Fida Hussain & Ors vs Moradabad Dev. Authority & Anr

Fida Hussain & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5382 OF 2006

Dhyan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

1

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5387 OF 2006

Het Ram (Dead) through LRs. ................Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5388 OF 2006

Sompal & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5389 OF 2006

Vipin Chandra & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

2

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5391 OF 2006

Mohan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5394 OF 2006

Hari Singh (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5395 OF 2006

Roshan & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

3

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5397 OF 2006

Ram Ratan & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5412 OF 2006

Lalman (Dead) through L.R. ................... Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5421 OF 2006

Gaj Ram (Dead) through LRs. ...................Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

4

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5428 OF 2006

Chandan & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5429 OF 2006

Hussain Bux (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5432 OF 2006

Waheed (Dead) through LRs. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

5

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5436 OF 2006

Sunil Kumar Sharma alias Sonu & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5444 OF 2006

Karan Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5445 OF 2006

Mahesh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

6

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5446 OF 2006

Ram Chandra & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5455 OF 2006

Komal Singh .............. Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5457 OF 2006

Laloo Singh alias Baloo Singh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

7

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5499 OF 2006

Khoob Chand & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5501 OF 2006

Babu Ram & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5502 OF 2006

Harbansh & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

8

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5504 OF 2006

Dori Lal & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Ors. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5506 OF 2006

Jafsar .............. Appellant

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5507 OF 2006

Bal Kisan & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

9

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5508 OF 2006

Bankey Lal & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5511 OF 2006

Jai Pal & Ors. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5533 OF 2006

Abhay Kumar Bhatnagar & Anr. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

10

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5452 OF 2006

Ram Lal & Anr. .............. Appellants

versus

Moradabad Development Authority & Anr. ..............Respondents

J U D G M E N T

H.L. Dattu, J.

1) This batch of appeals is directed against the separate orders passed

by the High Court of Allahabad in Regular First Appeals filed by

land owners for enhancement of compensation awarded by the

Reference Court for the lands acquired under the Land Acquisition

Act, 1894, [hereinafter referred to as `the Act'] in the villages of

Harthala and Mukkarrabpur. There are in all 30 appeals before us,

out of which, 23 are in relation to the village of Harthala and 7 in

relation to the village of Mukkarrabpur.

11

2) In view of the orders we propose to pass in all these appeals, we

deem it unnecessary to state the facts giving rise to the present

appeals in greater details and a brief reference thereto would suffice

to appreciate the controversy.

3) Lands in Village of Harthala:- There are twenty three appeals

relating to this village. Under Section 4 read with Section 17 of the

Act, Notification dated 20.09.1990 was issued and published by the

State Government for the acquisition of the lands of the appellants.

Subsequently, a declaration dated 10.06.1991 was published in the

Gazette, under Section 6 of the Act. The lands acquired were taken

physical possession by the State Government. In accordance with

Section 11 of the Act, the Land Acquisition Officer [hereinafter

referred to as `the LAO'] assessed the market value of the acquired

lands at `80 per sq. meter vide order dated 18.09.1993 as

compensation. Dissatisfied with the award of the LAO, the land

owners filed objections, inter-alia claiming that the market value of

the acquired lands is `1000 per sq. meter, due to the proximity of the

lands to the city of Moradabad. After scrutinizing the evidence on

record, the Reference Court had come to the conclusion that the

market value of the nearby land was `550 per sq. meter, however,

12

taking into consideration the location and potentiality of the lands

and also proximity of the lands from the city of Moradabad and other

relevant factors, enhanced the compensation awarded to `270 per sq.

meter. The State preferred appeals against the enhancement so made

by the Reference Court and the High Court has allowed the same in

the light of the judgment of the Court in First Appeal No. 247 of

1997 dated 05.03.2004.

4) Lands in village of Mukkarabbpur:- Seven of the present appeals

relate to the village of Mukkarabbpur. A Notification for acquisition

of the lands under the Act was issued and published on 20.08.1992.

In pursuance of the Notification, the State took possession of the said

lands on 06.05.1997 by paying 80% of the estimated compensation

at the rate of `150 per sq. meter. However, vide order dated

29.08.1997, the LAO fixed the compensation at the rate of `92.59 per

sq. meter. Aggrieved by the same, the appellants moved the

Reference Court and produced evidence in support of their claim that

the prevailing rates of land in that village and its roundabouts were

much higher. After giving due consideration to the claim made and

the evidence on record, the Reference Court enhanced the

13

compensation to `350 per sq. meter. The respondents preferred

appeals to the High Court, and the same came to be allowed,

reviving the award passed by the LAO.

5) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, appears for the appellants,

and Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, holds the brief for the

respondents.

6) At the outset, it is relevant to note that the question of adequacy of

compensation for the lands acquired in these two villages under the

same notification has been gone into by this Court in the case of

Gafar and Ors. v. Moradabad Development Authority, (2007) 7 SCC

614. In that case, this Court made a detailed enquiry into the method

of valuation adopted by the LAO and the enhancement of

compensation by the Reference Court. This Court took the view that

the evidence relied upon by the Reference Court while enhancing the

compensation were not reliable, and, therefore, the High Court was

justified in setting aside the order passed by the Reference Court and

restoring the award passed by the LAO.

14

7) In Gafar's case for the lands acquired in the village of Harthala under

Notification dated 13.09.1991, after a detailed consideration of the

compensation awarded by the LAO, this Court held:

"15. We find that the Awarding Officer had taken note of a

sale deed, which was at a time proximate to the date of

notifications in these cases and it related to a piece of land,

though a small extent, which was not distant from the

acquired lands, to borrow the language of the Awarding

Officer. We are inclined to see some force in the stand

adopted by the High Court that the Awarding Officer

himself had been generous in his award. Since he has

adopted such a rate, the question is whether this Court

should interfere with the decision of the High Court

restoring that Award or award any further compensation.

16. The scope of interference by this Court was delineated

by the decision in Kanta Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar

wherein this Court held that there was an element of guess

work inherent in most cases involving determination of the

market value of the acquired land. If the judgment of the

High Court revealed that it had taken into consideration

the relevant factors prescribed by the Act, in appeal under

Article 133 of the Constitution of India, assessment of

market value thus made should not be disturbed by the

Supreme Court. For the purpose of deciding whether we

should interfere, we have taken note of the position adopted

by the Awarding Officer, the stand adopted by the

Reference Court and the relevant aspects discussed by the

High Court. On such appreciation of the facts and

circumstances of the case as a whole, we are of the view

that the sum of Rs. 80 per square meter awarded as

compensation in these cases is just compensation paid to

the land owners. Once we have thus found the

compensation to be just, there arises no occasion for this

Court to interfere with the decision of the High Court

restoring the award of the Land Acquisition Officer. 15

17. In view of our conclusion as above, all the appeals

relating to Harthala have only to be dismissed."

8) In respect to the lands acquired in village of Mukkarabbpur, this

Court, in Gafar's case, held:

"18. In respect of the lands at Mukkarrabpur, the claim for

enhancement was allowed by the Reference Court in spite

of the finding that the evidence of P.Ws. 1 and 2 adduced

on behalf of the claimants was unreliable. It also found that

the two sale deeds relied on by the claimant in support of

the claim for enhancement were also not comparable or

reliable in the light of the evidence of the claimant himself

and that it has not been shown that the lands involved

therein were comparable to the lands acquired. In spite of

it, the Reference Court granted an enhancement only based

on its award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 and on that basis

the award was made at Rs. 192/- per square meter.

Obviously, the award in L.A.R. No. 134 of 1988 was set

aside by the High Court. Hence, the award of the Reference

Court in the case on hand became untenable. Once no

reliance could be placed on that award to enhance the

compensation, it is clear that even on the finding of the

Reference Court, no claim for enhancement has been made

out by the claimants. In that situation, the High Court was

fully justified in setting aside the award of the Reference

Court and in restoring the award of the Land Acquisition

Officer.

19. We may incidentally notice that the lands were

agricultural lands being used for cultivation and even the

method of valuing it on the basis of price per square meter

does not appear to be justified. All the same, the award has

adopted that method and the State cannot go back on it. In

the absence of any acceptable legal evidence to support the

claim for enhancement, no grounds are made out for

interference with the decision of the High Court in the

appeals relating to village Mukkarrabpur."

16

9) This Court also held that it could not be said that the High Court had

adopted an erroneous approach or employed the wrong principles in

regard to the claim for enhancement of compensation, or that, it has

so erred as to warrant interference under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India.

10) A review petition filed by the appellants therein was also

dismissed by this Court.

11) Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior counsel, submits that the findings

and the conclusions in the judgment of this Court in the case of

Gafar are flawed for the reason that the exemplars relied on for

deciding the compensation was for inundated land, and hence, the

same could not reflect the true value of the land. He further submits

that relevant sale deeds were not taken into consideration by the

Court while concluding that the Reference Court had erred in

enhancing the compensation and that the High Court was correct in

setting aside the same. The learned senior counsel also submits that

this Court should have remanded the matters to the High Court in the

case of Gafar, as the High Court, being the first appellate Court, was

required to give a reasoned judgment while allowing appeals against

17

the order of the Reference Court enhancing the compensation. In the

alternative, Shri. Varma contends that the decision in Gafar's case

does not operate as a binding precedent on the present set of appeals,

since this Court has not decided any legal issue. It is also stated that

the decision does not operate as a res judicata, as the parties were

different. It is further argued that out of the thirty appeals that are

listed before us, in the seven appeals relating to the acquisition of

lands in the village of Mukkarrbpur, the matters were not shown on

the cause list on the day they were disposed of. He further states that

in some other cases (six appeals), the learned counsel appearing for

the respondents before the High Court (appellants before us) had

submitted an "illness slip" and had not appeared on the day, the

matters were disposed of. Shri. Varma further contends that in as

many as seventeen appeals before us, the Development Authority

had filed applications for substitution to bring on record the legal

representatives of the deceased land owners and without considering

and deciding the applications, the High Court could not have passed

the impugned orders. Despite all these procedural infirmities, the

High Court could not have allowed the Regular First Appeals filed

by the State, is the contention of learned senior counsel Shri Varma.

18

12) Pursuant to the direction issued by this Court, an affidavit has been

filed by Shri. V.P. Rai, learned counsel, who had appeared before the

High Court, in support of factual assertion made by Sri Varma.

Learned counsel in his affidavit has stated that seven appeals before

the High Court (listed as C.A. No. 5502/2006, C.A. No. 5499/2006,

C.A. No. 5501/2006, C.A. No. 5404/2006, C.A. No. 5507/2006,

C.A. No. 5508/2006 and 5511/2006 before us, all relating to the

village of Mukkarrabpur) were not shown on the cause list of the

High Court on the day they were disposed of, and hence, he had no

knowledge about the hearing of the appeals. Shri. Rai, has further

stated, that as many six appeals (listed as C.A. No. 5448/2006, C.A.

No. 5391/2006, C.A. No. 5397/2006, C.A. No. 5445/2006, C.A. No.

5452/2006 and C.A. No. 5455/2006 before us) in which he was

appearing, were disposed of on the day, he had submitted an "illness

slip" due to his ill health.

13) Per contra, Shri. M.P. Shorawala, learned counsel, has argued that

there is no legal or factual infirmity in the judgment of this Court in

the case of Gafar. He submits that this Court has already dealt with

the merits of the matter at length in the case of Gafar and the same

need not be gone into, once over, again by this Court. With regard to

19

the point of non-listing of cases, the learned counsel contends that

the cause lists are prepared under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief

Justice of the High Court, and it was not the practice of the Court to

send the files of matters that were not listed, to the Court Hall, let

alone hear them and dispose them of.

14) Having carefully considered the submissions of the learned senior

counsel Shri Varma, we are of the view that the judgment in Gafar's

case does not require reconsideration by this Court. In Gafar's case,

this Court had meticulously examined all the legal contentions

canvassed by the parties to the lis and had come to the conclusion

that the High Court has not committed any error which warrants

interference. In the present appeals, the challenge is for the

compensation assessed for the lands notified and acquired under the

same notification pertaining to the same villages. Therefore, it

would not be proper for us to take a different view, on the ground

that what was considered by this Court was on a different fact

situation. This view of ours is fortified by the Judgment of this Court

in the case of B.M. Lakhani v. Municipal Committee, (1970) 2 SCC

267, wherein it is held that a decision of this Court is binding when

the same question is raised again before this Court, and

20

reconsideration cannot be pleaded on the ground that relevant

provisions, etc., were not considered by the Court in the former case.

15) With regard to the contention that the decision of the Court in the

case of Gafar did not operate as res judicata for the present batch of

cases, we are of the view that the principles of Resjudicata would

apply only when the lis was inter-parties and had attained finality of

the issues involved. The said Principles will, however, have no

application interalia in a case where the Judgment and/or order had

been passed by a Court having no jurisdiction thereof and/or

involving a pure question of law. The principle of Resjudicata will,

therefore, have no application in the facts of the present case.

16) To examine the other limb of the contention of the learned senior

counsel that the judgment in the case of Gafar did not operate as a

precedent for the present batch of cases, as no point of law was

decided, this issue requires to be considered in the light of the

judicial pronouncement of this Court.

17) In the case of Shenoy & Co. v. CTO, (1985) 2 SCC 512, a number of

writ petitions were allowed by the High Court. However, the State

chose to file appeal only in one case, which came to be allowed by

21

this Court in the said case. In this fact situation, this Court took the

view that the decision of this Court was binding on all the writ

petitioners before the High Court, even though they were not

respondents in the appeal before this Court. It was held:

"22. Though a large number of writ petitions were filed

challenging the Act, all those writ petitions were grouped

together, heard together and were disposed of by the High

Court by a common judgment. No petitioner advanced any

contention peculiar or individual to his petition, not

common to others. To be precise, the dispute in the cause

or controversy between the State and each petitioner had

no personal or individual element in it or anything personal

or peculiar to each petitioner. The challenge to the

constitutional validity of 1979 Act proceeded on identical

grounds common to all petitioners. This challenge was

accepted by the High Court by a common judgment and it

was this common judgment that was the subject-matter of

appeal before this Court in Hansa Corporation case. When

the Supreme Court repelled the challenge and held the Act

constitutionally valid, it in terms disposed of not the appeal

in Hansa Corporation case alone, but petitions in which the

High Court issued mandamus on the non-existent ground

that the 1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. It is,

therefore, idle to contend that the law laid down by this

Court in that judgment would bind only the Hansa

Corporation and not the other petitioners against whom the

State of Karnataka had not filed any appeal. To do so is to

ignore the binding nature of a judgment of this Court under

Article 141 of the Constitution. Article 141 reads as

follows:

"The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be

binding on all courts within the territory of India. A

mere reading of this article brings into sharp focus

its expanse and its all pervasive nature. In cases

like this, where numerous petitions are disposed of

22

by a common judgment and only one appeal is filed,

the parties to the common judgment could very well

have and should have intervened and could have

requested the Court to hear them also. They cannot

be heard to say that the decision was taken by this

Court behind their back or profess ignorance of the

fact that an appeal had been filed by the State

against the common judgment. We would like to

observe that, in the fitness of things, it would be

desirable that the State Government also took out

publication in such cases to alert parties bound by

the judgment, of the fact that an appeal had been

preferred before this Court by them. We do not find

fault with the State for having filed only one appeal.

It is, of course, an economising procedure."

23. The judgment in Hansa Corporation case rendered by

one of us (Desai, J.) concludes as follows:

"As we are not able to uphold the contentions

which found favour with the High Court in striking

down the impugned Act and the notification issued

thereunder and as we find no merit in other

contentions canvassed on behalf of the respondent

for sustaining the judgment of the High Court, this

appeal must succeed. Accordingly, this appeal is

allowed and the judgment of the High Court is

quashed and set aside and the petition filed by the

respondent in the High Court is dismissed with

costs throughout."

To contend that this conclusion applies only to the party

before this Court is to destroy the efficacy and integrity of

the judgment and to make the mandate of Article 141

illusory. But setting aside the common judgment of the High

Court, the mandamus issued by the High Court is rendered

ineffective not only in one case but in all cases.

24. A writ or an order in the nature of mandamus has

always been understood to mean a command issuing from

the Court, competent to do the same, to a public servant

amongst others, to perform a duty attaching to the office,

23

failure to perform which leads to the initiation of action. In

this case, the petitioners-appellants assert that the

mandamus in their case was issued by the High Court

commanding the authority to desist or forbear from

enforcing the provisions of an Act which was not validly

enacted. In other words, a writ of mandamus was

predicated upon the view that the High Court took that the

1979 Act was constitutionally invalid. Consequently the

Court directed the authorities under the said Act to forbear

from enforcing the provisions of the Act qua the petitioners.

The Act was subsequently declared constitutionally valid by

this Court. The Act, therefore, was under an eclipse, for a

short duration; but with the declaration of the law by this

Court, the temporary shadow cast on it by the mandamus

disappeared and the Act revived with its full vigour, the

constitutional invalidity held by the High Court having

been removed by the judgment of this Court. If the law so

declared invalid is held constitutionally valid, effective and

binding by the Supreme Court, the mandamus forbearing

the authorities from enforcing its provisions would become

ineffective and the authorities cannot be compelled to

perform a negative duty. The declaration of the law is

binding on everyone and it is therefore, futile to contend

that the mandamus would survive in favour of those parties

against whom appeals were not filed.

25. The fallacy of the argument can be better illustrated by

looking at the submissions made from a slightly different

angle. Assume for argument's sake that the mandamus in

favour of the appellants survived notwithstanding the

judgment of this Court. How do they enforce the

mandamus? The normal procedure is to move the Court in

contempt when the parties against whom mandamus is

issued disrespect it. Supposing contempt petitions are filed

and notices are issued to the State. The State's answer to

the Court will be: "Can I be punished for disrespecting the

mandamus, when the law of the land has been laid down by

the Supreme Court against the mandamus issued, which

law is equally binding on me and on you?" Which Court

can punish a party for contempt under these

circumstances? The answer can be only in the negative

24

because the mandamus issued by the High Court becomes

ineffective and unenforceable when the basis on which it

was issued falls, by the declaration by the Supreme Court,

of the validity of 1979 Act.

26. In view of this conclusion of ours, we do not think it

necessary to refer to the other arguments raised before the

High Court and which the learned counsel for the

appellants attempted to raise before us also. The appeals

can be disposed of on this short point stated above. The

judgment of this Court in Hansa Corporation case is

binding on all concerned whether they were parties to the

judgment or not. We would like to make it clear that there

is no inconsistency in the finding of this Court in Joginder

Singh case and Makhanlal Waza case. The ratio is the same

and the appellants cannot take advantage of certain

observations made by this Court in Joginder Singh case for

the reasons indicated above."

18) In the case of Director of Settlements, A.P. v. M.R. Apparao, (2002)

4 SCC 638, this Court held:

"7. So far as the first question is concerned, Article 141 of

the Constitution unequivocally indicates that the law

declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all

courts within the territory of India. The aforesaid Article

empowers the Supreme Court to declare the law. It is,

therefore, an essential function of the Court to interpret a

legislation. The statements of the Court on matters other

than law like facts may have no binding force as the facts of

two cases may not be similar. But what is binding is the

ratio of the decision and not any finding of facts. It is the

principle found out upon a reading of a judgment as a

whole, in the light of the questions before the Court that

forms the ratio and not any particular word or sentence...

A judgment of the Court has to be read in the context of

questions which arose for consideration in the case in

which the judgment was delivered. ... The law which will be

25

binding under Article 141 would, therefore, extend to all

observations of points raised and decided by the Court in a

given case..."

19) The position was made clear by the decision of this Court in the case

of Union of India v. Krishan Lal Arneja, (2004) 8 SCC 453. In this

case, 14 properties were notified for acquisition under the provisions

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1898. Only two persons, namely

Banwari Lal & Sons and Shakuntala Gupta, had previously

challenged the validity of the acquisition by filing writ petitions

before the High Court and having the cases decided in their favour

finally by this Court. This Court held that the decisions in the earlier

cases were a binding precedent for this subsequent appeal that was

preferred by the Union of India. This Court held:

"12....The decision in Banwari Lal and Shakuntala Gupta

of this Court in relation to the same notification may not be

binding on the principle of res judicata. The argument,

however, cannot be accepted that those decisions are not

binding being "property-specific" in those cases. In our

considered opinion, the decisions are binding as precedents

on the question of validity of the notification, which invokes

urgency clause under Section 17 of the Act. We find

ourselves in full agreement with the ratio of the decisions in

those cases that urgency clause, on the facts and

circumstances, which are similar to the present cases,

could not have been invoked. The two decisions are,

therefore, binding as precedents of this Court. We are not

able to find any distinction or difference as to the ground of

26

urgency in regard to the properties covered by these

appeals."

20) It is now well settled that a decision of this Court based on specific

facts does not operate as a precedent for future cases. Only the

principles of law that emanate from a judgment of this Court, which

have aided in reaching a conclusion of the problem, are binding

precedents within the meaning of Article 141. However, if the

question of law before the Court is same as in the previous case, the

judgment of the Court in the former is binding in the latter, for the

reason that the question of law before the Court is already settled. In

other words, if the Court determines a certain issue for a certain set

of facts, then, that issue stands determined for any other matter on

the same set of facts.

21) The other reasons given by Shri. M.L. Varma, learned senior

counsel, for contending that the case of Gafar does not apply as a

precedent in other cases are threefold: (a) that seven of the present

appeals relating to Mukkarrabpur were not heard due to non-listing;

(b) in six matters relating to Harthala, the matters were disposed of

in the absence of the counsel, who was absent due to his ill health

and submission of "illness slip"; and (c) in some of the cases, the

27

applications for substitution was pending before the High Court, and

these matters could not be disposed of by allowing the appeal against

the dead persons. We are not impressed by these contentions.

22) In the factual matrix of the present case, the adequacy of

compensation for the acquisition of land, in the aforesaid villages,

was the issue before this Court in the case of Gafar and in these

appeals also. The issue is now settled by this Court in the case of

Gafar and Ors. (supra). The decision of co-equal Bench is binding

on this Court. We may usefully note the decision of this Court in the

case of Union of India vs. Raghubir Singh (1989) 178 ITR 548. The

Court observed that the pronouncement of law by a Division Bench

of this Court is binding on a subsequent Division Bench of the same

or a smaller number of Judges and in order that such decision be

binding, it is not necessary that it should be a decision rendered by

the Full Court or a Constitution Bench of this Court. Judicial

decorum and certainty of law require a Division Bench to follow the

decision of another Division Bench and of a larger Bench and, even

if, the reasons to be stated, a different view was necessitated, the

matter should be only referred to Hon'ble The Chief Justice for

referring the question to a larger Bench.

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23) The learned senior counsel emphasizes the fact that the present

appellants were not heard when the appeals were decided by the

High Court, due to non-listing or disposal of the matters when their

counsel had submitted "illness slip" and was not present in Court. He

further states that in several cases, the appellants had died, and the

applications for substitution of legal heirs were filed by the

Development Authority, which were pending in all but in one case.

In the one case [presently numbered as C.A. No. 5421/2006], Shri.

Varma states that the application was dismissed by the Court. He

contends that the rules of natural justice of providing a fair hearing

have not been followed. He states that it would be in the interest of

justice to remand the matters back to the High Court to decide the

appeals on merits, keeping in view the parameters while disposing of

the first appeals by the High Court. Shri. Shorawala, learned counsel

for the respondent, does not seriously dispute the issue of non-listing

raised by the appellants, except stating that the cause list was

published under the authority of Hon'ble the Chief Justice of the

High Court, and it was not the practice of any Court to dispose of a

matter without it being listed.

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24) We have considered the contention canvassed by Shri. Varma,

learned senior counsel and the affidavit filed by Shri. V.P. Rai in

this regard. It is possible that due to the same nature of the matters,

the learned Division Bench sitting in appeal may have considered it

proper to dispose of the matters though they were not listed on the

said day or the advocate for the appellants was not present. This

issue is raised only in thirteen appeals filed before us. With regard to

seventeen appeals, the appellants have contended that the

substitution of legal heirs had not happened, and that the matter had

abated.

25) It is in C.A. No. 5421 of 2006, in which the appellants have

contended that the application for substitution was rejected, and by

that order, the appeal had abated. We have perused the appeal paper

books, and do not find any ground taken in this regard. Even the

order dated 7/1/2004, by which the application for substitution was

supposedly rejected by the High Court, has not been annexed. In the

light of this, we are not inclined to accept the argument that the

appeal had abated.

26) On perusal of the appeal paper books of the thirty appeals before us,

we find that in some of the appeals [namely C.A. Nos. 5429/2006

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and 5457/2006], the presence of the learned counsel is recorded

Though some of the appellants before us may not have been heard

by the High Court due to non-listing of the matter or disposal in the

absence of the advocate, it is clear from the impugned orders

enclosed in some of the appeal paper books that the learned counsel

for some of the appellants have been heard. It is settled position that

the Court speaks through its order and whatever stated therein has to

be read as correct and, therefore, we will go by what is recorded in

the impugned judgment, rather than what the counsel have stated at

the time of hearing of these appeals. In this view of the matter, we

are not inclined to accept that the learned counsel were not heard in

all the matters against which appeals are filed.

27) Having regard to the submissions urged on behalf of the appellants

in so far as not considering the application for substitution of the

L.Rs. of deceased appellants, we would have remitted the matter

back to the High Court to give an opportunity to the appellants

herein, who are the legal representatives of some of the deceased

appellants to afford an opportunity of hearing and decide the appeals

on merits. That, however, would only be a formality because having

regard to the law laid down by this Court in Gafar's case, the High

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Court is bound to follow that decision, since the notification for

acquiring the lands in respect of the villages are one and the same.

28) The learned senior counsel may be, as a last salvo, submits that in

the event, we are not inclined to grant any of the reliefs that he has

asked for, then we may direct that the amounts paid by way of

compensation pursuant to the judgment of the Reference Court need

not be recovered and the securities furnished by some of the

appellants need not be enforced. This prayer is contested by the

learned counsel for the respondents. This request of Shri. Varma

appears to be reasonable. The land acquisition in question is of two

decades old, and it is plausible that the landowners have utilized the

compensation amount paid for one purpose or the other. In such

circumstances, we are not inclined to put an extra burden of

repayment on them. Therefore, while dismissing the appeals, we

clarify that in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in

the interest of justice, we restrain the respondents from recovering

the amounts paid as compensation or enforcing security offered

while withdrawing the compensation amount pursuant to order

passed by the Reference Court.

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29) In light of the above, the appeals are dismissed with the rider as

indicated by us at paragraph 28 of the judgment. Costs are made

easy.

..............................J.

[ D.K. JAIN ]

........................

......J.

[ H. L. DATTU ]

New Delhi,

July 19, 2011.

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