Fulj1T Kaur vs State Of Punjab & Ors

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Respondents

JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

1. This is a unique case which reveals that an influential

person can have allotment of a residential plot in discretionary

quota within 48 hours of submission of application and then

assert in Court that she has a right to have a land on a

throwaway price and not to deposit the sale price for quarter of

a century.

2. This appeal has been preferred against a Judgment and

Order dated 21.12.1999 in Writ Petition No. 4763 of 1992 of

the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh, dismissing the petition against the Demand Notice of

additional price for residential plot.

3. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that

the appellant made an application on 23.02.1987 for allotment

of a residential plot in Urban Estates, SAS Nagar, Punjab. The

Administration, vide letter dated 25.02.1987, issued the

allotment letter in favour of the appellant in respect of plot No.

702, measuring 400 sq. yards in Sector 70 Urban Estate SAS

Nagar, making it clear that as the proper calculation could not

be made and tentative price had not been determined, the

allottee has to deposit provisional price of Rs. 93000/- in four

installments upto 15.10.1989. Subsequently, vide letter dated

25.03.1992, additional demand of Rs. 2,19,000/- was made,

however, instead of depositing the said amount, appellant

challenged the said Demand Notice by filing Writ Petition No.

4763 of 1992 before the High Court of Punjab & Haryana

contending that the additional demand was arbitrary and

unreasonable. A large number of similar cases were also

pending before the High Court and some had earlier been

disposed of. However, the Writ Petition filed by the appellant has been dismissed by the High Court vide impugned

Judgment and Order dated 21.12.1999 upholding the demand

dated 25.03.1992. Hence this appeal.

4. Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellant, has submitted that the High Court committed

an error in dismissing the said Writ Petition relying upon the

Judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh & Ors. Vs. Haryana

Urban Development Authority & Ors. (1996) 8 SCC 756. In

D.S. Laungia & Anr. Vs. The State of Punjab & Ors. AIR

1993 Pub.&Har. 54, such unreasonable and arbitrary demand

had been quashed by the High Court and the State

Government was issued direction to re-determine the amount

taking into consideration the provisions of the Punjab Urban

Estate (Sale of Sites) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter called as, "the

Rules") and provisions of Punjab Urban Estates (Development

and Regulation) Act, 1964 (hereinafter called as, "the Act").

The said Judgment has attained finality as the State had

preferred Special Leave Petition against the said Judgment &

Order before this Court but later on, it was withdrawn. After

re-determining the additional price, no recovery has been made from Sh. D.S. Laungia till date. Therefore, the appeal

deserves to be allowed.

5. On the other hand, Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned

counsel appearing for the respondent vehemently opposed the

appeal contending that the High Court has rightly relied upon

the Judgment in Preeta Singh (supra). In D.S. Laungia

(supra), the State Government, being aggrieved, had

challenged the said Judgment and Order before this Court by

filing the Special Leave Petition but it was withdrawn for

certain reasons. Therefore, it cannot be held that the

Judgment in D.S. Laungia (supra) stood approved by this

Court. Calculations had been made strictly in consonance

with the Statutory provisions of the Act and the Rules,

particularly taking note of Rule 2(aa) and 2(e) of the Rules and

it is to be recovered from D.S. Laungia also. The High Court

was fully satisfied regarding determination of the additional

price and therefore, no fault can be found with impugned

Judgment and Order. Hence, the appeal is liable to be

dismissed.

6. We have considered the rival submissions made by

learned counsel for the parties and perused the record.

7. The questions do arise as to whether such an order of

withdrawal passed by this Court amounts to

confirmation/approval of the judgment and order of the High

Court and as to whether appellant could be treated differently.

8. There is no dispute to the settled proposition of law that

dismissal of the Special Leave Petition in limine by this Court

does not mean that the reasoning of the judgment of the High

Court against which the Special Leave Petition has been filed

before this Court stands affirmed or the judgment and order

impugned merges with such order of this Court on dismissal

of the petition. It simply means that this Court did not

consider the case worth examining for the reason, which may

be other than merit of the case. Nor such an order of this

Court operates as res judicata. An order rejecting the Special

Leave Petition at the threshold without detailed reasons

therefore does not constitute any declaration of law or a

binding precedent. [Vide The Workmen of Cochin Port Trust Vs. The Board of Trustees of the Cochin Port Trust & Anr.

AIR 1978 SC 1283; Ahmedabad Manufacturing & Calico

Printing Co. Ltd. Vs. The Workmen & Anr. AIR 1981 SC

960; Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. Vs. State of Bihar & Ors.

AIR 1986 SC 1780; Supreme Court Employees' Welfare

Association Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 334;

Yogendra Narayan Chowdhury & Ors. Vs. Union of India &

Ors. AIR 1996 SC 751; Union of India & Anr. Vs. Sher

Singh & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1796; V.M. Salgaocar & Bros. (P)

Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax AIR 2000 SC 1623;

Saurashtra Oil Mills Assn., Gujrat Vs. State of Gujrat &

Anr. AIR 2002 SC 1130; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Jaipal

Singh (2004) 1 SCC 121; and Y. Satyanarayan Reddy Vs.

Mandal Revenue Officer, Andhra Pradesh (2009) 9 SCC

447].

9. In State of Maharashtra Vs. Digambar AIR 1995 SC

1991, this Court considered a case wherein against the

judgment and order of the High Court, special leave petition

was not filed but when other matters were disposed of by the

High Court in terms of its earlier judgment, the Authorities approached this Court challenging the correctness of the

same. It was submitted in that case that if the State

Authorities had accepted the earlier judgment and given effect

to it, it was not permissible for the Authority to challenge the

subsequent judgments/orders passed in terms of the earlier

judgment which had attained finality. This Court repealed the

contention observing that the circumstances for non-filing the

appeals in some other or similar matters or rejection of the

SLP against such Judgment in limine by this Court, in some

other similar matters by itself, would not preclude the State

Authorities to challenge the other orders for the reason that

non-filing of such SLP and pursuing them may seriously

jeopardize the interest of the State or public interest.

10. In Kunhayammed & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR

2000 SC 2587, this Court reconsidered the issue and some of

the above referred judgments and came to the conclusion that

dismissal of special leave petition in limine by a non-speaking

order may not be a bar for further reconsideration of the case

for the reason that this Court might not have been inclined to

exercise its discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution. The declaration of law will be governed by Article 141 where

the matter has been decided on merit by a speaking judgment

as in that case doctrine of merger would come into play. This

Court laid down the following principles:-

"(i) Where an appeal or revision is provided against an order passed by a court, tribunal or any other authority before superior forum and such superior forum modifies, reverses or affirms the decision put in issue before it, the decision by the subordinate forum merges in the decision by the superior forum and it is the latter which subsists, remains operative and is capable of enforcement in the eye of law.

(ii) The jurisdiction conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution is divisible into two stages. The first stage is upto the disposal of prayer for special leave to file an appeal. The second stage commences if and when the leave to appeal is granted and the special leave petition is converted into an appeal.

(iii) Doctrine of merger is not a doctrine of universal or unlimited application. It will depend on the nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject-matter of challenge laid or capable of being laid shall be determinative of the applicability of merger. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment-decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter.

(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a non-speaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties."

11. The Court came to the conclusion that where the matter

has been decided by a non-speaking order in limine the party

may approach the Court for reconsideration of the case in

exceptional circumstances.

12. In view of the above, in the fact-situation of the case in

D.S. Laungia (supra), question of application of doctrine of

merger did not arise and even by no stretch of imagination it

can be held that this Court has approved the judgment in D.S.

Laungia (supra), rather a different view is required to be

taken in view of the fact that this Court had expressed doubts

about the correctness of the impugned Judgment by making

the following observations :-

"In the instant matter as also in the matters enumerated in the letter of Mr. G.K. Bansal, Advocate for the petitioners dated January 25, 1994, seeking withdrawal of all these matters, we are constrained to remark that no reasons have been assigned as to why the State of Punjab is submitting to the impugned orders of the High Court which prima facie appear to us to be unsustainable. The direct result of the withdrawal would not only be compounding to an illegality but would otherwise cause tremendous loss to the State exchequer. We, therefore, direct that the reasons which impelled the State to seek withdrawal of these matters be placed before us in the form of an affidavit by the Chief Secretary, Punjab or the Secretary of the Department concerned justifying the step for seeking withdrawal." (Emphasis added)

13. The respondent cannot claim parity with D.S. Laungia

(supra) in view of the settled legal proposition that Article 14 of

the Constitution of India does not envisage for negative equality. Article 14 is not meant to perpetuate illegality or

fraud. Article 14 of the Constitution has a positive concept.

Equality is a trite, which cannot be claimed in illegality and

therefore, cannot be enforced by a citizen or court in a

negative manner. If an illegality and irregularity has been

committed in favour of an individual or a group of individuals

or a wrong order has been passed by a Judicial Forum, others

cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the higher or superior court

for repeating or multiplying the same irregularity or illegality

or for passing wrong order. A wrong order/decision in favour

of any particular party does not entitle any other party to

claim the benefits on the basis of the wrong decision. Even

otherwise Art.14 cannot be stretched too far otherwise it would

make function of the administration impossible. [vide

Coromandel Fertilizers Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. AIR

1984 SC 1772; Panchi Devi Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

(2009) 2 SCC 589; and Shanti Sports Club & Anr. Vs. Union

of India & Ors. (2009) 15 SCC 705].

14. Thus, even if some other similarly situated persons have

been granted some benefit inadvertently or by mistake, such order does not confer any legal right on the petitioner to get the

same relief. (Vide Chandigarh Administration & Anr Vs. Jagjit

Singh & Anr., AIR 1995 SC 705; Smt Sneh Prabha Vs. State

of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 540; Jalandhar Improvement

Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347; State of Bihar

& Ors. Vs. Kameshwar Prasad Singh & Anr., AIR 2000 SC

2306; Union of India & Ors. Vs. Rakesh Kumar, AIR 2001 SC

1877; Yogesh Kumar & Ors. Vs. Government of NCT Delhi &

Ors., AIR 2003 SC 1241; Union of India & Anr. Vs.

International Trading Company & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 3983;

M/s Anand Button Ltd. Vs. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR

2005 SC 565; K.K. Bhalla Vs. State of M.P. & Ors., AIR 2006

SC 898; and Maharaj Krishan Bhatt & Anr. Vs. State of

Jammu & Kashmir & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 24).

15. In view of the above, the submissions made by Shri

Hansaria, Amicus Curiae in this regard are preposterous and

not worth consideration.

16. In the instant case, the High Court has taken into

consideration all statutory provisions and calculations made by the respondents as under what circumstances the

"tentative- price" had been fixed and reached the conclusion

that the demand was justified. The Court also rejected the

submissions made on behalf of the allottees that judgment in

D.S. Laungia (supra) was an authority on the issue.

17. Rules 2(aa), 2(e), 4 and 5 of the Rules which have direct

bearing on the questions raised in this appeal read as under:

"2(aa)- `Additional Price' means such sum of money as may be determined by the State Government, in respect of the sale of a site by allotment, having regard to the amount of compensation by which the compensation awarded by the Collector for the land acquired by the State Government of which the site sold forms a part, is enhanced by the Court on a reference made under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, and the amount of cost incurred by the State Government in respect of such reference.

2(e)- `tentative price' means such sum of money as may be determined by the State Government from time to time, in respect of the sale of a site by allotment, having regard among other matters, to the amount of compensation awarded by the Collector under Land Acquisition Act, 1894 for the land acquired by the State Government of which the site sold forms a part.

4. Sale Price:- In the case of sale of a site by allotment the sale price shall be:

(a) where such site forms part of the land acquired by the State Government under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894; and

(i) no reference under Section 18 thereof is made against the award of the Collector of such reference having been made has failed, the tentative price.

(ii) On a reference made under Section 18 thereof the compensation awarded by the Collector is enhanced by the Court. The aggregate of the tentative price and the additional price;

(b) in any other case, such final price as may be determined by the State Government from time to time.

(2) In case of sale of site by auction the sale price shall be such reserve price as may be recommended by the State Government from time to time or any higher price determined as a result of bidding in an open auction.

5-A: Liability to pay additional price.

(1) In the case of sale of site by allotment the transferee shall be liable to pay to the State Government in addition to the tentative price, the additional price, if any determined in respect thereto under these rules.

(2) The additional price shall be payable by the transferee within a period of thirty days of the date of demand made in this behalf by the Estate Officer.

Provided that the Chief Administrator may in a particular case, and for reasons to be recorded in writing allow the applicant to make payment of the said amount within a further period not exceeding thirty days."

18. A perusal of the above quoted rules shows that the

"tentative price" means the price determined by the State

Government from time to time in respect of a sale of site by

allotment and while doing so, the Government has to take into

consideration various factors including the amount paid as

compensation.

19. The phrase `additional price' has been defined as the

price determined by the State Government having regard to

the enhanced compensation payable to the land owners in

pursuance of the award passed by the court on a reference

made under Section 18 or further appeal under the Act 1894.

The sale price is the price payable in respect of an allotment of

site. If the site sold by the competent authority forms part of

the land acquired by the State Government under the Act

1894 and no reference under Section 18 thereof is made

against the award of the Collector or such reference having

been made has failed, the sale price is the tentative price as

defined in Rule 2(e) of the Rules but if the compensation awarded by the Collector is enhanced by the court on a

reference made under Section 18 of the Act 1894, then the

sale price means the aggregate of the tentative price and the

additional price. If the site allotted by the competent authority

does not form part of the land acquired by the State

Government under the Act 1894, then the sale price would

mean such final price as may be determined by the State

Government. However, there is nothing in the scheme of the

Act 1964 and the rules from which it can be inferred that

tentative price is synonymous with the provisional price, and

that a person, to whom the plot has been allotted on

provisional price, cannot be asked to pay the tentative price

determined by the government. There is a difference between

the "provisional price" and the "tentative price" and it may

take a long time for the State to determine the tentative price.

20. In the instant case, the calculations had been furnished

by the respondents as on what basis tentative price had been

determined.

A. Cost of land

1. Cost of land per acre of Sector 70 SAS Nagar Rs.90,000/-

2. Solatium charges @30% Rs.27,000/-

3. Interest charges from the date of Notification till the date of Award @12% from 1980 to 1984 for 4 Years Rs.43,000/-

4. Interest charges 15% from 1984 to 1990 for 6 years on the cost of land Rs.1,44,180/-

______________

Rs.3,04,380/-

B. Cost of Internal and External Development

1. Water Supply @ Rs.1.35 lacs. Rs.1,35,000/-

2. Sewerage @ Rs.59,000/- Rs. 59,000/-

3. Sterm Water @ Rs.1,32,000/- Rs. 1,32,000/-

4. Roads @ Rs.55,000/- per acre Rs. 55,000/-

5. Bridges & Others @Rs.11,000/-per acre Rs. 11,000/-

6. Horticulture @ Rs.36,000/- per acre Rs. 36,000/-

7. Street lightening @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-

8. Electrification @Rs.15,000/-per acre Rs. 15,000/-

9. Conservancy charges @Rs.9,000/-per acre Rs. 9,000/-

10. Utility services @Rs.20,000/-per acre Rs. 20,000/-

11. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads for 5 years @ Rs.63,000/- per acre Rs. 63,000/-

12. Maintenance of Public Health service @ Rs.39,000/- per acre Rs. 39,000/-

13. Maintenance & Re-surfacing of roads Beyond 5 years @Rs.45,000/- per acre Rs. 45,000/-

14. Division of H.T. Line@ Rs.7,000/- per acre Rs. 7,000/-

15. Earth Filling @Rs.10,000/- per acre Rs. 10,000/-

_______________ Rs.6,51,000/-

C.(Establishment charges@14% + 3% on the cost of land. Rs. 51,745/-

(ii) Interest charges @1% for plotable area(55%)Rs. 2,662/-

(iii) Interest charges for 3 years @10% each Year on development charges Rs.1,51,200/-

(iv) Unforeseen charges as well as escalation Charges @10% Rs.1,16,098/-

__________________ Total expenditure per acre Rs.12,77,064/-

Total Expenditure of 306.59 acres of land Acquired for Sector 70 SAS Nagar Rs.39,15,34,824/- Saleable area 6,74,233 Sq.yds.

Rate per sq.yd. 39,15,34,824 = Rs.580/-

6,74,233

21. The plots measuring 100 sq.yds. were to be allotted at

tentative price calculated at subsidized rate of 10% less than

the reserve price while plots measuring 150, 200 and 250

sq.yds. were to be allotted at tentative price equal to the

reserve price. The plots measuring 300 and 400 sq.yds. area

are to be allotted at tentative price equal to 1-1/2 times of the

reserve price and plots measuring 500 sq.yds. were to be

allotted at tentative price equal to double the reserve price.

Taking the overall position into account, the Government fixed

the reserve price at Rs.520/- per sq.yd. for calculating the

tentative prices, in the above manner, for plots of various

sizes.

22. There is nothing on record to show that the

tentative price determined by the State could be

unreasonable or arbitrary and it is not the case of the

allottee that the market value of the land has not been

enhanced while deciding the reference under the Act 1894.

While deciding this case, the High Court placed heavy reliance

upon the judgment of this Court in Preeta Singh (supra)

wherein after taking note of various statutory provisions of

Act 1964 and Rules 1965, particularly, Rule 2(aa) and sale

price as determined in Rule 4, this Court came to the following

conclusion:

"7. A conjoint reading of the above Rules would clearly indicate that the allottee is liable to pay a sale price including the additional price and the cost incurred and also the cost of improvement of the sites. It is to be remembered that the respondent HUDA is only a statutory body for catering to the housing requirement of the persons eligible to claim for allotment. They acquire the land, develop it and construct buildings and allot the buildings or the sites, as the case may be. Under these circumstances, the entire expenditure incurred in connection with the acquisition of the land and development thereon is required to be borne by the allottees when the sites or the buildings sold after the development are offered on the date of the sale in accordance with the regulations and also conditions of sale. It is seen that in the notice dated 9-8-1990, the total area, net area, the payable amount for the gross acreage, the acreage left for the developmental purpose, balance recoverable from the plot-holders, plot-table area have been given for each of the areas and recovery rate also has been mentioned under the said notice. Under these circumstances, there is no ambiguity left in the calculations. If, at all, the appellants had got any doubt, they would have approached the authority and sought for further information. It is not the case that they had sought the information and the same was withheld. Under these circumstances, we do not find any illegality in the action taken by the respondents. The High Court, therefore, was right in refusing to interfere with the order."

23. In Bangalore Development Authority Vs. Syndicate

Bank (2007) 6 SCC 711, this Court, while considering a

similar issue, laid down large number of principles including

the following : -

"Where the plot/flat/house has been allotted at a tentative or provisional price, subject to final determination of price on completion of the project (that is acquisition proceedings and development activities), the development authority will be entitled to revise or increase the price. But where the allotment is at a fixed price, and a higher price or extra payments are illegally or unjustifiably demanded and collected, the allottee will be entitled to refund of such excess with such interest, as may be determined with reference to the facts of the case."

24. In Tamil Nadu Housing Board & Ors. Vs. Sea Shore

Apartments Owners' Welfare Association (2008) 3 SCC 21,

while deciding the similar issue, this Court held as under :-

"So far as price is concerned, in 1991, when the names of applicants were registered, it was clarified that the price indicated was 'tentative price' and it was subject to 'final price' being fixed by the Board. In any case when the scheme was altered from seven types to fifteen types flats, it was stated that the amount shown was merely tentative selling price. The intending purchasers, therefore, were aware of the fact that the final price was to be fixed by the Board. In fact an agreement to that effect was executed by all prospective allottees wherein they agreed that they would pay the amount which would be finally fixed by the Board................In the circumstances, it cannot be said that the allottees were not aware of the above condition and they were compelled to make payment and thus were treated unfairly or unreasonably by the Board."

25. The instant case is squarely covered by the aforesaid

Judgments of this Court and particularly, Preeta Singh

(supra) and in view thereof, the appeal is liable to be

dismissed.

26. Before parting with the case, it may be pertinent to

mention here that the allotment had been made to the appellant within 48 hours of submission of her application

though in ordinary cases, it takes about a year. Appellant had

further been favoured to pay the aforesaid provisional price of

Rs. 93,000/- in four installments in two years, as is evident

from the letter dated 8.4.1987. Making the allotment in such

a hasty manner itself is arbitrary and unreasonable and is hit

by Article 14 of the Constitution. This Court has consistently

held that "when a thing is done in a post-haste manner,

malafide would be presumed." Anything done in undue haste

can also be termed as "arbitrary and cannot be condoned in

law." [vide Dr. S.P. Kapoor Vs. State of Himachal Pradesh &

Ors. AIR 1981 SC 2181; Madhya Pradesh Hasta Shilpa Vikas

Nigam Ltd. Vs. Devendra Kumar Jain & Ors. (1995) 1 SCC

638; Bahadursinh Lakhubhai Gohil Vs. Jagdishbhai M.

Kamalia & Ors. AIR 2004 SC 1159; and Zenit Mataplast P.

LTd. Vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2009)10 SCC 388].

Thus, such an allotment in favour of the appellant is

liable to be declared to have been made in arbitrary and

unreasonable manner. However, we are not inclined to take

such drastic steps as the appellant has developed the land

subsequent to allotment.

27. We further find no force in submission made by Sh. Vijay

Hansaria, Sr. Advocate, that in spite of making recalculation

in view of the directions issued by the High Court in the case

of D.S. Laungia (supra), State could not make any recovery

from Sh. Laungia. This Court, vide order dated 20.05.2010,

asked the respondents to explain this aspect and file an

affidavit of the Administrator of the Authority. In response

thereto, an Affidavit had been filed by the Chief Administrator,

Greater Mohali Development Authority, explaining the entire

position in respect of the allotment and recovery of dues

furnishing all details and according to this Affidavit, the

money is being recovered from all defaulters including Shri

D.S. Laungia along with interest.

28. In view of the above, we find no force in the appeal, it

lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed. No order as to

costs.

......

.................................J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN) .......................................J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June 3, 2010.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3546 OF 2007

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Appellants

VERSUS

COL. KULDEEP SINGH .... Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

We have heard Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant. In spite of notice, respondent did

not enter appearance. We requested Sh. Vijay Hansaria,

learned senior counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court

as Amicus Curiae.

For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 5292 of

2004 (Smt. Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) decided

on this date, the appeal stands allowed. Judgment and Order

of the High Court dated 06.12.2006 is set aside and the Demand Notice is upheld. The appellant is entitled to make

recovery in accordance with law.

.......................................J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......................................J. (SWATANTER KUMAR) New Delhi, June 3, 2010.

2 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3392 OF 2007

STATE OF PUNJAB & ORS. .... Appellants

VERSUS

G.S. RANDHAWA .... Respondent

JUDGMENT

Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.

We have heard Ms. Rachna Joshi Issar, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant. In spite of notice, respondent did not

enter appearance. We requested Sh. Vijay Hansaria, learned senior

counsel for the respondent, to assist the Court as Amicus Curiae.

For the reasons recorded in Civil Appeal No. 5292 of 2004

(Smt. Fuljit Kaur Vs. State of Punjab & Ors.) decided on this

date, the appeal stands allowed. Judgment and Order of the High

Court dated 06.12.2006 is set aside and the Demand Notice is upheld. The appellant is entitled to make recovery in accordance

with law.

.......................................J. (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)

.......................................J. (SWATANTER KUMAR)

New Delhi, June 3, 2010.

2