Food Corporation Of India vs Abhijit Paul

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8572­8573/2022 ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 16009­16010 OF 2019

FOOD CORPORATION OF INDIA & ORS. ....APPELLANT(S) VERSUS ABHIJIT PAUL …RESPONDENT(S) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8574­8579/2022 ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 16063­16068 OF 2019 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8580­8581/2022 ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 4045­4046 OF 2021

JUDGMENT

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Food Corporation of India1, the Appellant herein, procures and

distributes foodgrains across the length and breadth of the country Signature Not Verified

as a part of its statutory duties. In the process, it enters into many Digitally signed by Rajni Mukhi Date: 2022.11.18 16:46:28 IST Reason:

contracts with transport contractors. In one such contract, the 1 hereinafter referred to as ‘Corporation’.

Page 1 of 24 subject matter of present appeals, the Corporation empowered itself

(under clause XII (a)) to recover damages, losses, charges, costs and

other expenses suffered due to the contractors’ negligence from the

sums payable to them. The short question arising for consideration

is whether the demurrages imposed on the Corporation by the

Railways can be, in turn, recovered by the Corporation from the

contractors as “charges” recoverable under clause XII (a) of the

contract. In other words, does contractors’ liability for “charges”, if

any, include demurrages?

3. The Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court of

Tripura have held that demurrages cannot be recovered as a charge

by the Corporation. After examining the contract in its entirety,

including its nature and scope, we conclude that the parties did not

intend to include liability on account of demurrages as part and

parcel of the expression “charges”. The liability of the contractors in

the present contracts is clearly distinguishable from other contracts

entered into by the FCI in 2010 and 2018, having a different scope

and objective. Because of our conclusions, we have upheld the

judgments of the High Court and dismissed the appeals filed by the

Page 2 of 24 Corporation. Before considering the submissions, analysis and the

conclusions, we will refer to the necessary facts and contractual

provisions.

4. There are three appeals. In the first set of appeals arising out

of Special Leave Petition Nos. 16009­16010 of 2019, the

Corporation notified a Tender inviting a bid from road transport

contractors for transporting foodgrains from railway siding,

Churaibari in Assam, to Food Security Depot Chandrapur in

Tripura, on a regular basis for a period of two years. The

Respondent – Mr. Abhijit Paul, was selected as the successful

tenderer2. He deposited an amount of Rs. 44,95,000/­ towards the

security deposit, leading to the execution of the contract 3. The

Corporation awarded several such Work Orders to the Respondent

and also to other contractors for transportation of foodgrains

between its multiple Food Security Depots.

5. The contract was discharged by performance by July 2014.

More than a year thereafter, by a letter dated 22.12.2015 followed

by a Notice dated 29.11.2016, the Corporation called upon the 2 hereinafter referred to as ‘contractor’.

3 Contract No. Cont.9/NEFR/TC/CBZ­CDR/2011 dated 25.04.2012, hereinafter referred to as ‘Work Order’ or the ‘contract’.

Page 3 of 24 contractor to reimburse the amount of demurrages imposed on it by

the Railways. As this demand was bereft of any reason and rightly

objected to, it was followed by another letter dated 27.06.2017 by

the Corporation. In this letter, the Corporation explained that it had

incurred heavy losses on account of demurrages due to the

contractor’s inability to readily provide trucks at railway sidings,

inhibiting the Corporation from unloading foodgrains from railway

wagons within the “free time” specified by the Railways. The

Corporation sought to recover the demurrages from the contractor

by withholding the security deposit tendered under the Work Order.

6. The contractor objected to this unilateral action, contending

that there was no power to recover demurrages under the Work

Order. Being unsuccessful in pursuing the Corporation to withdraw

the letters, demand and the unilateral action, the contractor filed a

writ petition4 before the High Court of Tripura for quashing the

illegal and arbitrary action.

7. This writ petition was allowed by the Single Judge of High

Court. It clarified that the Corporation was only entitled to recover

4 WP No. 1351 of 2016. Page 4 of 24 losses that were incurred due to the contractor’s dereliction of

duties under the contract, as permissible under Section 73 of the

Indian Contract Act 1872, which provides for recovery of damages

for the breach of a contract. This would not permit the recovery of

losses that were causally distant from the contractor’s actions.

Further, it held that the Corporation had unilaterally determined

and imposed demurrages on the contractor, and directed it to settle

its claims through a civil suit of recovery. The Corporation filed a

writ appeal5 and the Division Bench of the High Court by its order

dated 07.09.2018 dismissed the same on the ground of delay. A

Review Petition6 filed by the Corporation was also dismissed by the

Division Bench of the High Court on 22.01.2019. The present

appeals are against the orders in the writ appeal as well as in the

review.

8. The second set of civil appeals are also filed by the

Corporation. It arises out of Special Leave Petition Nos. 16063­

16068 of 2019 and it impugns the decision of the Division Bench of

the High Court of Tripura dated 15.05.2019. Therein, the High

5 Writ Appeal No. 56 of 2018. 6 Review Petition No. 02 of 2019.

Page 5 of 24 Court similarly dismissed the writ appeals on the ground that the

Corporation had no power to recover demurrages from contractors

under the clauses of the contract therein.

9. The third set of civil appeals, arising out of Special Leave

Petition Nos. 4045­4046 of 2021, are filed by the contractors. They

have challenged the orders of the Division Bench of the High Court

of Tripura dismissing their writ appeals7 and upholding the decision

of the Single Judge of the High Court dated 25.11.2019, directing

the contractors to avail alternative remedies.

10. Submission of Parties: Shri Neeraj Kishan Kaul, learned Senior

Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant started his

submissions preempting a preliminary objection about the

dismissal of a Special Leave Petition against an adverse order of the

High Court on the same issue 8, and relatedly, about not appealing

another adverse decision of the High Court of Tripura on identical

issues9. Relying on State of Maharashtra v. Digambar10, he

submitted that the dismissal of a Special Leave Petition at the

7 Writ Appeals Nos. 186 of 2020 dated 04.01.2021 and 187 of 2020 dated 18.01.2021. 8 SLP No 3391 of 2018, dismissed in limine on 26.03.2018. 9 Writ Appeal Nos. 25­27 of 2016 (Tripura High Court) 10 (1995) 4 SCC 683.

Page 6 of 24 admission stage did not operate as res judicata. He also explained

that the Corporation refrained from appealing against the

aforementioned judgment of the High Court because the amount

recoverable therein was low. Moreover, in those cases, the

Corporation had already issued No Dues Certificates to the

contractors.

11. Before proceeding any further, we make it clear here itself that

we do not propose to dismiss the Corporation’s appeals on

preliminary objections. We will therefore consider Shri Kaul’s

submission on the merits of the case.

12. Referring to and relying on the contractual clauses, Shri Kaul

submitted that the expression “charges” in clause XII (a) of the

Work Order clearly includes demurrages, and the Corporation is

empowered to recover the same. He relied on the decision of this

Court in Raichand Amulakh Shah and Anr. v. Union of India11 and

Trustees of the Port of Madras v. Aminchand Pyarelal & Ors12 to say

that demurrages constitute a charge. He also submitted that the

11 (1964) 5 SCR 148.

12 (1976) 3 SCC 167.

Page 7 of 24 Handbook used by Corporation13 would demonstrate that “charges”

certainly include “demurrage”.

13. Supplementing the above submissions, Shri Ajit Puduserry,

AOR submitted that in the construction of contractual terms, the

interpretation proposed by the author of the tender document must

be relied on. He referred to Agmatel India Pvt Ltd v. Resoursys

Telecom & Ors14 for this purpose. He further submitted that the

action of the Corporation is unexceptionable as it merely followed

the directions of the High Court in an earlier round of litigation

where the court directed it to issue notice before taking a decision

on the contractors’ liability. It is his contention that notices were

accordingly issued before recoveries were made. Appearing on

behalf of the Corporation in the third appeal, Shri Abhay Kumar,

AOR, supported the arguments of the Appellant Corporation on the

same grounds.

14. Shri Sanjay Parikh, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

behalf of the Respondents submitted that the Corporation acted

arbitrarily. It failed to follow due process of law to determine the

13 Movement Operations in Food Corporation of India (FCI Handbook 2020). 14 (2022) 5 SCC 362.

Page 8 of 24 liability of the contractors, despite specific instructions in a

previous round of litigation. He also submitted that contractors

were not responsible for loading and unloading of foodgrains from

railway wagons. Hence, the event which leads to the incurrence of

demurrages, i.e., delayed unloading of foodgrains from railway

wagons, was not within the scope of contractor’s responsibilities. He

took us through the contracts that were executed in 2010 and 2018

by the Corporation, which delegated the task of loading and

unloading the foodgrains to contractors, and therefore the relevant

expression “demurrages” was present in the liability clauses in

those contracts.

15. Supplementing the above submissions, Shri Shoeb Alam,

Advocate, submitted that the Corporation was not entitled to be a

judge in their own cause and to unilaterally determine the liability

with respect to demurrages. He placed reliance on State of

Karnataka v. Shree Rameshwara Rice Mills15, BSNL and Anr. v.

Motorola India (P) Ltd16 and J.G. Engineers (P) Ltd v. Union of India17.

15 (1987) 2 SCC 160.

16 (2009) 2 SCC 337.

17 (2011) 5 SCC 758.

Page 9 of 24 Analysis:

16. The core question arising for our consideration is whether the

contractual clause enabling the Corporation to recover “charges”

includes the recovery of demurrages. It is pertinent to extract the

relevant clauses of the road transport contract, i.e., Work Order.

The clauses detailing the description of work, liability of the

contractors, and the power to recover losses, which are identical in

the three appeals before us, read as under:

“(B) Brief description of work:

i) Transportation of foodgrains from Depots/Mandis/Rail Heads of Churaibari to various destinations as per Appendix­I...

...

X. Liability of Contractor for losses suffered by Corporation

a) The Contractor shall be liable for all costs, damages, registration fees, charges and expenses suffered or incurred by the Corporation due to the Contractor's negligence and unworkmanlike performance of any services under this Contract, or breach of any terms of the Contract, or failure to carry out the work under the Contract, and for all damages or losses occasioned to the Corporation, or in particular to any property or plant belonging to the Corporation, due to any act whether negligent or otherwise, of the Contractor or his employees. ...

...

XII. Recovery of losses suffered by the Corporation

(a) The Corporation shall be at liberty to reimburse themselves for any damages, losses, charges, costs or expenses suffered or incurred by them, or any amount payable by the Contractor as Liquidated Damages as provided in Clauses X above. The total sum claimed shall be deducted from any sum then due, or which at

Page 10 of 24 any time thereafter may become due, to the Contractors under this, or any other, Contract with the Corporation. In the event of the sum which may be due from the Contractor as aforesaid being insufficient, the balance of the total sum claimed and recoverable from the Contractors as aforesaid shall be deducted from the Security Deposit, furnished by the contractor as specified in Clause IX...” (emphasis supplied)

17. The Corporation seeks to recover demurrages as a part of

“charges” provided under clause XII(a) as extracted hereinabove.

The expression “charges”, stand alone, is not amenable to a precise

meaning. Its dictionary meaning is open textured, defining

“charges” as “any consideration that one must pay for goods and

services provided”. Therefore, the scope of the expression “charges”

must be understood as intended by the parties to the contract. The

process of interpretation, though the exclusive domain of the Court,

inheres the duty to decipher the meaning attributed to contractual

terms by the parties to the contract. It is with this purpose that we

shall now proceed to understand the meaning of the expression

“charges”.

18. There are certain basic principles evolved by courts of law for

deciphering the true and correct meaning of expressions in a

Page 11 of 24 contract. In Bihar State Electricity Board, Patna and Ors. v. M/s

Green Rubber Industries and Ors.18, this Court observed that,

“Every contract is to be considered with reference to its object and

the whole of its terms and accordingly the whole context must be

considered in endeavouring to collect the intention of the parties,

even though the immediate object of enquiry is the meaning of an

isolated clause.”

19. In Union of India v. Raman Iron Foundry19, this Court held that

contractual terms cannot be interpreted in isolation, following strict

etymological rules or be guided by popular connotation of terms, at

variance with the contractual context. It observed:

“8. It is true that the words “any claim for the payment of a sum of money” occurring in the opening part of Clause 18 are words of great amplitude, wide enough to cover even a claim for damages, but it is a well settled rule of interpretation applicable alike to instruments as to statutes that the meaning of ordinary words is to be found not so much in strict etymological propriety of language nor even in popular use as in the subject or occasion on which they are used and the object which is intended to be attained. The context and collocation of a particular expression may show that it was not intended to be used in the sense which it ordinarily bears. Language is at best an imperfect medium of expression and a variety of meanings may often lie in a word or expression. The exact colour and shape of the meaning of any word or expression should not be ascertained by reading it in isolation, but it 18 (1990) 1 SCC 731, ¶23.

19 (1974) 2 SCC 231.

Page 12 of 24 should be read structurally and in its context, for its meaning may vary with its contractual setting. We must, therefore, read the words ‘any claim for the payment of a sum of money’ occurring in the opening part of Clause 18 not in isolation but in the context of the whole clause, for the intention of the parties is to be gathered not from one part of the clause or the other but from the clause taken as a whole. It is in the light of this principle of interpretation that we must determine whether the words ‘any claim for the payment of a sum of money’ refer only to a claim for a sum due and payable which is admitted or in case of dispute, established in a Court of law or by arbitration or they also include a claim for damages which is disputed by the contractor.” (emphasis supplied)

20. In Provash Chandra Dalui and Anr. v. Biswanath Banerjee and

Anr.20, noting that the intention of the parties must be discerned

from the context of the contract, this Court observed:

“10. ‘Ex praecedentibus et consequentibus optima fit interpretatio.’ The best interpretation is made from the context. Every contract is to be construed with reference to its object and the whole of its terms. The whole context must be considered to ascertain the intention of the parties. It is an accepted principle of construction that the sense and meaning of the parties in any particular part of instrument may be collected ‘ex antecedentibus et consequentibus;’ every part of it may be brought into action in order to collect from the whole one uniform and consistent sense, if that is possible. ...

In construing a contract the court must look at the words used in the contract unless they are such that one may suspect that they do not convey the intention correctly. If the words are clear, there is very little the court can do about it. In the construction of a written instrument it is legitimate in order to ascertain the true meaning of the words used and if that be doubtful it is 20 1989 Supp (1) SCC 487.

Page 13 of 24 legitimate to have regard to the circumstances surrounding their creation and the subject matter to which it was designed and intended they should apply.” (emphasis supplied)

21. In BESCOM v. E.S. Solar Power Pvt Ltd and Ors 21, this Court

held that in case of two possible interpretations of a contractual

term, the court must accord primacy to the one that is consistent

with the underlying purpose of the contract. It noted:

“17. ... In seeking to construe a clause in a contract, there is no scope for adopting either a liberal or a narrow approach, whatever that may mean. The exercise which has to be undertaken is to determine what the words used mean. It can happen that in doing so one is driven to the conclusion that clause is ambiguous, and that it has two possible meanings. In those circumstances, the court has to prefer one above the other in accordance with the settled principles. If one meaning is more in accord with what the court considers to be the underlined purpose and intent of the contract, or part of it, than the other, then the court will choose the former or rather than the latter...”

(emphasis supplied)

22. Keeping in mind the above referred principles we have to

examine the expression “charges” in the context of its related words

in the contract, which are costs, damages, registration fees, and

expenses. These expressions indicate the different heads under

which losses are recoverable from the contractors for acts of 21 (2021) 6 SCC 718.

Page 14 of 24 negligence, unworkmanlike performance of any service, breach of

terms and failure to carry out the work in the context of the

working of the contract. These expressions are equally wide and do

not aid us in understanding the meaning of the expression

“charges”. Under these circumstances, we have to understand the

meaning of the expression “charges” in the larger context of the

contract.

23. The preamble of the contract, i.e., the Work Order, reads that

the contractor is engaged for “transportation of foodgrains from

depots, mandis, rail heads of Churaibari to various destinations as

per appendix 1”. Further, clause XIII of the Work Order detailing the

responsibilities of the contractor, to the extent relevant for our

purposes, reads as under:­ XIII. Responsibilities of the Contractor

(a) The Contractor shall be responsible to supply adequate and sufficient number of trucks for transportation of food grains and carrying out any other services under the Contract in accordance with the instructions issued by the General Manager or an officer acting on his behalf. ...

(f) The Contractor shall be responsible for the safety of the goods from the time they are loaded on their truck from godowns/mandis/rail heads until they have been unloaded from the trucks at godowns or at other destinations as specified in the Contract or as directed by the General Manager/Area Manager or any other officer acting on his behalf...” (emphasis supplied)

Page 15 of 24

24. We have scanned the entire contract, in addition to

scrutinising the provisions extracted above, and seen that there is

no contractual provision requiring the contractors to undertake the

task of loading and unloading of foodgrains from the railway

wagons. This is confirmed by the written submissions on behalf of

the Corporation, where the imposition of demurrages is justified

only for the reason that the contractor did not provide adequate

number of trucks near the railway sidings, to enable the

Corporation to promptly hand over the foodgrains to them to

commence transportation. The relevant portion is extracted as

under:­ “10. The reason why demurrage charges get levied during the performance of an RTC contract is on account of the failure of the contractor to supply required number of trucks even after prior intimation about the placing of the railway rakes due to which the Petitioner is unable to empty the wagons as the foodgrains are liable to get spoiled if they are unloaded onto the siding due to rain etc. Even after unloading unless they are removed from the railway premises within the free time available wharfage is charged by the Railways. The failure to prove trucks leads to detention of wagons beyond the free time allowed by the Railways...”

25. We may note that there is a dispute about the availability of

trucks for the transportation of foodgrains by the contractor. While

Page 16 of 24 the Corporation asserts that trucks were not made available in

numbers as well as in time, the contractor denies the same stating

that their trucks were kept waiting at the Corporation’s Food

Security Depots.

26. Irrespective of the disputed fact, the real question is whether

the contractors had any obligation towards loading and unloading

of foodgrains from the railway wagons. It is evident from the

contractual provisions and also the admissions of the Corporation

in written submissions, that the task of loading or unloading of

foodgrains from the railway wagons was not a part of the contract.

Thus, based on interpretation of the expression “charges” in the

contractual context, we are of the opinion that it did not include

liability on account of demurrages. Consequently, the Corporation

cannot impose and collect demurrages from the contractors.

27. Interpretation of contracts concerns the discernment of the

true and correct intention of the parties to it. Words and

expressions used in the contract are principal tools to ascertain

such intention. While interpreting the words, courts look at the

expressions falling for interpretation in the context of other

Page 17 of 24 provisions of the contract and also in the context of the contract as

a whole. These are intrinsic tools for interpreting a contract. As a

principle of interpretation, courts do not resort to materials external

to the contract for construing the intention of the parties. There are,

however, certain exceptions to the rule excluding reference or

reliance on external sources to interpret a contract. One such

exception is in the case of a latent ambiguity, which cannot be

resolved without reference to extrinsic evidence. Latent ambiguity

exists when words in a contract appear to be free from ambiguity;

however, when they are sought to be applied to a particular context

or question, they are amenable to multiple outcomes. This position

is well­explained in the following passage of Halsbury’s22:

“Latent ambiguity: When the instrument appears on its face to be free from ambiguity but, upon the endeavour being made to apply it to persons or things indicated, it appears that the words are equally applicable to two or more persons, or two or more things, either without any inaccuracy or with a common inaccuracy...”

22 Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn, 2012) vol 32, para 409.

Page 18 of 24 Extrinsic evidence, in cases of latent ambiguity, is admissible both

to ascertain where necessary, the meaning of the words used, and

to identify the objects to which they are to be applied. 23

28. Applying the above­referred principles to the present case, we

will juxtapose the present contracts with similar but not identical

contracts entered into by the Corporation, to confirm our

interpretation that the word “charges” in the contract is exclusive of

liability for demurrages. Pursuantly, we will examine certain

contracts entered into by the Corporation with other transporters.

For example, we will refer to a contract entered into by the

Corporation in 2010, which is prior in time to the present contract.

The relevant clauses read as under:­

“B. Brief description of work I. Unloading/Loading of foodgrain bags from/into railway wagons, trucks etc. stacking...and transporting of foodgrains from Railway Station to Corporation’s Godown or vice­versa...” XII. Liability of Contractors for losses etc. suffered by Corporation

a) The contractor shall be liable for all costs, damages, demurrages, wharfage, forfeiture of wagon, registration fees, charges and expenses...due to...their failure to carry out the work with a view to avoid incurrence of demurrage etc...

23 Halsbury’s Laws of England (5th edn, 2012) vol 32, para 394.

Page 19 of 24

b) The Corporation shall be at liberty to reimburse themselves of any damages, losses, charges, costs, or expenses suffered or incurred by them due to contractors negligence and un­workmanlike performance of service under the contract or breach of any terms thereof...” (emphasis supplied)

29. It is evident from the above that the contracts delegating the

responsibility of loading and unloading of foodgrains from railway

wagons, as an integral part of the contract, include a clear and

distinctive clause for the imposition of liability, inter alia, on

account of demurrages. Evidently, the liability clause in these

contracts, termed the Handling and Transport Contracts, is starkly

distinct from the present Road Transport Contracts.

30. We have every reason to believe that the Corporation,

statutorily obligated to procure and distribute foodgrains across the

nation, enters into contracts depending on the services it requires.

These contracts naturally vary depending on the needs and

purposes of the Corporation. With the aid of the provisions in the

Handling and Transport Contract from 2010, we are able to

understand the intention of the parties while entering into the

present Road Transport Contracts. As the present contracts do not

Page 20 of 24 involve the task of loading and unloading of foodgrains from the

railway wagons as a part of the contractors’ responsibility, there is

no clause enabling the recovery of demurrages from them by the

Corporation. Thus, our interpretation of the expression “charges”,

as exclusive of liability for demurrages, stands confirmed.

31. We will proceed to examine yet another Handling and

Transport Contract which was executed seven years after the

present contract, i.e., in 2018. The relevant clauses of the contract

are as under:­ “B. Brief description of work I. Unloading/Loading of foodgrain bags from /into railway wagons, trucks etc. stacking the foodgrains in bags, bagging, weighment, standardization, cleaning of foodgrains, etc., and transporting of foodgrains from Railway Good Shed/siding to Corporation Godown or vice­versa or transporting them from any place to any other place in and around Railhead KUMARGHAT/FSD KUMARGHAT...

...

X. Liability of Contractors for losses etc. suffered by Corporation

a) The contractor shall be liable for all costs, damages, demurrages, wharfage, forfeiture of wagon, registration fees, charges and expenses suffered or incurred by the Corporation due to the contractor’s negligence and un workmanlike performance of any services under this contract, or breach of any terms thereof or his failure to carry out the work with a view to avoid incurrence of demurrage etc. under this contract or breach of any terms thereof or his failure to carry out the work with a view to avoid incurrence of demmurage; etc. and for all damages or losses occasioned to the Corporation due to any act whether

Page 21 of 24 negligent or otherwise of the contractor themselves or his employees. The decision of the General Manager regarding such failure of the contractor and their liability for the losses, etc. suffered by the Corporation, and the quantification of such losses, shall be final and binding on the contractor...” (emphasis supplied)

32. It is evident from the above that the Handling and Transport

Contract from 2018, similarly involved loading and unloading of

foodgrains from the railway wagons within the scope of contractors’

duties, thereby necessitating the inclusion of demurrages as a

penalty for non­performance of contractual duties. Thus, the

present Road Transport Contract is distinct from the Handling and

Transport Contract from 2018, as the responsibility of loading and

unloading of foodgrains from railway wagons is absent in the

present contract. For this reason, the Corporation in the present

contract has chosen not to include the power to recover demurrages

and as such the expression “charges” cannot be interpreted to

include demurrages.

33. In light of the foregoing conclusions, we are not inclined to

adopt a textual approach for the interpretation of the contractual

term “charges”, and hence, the decisions of this Court in Raichand

Page 22 of 24 Amulakh Shah24 and Trustees of the Port of Madras25 are of no aid,

as they simply describe demurrages as a charge. Demurrage is

undoubtedly a charge, however, such a textual understanding

would not help us decipher the true and correct intention of the

parties to the present contract.

34. For these reasons, Civil Appeals arising out of SLP Nos.

16009­16010 of 2019 and SLP Nos. 16063­16068 of 2019, filed by

the Corporation are dismissed. The decisions of the High Court of

Tripura in Writ Appeal No. 56 of 2018 dated 07.09.2018 and Review

Petition No. 02 of 2019 dated 22.01.2019 are upheld. The decision

of the High Court of Tripura in Writ Appeal Nos. 53­58 of 2017

dated 15.05.2019 is also upheld. We may clarify that our decision

has no bearing on any other remedy available to the Corporation,

like the institution of a suit for recovery, if law enables them to do

so.

35. In so far as Civil Appeals arising out of SLP Nos. 4045­4046 of

2021 filed by the contractors are concerned, they are allowed for the

same reasons as indicated above. The judgments of High Court of

24 Supra note 11.

25 Supra note 12.

Page 23 of 24 Tripura in Writ Appeal Nos. 186 of 2020 and 187 of 2020 dated

04.01.2021 and 18.01.2021 respectively are set­aside and the Civil

Appeals stand allowed.

36. The parties shall bear their own costs.

……………………………….J. [A.S. BOPANNA]

……………………………….J. [PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 18,2022

Page 24 of 24