Gautam Satnami vs The State Of Chhattisgarh

2026 INSC 325 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1782 OF 2026 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CRIMINAL) NO.11080 OF 2022)

GAUTAM SATNAMI … APPELLANT(S) d

VERSUS

STATE OF CHHATTISGARH ... RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The instant Appeal takes exception to the judgment dated 19.07.2017

passed by the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No.

677 of 2012, whereby the judgment and order dated 28.07.2012 passed by the

Sessions Judge, Rajnandgaon in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2011 was affirmed.

The Trial Court had convicted the sole appellant, Gautam Satnami @ Gautam

Deshlahre, who was accused No. 1, under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,

18601 and sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment with a fine of ₹5,000 and

in case of default in payment of fine to undergo additional rigorous imprisonment

for one year.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.04.07 16:37:06 IST Reason:

1 For short, “IPC”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 1 of 17 FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The deceased, Dhumman @ Surjeet Bhattacharya, resided alone in his

house in village Dhourabhata and was engaged in the business of selling lentils

on his motorbike (Luna). His fufa - Ghasi Ram (PW-16), was residing next to his

house. The deceased was married for 4-5 times, including to one Dharmin Bai

(PW-2), who had returned to her maternal home a few years before the incident

due to disputes with the deceased.

4. In the evening of 13.01.2011, the deceased was consuming liquor in his

house with Girish Satnami (PW-12) and Tejprakash Satnami. At about 7:00

p.m., Dhanraj (PW-3) overheard noises from the deceased’s house, and on

stopping by, saw the appellant and Dwarika Jangde (accused No. 2 since

acquitted) present over there. The appellant had a liquor bottle in his hand and

was abusing the deceased, saying that because of him, the appellant had gone

to jail, and that one day he would kill him. It is said that two years before the

incident, the appellant and the deceased had fought with another villager, Tikam

Sahu, and the deceased had secured bail for him while the appellant had to go

to jail because he was absconding. This spawned an ongoing animosity in their

friendship.

5. It is further the case of the prosecution that on the next day i.e.,

14.01.2011, the accused went to the deceased’s house at night and when the

deceased opened the door, the accused, armed with axes, inflicted multiple

incised injuries on him, resulting in instantaneous death on account of shock

due to excessive haemorrhage. After committing the murder, the accused

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 2 of 17 persons fled from the spot. One Raja Ram Deshlahare (PW-4), riding pillion,

along with Maniram Sahu allegedly saw the appellant with an axe near the

deceased’s house in the headlight of the motorcycle and he found the lights of

the house were also turned on.

6. The deceased’s body was discovered the next day. One Hiraman (PW-1)

saw next morning that the door of the deceased’s house ajar, blood on both the

door and the floor, and the deceased’s corpse partially covered with a bedsheet.

He suspected the appellant for the murder as the appellant had a criminal

antecedent and was having enmity with the deceased for some time. Hiraman

(PW-1) went and informed Ghasi Ram, and they visited the spot. Other villagers

were also informed, after which merg intimation was lodged by the brother-in-

law of the deceased namely, Komal Das (PW-8), against unknown person(s).

Thereafter, the dehati nalishi was registered on the same day around 2:00 p.m.

wherein Komal Das stated that he saw half-open door of the deceased’s house,

blood stains and hair on the door, and clothes and other articles scattered near

the divan bed, as well as the presence of injuries caused by a sharp-edged

weapon on the person of the deceased. Police officials reached the spot, prepared

the inquest panchnama of the dead body, and sent it for post-mortem.

7. After the spot-inspection, a seizure memo was prepared, bearing the

signatures of Komal and Roopdas Sahu (PW-9), wherein the Police recorded that

they collected the blood-stained hairs and soil, liquor bottles, land record in the

name of Tularam Bhattacharya (father of the deceased), a notebook belonging to

the deceased, and the driver’s license of the appellant from the spot. A pair of

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 3 of 17 dusty blue full-pants with ₹7,800 cash in the pocket was also recovered from the

ganj (container).

8. The post-mortem examination, conducted by Dr. Kiran Chandekar (PW-

10), revealed six injuries on the eyes, face, head, chest, shoulder, and finger of

the deceased, and noted skull fractures and extrusion of brain matter. The

medical opinion was that death occurred due to shock caused by excessive

hemorrhage and had taken place 18-24 hours before the autopsy (conducted at

4:30 p.m. on 15.01.2011), putting the time of death approximately between 4:30

p.m. and 10:30 p.m. on the previous day. Finally, First Information Report No.

18 of 2011 was registered under Section 302 IPC against unknown person(s) at

8:30 p.m.

9. Next day i.e., 16.1.2011, the Police took the accused persons into custody

and questioned them. Allegedly, they gave confessional statements on the basis

of which the Police arrested them on 17.1.2011. On 17.1.2011, the Police

conducted seizures and recovered a blood-stained axe and clothes from each of

their houses. After the investigation was completed, a charge-sheet was

submitted and the case was committed for trial before the learned Sessions

Judge, Rajnandgaon. The learned Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 27 of

2011 acquitted accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) but convicted the present

appellant/accused no.1 under Section 302 of the IPC. As stated above, the

appellant had unsuccessfully preferred a criminal appeal before the High Court

challenging his conviction and sentence and now approaches this Court by way

of the instant Appeal.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 4 of 17 SUBMISSIONS

10. Mr. A Sirajudeen, learned senior counsel for the appellant, contended that

the prosecution has failed to present the true origin and genesis of the incident

and that the material contradictions and omissions elicited during cross-

examination, which were favourable to the appellant, were either ignored or

improperly appreciated. Learned senior counsel further urged that most

prosecution witnesses did not support the prosecution’s case vis-à-vis its

material particulars and specifically, that the seizure witnesses themselves

denied signing the seizure memos at the spot and their signatures were only

obtained later. It was also urged that while accused No. 2 was acquitted on the

same circumstantial evidence, the appellant was convicted without any

sustainable distinguishing circumstance. Particular emphasis was placed on the

alleged recovery of the appellant’s driving licence from the scene, which was not

produced along with the charge-sheet and was only later introduced into the

record of the Trial Court. Learned senior counsel thus argued that the

prosecution did not prove the charge under Section 302 of the IPC beyond

reasonable doubt and the conviction is totally unsustainable in law.

11. Per contra, Mr. Praneet Pranav, learned Deputy Advocate General for the

State of Chhattisgarh, submitted that instant case is a proved case of murder. It

was contended that both, the Trial Court and the High Court, correctly

appreciated the evidence on record, and there is no perversity warranting

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution. The prosecution’s case, as

accepted by both Courts, establishes prior enmity between the appellant and the

deceased; a quarrel and threat issued by the appellant on the evening preceding

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 5 of 17 the incident; the presence of the appellant near the deceased’s house on the

night of the incident, carrying an axe, as deposed by Raja Ram; recovery of a

blood-stained axe and clothes pursuant to disclosure under Section 27 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 18722; detection of human blood and human hair on the

seized articles as per the FSL report; and recovery of the driving licence of the

appellant from the spot. It was further submitted that the appellant failed to offer

any plausible explanation under Section 313 of the Cr.PC regarding these

incriminating circumstances, which together form a complete and unbroken

chain pointing to the guilt of the appellant.

ANALYSIS

12. At the outset, it is necessary to acknowledge the well-settled distinction

between criminal appeals as a matter of right under Article 134 of the

Constitution, and the broader, discretionary jurisdiction exercised by this Court

under Article 136. Under Article 134, this Court sits as a regular court of appeal,

but under Article 136, ordinarily limits itself to correcting manifest illegality

and/or grave miscarriage of justice. This is particularly apposite in a case like

the present Appeal, where the Courts below have returned concurrent findings

of guilt.

13. However, it is equally well-settled that any restrictions are not absolute. In

fact, both provisions underline that this Court has the final, Constitutional

responsibility to ensure that justice is done, and hence, the nature and scope of

Court’s powers under Article 136 are not curtailed where the interests of justice

2 For short, “Evidence Act”.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 6 of 17 so require. We may profitably refer to this Court’s observation in the recent case

of Agniraj & Ors. vs. State through Deputy Superintendent of Police, CB-

CID3, wherein precedents on Article 136 were described as “self-imposed

constraints on interference”4 that cannot restrain the Court from taking note of

“...striking features in the evidence which demolish the prosecution’s case.”5

14. Here, the Trial Court itself has noted that “the case of prosecution is based

on the circumstantial evidence and there is no direct evidence in the case.” This

necessarily calls for a careful re-examination of certain incriminating

circumstances, particularly where they expose the chain of evidence to doubt. At

this stage, we may briefly recount the five ‘golden principles’ laid down in Sharad

Birdhi Chand Sarda vs. State of Maharashtra6, i.e.:

I. the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn

should be fully established;

II. the facts so established should be consistent only with the

hypothesis of the guilt of the accused, that is to say. they should not

be explainable on any other hypothesis except that the accused is

guilty;

III. the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature and tendency;

IV. they should exclude every possible hypothesis except the one to be

proved; and

3 2025 INSC 774 4 Id at ¶ 39.

5 Id at ¶ 38.1.

6 1984 INSC 121 at ¶3.3.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 7 of 17 V. there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any

reasonable ground for the conclusion consistent with the innocence

of the accused and must show that in all human probability the act

must have been done by the accused.

15. We observe that the strongest circumstance considered by the Courts

below against the appellant, specifically, is the so-called ‘last-seen’ evidence of

Raja Ram. As discussed above, Raja Ram had deposed that he saw the appellant

near the deceased’s house on the night of the incident, carrying an axe. Raja

Ram and other PWs admit that there were no street lights near the house of the

deceased, and the spot was usually covered in darkness. The identification,

therefore, could only have been made in the light of a motorcycle and possibly,

the light of the house (as stated by Raja Ram). On the latter point, both, Dharmin

Bai and Dhanraj, had stated in their cross-examination that there was no

electricity supply in the deceased’s house. In these circumstances, the conditions

for reliable visual identification at night are certainly doubtful.

16. Moreover, even if Raja Ram’s testimony is accepted at face value, it only

states that the appellant was present near the deceased’s house at about 10:00

p.m. carrying an axe. In this case, the medical evidence has not fixed the time

of death with enough precision so as to conclusively correlate his presence there

with the commission of the offence. Raja Ram himself does not assert that he

saw the appellant enter the house, assault the deceased, or perform any overt

act. The deposition, at best, places the appellant in the vicinity of the spot, not

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 8 of 17 with the deceased, and does not possess the ‘clinching’ or determinative value

that can, by itself, sustain a conviction.

17. We also note that, in his cross-examination, Raja Ram had stated that he

worked together with Maniram and Maniram’s wife, Madhuri Bai, at Bhatiya’s

dairy, and that the appellant had also worked there earlier. During this period,

hostility had developed and the appellant had left the dairy. Raja Ram further

admitted that the animosity between the appellant and Krishna, the elder

brother of Maniram, was to such an extent that Krishna left the village, and also

that Madhuri had earlier lodged a case of eve-teasing against the appellant which

was eventually compromised in Court, though he denied that he was supporting

Maniram and Madhuri due to his “family relationship” with them. Raja Ram also

accepted that he had deposed against the appellant in another case and was

specifically questioned on the point of him and Maniram having given statements

against the appellant in multiple proceedings.

18. A three-Judge Bench of this Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki

& Anr.7 had held:

“5. …’Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. …”

In Md. Rojali Ali & Ors. vs. The State of Assam, Ministry of Home Affairs

through the Secretary8, this Court had further clarified:

“10. …This Court has elucidated the difference between ‘interested’ and ‘related’ witnesses in a plethora of cases,

7 1981 INSC 94.

8 2019 INSC 223

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 9 of 17 stating that a witness may be called interested only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation, which in the context of a criminal case would mean that the witness has a direct or indirect interest in seeing the accused punished due to prior enmity or other reasons, and thus has a motive to falsely implicate the accused. …”

19. Therefore, a ‘related’ witness is not necessarily an ‘interested’ witness, and

an ‘interested’ witness need not be a ‘related’ one. Based on the evidence on

record, it is plausible that a witness such as Raja Ram had the requisite direct

or indirect interest in seeing the appellant punished. His examination-in-chief

and cross-examination disclose circumstances suggesting that he himself, or at

least his ‘group’ or the persons closely associated with him, harboured

longstanding hostility towards the appellant. Therefore, the finding of the Trial

Court that it was “not established that the witness had any animosity with the

accused”, or of the High Court that there is “no reason to disbelieve his

statement”, is not sound. The possibility of Raja Ram being an interested witness

cannot be ruled out, and his testimony, at least without independent

corroboration, cannot sustain the conviction. Besides, we must point out that

the witness’s own conduct also discounts the reliability of his testimony. In his

cross-examination, Raja Ram had admitted that he met the Police on the very

day of the incident; despite this, his statement under Section 161 of the Cr.PC

was recorded only on 14.02.2011 i.e., a month after the occurrence.

20. We now turn to the next major incriminating circumstance relied upon by

the prosecution. Needless to say, under Section 25 of the Evidence Act, any

‘confession’ made to a police officer shall not be admissible at all. The accused

in this case have supposedly given ‘memorandums’ or disclosure statements

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 10 of 17 under Section 27 of Evidence Act. We will examine if the recoveries supposedly

made as a consequence of these statements withstand legal scrutiny.

21. Both accused put forth substantially similar narratives in the respective

disclosure statements. In fact, the language in many places is reproduced

verbatim in both statements, except the conclusions, where they state that the

axe and clothes worn at the time of the incident are concealed in their respective

rooms. The axes and clothes were consequently recovered from these spots.

22. Dr. Chandekar had recommended that the seized axes and clothes be sent

for forensic examination to determine whether the bloodstains present on them

were human, and whether the hair adhering to the axes belonged to the

deceased. It was further opined that the injuries on the deceased had been

inflicted by a hard, sharp-edged object. The FSL report confirmed that it was

human blood that was present on the axes and clothes; however, (i) the blood

group of either the deceased or of the blood present on the weapons or clothes

was not determined; (ii) though it was observed the hair present on the axes was

similar in morphological and microscopical characteristics to the hair recovered

from the spot, no conclusive opinion was given if it belonged to the deceased;

and (iii) there was no definitive link made between the recovered axes and the

deceased’s injuries. In fact, Khuman Sahu (PW-5) had stated in cross-

examination that every farmer in the village kept an axe. In order to bring home

the guilt of the accused, the seized weapons ought to have at least been shown

to the doctor for an opinion as to whether they had caused the injuries in

question.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 11 of 17

23. Now, without even embarking on an independent re-evaluation, we note

that the Trial Court had considered the entire recovery circumstance against

accused No. 2 and acquitted him in the following terms:

“24. On the intimation of the accused Dwarika (No.2), his clothes and axe had been seized by the prosecution and as per the Report Exhibit P-22 from the Forensic Science Lab, blood had been found on thein. There is no evidence on the document regarding the presence of the accused Dwarika on the scene during the incident. It has not been proved that the blood found on the axe and the clothes seized from the· accused Dwarika is human blood and there is not any other circumstances proved against the accused. It has been held in the case of Nehru versus C.G. State, 2005 (1) Manisa 90 (C.G.) that the only circumstance of blood found on the weapon and cloth is enough to connect it to murder. It has been held in the case of Hanumant Govind Nardandurkar Versus State A.I.R 1960 Supreme Court 29 that the link of the circumstances from which the conviction of the accused to be concluded has been proved completely. Even if a single link is missed, so the accused persons cannot be held guilty. It has not been proved that the blood found on the axe seized from the accused was human blood and the said blood was related to the deceased. Therefore on the basis of the only circumstance it cannot be said firmly that the accused Dwarika was involved in the murder of the deceased Dhumman.”

24. We feel this reasoning adopted applies with equal force to the case of the

present appellant. The major distinction between the case of the present

appellant and that of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) is the ‘last-seen’ testimony

of Raja Ram, which, as we have discussed above, does not inspire confidence. If

that circumstance is excluded from consideration, the position of the present

appellant is similar enough to that of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) that it

would be unsafe to sustain the conviction of the former, at least preponderantly

on the basis of this circumstance. In this regard, we refer to the observation

made by this Court in Javed Shaukat Ali Qureshi vs. State of Gujarat9:

“15. When there is similar or identical evidence of eyewitnesses against two accused by ascribing them the same

9 2023 INSC 829.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 12 of 17 or similar role, the Court cannot convict one accused and acquit the other. In such a case, the cases of both the accused will be governed by the principle of parity. This principle means that the Criminal Court should decide like cases alike, and in such cases, the Court cannot make a distinction between the two accused, which will amount to discrimination.”

(emphasis supplied)

This was reaffirmed in Ram Singh vs. State of U.P.10. Therefore, the acquittal

of accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde) persuades us to resolve any doubt vis-à-vis

the recoveries in favour of the present appellant.

25. Separately, we also note the contradictions in the testimonies of the

witnesses to (i) both Section 27 memorandums and (ii) both seizure memos.

(i) Girish and Manna Lal (PW-6) were cited as witnesses to the Section 27

statements made by the accused. Girish stated that suspicion had initially

fallen upon him and that the Police had taken him and the appellant into

custody at the same time and had taken away and kept Girish’s phone for

two days. Interestingly, he also denied that accused No. 2 made any

disclosure to the Police. Manna Lal outright turned hostile and denied that

either accused had disclosed anything and stated that the Police had

caught him and taken his signature on the documents.

(ii) Of the two witnesses to the seizure memos, Khuman essentially

admitted in cross-examination that the seizure memo was not signed

contemporaneously at the place of recovery, as he stated that he affixed

his signature around 2:30-3:00 p.m. when he was en route to another

village. He also stated that the Police told him, “You people have made

10 2024 INSC 128 at ¶32.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 13 of 17 signature on the panchnama, so make your signatures on the seizure also.”

The second witness, Jhumuk Lal (PW-11), was declared hostile, as he said

he had incomplete and no information about the recoveries made from the

present appellant and accused No. 2 (Dwarika Jangde), respectively.

It is evident that the witnesses have either turned hostile or not corroborated the

case of prosecution on any material particulars in relation to the recoveries

beyond just admitting their signatures. Given that both accused continuously

remained in judicial custody throughout the trial, the said hostility and non-

corroboration can also not be attributed to any influence or tampering on their

part. The recovery circumstance, therefore, remains legally tenuous.

26. Moreover, the remaining distinguishing circumstances relied upon the

appellant are also weak and inconclusive. In the interest of completeness, we will

now advert to these circumstances.

27. Much has been made of the alleged recovery of the appellant’s driving

licence from the spot at around 2:00 p.m. on 15.01.2011. This recovery, together

with various villagers’ Section 161 Cr.PC statements, had directed initial

suspicion toward the appellant. Of the two witnesses who signed the seizure

memo, one of them i.e., Komal, has stated that he did not know which articles

the Police recovered from the spot of the incident; only that when he was

standing outside, they showed him the licence and said they were taking it. He

admits he could not identify the owner of the license and was not told who it

belonged to either.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 14 of 17

28. We further observe that the Investigating Officer, Avadh Ram Sahu, (PW-

15) admitted in cross-examination that the driving licence was not mentioned in

or submitted along with the ‘challan’ or charge-sheet and had to be subsequently

called for and exhibited as Article “A”. Later, in his statement under Section 313

of the Cr.PC, the appellant had denied that the licence had been recovered from

the spot and stated that it had instead been taken from his pocket by the Police,

but the Trial Court had said that the “said explanation of the accused [was] not

acceptable,” and had considered it an incriminating circumstance against the

appellant. However, we feel that the aforementioned factors, considered

cumulatively, reinforce that this particular circumstance remains shrouded in

doubt and cannot be relied upon.

29. Even with respect to the circumstance of the alleged altercation during the

evening of 13.01.2011, Girish, who admits to being present in the deceased’s

house that day, did not implicate either of the accused in his Section 164 Cr.PC

statement. Dhanraj, one of the two people whose police statements formed the

basis of the prosecution’s narrative of a prior threat, totally recanted that version

in his deposition. The other witness, Ghasi Ram, similarly turned hostile and

stated that he had closed his shop around 8:00-8:30 p.m. and did not hear

anything before or after. It cannot, therefore, even be proved that the appellant

quarrelled with and issued a threat to the deceased that evening.

30. That leaves only the circumstance of motive. Though not expressly

considered by Trial Court, it is possible accused No. 2’s (Dwarika Jangde) family

relationship with the deceased weighed in his favour. In contrast, with respect

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 15 of 17 to the appellant, there is some material on the record that points to a specific

dispute with the deceased. However, first, the evidence does not establish the

immediacy or gravity of animosity; if anything, it seems the appellant and the

deceased continued to be friends and visit one another, and may even have been

consuming liquor together the evening before the deceased died. Second, motive

is a supporting factor which strengthens an otherwise complete chain of

evidence. It cannot replace such a chain where other circumstances are missing

or weak.

31. Here, the prosecution’s case fails at the threshold itself, as each

circumstance from which guilt is to be inferred is not firmly and fully established.

By way of example, it cannot even be said with certainty that the driving licence

was recovered from the spot in the manner alleged, let alone that its presence

there was consistent only with the hypothesis of guilt. The evidence on record

may raise suspicion, but, suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of

proof. Our considered opinion is that the appellant, like accused No. 2 (Dwarika

Jangde), deserves the benefit of doubt.

CONCLUSION

32. Accordingly, the Appeal is allowed. The judgment dated 19.07.2017 passed

by the High Court of Chhattisgarh in Criminal Appeal No. 677 of 2012 affirming

the judgment and order dated 28.07.2012 passed by the learned Sessions Judge,

Rajnandgaon in Sessions Case No. 27 of 2011, is set aside insofar as it relates

to the appellant, and he is acquitted of the charge under Section 302 IPC. Since

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 16 of 17 he was already on bail pursuant to the order of this Court dated 22.04.2025, his

bail bonds shall stand discharged.

Pending applications are disposed of.

………………………………………J. (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

………………………………………J. (VIPUL M. PANCHOLI)

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 07, 2026.

Criminal Appeal @ SLP (Crl.) No.11080/2022 Page 17 of 17