Govt. Of Nct Of Delhi Thr Secretary, Land And Building Department & Anr. vs M/S. K.L. Rathi Steels Ltd. & Ors.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 32257/2021) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857 OF 2016

Govt. of NCT of Delhi Through the Secretary, Land and Building Department & Another …Applicants

Versus

M/s. K.L. Rathi Steels Limited and others …Respondents

WITH

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 29713/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 23353/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8909 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 14614/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8529 OF 2016

Signature Not Verified MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 Digitally signed by (Diary No. 36340/2018) IN Neetu Sachdeva Date: 2023.03.17 16:33:54 IST Reason:

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857 OF 2016

1 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 41755/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8899 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 42234/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8527 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 44917/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8547 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 46131/2018) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8952 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 2230/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12111 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 6119/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8935 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 6120/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8954 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 6131/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9049 OF 2016 2 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 7653/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8559 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 7922/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8511 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 8510/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8925 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 8554/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9214 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 9317/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12114 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 20589/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9595 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 21094/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8898 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 21378/2019) IN

3 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11853 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 22637/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4599 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 23912/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8921 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 24543/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8505 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 24209/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10206 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 24544/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8904 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 25574/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9719 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 26034/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 12046 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 26476/2019) IN 4 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8957 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 27950/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8922 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 28432/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8929 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 29785/2019) IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION(CIVIL) NO. 17316 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 31560/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8545 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 31822/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9598 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 37443/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11256 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 37444/2019) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11854 OF 2016 MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 44515/2019) IN 5 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9597 OF 2016

CONTEMPT PETITION(CIVIL) NO.735/2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857/2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. 159/2018 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857 OF 2016

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO. OF 2022 (Diary No. 5715/2022) IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11841 OF 2016 REVIEW PETITION(CIVIL) NO. 882/2017 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11846 OF 2016

ORDER

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. As common question of law and facts arise in this group of

applications/petitions, all these applications/petitions are decided and

disposed of together by this common order.

2. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties and in the

facts and circumstances of the case, the delay caused in filing the

6 respective review/recall applications is hereby condoned.

3. All these applications under Article 137 of the Constitution of India

r/w Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code (CPC) have been preferred

by the Government of NCT of Delhi and Delhi Development Authority to

review and recall the orders passed in the respective Civil Appeals in

dismissing/disposing off the same and to restore the same to their

original files to consider the same on merits.

4. Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf

of the Government of NCT of Delhi and other learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the Delhi Development Authority have vehemently

submitted that while dismissing/disposing off all the respective Civil

Appeals and holding and/or confirming the judgments of the respective

High Courts declaring that the acquisition of the lands in question have

lapsed in view of Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act,

2013 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘2013 Act’), reliance was placed on

the decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation v.

Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183. It is the case on

behalf of the applicants that the decision of this Court in the case of

Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), which was relied upon while 7 dismissing/disposing off all the respective appeals has been specifically

overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & others, (2020) 8 SCC 129. It is submitted on behalf of the respective applicants that by specifically

overruling the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra), the Constitution Bench of this Court has specifically observed

and held that not only the decision rendered in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) is overruled, but all other decisions in which Pune

Municipal Corporation (supra) has been followed are also overruled.

Heavy reliance is placed upon para 365 of the Constitution Bench of this

Court in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra).

4.1 It is further submitted on behalf of the applicants that this Court in

the earlier decision in the case of Indore Development Authority v.

Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. & Others, (2018) 3 SCC 412, while

holding that the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra) and other decisions following the view taken in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) are per incuriam, it was observed that the

decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra) are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis of the

8 said decision. It is submitted that pursuant to the liberty reserved in the

said decision, the present applications/petitions have been preferred.

4.2 It is further submitted that power to review flows from Article 137 of

the Constitution of India. It is contended that once the law has been laid

down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Manohar Lal & Others (supra) and

specifically overruling the decision in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) which was the basis to dispose of/dismiss the

respective appeals, the principle of res judicata shall not be applicable

on the question of law.

4.3 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective applicants

have also submitted that as such the judgment and order passed by this

Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been

subsequently recalled by a three Judge Bench of this Court vide order

dated 16.07.2020 passed in Civil Appeal No. 877/2014. It is submitted

that in that view of the matter also, the orders passed in the respective

civil appeals dismissing/disposing off the same relying upon the decision

in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) are also required to

be reviewed/recalled.

9 4.4 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respective applicants

have also relied upon some of the subsequent orders passed by this

Court recalling similar orders dismissing/disposing off the civil appeals in

which the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)

was relied upon and the respective proceedings are ordered to be

restored to their original file in which the effect of the subsequent

judgment rendered by the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore

Development Authority (supra) Pune Municipal Corporation (supra)

is under consideration. Reliance is placed on the order passed by this

Court dated 15.02.2022 in Miscellaneous Application Diary No.

21678/2020.

4.5 Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf

of the applicants has relied upon the decision of this Court in the case of

Mathura Prasad Bajoo Jaiswal & Others v. Dossibai N.B.

Jeejeebhoy, (1970) 1 SCC 613 in support of his submissions that as

held by this Court that the decision on question of law where the law is

altered since the earlier decision, the earlier decision will not operate as

res judicata.

4.6 Relying upon the decision of this Court in the case of Assistant

Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot v. Saurashtra Kutch Stock

10 Exchange Limited, (2008) 14 SCC 171, it is submitted that as observed

and held by this Court a judicial decision acts retrospectively. It is

submitted that it is further observed that if a subsequent decision alters

the earlier one, the later decision does not make new law. It only

discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied

retrospectively. It is submitted that it is further observed that to put it

differently, even where an earlier decision of the court operated for quite

some time, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective

effect clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly

understood.

4.7 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the

respective applicants that in the present case, in many cases, the

possession of the lands in question has been handed over to the

DDA/applicants which are to be used for the public purpose. It is

contended that because of the wrong interpretation of law in the case of

Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), the acquisitions have been held

to be lapsed. It is submitted that therefore in view of the subsequent

decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development

Authority (supra) clarifying the law and specifically overruling the

decision of this Court rendered in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra), there shall not be any lapse of acquisition under 11 the provisions of the 2013 Act. It is submitted that if the impugned

orders passed in the respective Civil Appeals are not reviewed/recalled,

in that case, the applicants/public authorities have to suffer and they will

have to handover the possession of the lands in question back to the

original landowners and thereby the lands in question shall not be used

for the public purpose for which they are acquired. It is contended that

as observed and held by this Court in the case of Board of Control for

Cricket in India v. Netaji Cricket Club (2005) 4 SCC 741, a mistake on

the part of the Court may also call for a review of the order. It is

submitted that in the aforesaid decision it is further observed and held by

this Court that the words “sufficient reason” in order 47 Rule 1 CPC are

wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even

an advocate. It is further observed that an application for review may be

necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem

gravabit.

4.8 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid

decisions, it is prayed to allow the present applications and review/recall

the earlier orders passed in the respective Civil Appeals

dismissing/disposing off the same, relying upon the decision in the case

of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra), which has been subsequently

overruled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore 12 Development Authority (supra) and thereafter to decide and dispose

of the same in light of the subsequent decision rendered by the

Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development Authority

(supra). It is submitted that no prejudice shall be caused to the

respective respondents if the matters are heard afresh on merits and the

respective respondents/landowners will be heard on merits on all points.

5. All these review applications are opposed by Shri Shyam Divan,

Sri V. Giri, Shri Neeraj Kumar Jain, Shri Vivek Chib, learned Senior

Advocates and other counsel appearing for the respective respondents.

5.1 It is vehemently submitted on behalf of the respective respondents

that the applicants have admittedly filed the instant review applications

seeking review of the orders passed by this Court based on a

subsequent decision. It is submitted that change in law in view of the

subsequent decision of the Court cannot be a ground for review. It is

submitted that even if the judgment of the Constitution Bench in the case

of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) has

overruled the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra), the settled position inter parties may not be affected.

5.2 It is further submitted that even otherwise the judgment in Indore

Development Authority (supra) may be construed to be prospective in

13 its operation and cannot reopen claims/cases which have already

attained finality.

5.3 It is submitted that the law operational at the time when the Delhi

High Court delivered the judgment in the present matter (Civil Appeal

No. 8529/2016) was that laid down in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra).

5.4 It is contended that even before the date on which the judgment of

the Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar

Lal (supra) was delivered, the matter had attained finality and rights of

the respective respondents over the subject lands were crystallised. 5.5 It is urged that so far as the reliance placed upon para 365 of the

decision in the case of Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal

(supra) is concerned, the Constitution Bench was only concerned with

the correctness of the law laid down in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) and Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v.

State of Tamil Nadu (2015) 3 SCC 353. That the Constitution Bench

was not considering the appeals in relation to Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) or Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra),

or for that matter a review of the decision in the aforesaid cases or any

other case for that matter. Therefore, the Constitution Bench could not

14 have and did not intend to reverse or review the judgments, as an

expression of adjudication by this Court either in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) or Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra)

or any other judgment of the competent Court that has followed the

aforesaid judgments. That the effect of overruling of the judgment could

only be to address the precedential value of the judgments so overruled

but cannot set at naught the decree that has been passed in that regard.

It is submitted that by overruling a decision, the overruled judgment will

lose its precedential value and nothing more than that. Reliance is

placed on the decision of this Court in the case of BSNL v. Union of

India (2006) 3 SCC 1. That in the said decision, it is observed that the

overruling would not affect the binding nature of a decision between the

parties to the lis.

5.5.1 Shri Divan, learned Senior Advocate has also relied upon the

recent decision of this Court in the case of Neelima Srivastava v. State

of U.P. (2021 SCC OnLine SC 610) in support of his submission that as

held by this Court that mere overruling of the principles by a subsequent

judgment will not dilute the binding effect of the decision inter-parties. It

is urged that therefore para 365 of the Constitution Bench judgment in

Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) does not aid

the review petitioners.

15 5.6 It is further submitted by the learned counsel appearing for the

respective respondents that even otherwise none of the conditions

enumerated under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC and Order 47 of the Supreme

Court Rules are satisfied. That the review petitions are filed under

Article 137 of the Constitution r/w Order 47 of the Supreme Court Rules.

That Article 137 states that “subject to the provisions of any law made by

Parliament or any rules made under Article 145”, this Court shall have

power to review its decision. It is submitted that Order 47 of the

Supreme Court Rules states that “no application for review will be

entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in

Order 47 Rule 1 CPC. That Order 47 Rule 1 CPC states that a review

petition may be preferred on the following grounds,

(a) discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the

exercise of due diligence, was not within knowledge of the petitioner

or could not be produced by him, OR

(b) order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on

the face of the record, OR

(c) for any other sufficient reason.

It is submitted that in the case of Kamlesh Verma v. Mayawati

(2013) 8 SCC 320, this Court has reiterated the law on review

16 jurisdiction and it is observed and held that unless the aforesaid grounds

are made out, the review petition shall not be maintainable.

5.7 It is further submitted that even otherwise overruling of an earlier

decision cannot be a ground for review. It is contended that the sole

ground raised in the present cases is that the decision in the case of

Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has been held to be per incuriam

in the earlier decision of Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra

(dead) through Lrs. (supra) and it is contended by the review

petitioners that as per the judgment in Indore Development Authority

v. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra), the decisions rendered on

the basis of the Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) were open to

review in appropriate cases based on the said decision. It is submitted

that the explanation to Order 47 of the Code states that the fact that the

decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is

based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a

superior court in any other case, shall not be aground for the review of

such judgment. It is submitted that a Constitution Bench of this Court in

the case of Beghar Foundation v. K.S. Puttaswamy (2021) 3 SCC 1

has observed that change in law or subsequent decision/judgment of a

coordinate or larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded as a ground for

review.

17 5.8 Learned counsel for the respective respondents have submitted

that in some of the cases, similar review petitions post Constitution

Bench decision in the case of Indore Development Authority v.

Manohar Lal (supra) have been dismissed. It is submitted that merely

because the judgment in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra) has been recalled subsequently may not be a ground to review

and/or recall the orders passed in the present cases and that too after

such a long delay. It is submitted that the order of recall does not in any

manner afford any additional impetus to the applicants to seek a review

of the judgment in the present cases.

5.9 Making the above submissions and relying upon the aforesaid

decisions, it is prayed to dismiss the review applications.

6. I have heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length.

At the outset, it is required to be noted that in all these cases, the

respective Civil Appeals have been dismissed/disposed of, confirming

the orders passed by the respective High Courts, relying upon the

decision of this Court in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation

(supra). However, it is required to be noted that in Indore

Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 1 SCC 733, correctness

of the decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) was

18 doubted. The matter was placed before the three Judge Bench. By a

majority decision, the decision in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) was held to be per incuriam. While holding so and

overruling the decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. (supra)

and other decisions following the said decision to the extent they were in

conflict with the three Judge Bench decision, this Court also observed

that the decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on

the basis of the said decision. That is how, the applicants have preferred

the present review applications in view of the observations and liberty

reserved in para 217 in the case of Indore Development Authority v.

Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra). The matter does not rest

there. Thereafter, a reference was made to the five Judge Bench of this

Court. A Constitution Bench of this Court in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra) thereafter has

specifically overruled the decision in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra). In para 365, it is observed and held as under:

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. [Pune Municipal Corpn. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, (2014) 3 SCC 183 has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. [Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. v. State of T.N., (2015) 3 SCC 353 cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also

19 overruled. In Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra [Indore Development Authority v. Shailendra, (2018) 3 SCC 412, the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.”

Thus, the Constitution Bench of this Court in the aforesaid decision

has not only observed that the decision rendered in Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) is overruled but has also specifically observed that

all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) has

been followed, are also overruled. I have to give some meaning to the

said observations. Thus, in view of the above specific observations

made by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the objections, as above,

raised on behalf of the respective respondents are to be overruled. None of the submissions/decisions relied upon on behalf of the

respective respondents shall be of any assistance to the respondents,

though there cannot be any dispute with respect to the proposition of law

laid down in the relied upon judgments/decisions on the review

jurisdiction, more particularly, in view of the observations made in para

217 in the earlier decision of this Court in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra)

and the observations made in para 365 in the subsequent decision of

the Constitution Bench in the case of Indore Development Authority v.

20

Manohar Lal (supra), reproduced hereinabove.

7. It is also required to be noted that in similar set of facts and

circumstances, this Court had condoned the delay and reviewed/recalled

the similar order in which the decision in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra) was relied upon. It may be true that in some

cases, the review applications have been dismissed. However,

considering the orders passed in rejecting review applications, it appears

that attention of the Court to paras 365 and 366 of the decision of the

Constitution Bench in Indore Development Authority v. Manohar Lal

(supra) and para 217 of the earlier decision in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Shailendra (dead) through Lrs. (supra)

were not brought to the notice of the Court.

8. Now so far as the submission on behalf of the respective

respondents that the case does not fall under Order 47 CPC and that

the subsequent overruling cannot be a ground to review the earlier

order(s) is concerned, at the outset, it is required to be noted that here is

a peculiar case where the earlier decision in the case of Pune Municipal

Corporation (supra), upon which reliance has been placed earlier, was

itself doubted in the subsequent decision in the case of Indore

Development Authority (supra) and that the matter was referred to the 21 Constitution Bench and thereafter the Constitution Bench has declared

the law as above, more particularly paras 365 and 366 of the judgment

in the case of Indore Development Authority (supra). It is also

required to be noted that in most of the cases solely relying upon the

earlier decision in the case of Pune Municipal Corporation (supra) and

though the possession of the lands in question have been taken over

and in many cases it might have been utilised/used by the beneficiary

authorities, orders are passed declaring the deemed lapse of acquisition.

The resultant effect would be to return the possession of the land/s

which might have been used by the beneficiary authorities. Therefore

also in the larger public interest, the review applications are required to

be allowed and the respective appeals are required to be considered

and decided afresh. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the

case, these are the cases where the review applications are to be

allowed and the appropriate public authorities are to be given an

opportunity to put forward their case afresh, which shall be in the larger

public interest.

9. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, all these

review/recall applications are allowed. The orders passed in the

respective Civil Appeals are hereby recalled and the respective Civil

22 Appeals are hereby ordered to be restored to their original file. Let the

said Civil Appeals be considered in accordance with law and on their

own merits and in light of the decision in the case of Indore

Development Authority v. Manohar Lal (supra). All the defences

and/or contentions which may be available to the respective parties are

kept open including the possession and neither I have entered into the

questions on merits nor expressed anything on merits in favour of either

of the parties.

10. In view of the order passed in the review applications, no further

order is required to be passed in Contempt Petition (Civil) No. 735/2018

in Civil Appeal No. 11857/2016, which stands disposed of.

……………………………………J. [M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 17, 2023.

23 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

MISCELLANEOUS APPLICATION NO._____________ @DIARY NO. 32257 OF 2021 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11857 OF 2016

GOVT. OF NCT OF DELHI THR. SECRETARY, LAND AND ….. APPELLANT(S) BUILDING DEPARTMENT

VERSUS

M/S. K.L. RATHI STEELS LTD.

& ORS. ETC. …. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CONNECTED MATTERS

JUDGMENT

NAGARATHNA, J.

I have had the advantage of reading the judgment proposed by

His Lordship M.R. Shah, J. in these review petitions. However, I am

unable to agree with the reasoning as well as the conclusions arrived

at by him.

2. In these batch of cases, the issue revolves around in my view the

very maintainability of these review petitions both on the ground of

delay and on a consideration of Article 137 of the Constitution of India

as well as Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 (for

short, “S.C. Rules - 2013”) and Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code of Civil

Procedure, 1908 (‘CPC’ for short). The aforesaid provisions are

respectively extracted as under for immediate reference:

“Article 137 of the Constitution of India:

‘137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court. -Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.’

****** Order XLVII Rule 1 of Supreme Court Rules, 2013:

‘Order XLVII Rule 1- The Court may review its judgment or order, but no application for review will be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code, and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

The application for review shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate on Record certifying that it is the first application for review and is based on the grounds admissible under the Rules.’

******

25 ‘Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC-

1. Application for review of judgment. —

(1) Any person considering himself aggrieved —

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred,

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order.

2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applies for the review.

Explanation – The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other

26 case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.” (Emphasis by me)

3. Before applying the said provisions to these review petitions, it is

necessary to give a brief factual background to these cases.

4. Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, “L.A. Act, 1894”) was a

pre-Independence legislation applicable to acquisition of land on the

principle of eminent domain. The same was repealed and substituted

by the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land

Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (‘L.A. Act,

2013’ for the sake of convenience). L.A. Act, 2013 came into effect from

01.01.2014. Section 24 with particular reference to Section 24 (2) of

L.A. Act, 2013, is relevant for the purpose of these review petitions.

The said provision reads as under:

“24. Land acquisition process under Act No. 1

of 1894 shall be deemed to have lapsed in certain cases.–(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, in any case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894,—

(a) where no award under section 11 of the said Land Acquisition Act has been made, then, all provisions of this Act relating to the determination of compensation shall apply; or

(b) where an award under said section 11 has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the

27 said Land Acquisition Act, as if the said Act has not been repealed.

(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-

section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (1 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act:

Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act.”

5. Sub-Section 2 of Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013 was a subject

matter of consideration and interpretation in the case of Pune

Municipal Corporation vs. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki (2014)

3 SCC 183 (Pune Municipal Corporation) and Indore Development

Authority vs. Manoharlal (2020) 8 SCC 129 (Indore Development

Authority).

6. A Three-Judge Bench of this Court in Pune Municipal

Corporation interpreted Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013. In one of the

cases, namely, Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra 28 (2018) 1 SCC 733, the matter was referred to a Three-Judge Bench

vide order dated 07.12.2017. In Indore Development Authority vs.

Shailendra (2018) 3 SCC 412, the Three-Judge Bench took a view

that the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation did not consider

several aspects relating to the interpretation of Section 24 of the L.A.

Act, 2013 Act. Pune Municipal Corporation was a judgment by a

Bench of coordinate strength of three Judges. Two of the three learned

Judges in Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra opined

prima facie that the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation appears

to be per incuriam while Shantanagoudar J. dissented on one point.

Consequently, the Bench ordered that the matters could be listed

before the appropriate Bench subject to the orders of Hon’ble the Chief

Justice of India. Later, in Indore Development Authority vs. Shyam

Verma (2018) SCC Online SC 3324, this Court considered it

appropriate to again place the matter before Hon’ble the Chief Justice

of India to refer the issues to be resolved by a Larger Bench. There

were other cases also touching upon the same controversy which were

referred to a Larger Bench and ultimately, in Indore Development

Authority vs. Manoharlal, a five-Judge Bench was constituted by the

Hon’ble Chief Justice of India, which, after hearing the learned

counsel for the parties, framed the following questions for

consideration:

29

“4.1. (1) What is the meaning of the expression “paid”/“tender” in Section 24 of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (“the 2013 Act”) and Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (“the 1894 Act”)? Whether non-deposit of compensation in court under Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act results into lapse of acquisition under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act. What are the consequences of non-deposit in court especially when compensation has been tendered and refused under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act and Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act? Whether such persons after refusal can take advantage of their wrong/conduct?

4.1. (2) Whether the word “or” should be read as conjunctive or disjunctive in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (3) What is the true effect of the proviso, does it form part of sub-section (2) or main Section 24 of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (4) What is mode of taking possession under the Land Acquisition Act and true meaning of expression ‘the physical possession of the land has not been taken’ occurring in Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (5) Whether the period covered by an interim order of a court concerning land acquisition proceedings ought to be excluded for the purpose of applicability of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act?

4.1. (6) Whether Section 24 of the 2013 Act revives barred and stale claims?

5. In addition, question of per incuriam and other incidental questions also to be gone into.”

30

7. As the L.A. Act, 2013 has repealed the L.A. Act 1894, Section 24

of L.A. Act, 2013 begins with a non-obstante clause and overrides all

other provisions of L.A. Act, 2013. Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013 is in

the nature of a saving clause.

8. Submissions were made before the Five-Judge Bench that this

Court should overrule the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation

and other judgments which have followed the said dictum. After

analysing Section 24(1)(a) and Section 24 (1)(b) of the L.A. Act, 2013 at

paragraph 366 of Indore Development Authority, it has been

observed as under:

“366. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we answer the questions as under:

366.1. Under the provisions of Section 24(1)(a) in case the award is not made as on 1-1-2014, the date of commencement of the 2013 Act, there is no lapse of proceedings. Compensation has to be determined under the provisions of the 2013 Act. 366.2. In case the award has been passed within the window period of five years excluding the period covered by an interim order of the court, then proceedings shall continue as provided under Section 24(1)(b) of the 2013 Act under the 1894 Act as if it has not been repealed.

366.3. The word “or” used in Section 24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as “nor” or as “and”. The deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the said Act, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid. In other words, in case

31 possession has been taken, compensation has not been paid then there is no lapse. Similarly, if compensation has been paid, possession has not been taken then there is no lapse.

366.4. The expression “paid” in the main part of Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not include a deposit of compensation in court. The consequence of non-deposit is provided in the proviso to Section 24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the 2013 Act. In case the obligation under Section 31 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under Section 34 of the said Act can be granted. Non-deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings. In case of non-deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the 2013 Act has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under Section 4 of the 1894 Act. 366.5. In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under Section 31(1) of the 1894 Act, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under Section 24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court. The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under Section 31(1). The landowners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act.

366.6. The proviso to Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act is to be treated as part of Section 24(2), not part of Section 24(1)(b).

366.7. The mode of taking possession under the 1894 Act and as contemplated under Section 24(2) is by drawing of inquest report/memorandum. Once award has been passed on taking possession under Section 16 of the 1894 Act, the land vests in State there is no

32 divesting provided under Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act, as once possession has been taken there is no lapse under Section 24(2).

366.8. The provisions of Section 24(2) providing for a deemed lapse of proceedings are applicable in case authorities have failed due to their inaction to take possession and pay compensation for five years or more before the 2013 Act came into force, in a proceeding for land acquisition pending with the authority concerned as on 1-1-2014. The period of subsistence of interim orders passed by court has to be excluded in the computation of five years. 366.9. Section 24(2) of the 2013 Act does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition. Section 24 applies to a proceeding pending on the date of enforcement of the 2013 Act i.e., 1-1-2014. It does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.”

9. However, while doing so in para 365, it was observed as under:

“365. Resultantly, the decision rendered in Pune Municipal Corpn. is hereby overruled and all other decisions in which Pune Municipal Corpn. has been followed, are also overruled. The decision in Sree Balaji Nagar Residential Assn. cannot be said to be laying down good law, is overruled and other decisions following the same are also overruled. In Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra, the aspect with respect to the proviso to Section 24(2) and whether “or” has to be read as “nor” or as “and” was not placed for consideration. Therefore, that decision too cannot prevail, in the light of the discussion in the present judgment.” 33

10. Subsequent to the aforesaid judgment passed in Indore

Development Authority by the Five-Judge Bench and having regard

to the fact that Pune Municipal Corporation and all other judgments

following Pune Municipal Corporation have now been overruled, the

review petitioners, who are either the acquiring body/State or the

beneficiary have preferred these review petitions.

11. The object and purpose of filing these review petitions is to seek

review of the judgment impugned in the review petitions and for re-

hearing of the Special Leave Petitions or the Civil Appeals, as the case

may be, which were disposed of in terms of Pune Municipal

Corporation, in light of the latest pronouncement of this Court in

Indore Development Authority.

12. According to Sri Sanjay Poddar, learned senior counsel and

other learned counsel appearing for the review petitioners, on an

interpretation of para 365 of Indore Development Authority, it is

clear that not only the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation is

overruled but all other judgments following the said decision also

stand overruled. Consequently, the judgements passed by this Court

following the dictum in Pune Municipal Corporation are subject to

review and hence these review petitions have been filed.

34

13. The main plea of the review petitioners is to recall the

judgments/orders impugned in the review petitions and to restore the

Civil Appeals or Special Leave Petitions, as the case may be, on the file

of this Court and to rehear the same and to dispose them in terms of

the latest dictum of the Larger Bench of this Court in the case of

Indore Development Authority.

14. Learned senior counsel and learned counsel for the petitioners

relied upon Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal and Others vs.

Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy AIR 1971 SC 2355; and Assistant

Commissioner, Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock

Exchange Limited (2008) 14 SCC 171; in support of their

submissions that when a question of law is altered by a subsequent

decision, the earlier decision does not operate as res judicata. Further,

that a decision rendered later on would have a retrospective effect

clarifying the legal position which was earlier not accordingly

understood.

15. Per contra, learned senior counsel Sriyuth V. Giri, Shyam Divan,

Neeraj Kumar Jain, Vivek Chib and other learned counsel have

vehemently objected to the very maintainability of the review petitions.

This is by contending that having regard to the scope of review as

provided under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and particularly, the

35 Explanation thereto, these review petitions are not at all maintainable.

In other words, it is their contention that despite what has been stated

in paragraph 365 of Indore Development Authority, in view of the

bar contained in the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, the

review petitions are not maintainable and the review petitions have to

be dismissed in limine. In other words, it is contended that the purport

of what has been opined in paragraph 365 is to denude the judgment

passed in Pune Municipal Corporation and all other judgments or

orders following Pune Municipal Corporation of their precedential

authority and effect. This implies that the said judgment cannot be

cited as a precedent in future in view of the subsequent law being laid

down by the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority by

overruling the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. However,

the judgment themselves do not get effaced and they are binding on

the parties to the said cases although they can no longer be cited as a

precedent. Heavy reliance has been placed on the Explanation to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC to contend that when a decision on a question

of law on which the judgment of the Court has been reversed or

modified by the subsequent decision of the superior Court, it shall not

be a ground for review of such judgment. Thus, the contention on

behalf of the respondents is that the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation and all other judgments following the aforesaid

36 judgment, having been overruled, would cease to be a precedent for

future cases. It is submitted that merely because the Larger Bench of

this Court in Indore Development Authority has laid down the new

law by a different interpretation being given to Sub-Section (2) of

Section 24 of L.A. Act, 2013, it cannot give rise to a review of the

judgment passed in Pune Municipal Corporation and all other

judgments following Pune Municipal Corporation.

16. Learned senior counsel for the respondents further submitted

that there is delay in filing the review petitions.

17. Learned senior counsel, Sri Shyam Divan, appearing for one of

the respondents, placed reliance on the two judgments of this Court:

(i) Dr. Subramaniam Swamy vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Ors.

(2014) 5 SCC 75, with particular reference to para 52 thereof to

contend that having regard to the Explanation to Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC, even an erroneous decision cannot be a ground for

the Court to undertake review, as the first and foremost

requirement of entertaining a review petition is that the order, of

which review is sought, suffers from an error apparent on the face

of the order and in absence of any such error, finality attached to

the judgment/order cannot be disturbed. Rajender Kumar vs.

Rambhai (2007) 15 SCC 513, also alludes to the same principle.

37

(ii) Further, in Beghar Foundation through its Secretary vs.

Justice K.S. Puttaswamy (Retd.) & Ors. (2021) 3 SCC 1, while

considering the review petitions filed against the final judgment

and order passed in Justice K.S. Puttuswamy vs. Union of

India (2019) 1 SCC 1 (Aadhaar – 5 J.), it was observed that

there was no case for review of the said judgment. It was further

observed that, “change in the law or subsequent

decisions/judgment of a Larger Bench by itself cannot be regarded

as ground for relief.” The review petitions were, accordingly,

dismissed by the majority of the Judges on the Bench (4:1), while

Dr. D.Y.Chandrachud, J. expressed his dissenting opinion in the

said case.

(iii) Reliance was also placed on Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. and

Another vs. Union of India and Others (2006) 3 SCC 1 and

Kamlesh Verma vs. Mayawati and Others (2013) 8 SCC 320 in

support of their submissions.

18. By way of reply, learned senior counsel and learned counsel for

the review petitioners sought refuge under the expression “for any

other sufficient reason” in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC to contend that in

view of the changed circumstances, inasmuch as the dictum in Pune

Municipal Corporation is overruled by the Larger Bench of this

Court and all other judgments following the judgment in Pune

38 Municipal Corporation have also been overruled, there is good

ground to review and reopen all previous judgments passed on the

basis of the overruled judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation.

Hence, these review petitions are maintainable and ought to be

allowed. In this regard, learned counsel for the review petitioners

placed reliance on The Bengal Immunity Company Ltd. vs. The

State of Bihar AIR 1955 SC 661.

19. Having regard to the rival submissions made, I find that the

bone of contention between the parties is with regard to the

maintainability of these review petitions bearing in mind the scope

and purport of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC and particularly, the

Explanation thereto. In other words, the point for consideration is,

whether, the judgment passed in Pune Municipal Corporation and

all other judgments following the said dictum, which have been

overruled, could be reviewed by entertaining these review petitions

and the said orders be recalled and the said cases be reheard and

decided in light of Indore Development Authority.

20. At the outset, it is observed that this is not a case where the

question involved is, whether, the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation calls for a review or reconsideration. It has already been

reconsidered by this Court, by the Larger Bench in Indore

39 Development Authority. The pertinent question involved in this case

is, whether, the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation having

been overruled and all other judgments following Pune Municipal

Corporation having been overruled in Indore Development

Authority, would call for review of all those judgments despite having

attained finality between the parties. In other words, whether, on the

basis of a subsequent decision, on a pure question of law, the earlier

decisions arrived at, on the basis of law as it was, could now be

recalled at the instance of one of the parties to the earlier decisions.

21. The specimen judgment / Orders sought to be reviewed in the

instant cases, namely, Civil Appeals and SLPs, read as under:

“1. Leave granted.

2. The issue, in principle, is covered against the appellants by judgments in Civil Appeal No. 8477of 2016 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 8467 of 2015 and Civil Appeal No. 5811 of 2015 arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 21545 of 2015. The appeals filed by the requisitioning authority, namely the Delhi Development Authority, have already been dismissed by this Court.

3. These appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

4. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of these cases, the appellants are given a period of one year to exercise its liberty granted under Section 24(2) of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 for initiation of the acquisition proceedings afresh.

40

5. We make it clear that in case no fresh acquisition proceedings are initiated within the said period of one year from today by issuing a Notification under Section 11 of the Act, the appellants, if in possession, shall return the physical possession of the land to the original land owner.

Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of. No costs.” (Emphasis by me)

22. The order dated 01/07/2016 in SLP (C) CC No. 11422 of 2016

and 11005 of 2016 is as under:

“Delay Condoned Dismissed.”

23. Black's Law Dictionary defines a “decision” as “a determination

arrived at after consideration of facts, and in legal context, law”; an

“opinion” is defined as “the statement by a Judge or Court of the

decision reached in regard to a cause tried or argued before them,

expounding the law as applied to the case, and detailing the reasons

upon which the judgment is based”. It explains the difference between

a “decision” and “opinion” as follows:

“‘Decision’ is not necessarily synonymous with ‘opinion’. A decision of the court is its judgment; the opinion is the reasons given for that judgment, or the expression of the views of the Judge.”

41

24. This Court while considering the difference between the two

expressions, namely, “decision” and “opinion” or view of law stated

that, “it is necessary to bear in mind that the principles in regard to the

highest Court departing from its binding precedent are different from the

grounds on which a final judgment between the parties can be

reconsidered.”

25. When a review application is filed by an aggrieved party, the

same can be dismissed ex parte without issuing notice to the other

side on the ground that there is no sufficient ground to call upon the

opposite party to show cause as to why review should not be granted.

If notice is issued to the other side, then, after hearing both sides, it is

necessary to consider whether the review petition ought to be allowed

or rejected. It is at that stage the maintainability of the review petition

would also have to be considered such as if there is a bar to the very

maintainability of the review petition having regard to the scope to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Then, the review petition has to be dismissed

at that stage itself. But, if the Court is convinced that there is ground

for reviewing the order or judgment impugned, then the review petition

has to be allowed by recalling the orders sought to be reviewed.

Thereafter, the matter has to be reheard on merits by the Court. After

rehearing the case, the Court may either confirm the original order or

modify it. An order made subsequently whether reversing, confirming

42 or modifying the earlier order would be superseding the original one.

Therefore, it is at the stage prior to rehearing the matter on merits

that the maintainability of the review petition has to be ascertained

i.e., whether the grounds for seeking review enunciated in Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC are made out or not.

26. Article 137 of the Constitution of India speaks about the review

of judgments or orders passed by the Supreme Court of India. It states

that subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any

Rule made under Article 145 of the Constitution of India, the Supreme

Court shall have the power to review any judgment pronounced or

order made by it. However, the power of the Supreme Court of India to

review its judgment or order is subject to (i) the provisions of any law

made by the Parliament, or (ii) any Rule made under Article 145 of the

Constitution of India.

27. Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the S.C. Rules, 2013 made by virtue of

Article 145 of the Constitution of India states that, in any civil case,

review lies on any of the grounds stated under Order XLVII Rule 1

CPC. Thus, the scope and power to review a judgment or order by the

Supreme Court is restricted to the contours of Order XLVII Rule 1

CPC. Further, though the power to review is conferred by the

Constitution and is therefore a Constitutional power, that power is

43 circumscribed by the CPC and S.C. Rules, 2013 which have been

extracted above. Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC states that an aggrieved

person -

i) due to discovery of new and important matter or evidence which,

after exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the

person aggrieved or the person seeking review could not be

produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order

made, or

ii) due to a mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or

iii) on account of any other sufficient reason,

may seek review of a judgment or order of this Court.

28. Thus, it is noted that any person considering himself aggrieved

can seek review of the judgment or order only on the aforesaid three

grounds and none other. In the instance case, according to petitioners’

counsel, the first and second grounds for review do not apply. Learned

senior counsel for the petitioners have relied upon the third ground.

The third ground is “on account of any other sufficient reason”. The

said expression may mean that the reason must be sufficient to the

Court to which the application for review is made.

44

29. In the present batch of cases, serious arguments have been

advanced on both sides on, what I consider, the maintainability of

these review petitions revolving around the Explanation to Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC. Hence, in my view, the recalling of the judgments passed

following the judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation, which is no

doubt, overruled, will have to be reconsidered in light of Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC.

30. On a consideration of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, it is noted that

there are three main grounds referred to above on which a review of a

decree or order could be sought by an aggrieved person. Much

emphasis has been laid by the learned senior counsel for the review

petitioners herein, on the expression “sufficient reason” so as to

contend that since Pune Municipal Corporation was decided

contrary to the intent and purport of Section 24(2) of L.A. Act, 2013

and the same has been overruled by a Larger Bench comprising of five

Judges in Indore Development Authority, there is sufficient reason

to review all judgments passed by this Court following Pune

Municipal Corporation. Hence, the present review petitions have

been filed although there may be a delay in doing so.

31. It was further contended that having regard to paragraph 365 of

the judgment in Indore Development Authority, the dictum in Pune

45 Municipal Corporation as well as all decisions following Pune

Municipal Corporation have been expressly overruled. Therefore,

there is sufficient reason to review and recall all those erroneous

decisions in light of the subsequent decision in Indore Development

Authority. Hence, the review petitions have been filed.

32. While considering the aforesaid submission, it is also necessary

to bear in mind the arguments advanced by learned senior counsel

and counsel on behalf of the respondents as they have drawn our

particular attention to the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. It

was contended that the said Explanation clearly bars a review of a

judgment on the ground that a subsequent decision has been

rendered by a superior Court, i.e. a Larger Bench of five Judges in the

instant case, reversing or overruling the earlier decision. It was

contended that when such a decision is on a pure question of law, it is

not a ground for review of the judgments which have been overruled

by the Larger Bench. It was further submitted that the overruled

judgments are still binding on the parties to the said judgments and

have attained finality and in view of the Explanation, they cannot be

reopened or reviewed.

33. Applying the Explanation to the facts of the present case, it was

contended that in Indore Development Authority, the judgment in

46 Pune Municipal Corporation was overruled on a pure question of law

and further, all other judgments following Pune Municipal

Corporation also stood overruled. But the overruling of the decision

in Pune Municipal Corporation by a subsequent decision of a Larger

Bench of five Judges in Indore Development Authority is not a

ground for review and recall of the very decision in Pune Municipal

Corporation and all other decisions following Pune Municipal

Corporation. It was submitted that the Explanation to Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC bars the review petition being entertained in the instant

cases. Hence, in these cases, the review petitions may have to be

rejected/dismissed.

34. The expression “any other sufficient reason” which is a ground

for review and which is the sheet anchor of the petitioner’s review

petition has not been defined in the Code. However, the judgments of

the

(i) Privy Council in Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C. 112;

Bisheshwar Pratap Sahi vs. Parath Nath AIR 1934 P.C.

213;

(ii) Federal Court in Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Mitter

AIR 1949 FC 106, and,

47

(iii) This Court in Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Most

Rev. Mar Paulose Athanasius AIR 1954 SC 526 have held

that words must mean “a reason sufficient on grounds, at

least analogous to those specified in the Rule”.

35. In Chajju Ram vs. Neki (supra), the Privy Council held that

there cannot be a review on the ground that the judgment proceeded

on an incorrect exposition of law. Further, the Court has no

jurisdiction to order a review because it was of the opinion that a

different conclusion of law should have been arrived at. It was also

observed that if a decision is erroneous in law that is not a ground for

ordering review. If a court has decided a point erroneously, the error

could not be one apparent on the face of the record or even analogous

to it. Therefore, subsequent events or the fact that the Court took a

different view in a subsequent case is not a sufficient reason for

granting review (vide Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC).

36. Although, the expression “for any other sufficient reason” in

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is wide enough to take within its scope and

ambit many circumstances or situations which do not fall in the

earlier part of the Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which are the two grounds

(i) and (ii) referred to above, in my view, the Explanation to the said

provision carves out an exception to the expression “for any other

sufficient reason” as a ground for review of a judgment in ground (iii).

48 The Explanation being in the nature of an exception is to be read

outside the scope of the expression “for any other sufficient reason” in

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. In other words, if, on a question of law, a

decision of a Court is reversed by a subsequent decision of a superior

Court (Larger Bench in the instant case) and the same is reopened on

the basis of the said subsequent decision there would be no finality of

judgments of the Court even between the parties thereto. It is, hence,

observed that even an erroneous judgment or order is binding on the

parties thereto even if subsequently that very judgment is reversed in

a subsequent decision of a superior Court. Otherwise, there would be

chaos and no finality of any decision of a Court which is against

public policy. Judgments rendered by a Court of competent

jurisdiction as per the prevailing law are binding on the parties to the

said judgment. Merely because that judgment is subsequently

overruled by a subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other

case, the same shall not be a ground for review of such judgment.

37. In this context, the object and purpose of the Explanation to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC cannot be lost sight of and it needs to be

emphasised. In my view, the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is

in the nature of an exception to the expression “for any other sufficient

reason”. This would mean that if, in the mind of a Court there is a

sufficient reason for the review of a judgment, it cannot be on the

49 ground/reason covered in the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

Thus, the circumstances mentioned in the Explanation would be an

exception and is outside the scope and ambit of “for any other

sufficient reason”.

38. An Explanation is at times appended to a Section to explain the

object and content as well as the meaning of words contained in the

Section. An Explanation may be added to include something within or

to exclude something from the ambit of the main enactment or the

connotation of some words occurring in it. Even a negative

Explanation which excludes certain types or a category from the ambit

of the Section may have the effect of showing that the category leaving

aside the excepted types is included within it. An Explanation can also

be added to serve as a proviso to the main Section vide Y.P. Chawla

and Others vs. M.P. Tiwari and another AIR 1992 SC 1360. When

an Explanation is in the nature of a proviso, it is used to remove

special cases from the general provision and provide for them

especially. Sometimes an Explanation is added to clarify a doubtful

point of law as in the instant case the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule

1 CPC has been inserted by the amendment made in the year 1976.

[Source: G.P. Singh’s “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” –

15th Edition].

50

39. It is also in the nature of an exception intended to restrain the

enacting clause to particular cases. The Explanation in the instant

case being in the nature of a proviso is a qualifying or excepting

provision to what is stated in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which state the

grounds for seeking a review. Hence, the object and intendment of the

proviso must be given its full effect. The object and purpose of the

Explanation can be related to the following three maxims:

(i) Nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa (No man

should be vexed twice for the same cause);

(ii) Interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (It is in the interest of

the State that there should be an end to a litigation); and

(iii) Res judicata pro veritate occipitur (A judicial decision must

be accepted as correct).

These maxims would indicate that there must be an end to

litigation otherwise the rights of persons would be in an endless

confusion and justice would suffer.

40. At the same time, there are a line of decisions which have held

that exercising power of review for “for any other sufficient reason”

must be analogous to the two reasons mentioned in the provision

therein, namely, –

51

1) who from the discovery of new and important matter or evidence,

which after the exercise of due diligence, was not within his

knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the

decree was passed or order was made; or

2) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the

record.

41. The Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC states that the fact

that a decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the

Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent

decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground

for the review of such judgment. Thus, the bar is for a Court to review

its judgment, when a Court superior to it has subsequently reversed

or modified a judgment on a question of law. As far as this Court is

concerned, a superior Court would mean a Larger Bench of this Court

which would pass a judgment or order contrary to the judgments

sought to be reviewed.

42. However, in taxation matters, the position is slightly different. In

Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd. vs. Union of India (2006) 3 SCC 1, it

was observed that overruling of a decision takes place in a subsequent

lis where the precedential value of the decision is called in

question. That in our judicial system, it is open to a Court of superior

52 jurisdiction or strength before which a decision of a Bench of lower

strength is cited to act as an authority to overrule such a decision. But

this overruling would not operate to upset the binding nature of the

decision on the parties to an earlier lis. In that lis, the principle of res

judicata would continue to operate. But in tax cases relating to a

subsequent year involving the same issue as an earlier year, the Court

can differ from the view expressed if the case is distinguishable or per

incuriam.

43. Learned senior counsel for the petitioners relied upon the

following judgments in their arguments as well as reply arguments:

(a) Mathura Prasad Sarjoo Jaiswal vs. Dossibai N.B. Jeejeebhoy

(supra) was a question related to jurisdiction of a Court which

cannot be deemed to have been finally determined by an

erroneous decision of the court. It was observed that if by an

erroneous interpretation of the statute the court holds that it has

no jurisdiction, the question would not, operate as res judicata.

Similarly, by an erroneous decision if the court assumes

jurisdiction which it does not possess under the statute, the

question cannot operate as res judicata between the parties,

whether the cause of action in the subsequent litigation is the

same or otherwise, because if those decisions are considered as

conclusive, it will assume the status of a special rule of law

53 applicable to the parties relating to the jurisdiction of the court in

derogation of the rule declared by the Legislature. Reliance on the

said decision is placed as the controversy involved therein, was in

the context of the doctrine of res judicata, wherein, it was

observed that the previous decision on a matter in issue alone is

res judicata. When it is said that a previous decision is res

judicata, it is meant that the right claimed has been adjudicated

upon and cannot again be placed in contest between the same

parties. It was further observed that a previous decision on a

matter in issue is a composite decision: the decision on law

cannot be dissociated from the decision on facts on which the

right is founded. A decision on an issue of law will be a res

judicata in a subsequent proceeding between the same parties, if

the cause of action of the subsequent proceeding is the same as in

the previous proceeding, but not when the cause of action is

different, nor when the law has since the earlier decision been

altered by a competent authority, nor when the decision relates to

the jurisdiction of the Court to try the earlier proceeding, nor

when the earlier decision declares valid a transaction which is

prohibited by law. Therefore, if a subsequent proceeding is

initiated between the parties in these cases, then the decision

arrived at in terms of the impugned judgment in these review

54 petitions would be binding on the parties. This does not mean

that a decision rendered between the parties in Pune Municipal

Corporation or decision following Pune Municipal Corporation

can be reviewed or recalled by filing review petitions on the

ground that subsequently in Indore Development Authority,

Pune Municipal Corporation has been overruled and sought to

be contended by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The same

would be contrary to the Explanation in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

(b) Similarly, reliance was placed on Assistant Commissioner,

Income Tax, Rajkot vs. Saurashtra Kutch Stock Exchange

Limited (supra). A judgment which was pronounced earlier by a

superior Court and holding the field, was not noticed by the

Income Tax Appellate Tribunal, subsequently, while deciding a

matter. Hence, it was observed that there was a mistake apparent

from the record as there was non-consideration of a binding

decision of superior Court by the said Tribunal. Hence, the same

could be rectified under Section 254(2) of the Income Tax Act,

1961.

The above decision is also not applicable in the instant case

for the reason that when Pune Municipal Corporation was

decided there was no judgment of Indore Development

55 Authority. The decision of the Larger Bench in Indore

Development Authority is not prior to but subsequent to the

judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation. The judgment and

decision in Pune Municipal Corporation dated 08.02.2018 held

the field till the judgment in Indore Development Authority

which was pronounced on 06.03.2020. Therefore, the judgment in

Indore Development Authority being a subsequent decision

cannot give rise to review and recall of the decision in Pune

Municipal Corporation as well as other judgments following the

aforesaid case, on the basis that judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation has been overruled in the subsequent case, namely,

Indore Development Authority.

(c) In Shakuntla Devi vs. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390, a declaratory

decree was granted on the basis of law as it stood then i.e. the

date when the declaratory decree was passed. But by the time the

second declaratory decree was passed between the same parties

in a subsequent suit, this Court had declared the law under

Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 holding that the

estate of women gets enlarged in terms of the said provision.

Since the law on the date of the second declaratory decree was

contrary to the earlier declaration of law made by this Court, the

earlier decree in the first suit would not operate as res judicata

56 even between the same parties when the second suit on a

different cause of action between the same parties is being

considered. Thus, in the above circumstances, the principle of res

judicata would not apply. It is in the context of the principle of res

judicata, it was observed by this Court that if the earlier

declaratory decree which is sought to be made the basis of res

judicata, is delivered by a Court without jurisdiction or is contrary

to the existing law at the time and the issue comes up for

reconsideration, such earlier declaratory decree cannot be held to

be res judicata in a subsequent case unless, of course, protected

by any special enactment. Therefore, it was held in the said case

that if a subsequent suit is based on an earlier declaratory decree

and such decree is contrary to the law prevailing at the time of the

consideration of the second suit as to its legality or is a decree

granted by a Court which had no jurisdiction to grant such

decree, principles of res judicata under Section 11 CPC will not be

attracted. It is then open to the defendant in the second suit to

establish that the declaratory decree relied upon by the plaintiff

granted in the earlier suit is not based on good law or that the

Court granting such decree did not have the jurisdiction to grant

such decree. In the aforesaid case, the second suit was filed for

possession of the suit properties on the basis of a declaratory

57 decree obtained earlier in the first suit which was not found to be

a lawful decree as per the law prevailing at the time when the

second suit was considered.

The aforesaid decision does not apply to the present case as

herein, review petitions have been filed seeking review of the

judgments passed by this Court on the basis of the decision in

Pune Municipal Corporation which has been subsequently

overruled by this Court in Indore Development Authority on a

pure question of law and the review petitions are hit by the

Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. This is not a case where

a subsequent fresh petition has been filed before the High Court

seeking reliefs based on the judgment of this Court in Pune

Municipal Corporation. It is necessary to emphasise that these

review petitions have been filed before this Court to review the

judgments/orders passed by this Court on the basis of the

judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation which has been

overruled by a subsequent judgment in Indore Development

Authority. In my view, these review petitions are not

maintainable in view of the bar contained in the Explanation to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

58

(d) Learned senior counsel for the petitioners has relied upon the

expression “sufficient reason” found in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC

being a ground for review in these cases. In this regard, he placed

reliance on Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Netaji

Cricket Club, wherein it was observed that an application for

review would also be maintainable if there exists sufficient reason

thereof. What would constitute sufficient reason would depend on

the facts and circumstances of the case. In the said case, reliance

was placed on a judgment of the Privy Council in Moran Mar

Basselios Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose

Athanasius (supra), dealing with the limitations in the

application of review and it was observed that the expression “any

other sufficient reason” must mean “a reason sufficient on

grounds, at least analogous to those specified in the rule.”

In Netaji Cricket Club (supra), this Court recognised that

there was a mistake on the part of this Court which would include

a mistake in the understanding of the nature of an undertaking

given to this Court and therefore, the review application was

entertained by accepting the mistake in the nature and purport of

the undertaking given before this Court. In the aforesaid factual

matrix, the review petition was entertained.

59

(e) In the same context, Lily Thomas vs. Union of India (2000) 6

SCC 224 could be adverted to wherein it has been held that the

power to review is not an appeal in disguise but is a creature of

statute and not an inherent power. In the said case, the question

was with regard to the consideration of a subsequent event to

mould the relief accordingly. It was observed that while exercising

its review jurisdiction, the Court can take into consideration a

subsequent event for the purpose of rectifying its own mistake. A

party cannot be made to suffer on account of an act of the Court

which is expressed in the well-recognised maxim of equity,

namely, actus curiae neminem gravabit which means an act of the

Court shall prejudice no man. This maxim is founded upon

justice and good sense or otherwise a man would be compelled to

do what he cannot possibly perform, which the law does not

permit (lex non cogit ad impossibilia). The above proposition would

fall within the scope of “any other sufficient reason” when there is

a mistake of the Court which has led to injustice. That is a

situation which does not take in a situation covered by the

Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, which, as already

observed, is an exception to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Hence, the

aforesaid judgment does not apply to the instance cases. 60

44. The aforesaid cases turn on their own facts and do not fall

within the scope of exception which is in the nature of an Explanation.

The aforesaid judgments cannot be a precedent in the instant case

where the review petition has been filed in order to set at naught the

impugned orders following the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation passed by this Court which held the field till it was

subsequently overruled in Indore Development Authority. Having

regard to the Explanation provided in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC review

in these cases is impermissible.

45. A few judgments of this Court could be referred to at this stage

in support of the view that I wish to take in this case:

a) In Haridas Das vs. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4 SCC 78, it has

been observed that one of the parameters prescribed in Order

XLVII Rule 1 CPC for allowing the review petition for rehearing the

case is “on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face

of the record or for any other sufficient reason”. The former part of

the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and

the later to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on

which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them

postulates a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not

highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have

argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to

61 the Court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. It was further

observed categorically that an error apparent on the face of the

record for acquiring jurisdiction to review must be such an error

which may strike one on a mere looking at the record and would

not require any long-drawn process of reasoning.

b) In fact, in Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. vs. Government of

A.P. AIR 1964 SC 1372: (1964) 5 SCR 174, it has been

observed that there is a distinction which is real between a mere

erroneous decision and a decision which could be characterised

as vitiated by “error apparent”. A review is by no means an appeal

in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is corrected but lies

only for a patent error without any elaborate argument that one

could point to the error and therefore, a clear case of error

apparent on the face of the record would be made out.

c) Reliance could also be placed on Union of India vs. Mohd.

Nayyar Khalil (2000) 9 SCC 252, wherein it was observed that if

an order following a Three-Judge Bench decision is passed and at

that time the Three-Judge Bench decision had not been upset,

even in the future or later if the Constitution Bench takes a

contrary view, it would be a subsequent judgment which cannot

be a ground for review in view of the Explanation to Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC.

62

d) Similarly, in Shanti Devi vs. State of Haryana (RP Dy. No. 1249

of 1999) in Civil Appeal No. 14608 of 1996 as reported in (1999) 5

SCC 703, this Court held that the contention that the judgment

sought to be reviewed was overruled in another case,

subsequently, is no reason for reviewing the said decision in view

of the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The said review

petition was dismissed both on the ground of unexplained

inordinate delay as well as on merits.

e) In Usha Bharti vs. State of Uttar Pradesh (2014) 7 SCC 663, it

was held that the Supreme Court, in exercise of its power of

review may in an appropriate case reopen the case and rehear the

entire matter but while doing so the Court must remain conscious

of the provisions contained in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC as well as

the Rules framed by the Supreme Court. Thus, the expression “for

any other sufficient reason” has been intentionally used in Order

XLVII Rule 1 CPC by the Legislature to cater to possible

exceptional cases in which injustice may have been meted out.

46. The following relevant judgments could also be discussed at this

stage:

(a) Reliance could be placed on State of Gujarat & Anr. vs. Justice

R.A. Mehta (Retd.) (2013) 3 SCC 1, wherein following several

earlier decisions of this Court, it was observed that a decision

63 does not lose its authority “merely because it was badly argued,

inadequately considered or fallaciously reasoned.”

(b) In fact, in Madan Mohan Pathak & Anr. vs. Union of India

AIR 1978 SC 803; (1978) 2 SCC 50, a Seven-Judge Bench of

this Court considered the question whether Parliament enacting

an Act consequent upon the judgment of the Calcutta High Court

would unsettle the binding effect of the said judgment. In that

case, the appeal filed against the judgment of the Calcutta High

Court was not pressed before this Court and the said judgment

was allowed to become final. This Court held that there was

nothing in the Act passed subsequent to the judgment of the

Calcutta High Court which had nullified the effect of the same or

which could unsettle the judgment or take away the binding

character of the same. In the circumstances, it was held that Life

Insurance Corporation which was a party in that case was liable

to make the payment of cash bonus for the year 1975-1976 to its

Class III and IV employees in accordance with the said judgment

of the Calcutta High Court as it was not absolved of the

obligations imposed by the said judgment despite the Parliament

passing an Act subsequent thereto on the ground that the

judgment of the Calcutta High Court was binding on the parties

thereto.

64

(c) Further, in Neelima Srivastava vs. State of Uttar Pradesh

(2021) SCC online 610, reference was made to Secretary, State

of Karnataka vs. Uma Devi (3) (2006) 4 SCC 1 (“Uma Devi 3”),

in which the Constitution Bench had stated, “it is also clarified

that those decisions which run counter to the principle settled in

this decision, or in which directions running counter to what we

have held herein, will stand denuded of its status as precedent.” It

was observed in Neelima Srivastava that the import of the

aforesaid observations was that earlier decisions running counter

to the principles settled in the decision of Uma Devi could not be

treated as a precedent. This does not mean that the judgment of a

competent Court delivered prior to the decision in Uma Devi

which attained finality and is binding inter-se between the parties

need not be implemented. It was further observed that, “mere

overruling of the principles, on which the earlier judgment was

passed, by a subsequent judgment of higher forum will not have

the effect of uprooting the final adjudication between the parties

and set it at naught.”

Moreover, it was held that there is a distinction between

overruling of a principle and reversal of a judgment. The judgment

between the parties has to be assailed and overcome in a manner

known to or recognised by law by a higher forum. Mere overruling

65 of principles by a subsequent judgment will not dilute the binding

effect of the decision on parties to the judgment overruled. It was

held that observation at paragraph 54 of Uma Devi case does not

absolve the parties in other cases to comply with the directions

issued prior to the judgment in Uma Devi’s case.

(d) Reference can also be made to Union of India vs. Major S.P.

Sharma (2014) 6 SCC 351, in which it was stated that “a

decision rendered by a competent Court cannot be challenged in

collateral proceedings for the reason that if it is permitted to do so

there would be confusion and chaos and the finality of the

proceeding would cease to have any meaning”. It was further

observed that it is not permissible in law for the parties to reopen

concluded judgments of the Court as the same may not only

tantamount to an abuse of the process of the Court but would

have a far-reaching adverse effect on the administration of justice.

(e) When reconsideration of a judgment of this Court is sought, there

are two limitations which have been observed – one jurisdictional

and the other self-imposed. The same has been explained in

Natural Resources Allocation, in Re: Special reference no. 1

of 2012, speaking through D.K. Jain, J., as under:

“The first limitation is that a decision of this Court could be reviewed only under Article 137 or a curative petition and in no other way. Once a lis between parties is decided, the operative decree can

66 only be opened in review. Overruling the judgment— as a precedent—does not reopen the decree. The second limitation, a self-imposed rule of judicial discipline, was that overruling the opinion of the Court on a legal issue does not constitute sitting in appeal, but is done only in exceptional circumstances, such as when the earlier decision is per incuriam or is delivered in the absence of relevant or material facts or if it is manifestly wrong and capable of causing public mischief.”

It was further observed that “in fact, the overruling of a

principle of law is not an outcome of appellate jurisdiction but a

consequence of its inherent power. This inherent power can be

exercised as long as a previous decree vis-à-vis a lis inter partes is

not affected”.

(f) Further, a Seven-Judge Bench of this Court speaking through

Chandrachud, C.J. in Special Courts Bill, 1978, In RE (1979) 1

SCC 380, observed that it is always open to this Court to re-

examine the question already decided by it and to overrule, if

necessary, the view earlier taken by it. But insofar as all other

Courts in the territory of India are concerned, they ought to be

bound by the view expressed by this Court even in the exercise of

its advisory jurisdiction under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of

India.

Although the principle of stare decisis is not applicable to this

Court, on the strength of Article 137 of the Constitution of India,

67 this Court, in a subsequent judgment, can overrule a previous

judgment but the same would not unsettle the dictum in the

judgment overruled inter partes. Further, the overruled judgment

which has held the field is bound to be followed in all other cases

till the subsequent judgment overruling the earlier judgment is

passed.

(g) In State of West Bengal vs. Kamal Sengupta (2008) 8 SCC

612, Section 22(3) of the Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985 came

up for consideration in the context of the power of review. While

dealing with the said question, it was held that a Tribunal

established under the aforesaid Act is entitled to review its order

or decision if either of the grounds enumerated in Order XLVII

Rule 1 CPC was available. In that case, the question, whether, the

subsequent contra judgment by the same or a superior Court on a

point of law can be treated as an error apparent on the face of the

record for the purpose of review of an earlier judgment, was

considered as there was a divergence of opinion among the High

Courts on the said question. It was observed that in view of there

being a dichotomy of opinion on the issue, the Law Commission

took cognizance of the same and suggested an amendment to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which led to the insertion of the

68 Explanation after Order XLVII Rule 2 CPC. The following cases

were referred to in the aforesaid judgment:

(i) Hari Sankar Pal vs. Anath Nath Mitter 1949 FCR 36, a

Five-Judge Bench decision of the Federal Court was alluded

to, wherein it was observed that if a decision is erroneous in

law, the same is certainly no ground for ordering review.

Moreover, if the case had been decided erroneously, the error

could not be construed as being one apparent on the face of

the record justifying the Court to exercise its power of review

under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) Reliance was also placed on Parison Devi vs. Sumitri Devi

(1997) 8 SCC 715 and it was observed that there is a clear

distinction between an erroneous decision and an error

apparent on the face of the record. While the first can be

corrected by the higher forum, the latter only can be

corrected by exercise of the review jurisdiction. A review

petition has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be

“an appeal in disguise”.

(iii) In Nalagarh Dehati Coop. Transport Society Ltd. vs. Beli

Ram AIR 1981 HP 1, a Full Bench of the Himachal Pradesh

High Court considered the Explanation and held that a

69 subsequent judgment of the Supreme Court or a Larger

Bench of the same Court taking a contrary view on the point

covered by the judgment does not amount to a mistake or

error apparent on the face of the record of the judgment

sought to be reviewed.

(iv) Reference was also made to Gyan Chandra Dwivedi vs. 2nd

ADJ, Kanpur AIR 1987 All 40, in which it was observed

that almost all the High Courts except Kerala High Court

were unanimous in their opinion of the fact that if a point of

law in a judgment has been altered by a subsequent decision

of the superior Court in another case, the same could not

afford a valid ground for the review of the judgment.

(v) Further, with reference to Netaji Cricket Club (supra), on

which reliance has been placed by the review petitioners, it

was observed that the consideration of the exercise of review

jurisdiction in that case, based on a subsequent event was

confined to purely the facts of the said case involving a

controversy between rival Cricket Associations. Hence, it was

opined that the decision in Netaji Cricket Club could not be

applied as a general ratio.

70 While delineating the principles from the aforesaid

judgments, inter alia, the following principles relevant to the

instant cases are reiterated:

i) the expression “any other sufficient reason” appearing in

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC has to be interpreted in light of

other grounds specified in the said provision.

ii) an erroneous order/decision cannot be corrected in the

guise of exercise of power of review.

(h) In a recent judgement dated 18.08.2022 in Civil Appeals Nos.

5503-5504 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 9602-9603 of 2022

along with Civil Appeal No. 5505 of 2022 arising out of SLP (C)

No. 11290 of 2022, a Three-Judge Bench of this Court in the case

of S. Madhusudhan Reddy vs. V. Narayana Reddy (2022) SCC

OnLine SC 1034 had made specific reference to the

aforementioned cases of Chajju Ram vs. Neki AIR 1922 P.C 112

and Moran Mar Basselios Catholics vs. Most Rev. Mar Paulose

Athanasius (supra) wherein the words “any other sufficient

reason appearing in Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC” was defined to

mean “a reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those

specified in the Rule.” In making reference to these cases, the

Three-Judge Bench reiterated that an essential principle for

71 exercising review jurisdiction under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is

that the review will be maintainable for “any other sufficient

reason”, and has narrowed the scope of this ground to mean a

reason sufficient on grounds at least analogous to those specified

in the rule.

(i) In the aforesaid case Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese &

Iron Ores Ltd. & Ors. (2013) 8 SCC 337 has also been adverted

to wherein this Court delineated on some of the grounds as to

when the review will not be maintainable as under: -

“(i) A repetition of old and overruled argument is not enough to reopen concluded adjudications,

(ii) Minor mistakes of inconsequential import,

(iii) Review proceedings cannot be equated with the original hearing of the case,

(iv) Review is not maintainable unless the material error, manifest on the face of the order, undermines its soundness or results in miscarriage of justice,

(v) A review is by no means an appeal in disguise whereby an erroneous decision is re-heard and corrected but lies only for patent error,

(vi) The mere possibility of two views on the subject cannot be a ground for review,

(vii) The error apparent on the face of the record should not be an error which has to be fished out and searched,

72

(viii) The appreciation of evidence on record is fully within the domain of the appellate court, it cannot be permitted to be advanced in the review petition, and

(ix) Review is not maintainable when the same relief sought at the time of arguing the main matter had been negatived.”

47. In fact, in State of Haryana vs. G.D. Goenka Tourism

Corporation Corporation Ltd. (2018) 3 SCC 585, this Court

directed that pending a final decision on making a reference to a

Larger Bench on the interpretation of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013,

the High Courts ought not to deal with any case relating to the said

interpretation. Therefore, between 21.02.2018 till the date of

pronouncement of the judgment by the Larger Bench in Indore

Development Authority i.e., 06.03.2020, the High Courts were

requested not to deal with cases arising under Section 24(2) of the L.A.

Act, 2013, and its applicability to acquisition arising under L.A. Act,

1894, i.e. only insofar as acquisition initiated under L.A. Act, 1894.

But insofar as cases which were decided prior to the aforesaid

directions issued by this Court or the High Court or cases decided

even by this Court on the strength of the dictum in Pune Municipal

Corporation cannot be set at naught between the parties to those

cases. The judgment in Pune Municipal Corporation having been

overruled, it would only lose its value as a precedent subsequent to

73 the dictum of the Larger Bench in Indore Development Authority

and therefore, cannot be cited as a precedent.

48. Hence, in my view, having regard to the scope and ambit of the

Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC, these review petitions are not

maintainable and the judgment and the orders of this Court ought not

be reviewed and the review petitions are liable to be dismissed.

49. It is also important to bear in mind that in various High Courts

across the country following the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation, Writ Petitions have been disposed of and the said

decisions passed in the said writ petitions or intra court appeals, as

the case may be, may have attained finality and binding on the parties

thereto. If these review petitions are allowed and are held to be

maintainable there would be hundreds of review petitions which would

be filed seeking review of the decisions passed by various High Courts

in writ petitions following the judgment in Pune Municipal

Corporation. This would open a Pandora’s Box and upset the binding

nature of the decisions between the parties and be contrary to the

doctrine of finality in litigation.

50. In Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra (supra), a

majority of two Hon’ble Judges in paragraph 217 while opining that,

the judgment rendered in Pune Municipal Corporation and other

74 decisions following Pune Municipal Corporation are per incuriam

observed that the “decisions rendered on the basis of Pune Municipal

Corporation are open to be reviewed in appropriate cases on the basis

of this decision”. However, the Larger Bench in Indore Development

Authority did not observe the above, either in paragraph 365 of the

judgment or any other paragraph. In fact, the reason as to why a

Larger Bench of five Judges was constituted, was because a majority

of 2:1 in Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra had taken a

view that Pune Municipal Corporation was per incuriam and also the

decision in Pune Municipal Corporation was by a Two-Judge Bench.

Therefore, in order to make an authoritative pronouncement on the

question of law concerning the interpretation of Section 24(2) of L.A.

Act, 2013 and since there were many orders passed by this Court

questioning the correctness of the decision in Pune Municipal

Corporation, a Larger Bench of five Judges was constituted by

Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. Now, the unanimous judgment of

the Larger Bench of five Judges holds the field. However, in paragraph

365 of the said judgment or in any other paragraph, there is no

observation that on overruling the decision in Pune Municipal

Corporation as well as all decisions following Pune Municipal

Corporation, the overruled decisions have to be reviewed. The said

observation is conspicuous by its absence obviously for the reason

75 that such a review is impermissible having regard to the Explanation

to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC which aspect has been elaborately

discussed above. In fact, the Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC

has not been noticed by the two learned Judges constituting the

majority in Indore Development Authority vs. Shailendra.

51. There is another aspect which ought to be considered. That in

two matters i.e., in the very case of Pune Municipal Corporation

(decided on 08.02.2018) which has been overruled by Indore

Development Authority (decided on 06.03.2020) by a Bench of three

Judges but the judgment has also been recalled vide Order dated

16.07.2020. Similarly, another judgement dated 31.08.2016 passed by

this Court following Pune Municipal Corporation has been recalled

by order dated 15.02.2022 by this very Bench. I must be forthright in

saying that the recalling of the said Orders/Judgment dated

08.02.2018 and 31.08.2016 was done so in the absence of any

arguments being advanced on the maintainability of review petitions

itself as in the present cases and without taking into consideration the

Explanation to Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. I find that the Explanation to

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is a bar to the very maintainability of these

review petitions in these cases. Hence, before hearing the Civil Appeals

/ Special Leave Petitions on merits, the Orders passed recalling the

76 decision passed earlier would call for reconsideration.

All judgments and orders which have been recalled till date

subsequent to the judgment in Indore Development Authority on the

basis that Pune Municipal Corporation was incorrectly decided are

also not in accordance with law in view of the discussion made above.

52. Having held that the judgments/orders sought to be reviewed by

the petitioners is impermissible in law, the ground realities would also

have to be now taken into consideration on account of the passage of

time. It is noted that Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013 is in the nature

of a saving clause which is evident on a reading of the same, including

the proviso to Sub-Section 2 of Section 24 of the L.A. Act, 2013. The

object is to save the acquisition as far as possible. Possibly taking a

cue from the proviso, this Court in the impugned judgments reserved

liberty to the petitioners herein to initiate acquisition proceedings

afresh within one year in some of the cases failing which the land was

to be returned to the land owners if in possession of the review

petitioners herein. Thus, if no fresh acquisition proceedings are

initiated within the said period of one year by issuing a notification

under Section 11 of the L.A. 2013 Act and if the review petitioners

herein are in possession of the land, the physical possession thereof

shall be returned to original land owners.

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53. In the circumstances, the only relief that can be granted to the

review petitioners/applicants is to extend the period for initiation of

acquisition under the provisions of L.A. Act, 2013 to a period of one

year from today. Till then, in those cases where physical possession of

the land has already been taken over by the acquiring body or has

been handed over to the beneficiary the same shall continue to remain

with the acquiring body or the beneficiary, as the case may be.

54. Thus, only a limited relief is being given to the review

petitioners/applicants and impugned judgments/orders of this Court

are not being reviewed in the review petitions. There is a delay in filing

the same in certain cases. This is owing to the passage of time from

the date of passing the judgments/orders sought to be reviewed and

the uncertainty in the interpretation of Section 24 (2) of L.A. Act, 2013

and due to Covid-19 and one year time being granted to initiate fresh

acquisition, in the impugned order itself. Hence, the said delay is

condoned.

55. Where no such direction has been issued in the impugned orders

and the Special Leave Petitions have been dismissed, the petitioners

are at liberty to initiate fresh acquisition proceedings under the L.A.

Act, 2013, if so advised.

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56. In the result, the review petitions are disposed of in the above

terms.

No costs.

…..……………………J. [B.V. NAGARATHNA] NEW DELHI;

17 MARCH, 2023.

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