place

on cycle with a bag but is set to have returned at around 9:00

am claiming that his cycle got punctured. He therefore asked 2 for money from Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the wife of the

deceased, to get the puncture repaired. Budhiyarin Bai told

him that she had no money readily available at home and

that he can take paddy and sell it in the market, but he

refused. So, Budhiyarin Bai herself went to the market to sell

the paddy, leaving the appellant and her husband at home.

When she returned at about 9:30 am, she saw the appellant

fleeing with a farsi (Ex P/6) in his hand and discovered that

her husband is lying on the floor, profusely bleeding with his

neck severed. She therefore raised an alarm and upon

hearing her cries her neighbours Jogeshwar (PW-3) and

Jhadu Ram (PW-4) came and they also saw her husband

lying dead. The neighbours informed another villager namely

Jogi Ram (PW-1) who also came on the spot and thereafter

proceeded to the Police Station Bhanupratappur to lodge an

FIR. He lodged the FIR at 11:15 am on the same day.

7. It is alleged that the relationship of the appellant with the

deceased was strained probably on account of non-

payment/untimely payment of his wages. The appellant was

the person last seen in the company of the deceased and that 3 the weapon of recovery i.e., farsi was recovered at his

pointing out. The injuries sustained by the deceased were

opined to have been caused by the weapon recovered. In

these circumstances, the prosecution asserts that the

evidence on record proves beyond reasonable doubt that the

appellant alone is the person who committed the offence and

that he has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the two

Courts below.

8. Undisputedly, the case of the prosecution is based on

circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the

commission of the offence in as much as the wife of the

deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, was also not present at the time

of the commission of the offence and had discovered that her

husband was lying on the floor bleeding profusely with neck

severed upon returning from the market. She probably saw

the accused fleeing from the scene of crime.

9. The law with regard to a case based purely on circumstantial

evidence stands crystalised by the decision of this Court in

the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of

4 Maharashtra2 wherein five golden principles known as

panchsheel proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence

were enshrined namely (i) the circumstances from which the

conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established

crafting out a distinction between ‘may be’ established and

‘must or should’ be established; (ii) the facts established

should be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the

accused; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive

nature; (iv) the circumstance should exclude every other

possible hypothesis except the one to be proved i.e., the guilt

of the accused; and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so

complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for

conclusion that the accused is innocent and must show that

in all human probability the act must have been done by the

accused.

10. In other words, the chain of events leading to the prosecution

of the convict must conclusively be established with certainty

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116 5 and there shall not be any room for any second opinion which

may lead to the innocence of the accused.

11. The appellant is said to have a motive to kill the deceased.

The alleged motive being that he was living as a servant of

the deceased for the last two months and there was some

discord between him and the deceased in connection with

non-payment/untimely payment of wages. However, such a

discord is not of such a nature of extent which may lead to

such a drastic action on part of the appellant to kill the

deceased. The issue of non-payment of wages is hardly

material and is so trivial a matter so as to compel anyone to

take an extreme step of committing a crime of such a grave

nature. Moreover, there is no material evidence to prove any

discord between the two.

12. In so far as the last seen theory is concerned, that the

appellant was in the company of the deceased at the time

when Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the wife of the deceased went to

the market to sell paddy also appears to be a little doubtful.

It is the consistent case of all the witnesses including

Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) that the appellant had left in the 6 morning at about 7:00 am for his native place and that as

told by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) he returned around 9:00 am

as his cycle’s tyre got punctured. The fact that he actually

returned as alleged does not stand established by any

independent evidence except for the statement of Budhiyarin

Bai (PW-5). However, her statement could not be

corroborated by any piece of evidence. It is hardly believable

that a person whose relationship with the deceased was not

cordial and has left for his native place in disgust would

return soon thereafter. The cycle of the appellant was

recovered by the police but no effort was made to find out if

either of the tyres was actually punctured, which could have

proved that the appellant may have returned as the cycle’s

tyre got punctured.

13. The weapon of crime i.e., farsi (Ex P/6) was set to have been

recovered after 20-25 days of the incident on the pointing out

of the appellant. It has come in evidence that it had some

blood stains. However, no forensic report was brought on

record to prove that the blood stains on it matched with that

of the blood of the deceased. Merely for the reason that the 7 doctor opined that the injuries on the deceased may have

been caused by a similar weapon would not conclude that

the recovered farsi was the weapon of crime. Similar and

identical instruments like farsi are found in almost every

home in the village as it is one of the most used farming

equipment. That apart, Jogi Ram, who lodged the complaint,

in his cross examination stated that the farsi was lying in an

open place, referring to the place of the commission of the

crime. The said statement completely belies the fact that the

farsi was recovered subsequently from the field of one

Chamaru Ram. The recovery of the weapon of crime or the

farsi, which was recovered, is doubtful and it is also not

certain that it was actually the weapon of crime.

14. One important circumstance pointing to the involvement of

the appellant is that he was seen running from the village

both by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) and Jogi Ram (PW-1).

Budhiyarin Bai in her statement in unequivocal terms stated

that when she returned home after selling the paddy, the

appellant had fled. It means that she had not found and seen

the appellant at the place of the crime after her return as he 8 had already fled. However, in her cross examination she took

a summersault and stated that when she came back, she saw

the appellant Hans Raj running from the house with the farsi.

Jogi Ram (PW-1) who at the time of occurrence of the incident

was working in his field, stated that he had seen the

appellant running before he came to know about the incident

through Jogeshwar (PW-3), whereupon he went to the house

of the deceased. In his cross examination, he further stated

that the wife of the deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, told him that

when she came back after selling paddy, her husband was

lying on the spot and the appellant had disappeared. PW-1

nowhere stated that Budhiyarin Bai saw the appellant fleeing

from the spot rather, she only informed that the appellant

had already disappeared when she returned from the market.

Later, in the cross-examination, Jogi Ram stated that while

working in the field collecting mahuva he only saw a man

running from a distance of more than a furlong. But he never

named the person who was running. Therefore, the evidence

of none of the two witnesses could conclusively establish that

they saw the appellant running or fleeing from the place of 9 crime or from the village. The identity of the person running

away had not been established by any evidence.

15. In addition to this, according to the prosecution, the clothes

of the appellant which he was wearing at the time of the

incident were produced by one Pritam Singh (PW-9) who was

declared to be hostile. The said clothes again had the blood

stains but no forensic report was produced to prove that the

blood of those stains matched with the blood of the deceased.

16. In the aforesaid facts, the circumstances raising finger upon

the appellant, are not of a conclusive nature to prove beyond

the shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person

responsible for the commission of the crime. The possibility

of innocence of the appellant does not stand excluded as per

the chain of events.

17. Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the

appellant cannot be held guilty of the commission of the

offence beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, in such

circumstances the benefit of doubt goes in his favour.

Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Courts below have

manifestly erred in convicting him for the aforesaid offence. 10

18. The impugned judgment and orders dated 19.12.2002 and

30.07.2012 are hereby set aside and the appellant is

acquitted from the offence charged with. He has already

suffered incarceration for over 10 years. He is already on bail.

His sureties and bail bonds are discharged.

19. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

.........………………………….. J.

(PANKAJ MITHAL)

...……………………………….. J.

(AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH)

NEW DELHI;

FEBRUARY 10, 2025.

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