Fulmati Dhramdev Yadav vs New India Assurance Company Limited

2023INSC790 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4713 OF 2023 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.17963 of 2019)

FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

SANJAY KAROL J.,

1.This appeal is filed at the instance of one Fulmati Dhramdev

Yadav, assailing the judgement passed by the High Court of

Gujarat at Ahmedabad in First Appeal No.3487 of 2013

whereby the Court has set aside the order of the Commissioner

for Workmen Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch), Gujarat in

W.C.F.C. No.08/10 awarding compensation in favour of legal Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

representatives of the deceased employee. NITIN TALREJA Date: 2023.09.04 16:09:41 IST Reason:

2

2.Appellants herein1 are the mother and wife of one Ramakant

Yadav2 who allegedly died on 31st October, 2009 as he was tying

up logs on trailer while in employment as its driver, when one

such log fell on his left leg. He died before any medical

treatment could be given to him.

3.The deceased, allegedly, was an employee of Kutch Carrier

(Sohansing & Sons3), drawing a salary of ₹4000 per month.

4.Such employment of the deceased was denied by the insurer for

lack of production of documents of employment. Neither has

any proof of income of the deceased been produced.

5.The claim of ₹3,94,120/- is denied in the above terms, by the

Insurer-respondents herein.

Order of the Commissioner

6.Feeling aggrieved by the denial of the claim, proceedings were

initiated by the claimants herein before the Commissioner,

Workmen Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch), Gujarat in terms of

W.C.F.C.No.08/10. The Commissioner framed 8 issues for

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the claimants" 2 Hereinafter referred to as " the deceased" 3 Hereinafter referred to as "the employer". Opponent 1 before the Commissioner 3

consideration. The tabular representation below represents the

issues framed, the reasoning thereon and the findings

returned.

S.No Issue Order Reasoning 1. Whether present Affirmative Claimants are dependants applicants are legal heirs and Legal heirs of and dependant of deceased. deceased? 2. Whether deceased was Affirmative FIR in question reveals employee of Employer? name of the deceased as a driver performing duty of Employer. 3. Whether accident Affirmative No document contrary occurred during course of shown by Employer. employment? If yes, then deceased died due to injuries in accident?

4. Whether age is proved at the 35 years & Age affirmed by Driving time of accident? and salary License indicating date of monthly income of ₹4,000/- ₹4,000/- birth as 01-05-74. Also no is proved? adverse evidence shown by Insurer. On salary being ₹4,000/- p.m. reliance was placed on deposition of Ex-

19.

5. Whether opponents are Affirmative Awarded compensation of liable to compensation ₹3,94,120/- on the ground amount? If yes, then what that deceased died during amount? the course and out of employment as ownership truck was also insured by the insurer as per documents placed by the claimant.

6. What is the responsibility Affirmative Deceased was employed as of insurance co.? a driver with the employer on vehicle no. GJ-

12w7670. The vehicle being insured, the insurer was to pay 9% interest 4

from date of accident. 7. Whether opponents are Affirmative Employer while being in negligent to pay knowledge of accident did compensation? If yes, not pay compensation to then are they liable to pay claimant within 30 days of the accident as per the penalty and interest? Workmen Compensation Ac,t hence Penalty @ 50% was imposed amounting to ₹1,97,060/-.

8. What is final order? Affirmative ₹3000/- for expenses and ₹5000/- for funeral expenses to be paid to the claimant.

7.In terms of the above, the Insurer-New India Assurance Co.

Ltd.4 was directed to pay as compensation ₹3,94,120/-with

interest accruing thereupon from the date of the death of the

deceased @9%. The same was to be paid within 30 days of the

order. The employer was directed to pay ₹1,97,060/-, i.e., 50%

of the compensation amount as penalty. Further, it was

directed that the latter would pay ₹8000/- (with breakup of

₹3,000/- and ₹5,000/-) for expenses and funeral expenses,

particularly.

8.Only the Insurer appealed against this order.

First Appeal-Impugned Judgement

9.It may be noted that during the pendency of the First Appeal,

vide an order dated 25th June, 2014 passed in Civil Application

4 Hereinafter referred to as “Insurer” 5

No. 2822 of 2013 the Commissioner was directed to invest 80%

of the amount that was deposited with such authority in

cumulative fixed deposits for an initial period of three years, to

be renewed from time to time and the remaining 20% to be

disbursed to the claimants.

10. Having considered the evidence on record such as an

abstract of the accidental death register of the Gandhigram “A”

division police station, and the cross-examination of the

claimant i.e., wife of the deceased, as well as the other

documents produced, which, the learned Court concluded that

the deceased was neither working with the employer nor on the

date of the occurrence of the incident, received injuries and

died, as a result thereof.

11. Hence, the order of the Commissioner was set aside.

12. Thus, the present appeal.

13. By way of the special leave petition it has been urged

amongst other grounds, that the Court in First Appeal has

transgressed the confines of Section 30 of the Workmen

Compensation Act, 19235; the vehicle in which the logs were 5 Hereafter, the Act 6

stored and thus were being untied, was insured and therefore,

the accident having taken place is within the ambit of the

insurance company’s responsibilities; that the impugned

judgement has left the Claimants remediless and sans any

support since the sole breadwinner of the family had passed

away.

Analysis and Consideration

14. The act governing the present dispute, i.e., the Workmen

Compensation Act, 1923, has been, vide The Workmen’s

Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009, amended, by which

the word “workmen” has been substituted by “employees”

rechristened as the Employees Compensation Act, 1923.

15. What this Court must consider is whether the impugned

judgement is sustainable in law? On merits, the consideration

would be whether the order of the Commissioner, in light of

the materials on record, can stand or not? In other words, the

impugned judgement must stand true on two grounds, (i)

statutory text; and (ii) whether the materials on record

support the conclusion drawn therein or not? 7

16. Appeals within the act are governed by Section 30 which is

extracted below for reference: – “30. Appeals. — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely :—

an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum;

1 [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A;]

(b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment;

(c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased 6 [employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant;

(d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or

(e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions:

Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than 2 [ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, specify]:

Provided, further, that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives effect to an agreement come to by the parties:

3 [Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is 8

accompanied by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.]

(2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days.

(3) The provisions of section 5 of 4 [the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall be applicable to appeals under this section.” (Emphasis Supplied)

17. The Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from an

order of Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists

a substantial question of law to be considered. It has been

observed by this Court that the phrase “substantial question

of law” within this Act shall be understood by its general

meaning.6 When considering the general meaning of this

phrase, naturally, the reference is to the Code of Civil

Procedure (CPC). The rule therein is that framing of a

substantial question of law is of cardinal importance.

18. A bare perusal of the impugned judgement shows that the

Court did not frame any such question.

19. The wording of the Act indicates that the existence of such

a question is a prerequisite to the appeal being entertained.

6 Om Prakash Batish v. Ranjit (2008) 12 SCC 212 (2 judge-bench) 9

20. Illustratively, in North – East Karnataka Road Transport

Corporation v. Sujatha7 (Two-Judge Bench) amongst

numerous other cases, this Court has observed:

“12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular first appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confined only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case.”

21. The other ground making the order under challenge,

amenable to interference when the scope of jurisdiction is

circumscribed by it being exercised only in cases of

“substantial question of law”, is perversity in the findings.

Here, the impugned judgement does not, even remotely, reflect

the observation that the findings arrived at by the

Commissioner are perverse. The difference, between the two

judgements, i.e., the order of the Commissioner and the

judgment in First Appeal, was on the point of the employer-

employee relationship having been established. The

Commissioner held such relationship to have been

established however, the appeal Court observed that

“claimants have clearly failed to prove this aspect”

7 (2019) 11 SCC 514 10

22. It may here only be noted that the Commissioner had not

returned any findings in respect of the validity of non-

availability of the license of the deceased nor was it one of the

questions framed by the Commissioner for consideration. In

such a situation, while exercising powers within the limited

purview allowed by section 30 of the Act, the learned Court

below erred in making observations and giving a holding in

that regard.

23. It has also been observed by this Court that the

Commissioner is the last authority on facts involved in a

case. In Golla Rajamma & Ors. v. Divisional Manager &

Anr.8 (2-Judge Bench) it was observed that “under the

scheme of the Act, the Workmen's Compensation

Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has

thought it fit to restrict the scope of the appeal only to

substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation.

Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial

question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to

reappreciate the evidence and recorded its own findings on 8 (2017) 1 SCC 45 11

percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The

whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the

competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.”

24. Keeping in view the said principles, the impugned

judgement, ex-facie, appears to be in contravention thereto.

25. On merits too, we find that the conclusions arrived at by

the Commissioner, were undoubtedly “a possible view”,

therefore extinguishing the possibility of perversity in

findings.

26. A Bench of two learned Judges observed in C. Manjamma

v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.9 “15. That being the position, the view taken by the Commissioner had been a possible view of the matter in the given set of facts and circumstances; and there was no reason for the High Court to interfere with the same, particularly when the case did not involve any substantial question of law within the meaning of Section 30 of Employees Compensation Act, 1933.”

27. From the materials available on record before the

Commissioner as described in the order, it certainly will not

be an improbable, much less an impossible, conclusion that

the deceased was on the pay-roll of the employer. Prima facie,

the question that arises and remains un-addressed

throughout was, as to what the deceased was doing with the 9 (2022) 6 SCC 206 12

trolley as also the goods laden on it, which he was tying or

untying at the time of his death. Second, the affidavit placed

before the Commissioner categorically stated that deceased

was an employee of the employer. It has been noted by the

Commissioner, in his consideration of the second issue that,

no written statement had been filed nor had the version of

the Applicants been challenged by the employer; and even

though the Respondents herein had denied the facts as stated

in the petition and cross examined the Applicants, “but no

adverse facts proved” by and “no adverse document produced”

by the Insurer to rebut the contents of the claim petition

28. Additionally, having gone through the record we find that in

the Panchnama of the place of occurrence10, it has been

recorded that there was only one person present at the spot.

He was Sunilbhai Ramjibhai Ahir and was serving as a

supervisor in the company of the employer. The inquest

panchnama form11 also names the employer company. The

address mentioned, with which the deceased was associated

as also the person who has identified the corpse of the

10 Annexure P – 1 at page 23 11 annexure P – 6 at page 9 of application to place on record additional documents 13

deceased, for both of them it corresponds to that of the

employer company.

29. The circumstances, i.e., the presence of the deceased at

the spot; the ownership of the trolley and the goods loaded

therein; the presence of this supervisor of the employer

company; and details mentioned in the inquest panchnama

form, when considered together, point to the aspect of the

deceased person being on the roll of the employer.

30. It is well-established that the Act is a social welfare

legislation and, therefore, it must be given a beneficial

construction. Matters thereunder are to be adjudicated with

due process of law and also with a keen awareness of the

scope and intent of the act. This Court has, time and again,

reiterated this principle. We may refer to K. Sivaraman v. P.

Sathishkumar12 wherein, speaking for the Court, Dr. D.Y

Chandrachud J., observed: – “25. The 1923 Act is a social beneficial legislation and its provisions and amendments thereto must be interpreted in a manner so as to not deprive the employees of the benefit of the legislation. The object of enacting the Act was to ameliorate the hardship of economically poor employees who were exposed to risks in work, or occupational hazards by providing a cheaper and quicker machinery for compensating them with pecuniary benefits. The amendments to the 1923 Act have been 12 (2020) 4 SCC 594 14

enacted to further this salient purpose by either streamlining the compensation process or enhancing the amount of compensation payable to the employee.”

(Emphasis supplied)

31. It may be noted that the Commissioner had not returned

any findings in respect of the validity or invalidity of the

license of the deceased nor was it one of the questions framed

by the Commissioner for consideration. In such a situation,

while exercising powers within the limited purview allowed by

Section 30 of the Act, the learned Court below erred in

making observations and giving a holding in that regard.

32. In the facts at hand, with the cumulative sum of

circumstances pointing to the employment of the deceased

with the employer company; in keeping with the principles of

the legislation being intended for social welfare and protection

of employees; the Commissioner being the last authority on

facts; the scope of an appeal under the said Act being limited

only to substantial questions of law; and no perversity could

be demonstrated from the order of the Commissioner, we set

aside the order passed in First Appeal No.3487 of 2013. The

Appeal is allowed.

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33. As a consequence thereof, the order passed by the

Commissioner, Workmen Compensation Act, Bhuj (Kutch),

Gujarat in W.C.F.C.No.08/10 is restored. The amount as

deposited, per this order (the remaining 80%, after the release

of 20% of the sum awarded being ordered by the Court below in

Civil Application No.12822 of 2013 vide order dated 25 th June,

2014) and placed in cumulative fixed deposits, shall become

payable to the claimants forthwith, in compliance of the terms

and conditions set out therein.

34. Parties to bear their own costs.

35. Interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

…..………………..J. (ABHAY S. OKA)

…………………….J. (SANJAY KAROL)

Dated: 04 September 2023 Place: New Delhi