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Dr. Gajendra Singh vs Union Of India

Supreme Court11 July 2022B.V. Nagarathna · M. R. Shah

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

The proportionality of disciplinary punishment against a civil servant must be assessed by considering the nature and gravity of the misconduct proved, the length and quality of the employee's service record, and the circumstances mitigating the culpability of the acts charged; where a punishment of removal from service is imposed on an officer with more than twenty years of unblemished service for a single instance of misconduct that, while proved, arose from reliance on an assurance from a long-standing customer and did not demonstrate a failure to maintain integrity, such punishment may be found disproportionate and remittable for imposition of a lesser penalty.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4149 of 2022

Dr. Gajendra Singh ...Appellant

Versus

Union of India & Ors. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

M. R. Shah, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

Judgment and Order 14.02.2017 passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Allahabad in Writ Appeal No.64492 of 2008 by

which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal and has

not interfered with the judgment and order passed by the

learned Single Judge in which the petitioner challenged the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2022.07.11 17:11:55 IST Reason:

penalty imposed by the disciplinary authority of “removal from

1 service which would not be disqualification for future

employment”, the original petitioner has preferred the present

appeal.

2. The appellant herein was a Branch Manager of the

United Insurance Company during the period 1995­96. He

issued an Insurance Cover Note No.543675 on 20.03.1996

with respect to the vehicle bearing no.DL 1P 7143 belonging to

one Chander Singh for the period 20.03.1996 to 19.03.1997.

On that very day, he issued another cover note. It was found

that for the first cover note No.543675, he had not taken any

premium and for the second Cover Note No.543680 a cheque

given by the insured had bounced. The vehicle insured met

with an accident on 20.04.1996 relating to which a claim was

filed on the basis of the first insurance Cover Note No.543675.

An award of Rs.3,24,400/­ came to be passed by the Motor

Vehicle Accident Tribunal. The Insurance Company accepted

the same. However, the disciplinary authority issued a

charge­sheet to the appellant on 18.10.2001 alleging that the

appellant had issued a Cover Note No.543675 without

collecting any premium, he had thus caused a financial loss

2 to the insurance company. Therefore, it was alleged that the

appellant had failed to maintain integrity, devotion to duty

and acted in a manner prejudicial to the interest of company.

The charges were replied to by the appellant. He explained

the circumstances under which he had issued the first cover

note as at the relevant time when the cover note was issued,

he had relied upon the assurance given by the insured that he

will send the amount through his person, but he did not send

the premium amount. Instead, the insured applied for

another insurance policy for which a cheque was given,

however the cheque bounced. Therefore, it was the case on

behalf of the appellant that having long standing relations

between the insured and the insurance company, he relied

upon the assurance given by the insured that he will send the

amount and, on that assurance, he issued the first cover note.

In the departmental enquiry the charge levelled against the

appellant came to be proved. The enquiry report was accepted

by the disciplinary authority. Therefore, the appellant came to

be removed from service however without any disqualification

of a future employment. The appellant challenged the order of

removal before the learned Single Judge. The learned Single

3 Judge dismissed the writ petition. The judgment and order

passed by the learned Single Judge dismissing the writ

petition has been confirmed by the impugned judgment and

order passed by the Division Bench.

3. Having heard learned counsel for the respective parties

and considering the reply to the charge­sheet and the

plausible explanation given by the appellant – delinquent

officer, we are of the opinion that the order of removal passed

by the disciplinary authority against the appellant who had

rendered approximately over twenty years of service and the

fact that the appellant had an unblemished service record

throughout, we are of the opinion that the punishment of

removal from service is disproportionate to the charge and the

misconduct held to be proved. It appears that the insured

was an old customer and the insured and the insurer

company had a long­standing relationship with him. The

petitioner relied upon the assurance given by the insured that

he will send the money and on that assurance the appellant

issued the first cover note. However, at the same time when

the second cover was issued with respect to the very vehicle,

4 the appellant was required to cancel the earlier cover note

which the appellant did not cancel, which has resulted in loss

to the insurance company. However, at the same time it

cannot be said that the appellant failed to maintain integrity.

Therefore, this is a fit case to impose any other punishment

lesser/other than the removal from service.

4. In view of the above and for the reason stated above

present Appeal Succeeds in Part. The impugned judgment

and orders passed by the High Court are hereby quashed and

set aside. The order of punishment imposed by the

disciplinary authority removing the appellant from service is

hereby quashed and set aside and the matter is remitted to

the disciplinary authority to impose any other appropriate

punishment lesser/other than the order of removal from

service. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a

period of three months from the date of present order.

5 Present appeal is partly allowed to the aforesaid extent.

However, in the facts and circumstances of the case there

shall be no order as to costs.

…………………………………J. (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA) New Delhi, July 11, 2022.

6

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