Gridco Limited & Anr vs Sadananda Doloi & Ors

GRIDCO Limited & Anr. ...Appellants

Versus

Sri Sadananda Doloi & Ors. ...Respondents

J U D G M E N T

T.S. THAKUR, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Two questions fall for our determination in this appeal

by special leave, which arises out of a judgment and order

dated 2nd April, 2008, passed by a Division Bench of the

High Court of Orissa whereby Writ Appeal No.11 of 2003

filed by respondent No.1 has been allowed, order dated 26th

September, 2003, passed by a Single Judge of the High

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Court in O.J.C. No.2225 of 2001 set aside and order of

termination of the services of respondent No.1. quashed.

3. The questions are:

1. What was the true nature of the appointment of the

respondent? In particular, was the appointment

regular or simply contractual in nature? and

2. If the appointment was contractual, was the

termination thereof vitiated by any legal infirmity to

call for interference under Article 226 of the

Constitution?

4. Before we advert to the questions and possible

answers to the same, we may briefly set out the facts in

the backdrop:

5. The appellant-Grid Corporation of Orissa Ltd.

(`GRIDCO' for short) is a company wholly owned by the

Government of Orissa. By an advertisement notice dated

28th May, 1996, issued by the appellant, applications were

invited from eligible candidates for appointment against the

post of Senior General Manager: HR Policy, Job Evaluation,

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Appraisal, Remuneration. Respondent No.1 was one among

several others who applied for selection and appointment

against the said post. A Selection Committee constituted

by the appellant short-listed three candidates including

respondent No.1-Shri Sadananda Doloi for an appointment.

The Corporation eventually issued a letter dated 8th

January, 1997, by which it offered to the respondent,

appointment as Senior General Manager on contract basis

for a period of three years subject to renewal on the basis

of his performance. Clause (3) of the letter stipulated the

tenure of the proposed appointment as under:

"(3) Period:- The tenure of appointment as Sr. General

Manager (HRD) is for a period of three years on

contract basis subject to renewal on the basis of your

performance. This contract of employment is, however

terminable even during this three year term on three

months' notice or on payment of three months salary in

lieu thereof by either side."

6. A formal order of appointment dated 6th February,

1997, was, in due course, issued in favour of respondent

No.1 by the appellant-Corporation, which embodied the

condition regarding the tenure of his appointment as

contained in the initial offer. Clause (12) of the

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appointment letter further stipulated that the respondent

shall be governed by the Grid Corporation Officers Service

Regulations, 1996.

7. The respondent joined the appellant-Corporation as

Senior General Manager (HRD) on 30th April, 1997. With

the coming into force of the Grid Corporation Officers

Service Regulations, 1996, the Officers working in the

Corporate Office of GRIDCO were re-designated including

respondent No.1, whom the Corporation re-designated as

Chief General Manager (HR). Respondent No.1 soon after

re-designation wrote a letter dated 29th October, 1997,

requesting for an amendment of Clause (2) of the

appointment letter to bring the same in conformity with the

Para 13(3) of the GRIDCO Officers Regulations. That

request of the respondent was accepted and Clause (2) of

the Appointment Order dated 6th February, 1997, amended

to read as under:

"(2) Period:- Your tenure of appointment shall be on a

contract basis initially for a period of three years &

renewable thereafter for such period(s) as the Board or

the Committee of the Board may prescribe until you

attain the age of superannuation as provided in

GRIDCO Officers Service Regulations. This contract of

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employment is, however, terminable even during this

three year term on three months' notice or on payment

of three months' salary in lieu thereof by either side."

8. On the expiry of the contractual period of three years

stipulated in the appointment letter the appellant-

Corporation extended the employment of the respondent

upto 3rd November, 2000, by a letter dated 29th March,

2000, on the same terms and conditions as were stipulated

in the appointment letter. Respondent No.1, however,

made a representation to the Chairman-cum-Managing

Director of the appellant on 3rd June, 2000, seeking

extension of his tenure till superannuation. In the

meantime, the extended period of his employment also

expired whereupon the Corporation granted to the

respondent a further extension of one year upto 3rd

November, 2001, on the same terms and conditions as

stipulated in the letters dated 6th February, 1997, and 29th

October, 1997. Two further representations dated 22nd

November, 2000, and 13th February, 2001, to the

appellant-Corporation for extension of the tenure of

appointment till superannuation did not find favour with the

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appellant. Instead the appointment of the respondent was

terminated in terms of an order dated 19th February, 2001

with three months' salary in lieu of notice paid to him.

9. Aggrieved by the termination of his services,

respondent no.1 filed a writ petition in the High Court of

Orissa for issue of a Writ of Certiorari quashing the same on

several grounds. A learned Single Bench of the High Court,

however, dismissed the said petition holding that the

appointment of the writ petitioner, respondent herein,

being purely temporary and contractual in nature and the

termination being in no way stigmatic, the respondent had

no legal right to claim continuance in service. The writ

petition was, on that basis, dismissed.

10. Respondent No.1 then filed Writ Appeal No.11 of 2003

which was heard and allowed by a Division Bench of the

High Court of Orissa in terms of the impugned judgment

and order. The Division Bench held that `introduction of a

contractual condition' in a regular appointment under the

State was opposed to the principles of Articles 14 and 16 of

the Constitution, and that the freedom of contract was

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rendered illusory by an unequal bargaining power between

a citizen seeking appointment to public service on the one

hand and a giant employer like a State Corporation on the

other. The order passed by the learned Single Judge was on

that reasoning set aside by the High Court and the order

terminating the services of respondent No.1 quashed.

11. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at

considerable length and propose to take up the two

questions that we have formulated for determination ad-

seriatim.

Re: Question No.1

12. As noticed earlier, while the learned Single Judge has

held the appointment of the respondent to be contractual in

nature and termination thereof to be valid and permissible

in terms of the contract, the Division Bench has in appeal

taken the view that the appointment was a regular

appointment that could not be terminated summarily by

issuing a notice or paying three months' salary in lieu

thereof. It is trite that the power to make a contractual

employment is implicit in the power to make a regular

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permanent appointment unless the statute under which the

authority exercises its powers and discharges its functions

or the Rules & Regulations governing recruitment under the

authority specifically forbid the making of such an

appointment. No such prohibition has been pointed out to

us in the present case. All that was argued was that the

Rules did not at the relevant time specifically provide for

making a contractual employment. That is, in our opinion,

no reason to hold that an appointment made on contractual

basis would constitute a breach of the Rules or that such an

appointment had to be necessarily treated as a regular

appointment. Having said that, let us now see the

background in which the appointment was made in the

present case. As seen above, the selection process

culminating in the appointment of the respondent started

with the publication of an advertisement to fill up two

vacancies of human resource professionals at senior

management level. The advertisement, it is common

ground, did not indicate the nature of appointment

(whether regular or contractual) that may be offered to the

selected candidates. The absence of any such indication in

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the advertisement notice did not, in our opinion, make any

material difference having regard to the fact that the offer

of appointment made to respondent No.1 in terms of

appellant-Corporation's letter dated 8th January, 1997,

specifically described the appointment to be a tenure

appointment. A careful reading of paragraph 3 of the offer

letter leaves no manner of doubt that the tenure of

appointment offered to the respondent No.1 as Senior

General Manager, HRD was limited to a period of three

years subject to renewal on the basis of his performance. It

also made it abundantly clear that the contract of

employment was terminable even during the currency of

the three years term on three months' notice or on

payment of three months' salary in lieu thereof by either

side. We find it difficult to read any element of regular

appointment in the offer made to the respondent or any

assurance that the appointment is in the nature of a regular

appointment or that the respondent was on probation to be

regularised on satisfactory completion of his probation

period. That apart, appointment order issued on 6th

February, 1997, also specifically embodied the stipulation

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regarding the tenure as it was in clause (3) of the offer

letter.

13. It is not the case of the respondent that there was any

uncertainty or ambiguity in the appointment made by the

respondent in so far as the tenure on the post to which he

was appointed, was concerned. What puts the matter

beyond any shadow of doubt is the understanding of the

respondent evident from his letter dated 29th October 1997

asking for an amendment of clause (2) of the appointment

order so as to bring the same in conformity with para 13 of

the GRIDCO Officers' Regulation. The request manifestly

demonstrated that the parties were ad idem regarding the

tenure of appointment given to the respondent and that

while the initial contract period was limited to three years

the same could be renewed by the Board or the Committee

of the Board until the respondent attained the age of

superannuation as provided in the GRIDCO Service Officers

Regulations. It is quite evident that reference to the

superannuation of the respondent in this appointment letter

was only in the nature of providing an outer limit to which

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the employment on contract could have been extended. It

did not suggest that there was any specific or implied

condition of employment that the respondent would

continue to serve till he attains the age of superannuation.

Even after the amendment of clause (2) of the appointment

letter, the condition that the contract of employment could

be terminated at any time during the period of three years

on three months' notice or payment of three months' salary

in lieu thereof by either side continued to be operative

between the parties. The fact that the appellant-

Corporation extended the tenure upto 3rd November, 2000,

in the first place and upto 3rd November, 2001 later, is also

suggestive of the parties having clearly understood that the

appointment was a tenure appointment, extendable at the

discretion of the Board of Directors/Corporation. These

extensions, it is noteworthy, were themselves subject to

the terms and conditions stipulated in the appointment

letter which, inter-alia, provided that the arrangement

could be terminated by either party on three months' notice

or on payment of three months' salary in lieu thereof. In

the totality of the above circumstances, we are of the

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opinion that the nature of appointment made by the

appellant-Corporation was contractual and not regular as

held by the Division Bench of the High Court.

14. There is one other aspect to which we must advert

before we part with the question of nature of appointment

offered to the respondent. The appointment order issued in

favour of the respondent specifically stated that the

respondent will be governed by the GRIDCO Officers

Service Regulations, 1996. With the coming into force of

the said Regulations, the respondent was re-designated as

Chief General Manager, HR which was in terms of the

Regulations, a post in the Executive Grade of E-10. This re-

designation was not at any stage questioned by the

respondent. On the contrary it was he who had prayed for

amendment of clause (2) of the appointment letter to bring

the same in tune with para 13(3) of the GRIDCO Officers

Service Regulation. Para 13(3) of the Regulations reads as:

"13(3): The appointment to grades above E-9 shall be

on a contract basis initially for a period of 3 years and

renewable thereafter for such period(s) as the Board or

the Committee of the Board may prescribe until the

Officer attains the age of superannuation as provided in

these Regulations."

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15. The above makes it manifest that an appointment to

the post in category E-10 could be made only on a

contractual basis. The Regulations do not envisage a

regular appointment at E-10 level to which the respondent

stands appointed on the terms of the contract of

employment. That being the case it is difficult to see how

the said appointment could be treated to be a regular

appointment when the Rules did not permit any such

appointment. We may mention to the credit of learned

senior counsel who appeared for the respondent that

although at one stage an attempt was made to argue that

the appointment of the respondent was regular in nature,

that line of argument was not pursued further and in our

opinion, rightly so having regard to what we have said

above. Such being the case the question of the so called

unequal bargaining power of the parties did not have any

relevance or role to play in the facts and circumstances of

the case. Question No.1 is answered accordingly.

Re: Question No.2

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16. This question has to be answered in two distinct parts.

The first part relates to the aspect whether the order

passed by the appellant-Corporation is amenable to judicial

review and if so what is the scope of such review. The

second part of the question is whether on the standards of

judicial review applicable to it, the order of termination is

seen to be suffering from any legal infirmity. Before we

refer to certain decisions of this Court that have dealt with

similar issues in the past we may at the outset say that

there was no challenge either before the High Court or

before us as to the competence of the authority that passed

the termination order. There was indeed a feeble argument

that the order was mala fide in character but having regard

to the settled legal position regarding the proof of mala

fides and the need for providing particulars to substantiate

any such plea, we are of the view that the charge of mala

fide does not stand scrutiny. Neither before the learned

Single Judge nor before the Division Bench was the ground

based on mala fides seriously argued by the respondent.

What was contended on behalf of the respondent was that

the appellant-Corporation did not act fairly and objectively

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in taking the decision to terminate the arrangement. It was

contended that the decision to terminate the contractual

employment was not a fair and reasonable decision having

regard to the fact that the respondent had performed well

during his tenure and the requirement of the Corporation to

have a Chief General Manager (HR) continued to subsist. In

substance, the contention urged on behalf of the

respondent was that this Court should reappraise and

review the material touching the question of performance

of the respondent as Chief General Manager (HR) as also

the question whether the Corporation's need for a General

Manager (HR) had continued to subsist. We regret our

inability to do so. It is true that judicial review of matters

that fall in the realm of contracts is also available before

the superior courts, but the scope of any such review is not

all pervasive. It does not extend to the Court substituting

its own view for that taken by the decision-making

authority. Judicial review and resultant interference is

permissible where the action of the authority is mala fide,

arbitrary, irrational, disproportionate or unreasonable but

impermissible if the petitioner's challenge is based only on

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the ground that the view taken by the authority may be

less reasonable than what is a possible alternative. The

legal position is settled that judicial review is not so much

concerned with the correctness of the ultimate decision as

it is with the decision-making process unless of course the

decision itself is so perverse or irrational or in such

outrageous defiance of logic that the person taking the

decision can be said to have taken leave of his senses.

17. In Shrilekha Vidyarthi & Ors. v. State of U.P. &

Ors. (1991) 1 SCC 212, the State Government had by a

circular terminated the engagement of all the government

counsels engaged throughout the State and sought to

defend the same on the ground that such appointments

being contractual in nature were terminable at the will of

the government. The question of reviewability of

administrative action in the realm of contract was in that

backdrop examined by this Court. The Court also examined

whether the personality of the State Government

undergoes a change after the initial appointment of

government counsels so as to render its action immune

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from judicial scrutiny. The answer was in the negative. The

Court held that even after the initial appointment had been

made and even when the matter is in the realm of contract,

the State could not cast off its personality and exercise a

power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 or claim

to be governed only by private law principles applicable to

private individuals. The Court observed:

"... we are also clearly of the view that this power is

available even without that element on the premise

that after the initial appointment, the matter is purely

contractual. Applicability of Article 14 to all executive

actions of the State being settled and for the same

reason its applicability at the threshold to the making

of a contract in exercise of the executive power being

beyond dispute, can it be said that the State can

thereafter cast off its personality and exercise unbridled

power unfettered by the requirements of Article 14 in

the sphere of contractual matters and claim to be

governed therein only by private law principles

applicable to private individuals whose rights flow only

from the terms of the contract without anything more?

We have no hesitation in saying that the personality of

the State, requiring regulation of its conduct in all

spheres by requirements of Article 14, does not

undergo such a radical change after the making of a

contract merely because some contractual rights accrue

to the other party in addition. It is not as if the

requirements of Article 14 and contractual obligations

are alien concepts, which cannot co-exist."

18. Recognizing the difference between public and private

law activities of the State, this Court reasoned that unlike

17

private individuals, the State while exercising its powers

and discharging its functions, acts for public good and in

public interest. Consequently every State action has an

impact on the public interest which would in turn bring in

the minimal requirements of public law obligations in the

discharge of such functions. The Court declared that to the

extent, the challenge to State action is made on the ground

of being arbitrary, unfair and unreasonable hence offensive

to Article 14 of the Constitution, judicial review is

permissible. The fact that the dispute fell within the domain

of contractual obligations did not, declared this Court,

relieve the State of its obligation to comply with the basic

requirements of Article 14. The court said :

"This factor alone is sufficient to import at least the

minimal requirements of public law obligations and

impress with this character the contracts made by the

State or its instrumentality. It is a different matter that

the scope of judicial review in respect of disputes

falling within the domain of contractual obligations may

be more limited and in doubtful cases the parties may

be relegated to adjudication of their rights by resort to

remedies provided for adjudication of purely

contractual disputes. However, to the extent,

challenge is made on the ground of violation of

Article 14 by alleging that the impugned act is

arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable, the fact that

the dispute also falls within the domain of

contractual obligations would not relieve the

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State of its obligation to comply with the basic

requirements of Article 14. To this extent, the

obligation is of a public character invariably in every

case irrespective of there being any other right or

obligation in addition thereto. An additional contractual

obligation cannot divest the claimant of the guarantee

under Article 14 of non-arbitrariness at the hands of

the State in any of its actions."

(emphasis

supplied)

19. In Assistant Excise Commissioner & Ors. v. Issac

Peter & Ors. (1994) 4 SCC 104, the dispute related to

supply of additional quantities of arrack demanded by the

license-holder. Supply of arrack was, however, controlled

by the Government and the entire transaction relating to

the supply and sale of arrack was based on licenses

granted under the relevant rules to persons who emerged

successful in a public auction. The Government claimed

that the only obligation cast upon it under the Rules was to

provide the monthly quota of arrack to each license-holder,

supply of additional quantity being discretionary with the

authorities. The license-holders, on the other hand, argued

that supply of additional quantity was implicit in the

conditions of the license. In support they relied upon the

19

past practice and argued that if the supply is limited to the

monthly quota only it would not be possible for the license

holder to pay even the license fee. The license-holders

questioned the refusal of the State Government to issue

additional quantities of arrack as unfair and unreasonable.

This court, however, rejected that contention and held :

"Doctrine of fairness or the duty to act fairly and

reasonably is a doctrine developed in the administrative

law field to ensure the Rule of Law and to prevent

failure of justice where the action is administrative in

nature. Just as principles of natural justice ensure fair

decision where the function is quasi-judicial, the

doctrine of fairness is evolved to ensure fair action

where the function is administrative. But it can

certainly not be invoked to amend, alter or vary

the express terms of the contract between the

parties. This is so, even if the contract is governed by

statutory provisions, i.e., where it is a statutory

contract - or rather more so."

(emphasis supplied)

20. Taking note of the decision of this Court in Shrilekha

Vidyarthi's case (supra), this court held that there was no

room for invoking the doctrine of fairness and

reasonableness against one party to the contract, for the

purpose of altering or adding to the terms and conditions of

20

the contract merely because it happens to be the State.

The Court said :

"It was a case of termination from a post involving

public element. It was a case of non-government

servant holding a public office, on account of which it

was held to be a matter within the public law field. This

decision too does not affirm the principle now

canvassed by the learned Counsel (that being of

incorporating the doctrine of fairness in contracts where

State is a party). We are, therefore, of the opinion

that in case of contracts freely entered into with

the State, like the present ones, there is no room

for invoking the doctrine of fairness and

reasonableness against one party to the contract

(State), for the purpose of altering or adding to

the terms and conditions of the contract, merely

because it happens to be the State. In such cases,

the mutual rights and liabilities of the parties are

governed by the terms of the contracts (which may be

statutory in some cases) and the laws relating to

contracts. It must be remembered that these contracts

are entered into pursuant to public auction, floating of

tenders or by negotiation. There is no compulsion on

anyone to enter into these contracts. It is voluntary on

both sides."

(emphasis supplied)

21. In conclusion, the Court made it clear that the opinion

expressed by it was only in the context of contracts entered

into between the State and its citizens pursuant to public

auction, floating of tenders or by negotiation. The court

considered it unnecessary to express any opinion about the

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legal position applicable to contracts entered into otherwise

than by public auction, floating of tenders or negotiation.

22. In State of Orissa v. Chandra Sekhar Mishra

(2002) 10 SCC 583, the respondent had been appointed

as a Homeopathic Medical Officer whose services were

subsequently terminated by issue of a notice. While

rejecting the challenge to the termination order, the Court

observed "when the respondent was only a contractual

employee, there could be no question of his being granted

the relief of being directed to be appointed as a regular

employee."

23. We may also refer to the decision of this court in

Satish Chandra Anand v. Union of India (AIR 1953

SC 250), where the petitioner, an employee of the

Directorate General of Resettlement and Employment, was

removed from contractual employment after being served a

notice of termination. The contract of service in that case

was initially for a period of five years which was later

extended. A five-Judge Bench hearing the matter,

dismissed the petition, challenging the termination

22

primarily on the ground that the petitioner could not prove

a breach of a fundamental right since no right accrued to

him as the whole matter rested in contract and termination

of the contract did not amount to dismissal, or removal

from service nor was it a reduction in rank. The Court

found it to be an ordinary case of a contract being

terminated by notice under one of its clauses. The Court

observed :

"10. There was no compulsion on the Petitioner to

enter into the contract he did. He was as free under the

law as any other person to accept or reject the offer

which was made to him. Having accepted, he still had

open to him all the rights and remedies available to

other persons similarly situated to enforce any rights

under his contract, which has been denied to him,

assuming there are any, and to pursue in the ordinary

Courts of the land, such remedies for a breach as are

open to him to exactly the same extent as other

persons similarly situated. He has not been

discriminated against and he has not been denied the

protection of any laws which others similarly situated

could claim...

11. ...

.........

The Petitioner has not been denied any opportunity of

employment or of appointment. He has been treated

just like any other person to whom an offer of

temporary employment under these conditions was

made. His grievance when analysed, not one of

personal differentiation but is against an offer of

temporary employment on special terms as opposed to

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permanent employment. But of course the State can

enter into contracts of temporary employment

and impose special terms in each case, provided

they are not inconsistent with the Constitution,

and those who chose to accept those terms and

enter into the contract are bound by them, even as

the State is bound."

(emphasis supplied)

24. In Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of India (AIR

1958 SC 36), this court followed the view taken in Satish

Chandra's case (supra). Any reference to the case law on

the subject would remain incomplete unless we also refer to

the decision of the Constitution Bench of this court in Delhi

Transport Corporation v. D.T.C. Mazdoor Congress &

Ors. (1991) supp (1) SCC 600, where this Court was

dealing with the constitutional validity of Regulation 9 (b)

that authorized termination on account of reduction in the

establishment or in circumstances other than those

mentioned in clause (a) to Regulation 9 (b) by service of

one month's notice or pay in lieu thereof. Sawant, J. in his

concurring opinion held that the provision contained the

much hated rules of hire and fire reminiscent of the days of

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laissez faire and unrestrained freedom of contract and that

any such rule would have no place in service conditions.

25. To the same effect was an earlier decision of this

Court in Central Inland Water Transport Corporation

Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. (1986) 3

SCC 156, where the Court had refused to enforce an unfair

and unreasonable contract or an unfair and unreasonable

clause in a contract entered into between parties who did

not have equal bargaining power.

26. A conspectus of the pronouncements of this court and

the development of law over the past few decades thus

show that there has been a notable shift from the stated

legal position settled in earlier decisions, that termination

of a contractual employment in accordance with the terms

of the contract was permissible and the employee could

claim no protection against such termination even when

one of the contracting parties happened to be the State.

Remedy for a breach of a contractual condition was also by

way of civil action for damages/compensation. With the

25

development of law relating to judicial review of

administrative actions, a writ Court can now examine the

validity of a termination order passed by public authority.

It is no longer open to the authority passing the order to

argue that its action being in the realm of contract is not

open to judicial review. A writ Court is entitled to judicially

review the action and determine whether there was any

illegality, perversity, unreasonableness, unfairness or

irrationality that would vitiate the action, no matter the

action is in the realm of contract. Having said that we

must add that judicial review cannot extend to the Court

acting as an appellate authority sitting in judgment over

the decision. The Court cannot sit in the arm chair of the

Administrator to decide whether a more reasonable

decision or course of action could have been taken in the

circumstances. So long as the action taken by the authority

is not shown to be vitiated by the infirmities referred to

above and so long as the action is not demonstrably in

outrageous defiance of logic, the writ Court would do well

to respect the decision under challenge.

26

27. Applying the above principles to the case at hand, we

have no hesitation in saying that there is no material to

show that there is any unreasonableness, unfairness,

perversity or irrationality in the action taken by the

Corporation. The Regulations governing the service

conditions of the employees of the Corporation, make it

clear that officers in the category above E-9 had to be

appointed only on contractual basis.

28. It is also evident that the renewal of the contract of

employment depended upon the perception of the

management as to the usefulness of the respondent and

the need for an incumbent in the position held by him.

Both these aspects rested entirely in the discretion of the

Corporation. The respondent was in the service of another

employer before he chose to accept a contractual

employment offered to him by the Corporation which was

limited in tenure and terminable by three months' notice on

either side. In that view, therefore, there was no element

of any unfair treatment or unequal bargaining power

27

between the appellant and the respondent to call for an

over-sympathetic or protective approach towards the

latter. We need to remind ourselves that in the modern

commercial world, executives are engaged on account of

their expertise in a particular field and those who are so

employed are free to leave or be asked to leave by the

employer. Contractual appointments work only if the same

are mutually beneficial to both the contracting parties and

not otherwise.

29. In the result, we allow this appeal, set aside the

impugned judgment and order passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Orissa dismissing the Writ

Appeal No.11 of 2003. We, however, direct that the salary

and allowances if any paid to respondent No.1 pursuant to

the impugned judgment shall not be recovered from him.

Parties shall bear their own costs in this Court as also in

the courts below.

...........................................J.

(CYRIAC JOSEPH)

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...........................................J.

(T.S. THAKUR)

New Delhi

December 16, 2011

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