Dinesh Chandra Pandey vs High Court Of M.P. & Anr

1. Dinesh Chandra Pandey, appellant herein, was appointed

to the post of Civil Judge in the M.P. Judicial Service (Class II)

on 27th January, 1982. On completion of the training period,

he joined as Civil Judge, Dhamtari on 12 th September, 1982.

During his tenure as Civil Judge, certain irregularities were

noticed by the competent authority and on 7th December,

1988, a charge-sheet was served upon him, primarily, on the

ground that he was possessed of disproportionate

money/assets to his known sources of income. He was served

with a charge sheet containing two articles of charges. One

2 out of them (Charge 2) had not been proved while other

Charge (Charge 1) stood proved against the delinquent officer.

Article 1 which had been established reads as under:

"That the said Shri D.C. Pandey while his posting as Civil Judge, Class-II and J.M.F.C. Raipur had a Bank account in State Bank of India Account No.

SB/8833, the balance whereof swelled from Rs.2170.01 to Rs.35036.92 paise within the period from January 1984 to 6th May, 1985, his explanation in this behalf having been found unconvincing considering the disproportionateness of the said increase in his bank balance to his salary income and pattern and frequency of deposits the said increase in balance is capable of no other reasonable

3 explanation than that of illicit gains as the source of money which renders his integrity gravely doubtful."

2. The allegations were denied by him and on 30 th January,

1989 he submitted that he owns 37 acres of land in Bilaspur

and has agricultural income to the extent of Rs. 50,000/- p.a.

It is out of this agricultural income that he has been

depositing amounts in the bank and has not committed any

violation of service regulations or other offence which would

attract disciplinary action against him. The competent

authority decided to conduct a regular departmental enquiry

4 and appointed Shri G.R. Pandya, District & Sessions Judge,

Raipur as enquiry officer. Besides appointing an enquiry

officer, the High Court also appointed Shri Ram Krishna

Behar, Addl. Judge as Presenting Officer. During the course

of enquiry, the appellant made an application for permission

to engage a legal practitioner to assist him in the departmental

enquiry. This request was declined by the High Court vide

order dated 4th December, 1989. The appellant participated in

the enquiry and the enquiry officer submitted his report on 4 th

April, 1990 and returned the finding of guilt against the

5 appellant. The concluding paragraphs of the report read as

under:

"Shri Pandey was saving Rs.600/- p.m. out of his salary and, therefore, this amount was quite insufficient for making such a large saving. More saying of Shri Pandey received the amounts frequently from his mother is not sufficient.

Something more was required to explain the deposits. This type of explanation was already given by Shri Pandey during the preliminary inquiry and was already found unsatisfactory, hence further opportunity was given to Shri Pandey, by holding this inquiry to give reasonable and convincing explanation regarding the source of his income. I am sorry to say that Shri Pandey could not assess the

6 seriousness of the matter and went on repeating that the money was sent by his mother. The mother of Shri Pandey as well as the customers who had purchased the produce of the messenger who used to bring the money frequently from Bilaspur to Raipur have not been examined. Under these circumstances, bald statement of Shri Pandey that money was received by him from his

mother does not appear to be correct. Thus, I come to the conclusion that charge no. 1 regarding the frequent deposits made by Shri Pandey within a span of short period is proved against him.

3. Disciplinary authority, after receiving the said report,

issued show cause notice to the appellant on 16th March, 1991

7 informing the appellant that finding of the enquiry officer on

Article (1) had been accepted and as to why punishment

should not be imposed upon him to which he submitted a

detailed reply. The disciplinary authority vide its order dated

10th June, 1992, opined that the stand taken by the appellant

was not satisfactory and consequently, imposed the

punishment of removal from service. The appellant preferred

an appeal against this order before the Governor which also

came to be dismissed vide order dated 3rd February, 1993.

The order of removal from service, as confirmed by the

8 appellate authority, was challenged by the appellant by filing

a Writ Petition being Misc. Petition No. 3847 of 1992 in the

High Court which also came to be dismissed by the Ld. Single

Judge vide its order dated 1st July, 2003. Still dissatisfied

with the judgment of the Court, Letter Patent Appeal was filed

which also met the same fate and was dismissed by the

Division Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court vide order

dated 17th December, 2004. The legality and correctness of

this order has been challenged by the appellant in the present

appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution.

9

4. As would be evident from the above narrated facts, the

charge against the appellant was a very limited one. In fact,

the deposit of the amount in the bank was not disputed by the

appellant. However, he rendered the explanation that he had

agricultural land from where he was getting Rs. 50,000/-p.a.

as income and had, therefore, deposited these amounts in the

bank during the period stated in the charge sheet i.e. between

January, 1984 to May, 1985. He had also taken up the stand

before the Courts that while he was functioning as a Civil

Judge (Class II), Dhamtari in December, 1982, a crime had

10 taken place in which one Shri Pandri Rao Pawar, Advocate

and one of his nephew were involved. They had caused

serious injuries to the brother of Shri H.L. Warda, the then

Judicial Magistrate, 1st Class, Dhamtari who had lost his one

eye in the assault. A case under Sections 294, 325, 506B of

IPC was registered. The appellant herein had rejected their

bail application and did not succumb to the pressure brought

in by the advocate which resulted in enmity between the

parties. It was also alleged that the said advocate filed a

complaint on 9th December, 1982 against the appellant stating

11 therein that one witness Dayaram Sahu in Criminal Case No.

1153 of 1986 under Section 325/34 IPC was directed to be

handcuffed without any justification and later on the

appellant was transferred from Dhamtari and posted to

Raipur. As such there was a different motive for taking

disciplinary action against the appellant than what was

apparent from the record of the disciplinary proceedings.

According to the appellant, he was possessed by sufficient

means as he had income from salary as well as agricultural

activity. In light of the facts given by him, there was no

12 occasion to frame any charge against the appellant. Further,

the contention is that none of the article of charges have been

proved against the delinquent in accordance with law.

5. On the contrary, the learned counsel appearing for the

respondents contended that this Court should not re-

appreciate the evidence. The enquiry officer, the disciplinary

authority, the learned Single Judge and even the Division

Bench have accepted the fact that the appellant had been

rightly charged with Article 1, which stands proved and, as

such, no interference is called for on merits or even on the

13 question of quantum of punishment. It is also stated by him

that in terms of Govt. Servant Conduct Rules, 1985, which are

applicable to the members of the Judicial Service in the State

of Madhya Pradesh, a Government servant who either fails to

file a return prescribed in sub-rule (i) or files a return for any

year, which does not fully disclose all the property that is

required to be indicated or otherwise conceals any such

property, would amount to misconduct. Further, the argument

raised is that the Enquiry Officer has examined all the

relevant aspects and after being satisfied that there was no

14 plausible explanation for depositing the money in the bank at

such short intervals, no fault can be found with the finding of

the Enquiry Officer. Referring to the behaviour of a common

prudent person/agriculturist, the income from agriculture

could hardly be on day-to-day basis. It was nobody's case

that vegetable or allied crop was being grown on the land in

question. In normal course, the money would be available to

agriculturist only when the crop is harvested and sold in the

market. No such evidence had been produced by the

15 appellant during the course of enquiry. Thus, no interference

is called for.

6. The challenge to the impugned order is, primarily, on two

grounds. Firstly, the appellant had asked for assistance of a

legal practitioner which had been unfairly denied to him.

Denial of assistance of a legal practitioner tantamount to

violation of principles of natural justice as well as M.P. Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for

short "1966 Rules"), and, as such, the entire departmental

proceedings as well as the impugned order of punishment are

16 vitiated. Secondly, the enquiry officer as well as the High

Court have not appreciated the evidence in its proper

perspective and has failed to accept plausible defence raised

by the appellant in regard to deposit of money in the bank.

The order of removal from service, thus, is based on no

evidence and is required to be set aside. In support of this

contention learned counsel referred to Rule 14(8) of the 1966

Rules as well as Judgment of this Court in the case of J.K.

Aggarwal v. Haryana Seeds Development Corporation Ltd.

[(1991) 2 SCC 283] and Board of Trustees of the Port of

17 Bombay v. Dilipkumar Raghavendranath Nadkarni, [(1983) 1

SCR 828]. The 1966 rules are applicable to the member of

judicial services of the State of Madhya Pradesh as the

Government, in consultation with the High Court, has only

framed one set of Rules i.e. M.P. Judicial Service

(Classification, Recruitment and Conditions of Service) Rules,

1955 ( which primarily deal with the eligibility, methodology

relating to appointment to the judicial services of the States

and its cadre etc. As far as the disciplinary rules are

concerned, it is a common case of the parties that the above

18 1966 Rules are the Rules applicable to the members of

judicial services. These Rules came into force from the date of

their publication. They deal with power to suspend, conduct

departmental enquiry, the procedure which is to be adopted in

a departmental enquiry and punishments which can be

inflicted upon an officer by the Competent Disciplinary

Authority. While Rule 10 deals with the punishment and

penalties which can be imposed on the member of the service,

Rules 12 and Rule 13 deal with the Disciplinary Authority and

the authority who can institute the proceedings. While Rule

19 14 deals not only with imposition of punishment but also

gives the entire procedure which is required to be followed by

the Enquiry Officer as well as the Disciplinary Authority before

inflicting any punishment upon the charged officer, Rule

14(8) deals with providing of legal assistance or engagement of

a legal practitioner during the course of a departmental

enquiry. As the reliance has been placed by both the parties

on this Rule, it will be useful to reproduce the same here:

"Rule 14(8): The Government servant may take the assistance of any other Government servant to present the case

20 on his behalf, but may not engage a legal practitioner for the purpose unless the Presenting Officer appointed by the disciplinary authority is a legal practitioner, or, the disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of the case, so permits."

7. The bare reading of this Rule shows that the Government

servant may take the assistance of any other Government

servant to represent his case but may not engage a legal

practitioner for the purpose unless the presenting officer

appointed by the authority is a `legal practitioner' or the

disciplinary authority, having regard to the circumstances of

21 the case, so permits. The expression `may' cannot be read as

`shall'. The normal Rule is that a delinquent officer would be

entitled to engage another officer to present his case. But if

the presenting officer is a `legal practitioner', he may normally

be permitted to engage a legal practitioner. The third category

is where the disciplinary authority having regard to the

circumstances of the case so permits. It is, therefore, not

absolutely mandatory that the disciplinary authority should

permit the engagement of a legal practitioner irrespective of

the facts and circumstances of the case. There is some

22 element of discretion vested with the authority which, of

course, has to be exercised properly and in accordance with

the settled principles of service jurisprudence. The Courts

have taken a view that where expression `shall' has been used

it would not necessarily mean that it is mandatory. It will

always depend upon the facts of a given case, the conjunctive

reading of the relevant provisions along with other provisions

of the Rules, the purpose sought to be achieved and the object

behind implementation of such a provision. This Court in the

case of Sarla Goel v. Kishan Chand [(2009) 7 SCC 658], took

23 the view that where the word `may' shall be read as `shall'

would depend upon the intention of the legislature and it is

not to be taken that once the word `may' is used, it per se

would be directory. In other words, it is not merely the use of

a particular expression that would render a provision directory

or mandatory. It would have to be interpreted in light of the

settled principles, and while ensuring that intent of the Rule is

not frustrated. Further, in the case of Malaysian Airlines

Systems BHD (II) v. Stic Travels (P.) Ltd., [(2001) 1 SCC 509],

this Court took the view that word `may' in Section 11(1) of the

24 Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is not to be construed

as `must' or `shall', as the word `may' has not been used in the

sense of `shall', the provision is not mandatory. In the light of

these principles, we are of the considered view that the

expression `may', used in Rule 14(8) of 1966 Rules would have

to be construed as directory and not absolutely mandatory

with reference to the facts and circumstances of a given case.

Of course, it would be desirable that wherever the presenting

officer is a legal practitioner, the delinquent officer should be

given the option and may be permitted to engage a legal

25 practitioner if he so opts. But this Rule is hardly of any

assistance and help to the appellant in the present case. The

Presenting Officer was an Additional District Judge. He was

possessed of similar qualification, professionally or otherwise,

as was the appellant himself. The appellant could have asked

for permission to engage and take assistance of any other

judicial officer of that rank or of any rank that he wanted

which request ought to have been considered by the

Disciplinary Authority. It will be entirely uncalled for that an

Additional Judge should be termed as a legal practitioner and,

26 therefore, vesting in the appellant a right to engage a legal

practitioner or an advocate for defending him in the

departmental proceedings. It will be rather appropriate to

apply the principles of contextual interpretation in the facts

and circumstances of the case. In the case of Muddada

Chayanna vs. K. Narayana [AIR 1979 SC 1320], it was held

by this Court that interpretation of statute, contextual or

otherwise, must further and not frustrate the object of the

statute. In other words, the expression `medical practitioner'

appearing in the Maharashtra Nurses Act, 1966 should be

27 given a meaning in the context in which it is sought to be

applied to achieve the real object of the statute. It is also to be

kept in mind that while dealing with the provisions of the

statute, the Court would not adopt an approach or give

meaning to an expression which would produce unintelligible,

absurd and unreasonable result and would render the

legislative intent unworkable or totally irreconcilable with the

provisions of the statute (Bhavnagar University vs. Palitana

Sugar Mills Pvt. Ltd. [AIR 2003 SC 511]). The learned counsel

for the appellant referred to P. Ramanatha Aiyar's Law Lexicon

28 to emphasise that the expression `legal practitioner' appearing

in Rule 14(8) would cover even a judicial officer. He relied

upon the following explanations given to this expression:

"Legal practitioner" defined (See also Advocate of a High Court; Barrister; Government pleader; Pleader; Public Prosecutor; Recognized agent) Act 18,

1879, S. 3; Act 18, 1881, S. 4(2); Act 16, 1887, S.4(16); Act 17, 1889, S 3(13); Act 23, 1923, S.2; Act 21, 1926, S.2

`Legal Practitioner' means an advocate vakil or attorney of any High Court, a pleader, mukhtaro revenue agent. Act XVIII of 1879 (Legal Practitioners), S.3]"

29 8. The above referred explanations clearly show that a

judge in service cannot be termed as a legal practitioner, as it

will mean and include only an Advocate or a vakil of Court

practicing in a Court, may even be a Barrister, Special

Pleader, solicitors depending on the facts of a given case. Rule

2 (e) of the Central Administrative Rules, 1987 also defines the

word `legal practitioner'. However, it, in turn, requires that

this expression shall have the same meaning as is assigned to

it under the Advocates Act, 1961. In that Act the word `legal

practitioner' has been defined under Section 2(i) to mean an

30 advocate or vakil of any High Court, a pleader mukhtar or

revenue agent. In other words, this is an expression of

definite connotation and cannot be granted an extended or

inclusive meaning, so as to include what is not specifically

covered. A Judge may be law graduate holding a Bachelor

Degree in Law from any University established by law in India

but this by itself would not render him as a `legal practitioner'.

On the contrary, there is a definite restriction upon the

Judge from practicing law. Such an implied inclusion, as

argued by the appellant, would not lead to absurdity but

31 would even offend the laws in force in India. John Indermaur,

Principles of the Common Law 169 (Edmund H. Bennett ed.,

1st Am.ed. 1878 explains the term as follows :

"Legal practitioners may be either barristers, special pleaders not at the bar, certified conveyancers, or solicitors.

The three latter may recover their fees, but the first may not, their acting being deemed of a voluntary nature, and their fees merely in the light of honorary payments; and it follows from this, that no action lies against them for negligence or unskilfulness."

32 9. Thus, the expression `legal practitioner' is a well defined

and explained term. It, by any stretch of imagination, can

include a serving Judge who might have been appointed as a

presenting officer in the departmental proceedings. Besides

this legal aspect of the matter, even on principle of fairness we

do not think that the order has caused any prejudice to the

appellant. The appellant could have asked for appointment of

any colleague whose assistance he wanted to take and who

would have been as well qualified and experienced as the

presenting officer. The request of the appellant has been

33 rightly rejected by the disciplinary authority. Furthermore,

the application was made on 7th December, 1988 itself and

thereafter the appellant took no steps whatsoever to challenge

the order of the Disciplinary Authority declining assistance of

an advocate. On the contrary, he participated without any

further protest in the entire departmental enquiry and raised

no objections. The Enquiry Officer conducted the proceedings

in a just, fair manner and in accordance with rules. In fact,

there is no challenge to that aspect of the matter. In the

application, the appellant had stated "that the complainant

34 neither has necessary experience nor the required skill to

handle his defence in such circumstances." This statement ex

facie is not correct. The appellant must have dealt with

variety of cases during his tenure as a Judge. He was fully

capable of defending himself in the departmental enquiry. In

the alternative he could easily ask for assistance of any senior

colleague from the service if he was under pressure of any

kind that the Presenting Officer was senior to him and

belonged to Higher Judicial Service. He did not exercise this

choice, at any stage, for reasons best known to him. However,

35 he made an application praying for permission to engage an

advocate and nothing else. Charge against the appellant was

not of a very complicated nature, which a person having

qualification and experience of the appellant would not be able

to defend. In these circumstances, we are of the considered

view that no prejudice whatsoever has been caused to the

interest of the delinquent officer. These are the rules

primarily of procedure, an element of prejudice would be one

of the necessary features, before departmental proceedings

can be held to be vitiated on that ground. The reliance placed

36 upon the case of J.K. Aggarwal (supra) is totally unwarranted.

In that case, the Court came to the conclusion that refusal to

sanction the service of lawyer in the inquiry proceedings was

not a proper exercise of discretion under the Rule resulting in

failure of justice. The Court held that the discretion was

vested in the disciplinary authority in terms of Rule 7(5) of the

relevant Rules. The language of that Rule was entirely

different and permission to engage a legal practitioner was

relatable to the nature of the punishment which could be

imposed upon the delinquent officer in the departmental

37 proceedings. If the charges were likely to result in dismissal of

the person from service, in that event, that officer may with

the sanction of the Enquiry Officer be permitted to be

represented through a counsel. Language of this Rule is

entirely different from the language of the Rule in question in

the present case. On the basis of the facts of that case and

Rule 7(5) of the said Rules the Court held:

"The right of representative by a lawyer may not in all cases be held to be a part of natural justice. No general principle valid in all cases can be enunciated. In non-statutory domestic tribunals, Lord

38 Denning in the Court of Appeal in England favoured such a right where a serious charge had been made which affected the livelihood or the right of a person to pursue an avocation and observed:

"I should have thought, therefore, that when a man's reputation or livelihood is at stake, he not only has a right to

speak by his own mouth. He also has a right to speak by counsel or solicitor."

But this was not followed by Lyell, J. in Pett case (No.2)

It would appear that in the inquiry, the respondent-Corporation was represented by its Personnel and Administration Manager who is stated

39 to be a man of law. The rule itself recognizes that where the charges are so serious as to entail a dismissal from service the inquiry authority may permit the services of a lawyer. This rule vests a discretion. In the matter of exercise of this discretion one of the relevant factors is whether there is likelihood of the combat being unequal entailing a miscarriage or failure of justice and a

denial of a real and reasonable opportunity for defence by reasons of the appellant being pitted against a presenting officer who is trained in law.

Legal Adviser and a lawyer are for this purpose somewhat liberally construed and must include "whosoever assists or advises on facts and in law must be deemed to be in the position of a legal adviser". In the last analysis, a decision

40 has to be reached on a case to case basis on the situational particularities and the special requirements of justice of the case. It is unnecessary, therefore, to go into the larger question "whether as a sequel to an adverse verdict in a domestic enquiry serious civil and pecuniary consequences are likely to ensue, in order to enable the person so likely to suffer such

consequences with a view to giving him a reasonable opportunity to defend himself, on his request, should be permitted to appear through a legal practitioner" which was kept open in Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar. However, it was held in that case (SCC p. 132, para 12)

41 "...In our view we have reached a stage in our onward march to fair play in action that where in an enquiry before a domestic tribunal the delinquent officer is pitted against a legally trained mind, if he seeks permission to appear through a legal practitioner the refusal to grant this request would amount to denial of a reasonable request to defend himself

and the essential principles of natural justice would be violated...."

On a consideration of the matter, we are persuaded to the view that the refusal to sanction the service of a lawyer in the inquiry was not a proper exercise of the discretion under the rule resulting in a failure of natural justice; particularly, in view of the fact that the Presenting

42 Officer was a person with legal attainments and experience. It was said that the appellant was no less adept having been in the position of a Senior Executive and could have defended, and did defend, himself competently; but as was observed by the learned Master of Rolls in Pett case that in defending himself one may tend to become "nervous" or "tongue-tied". Moreover,

appellant, it is claimed, has had no legal background. The refusal of the service of a lawyer, in the facts of this case, results in denial of natural justice."

10. Thus, the appellant can hardly take any help from that

case. Even in the case of Dilipkumar Raghavendranath

43 Nadkarni (supra), the Board of Trustees had appointed its law

officer as a presenting officer. The Presenting Officer was

legally trained and experienced in handling departmental

enquiries, it was in those circumstances that this Court

found, as a matter of fact, that there was violation of

principles of natural justice and that a legally expert person

has been permitted to be engaged by the delinquent worker.

In that case the provisions similar to the present provisions

also came into force during the pendency of the departmental

proceedings. The Court remanded the matter and directed re-

44 conducting of the departmental enquiry with specific liberty to

the workman to cross-examine all the witnesses afresh in

accordance with law. The facts of that case are thus entirely

different from the case in hand wherein no such ground is

made out. Firstly, the petitioner himself was equally qualified

and trained as the presenting officer and/or he could even ask

for assistance for a fellow colleague with similar experience

and status as that of the presenting officer which he choose

not to do. Having given up the right, he cannot now be

45 permitted to turn back and raise a grievance in that regard.

This contention of the appellant is without any merit.

11. Coming to the other aspect of the case, that there is

perversity in appreciation of the evidence in the impugned

judgment under appeal, we may notice that the finding of

facts arrived at by the enquiry officer was not interfered with

by the learned single Judge as well as the Division Bench of

the Madhya Pradesh High Court, it is hardly permissible for

this Court to disturb such findings of fact in exercise of its

jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

46 Besides that, we must notice that the conduct of the appellant

can hardly be appreciated in regard to deposit of money in the

Bank regularly during the entire period of 1984-85. The

Department had showed that the deposits have been made

and the bank balance of the appellant, on a particular date,

was beyond the known sources of his income to which, the

appellant has raised a defence that he owned the land and the

income received was an agricultural income. However, he

produced no evidence during the departmental enquiry to

show that some person was making payment to him and/or

47 some person was depositing the money in the Bank so

received from agricultural activity in every 2-3 days. Once a

person is carrying on agricultural activities like the appellant,

the obvious result thereof would be that there would be

persons who would be carrying on agricultural activities on

the land on his behalf, would be harvesting the crops and

then selling the same on his behalf and that there would be

persons who would be buying such crops and disposing the

crops in the open market directly or indirectly. Thus, these

persons would have been easily available to the appellant to

48 be produced in departmental enquiry to substantiate his

defence. No such effort was ever made by the appellant. Non-

examination of these witnesses and non-production of

necessary documents must lead to draw an adverse inference

against the appellant. In any case, the appellant cannot take

advantage of that fact and contend that the inquiry officer has

failed to appreciate evidence in its correct perspective. At this

stage, we may also notice that during the course of hearing,

we had called for the original personal file of the officer where

he had filed property returns to the Department. In the

49 property return for the year 1984-85 (copy of which is stated

to have been produced before the Enquiry Officer), which is

the relevant year, the appellant is shown to have 1/3 rd share

in the agricultural land located at two different places. There

is a specific column relating to income from agriculture. In

that form it was filled in by the appellant as `uncertain'

(anishchit). This return had been filed on 27 th March, 1985.

In other words, on that date he did not know whether he had

earned any amount from the agricultural income or not. The

period in question was January, 1984 to May 1985, thus, for

50 the substantial period, he was fully aware of his income

received from agricultural activity but he still chooses to keep

it vague and not declare his true income in the return. Now,

in the departmental proceedings and in the reply to the

charge-sheet, he submitted that there was an income of more

than Rs.50,000/- p.a. and that he owned 37.53 acres of land

in village Bilaspur at two different places. It is again strange

that he did not disclose in his reply that this was a land jointly

owned with his brothers and family members and what was

the extent of his holding individually. In the return, he

51 himself claimed one-third share in the property. The total

land indicated at two different places being 26 acres + 18

comes to 44 acres and one third of which, merely 14 acres

approximately, would be the land owned by him and not 37

acres as claimed. This, itself shows that the appellant has not

approached the Court with clean hands and has not disclosed

true facts which were known to him alone. In the

departmental proceedings, he took incorrect defence contrary

to his return and failed to discharge the onus placed upon

him. In the departmental enquiry, the appellant produced no

52 income tax returns to show that in addition to his salary, he

had other sources of income and what was the extent of

income from these sources. In his written statement of

defence he never took up the plea that any such returns were

filed and he made no effort to bring on record the copies of

such income-tax returns, if at all filed. The delinquent officer

could have stated in his statement if he was not filing any

return and reason thereof. We are certainly of the considered

view that it was obligatory on the part of the delinquent officer

to disclose all such relevant facts which were only within his

53 personal knowledge. He belongs to a service which is looked

upon by the public at large as a service cadre of high integrity

and professional values. The Judges are expected to apply

stringent social and moral values to their standard of living. It

was expected of the appellant to disclose all true and correct

information and documents in his power and possession

before the Enquiry Officer. It was not required of him to with-

hold relevant material and take such a defence which could

not be substantiated during the course of departmental

enquiry. Having failed to produce relevant documentary

54 evidence as well as examine the witnesses, the appellant

cannot argue that the Disciplinary Authority or the Courts

have not appreciated the evidence in its correct perspective.

We are unable to accept the contention of the appellant that

the findings are based on no evidence or are perverse in any

manner whatsoever.

12. For the reasons afore stated, we find no merit in this

appeal. The same is dismissed however, without any order as

to costs.

55 ....

.....................................J. [ DR. B.S. CHAUHAN ]

......

...................................J. [ SWATANTER KUMAR ] New Delhi July 8, 2010.

56