H.G.Rangangoud vs M/S State Trading Corp.Of India L.& Ors

lease for iron ore over an area of 350 acres in

Yeshawanthnagar Range of the Kumarswamy Reserve

Forest Area within Sandur Taluk in Bellary District

of the State of Karnataka. The State Government

processed the request and in exercise of powers

under Section 5 (1) of the Mines and Minerals

(Development and Regulation) Act, 1957 (hereinafter

referred to as `the Act') by its letter dated 9th of

February, 2004 recommended to the Central

Government for grant of mining lease in favour of

the appellant to the extent of 16.8 hectares.

However before any decision could be taken, the

Central Government issued notification dated 27th of

June, 2005 in exercise of the power under Section

17 A (1A) of the Act and reserved iron ore deposits

in the area in question for exploitation by State

Trading Corporation of India Limited, a public

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sector undertaking. In view of the aforesaid

reservation the Central Government returned the

proposal of the State Government to grant mining

lease to the appellant by its letter dated 21st of

July, 2005. Aggrieved by the aforesaid

notification appellant preferred WP No. 19339 of

2005 (H.G. Rangangoud v. Minister of Coal & Mines,

represented by the Secretary & Ors.) before the

Karnataka High Court, inter alia praying for

quashing the notification reserving the iron ore

deposits in favour of the State Trading Corporation

of India Limited. The writ petition filed by the

appellant was heard along with another writ

petition filed by Salgaocar Mining Industries

Private Limited and the learned Single Judge by its

judgment and order dated 14th of August, 2007

quashed the aforesaid notification dated 27th of

June, 2005. Armed with the order of the High

Court, appellant represented to the State

Government to consider his application for grant of

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mining lease by its representation dated 18th of

September, 2007. After one day of filing of the

representation i.e. on 20th of September, 2007 the

State Trading Corporation, aggrieved by the order

of the learned Single Judge preferred appeal before

the High Court. Said appeal was posted for

consideration on 3rd of October, 2007 and the

Division Bench of the High Court taking into

consideration the `enormity' of the case and

finding that all the parties have been served and

represented, directed for its final disposal on 11th

of October, 2007. However, no interim order was

passed. As directed, the matter was heard and

reserved for judgment but before the judgment could

be pronounced the State Trading Corporation, the

appellant before the High Court, brought to its

notice that "when the matter was in the hearing

process, Government of Karnataka has sent a

communication to the Union of India for mining

lease in favour of the writ petitioners". The

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Division Bench of the High Court, when informed

about the aforesaid fact "called upon the

Government Advocate to explain this situation".

The explanation was furnished in which it was inter

alia stated that "as there was no interim order

granted in the writ appeal and keeping in view the

fact that if the mining area is not sanctioned to

the writ petitioners the existing mining operation

would be forced to close down and keeping in view

the jeopardy to the workmen, such recommendation

has been made." The explanation put forth by the

State Government did not find favour with the High

Court and on its prima facie finding that the

aforesaid conduct "amounts to interference with the

due course of judicial process" initiated suo motu

criminal contempt proceedings against the appellant

herein and K. Jayachandra, Under Secretary to the

Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries

Department. While doing so the High Court observed

as follows:

6 "........On going through the affidavit as well as the records, prima facie it appears to us that there is a clear attempt on the part of the writ petitioner Mr. H.G. Rangangoud and the concerned official to take such action when the grant of lease/licence itself was seized and was under consideration by this Court thereby cause on the merit or decision of this court."

4. Mr. P. Vishwanatha Shetty, Senior Advocate

appearing on behalf of the appellant submits that

the appellant had filed the representation in the

light of the order of the learned Single Judge even

before the appeal was filed against the judgment of

the learned Single Judge and hence it cannot be

said that the appellant in any way interfered with

the due course of judicial process. Accordingly he

submits that the order initiating the proceeding

for criminal contempt deserves to be set aside.

Ms. Anitha Shenoy appears on behalf of the State of

Karnataka and submits that the act of filing the

representation by the appellant and the

recommendation made by the Under Secretary in no

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way interferes with the due course of judicial

process and in such a state of affairs she is not

in a position to defend the order of the

High Court. At the same breath she reminds us that

contempt is a matter between the court and the

contemnor and this Court may take the view which it

considers just and proper.

5. We have given our most anxious consideration to

the submissions advanced and at the outset we may

observe that this Court seldom interferes with an

order initiating a contempt proceeding and

ordinarily relegates the person charged with

contempt to file a show cause before the court

which had initiated the proceeding. But this is

not an absolute rule and in the facts of a given

case when this Court comes to the conclusion that

the allegation made, even when not denied do not

constitute contempt, interferes with the order

initiating contempt proceeding so as to avoid

unnecessary harassment to the person served with

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contempt notice. We proceed to consider the

present appeal bearing in mind the aforesaid

principle.

6. It is relevant here to state that the

proceeding has been initiated against the appellant

for criminal contempt on the ground that the act

done by the appellant amounts to interference with

the due course of judicial process. The expression

"criminal contempt" has been defined under Section

2 (c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 and in

the present case we are concerned with Section 2

(c) (ii), the same reads as follows:

"2. Definitions. - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -

xxx xxx xxx

(c) "criminal contempt" means the

publication (whether by words, spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or otherwise) of any matter or the doing of any other act whatsoever which -

xxx xxx xxx

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(ii) prejudices, or interferes or tends to interfere with, the due course of any judicial proceeding; or

xxx xxx xxx."

From a plain reading of the aforesaid provision

it is evident that an act which prejudices or

interferes or tends to interfere with the due

course of judicial proceeding comes within the

mischief of criminal contempt. The power to punish

for contempt is inherent in Courts of record and

described as a necessary incident to every court of

justice. The power is inalienable attribute of

court and inheres in every Court of record. This

power though inherent to the High Court is given a

constitutional status by Article 215 of the

Constitution. It is to secure public respect and

confidence in the judicial process. Rule of law is

the basic rule of governance of any civilized

democratic polity. It is only through the courts

that rule of law unfolds its contours and

establishes its concept. For the judiciary to

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carry out its obligations effectively and true to

the spirit with which it is sacredly entrusted the

task, constitutional courts have been given the

power to punish for contempt, but greater the

power; higher the responsibility.

7. In the present case, even before filing of the

appeal the appellant has brought to the notice of

the State Government the order passed by the

learned Single Judge and sought its implementation.

In the representation he had not voiced and could

not have voiced any opinion on the appeal as the

same was not filed till then. The Under Secretary

while making recommendation also did not voice any

opinion on the pending appeal. It has to be borne

in mind that any attempt to influence the outcome

of the matter pending before the court to prejudice

the parties therein may prejudice or interfere with

the due course of any judicial proceeding but in

our opinion, mere filing of the representation and

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making recommendation thereon in no way prejudices

or interferes or tends to interfere with the due

course of any judicial proceeding. In our opinion,

it is criminal contempt to voice opinion on a case

pending in court as that would seem to influence

the outcome of the matter and to prejudice the

parties therein. However, we hasten to add that

fair reporting of court proceedings and fair

comments on the legal issues do not amount to

contempt. The order of the learned Single Judge

was not stayed. Further, mere filing of the appeal

would not operate as a stay of order appealed from.

8. When tested on the aforesaid anvil we are of

the opinion that the act alleged in no way

prejudices or interferes or tends to interfere with

the due course of any judicial proceeding. From

the conspectus of the discussion aforesaid we have

no doubt in our mind that the proceeding initiated

against the appellant as also the Under Secretary

to the Government of Karnataka, Commerce and

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Industries Department is not just and appropriate

and an abuse of the process of the court. This

being so, we are duty bound to interfere at this

stage itself.

9. True it is that Under Secretary to the

Government of Karnataka, Commerce and Industries

Department against whom the contempt proceeding has

been initiated by the impugned order, not chosen to

file any petition before this Court but in view of

what has been observed above we are of the opinion

that it shall be too technical to deny him the

relief by this Court, which has jurisdiction for

doing complete justice in any cause or matter

pending before it. Therefore, he shall also be

entitled to the same relief as that of the

appellant.

10. Accordingly, these appeals are allowed, the

impugned judgment and order is set aside.

13 ..........................................................J. (H.L. DATTU)

...... ................................................J. (CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD)

NEW DELHI, NOVEMBER 11, 2011.

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