Gudivada Seshagiri Rao vs Gudiavada Ashalatha
- Neutral2025 INSC 195
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Article 142 of the Constitution of India may be invoked by a court to grant divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage to one spouse notwithstanding the opposition of the other spouse, provided the court is satisfied that the marriage is completely unworkable, emotionally dead, and beyond salvation, and that complete justice to both parties is ensured through adequate financial provision for the dependent spouse. The legislative intent behind Section 13-B(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, requiring a second motion before divorce on mutual consent, may be waived under Article 142 in cases of exceptional hardship where parties have undergone prolonged acrimonious litigation and the continuation of the marital relationship has become impossible due to irreconcilable differences, where both parties jointly seek dissolution of the marriage.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2025 INSC 195 Non-reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. OF 2025 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NOS. 6954-6955 of 2023)
Gudivada Seshagiri Rao …Appellant -Versus- Gudivada Ashalatha & Anr. …Respondents WITH
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 1555 of 2024)
JUDGMENT
K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.
Leave granted.
2. The appellant is the husband and the respondent
is the wife, who have spent a fair share of their life fighting in courts.
Allegations and counter-allegations galore, are raised despite the fact
that they have had a matrimonial life for just about four months. One of Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NITIN TALREJA Date: 2025.02.12
the appeals is filed against the common order in the two Criminal 09:53:14 IST Reason:
Revision Petitions filed before the High Court against the order 1 granting maintenance of Rs. 10,000/- to the wife. The husband
challenged the grant while the wife sought enhancement, to double the
amount in the revisions filed. After enhancement in the revision filed
by the wife, the maintenance awarded stood at Rs. 15,000/- per month.
The other appeal is against the order of remand made by the High
Court, from an order rejecting the prayer of the husband for a divorce
on the ground of desertion and cruelty.
3. The High Court in the appeal from the order
rejecting divorce, framed two issues for consideration. First, whether
the trial court was in error in treating the divorce petition as one filed
on the ground only of desertion and not on the ground of cruelty and
then, whether the trial court erred in finding the marriage between the
appellant and the respondent as one performed under Christian
customs and rites; thus, making inapplicable the provisions of the
Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, under which the Divorce Petition was filed.
The High Court found that the trial court seriously erred in considering
only the case of desertion put forth by the husband and rejecting the
claim for divorce; while glossing over the ground of cruelty. It was held
that mere failure to prove desertion cannot be taken as a failure to
prove the ground of cruelty. On the question of the marriage having
been performed as per Christian rites, it was found that the trial court
2 egregiously misdirected itself in having considered an averment in the
bail application; that the husband wanted to be released on bail prior
to Christmas, while ignoring the oral evidence proffered by the
husband and the caste certificate produced, as also the document
indicating the auspicious time for the marriage as prepared by a
Purohit, which documents clearly proved the fact that the husband was
a Hindu. That the wife is a Hindu is not disputed at all. The High Court
hence ordered a remand setting aside the Judgment and Decree
rejecting the HMOP providing a further opportunity to the parties to
adduce evidence on the two points on which the trial court order was
set aside.
4. On facts, suffice it to notice that the marriage
between the parties happened, on 27.05.1999 and soon thereafter the
couple travelled to the husband’s place of work at Assam. As we notice
from the allegations and counter allegations made; regarding what
transpired prior to the marriage and after a brief tumultuous period of
four months, the couple separated. On their separation, they had
different versions; with the husband claiming that the wife left him
abruptly on 01.11.1999 and the wife asserting that the husband
unceremoniously evicted her from the matrimonial home on
31.10.1999. The fact remains that they have been separated from then,
3 after which commenced the series of litigation. As of now, both have
passed their prime and we were of the opinion that there should be a
quietus in the matter which would also release both the parties from the
trauma of an agonizing marriage; which was a non-starter.
5. We were of the opinion that a quietus would be
possible only by severing the marriage ties but at the same time
ensuring that the wife, who was in an employment before marriage and
presumably left it to move out with her husband to his work place, is
not left in the lurch. We are fortified in this view by Shilpa Sailesh Vs.
Varun Sreenivasan1 which expounded on the ambit and scope of
Article 142 of the Constitution of India, which enables ‘complete
justice’ in a ‘cause or matter’, in relation to matrimonial matters;
specifically, the provision to sever marital ties on mutual consent under
the Hindu Marriage Act. The legislative intent behind incorporating
sub-section (2) to Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 was
found, to enable time to the parties to introspect and consider their
decision to separate, before a second motion is moved; when a decree
of divorce is sought on a joint petition filed by the parties. The
Constitutional Bench noticed cases of exceptional hardship where after
some years of acrimonious litigations and prolonged suffering, parties
1 [2023] 5 S.C.R. 165
4 jointly pray for dissolution of marriage and seek a waiver of the need
to make a second motion; where it could be allowed when the divorce
is inevitable on account of irreconcilable differences evident from the
allegations and aspersions made against each other and in certain
cases by reason of the multiple litigations making the continuation of
the marital relationship an impossibility. The said finding was on the
powers of the Court in a joint application for divorce on mutual consent.
6. The Bench also dwelt upon the question whether
Article 142 of the Constitution of India could be invoked, even upon the
prayer of one of the spouses, when the Court is satisfied that there is
complete and irretrievable breakdown of marriage notwithstanding
the opposition to a divorce by the other spouse. It was held that though
grant of divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage
is not a matter of right, but a discretionary remedy which has to be
exercised with great care and caution, keeping in mind several factors
ensuring that ‘complete justice’ is done to both parties. Though the
Bench refused to codify the various factors, which could curtail the
exercise of jurisdiction, sufficient guidelines have been laid down to
invoke the powers under Article 142 to do ‘complete justice’ to both the
parties when the Court is fully convinced and satisfied that the
5 marriage is totally ‘unworkable, emotionally dead and beyond salvation’
[sic].
7. We have considered the matter in the light of the
observations made by the Constitution Bench. In the present case the
marriage was held way back in the year 1999 and the couple remained
together for only about four months. Long separation has not resulted
in an attitude of ‘forget and forgive’; but on the contrary has fueled into
further acrimony. Though living apart, the bitterness has continued
and escalated to spread over in the form of litigations. There are no
children involved, fortunately, and both the parties are educated. The
husband is working in a public sector undertaking and the wife though
unemployed is a post graduate. We cannot but notice that despite her
educational qualification, it is too late in life to establish herself in a
profession and employment to ensure a decent livelihood. We are of
the opinion, looking at the facts of the case and on a bare reading of the
allegations and counter allegations that come forth in the pleadings,
that there is no salvation possible and the relationship is practically
dead and emotionally irretrievable. We are only concerned with
providing adequate alimony for the wife to ensure that the wife is not
left to fend for herself and both parties are not saddled again with the
existing or further litigations. We, hence, on the totality of the
6 circumstances direct that the parties be granted divorce on grounds of
irretrievable breakdown of marriage; but subject to the condition that
the appellant husband pays an amount of Rs.25,00,000 (Rupees Twenty
Five lacs only) within a period of six months from today. The amount of
Rs.2,00,000/- (Rupees Two lacs only) deposited before this Court as
per order issued on 23.01.2024 in Civil Appeal No._________ of
2025@Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.1555/2024 shall be over and
above Rs.25,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Five lacs only) awarded to the
respondent-wife and she shall be entitled to withdraw the same with
interest accrued, immediately. On the further payment of Rs.25,00,000
(Rupees Twenty Five lacs only), there shall be effective a divorce
between the parties, on the grounds stated hereinabove and either of
the spouses would be entitled to produce the aforesaid judgment with
proof of payment of the directed amounts before any court before
which either criminal or civil proceedings are pending, in relation to
the marriage, so as to bring a quietus to the same; which the concerned
court shall direct to be closed on the settlement directed by this Court.
8. We dispose of the appeals with the above
directions setting aside both the impugned orders. Though the matters
are disposed of, the matters shall be placed before the Court after six
months to ensure compliance of the orders passed by us.
7
9. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand
disposed of.
…..…………..……..………..,J.
[B.R. GAVAI]
…..…………..……..………..,J.
[K. VINOD CHANDRAN]
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 07, 2025.
8 9
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