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Dilbag Rai vs The State Of Haryana

Supreme Court3 December 2018D.Y. Chandrachud · M.R. Shah

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where criminal proceedings have been initiated following an investigation that has resulted in a chargesheet and the framing of charges by a court, the High Court's exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure to quash those proceedings should not proceed on the basis of a reading of the FIR alone if crucial facts that emerged during investigation are thereby overlooked. The Court will not quash proceedings at this advanced stage merely because a plain reading of the FIR fails to disclose criminal intent where the investigation has revealed additional material facts touching on the question of mens rea. Whether the allegations made by the complainant—including that the accused dealt with property without having title to it and thereby induced the complainant to part with valuable consideration—are true is a matter for determination at trial, not for the High Court to decide through the exercise of its jurisdiction to quash; the High Court was not justified in quashing the proceedings when the determination of such contested facts remained pending.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

1

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1509 OF 2018 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No. 3958 of 2016)

DILBAG RAI Appellant(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud

Leave granted.

This appeal arises from a judgment and order dated

11.2.2016 passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana. By

the impugned judgment, the High Court has quashed the

proceedings arising out of F.I.R. No. 210 dated 21.6.2014

registered under Sections 406, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 506 of

the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“the Penal Code”) at Police

Station Shahabad, District Kurukshetra.

The complainant is in appeal in these proceedings. The

case of the appellant is that on 1.12.2011, the accused, who is

impleaded as respondent No. 2, entered into an agreement to

sell a property admeasuring 8 marlas situated at Patti Jhabran,

behind Lucky Colony, Shahabad, District Kurukshetra. An amount

of Rs. 10 lakhs is said to have been paid at the time of Signature Not Verified execution of the agreement to sell. The complaint states that Digitally signed by SUSHIL KUMAR RAKHEJA Date: 2018.12.06 14:33:06 IST Reason: though the agreement recites that possession of the property

was handed over, as a matter of fact, the possession was not

transferred.

2

Since the accused did not proceed to complete the

transaction, the appellant on 30.1.2014 filed an application

before the Superintendent of Police, District Kurukshetra for

registration of a complaint and for taking action against

respondent No. 2 and her husband Gurcharan Singh.

The case was referred to the Economic Crime Cell,

Kurukshetra. On enquiry, the Economic Crime Cell submitted its

report dated 4.3.2014 concluding that the dispute was of a

civil nature.

The appellant thereafter filed an application under

Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (“the CrPC”)

and on the direction of the Illaqa/Duty Magistrate,

Kurukshetra, F.I.R. No. 210 was registered on 21.6.2014 at the

Police Station, Shahabad Markanda, District Kurukshetra.

The accused filed an application being CRM-M No. 35679 of

14 before the High Court for quashing the FIR on the ground

that the dispute was of a civil nature. During the course of

the investigation, the statement of the owner of the plot was

recorded on 27.10.2014 to the effect that the plot in fact

belongs to his wife Sushila.

Eventually after investigation, a chargesheet under

Section 173 CrPC was submitted by the Investigating Officer on

20.11.2014 for offences under Sections 406 and 420 of the Penal

Code.

Charges have been framed on 11.12.2014. The trial

commenced and five prosecution witnesses were examined.

The High Court by its impugned order dated 11.2.2016, 3

quashed the proceedings arising out of the F.I.R. on the ground

that on a plain reading of the FIR, the complainant had failed

to make out any criminal intent on the part of the accused.

Assailing the judgment of the High Court, it has been

submitted on behalf of the appellant that the High Court had

manifestly erred in exercising its jurisdiction under Section

482 CrPc at this stage particularly when after due

investigation, the chargesheet has been filed and charges have

been framed. Moreover, it has also been submitted that a

criminal intent emerges from the fact that though the property

did not stand in the name of the accused it was sought to be

sold and in pursuance of the transaction, the appellant was

made to part with valuable consideration.

On 29.6.2016, notice was issued in these proceedings.

The office report indicates that service of notice is complete

on respondent No. 2. Despite service, none has appeared for

respondent No. 2.

The High Court was persuaded to quash the criminal

proceedings purely on the basis that the F.I.R. indicated that

the vendor had refused to execute the sale deed. On this basis,

the High Court held that there is no element of cheating and on

reading of the F.I.R., the complainant had failed to make out

any criminal intent on the part of the accused.

In arriving at this conclusion, the High Court, as would

appear from the narration of facts earlier, has lost sight of

crucial aspects which have emerged during the course of the

investigation. The case of the complainant, it must be noted, 4

is that though the accused did not have title to the property,

she had dealt with the property and it was on that basis that

the complainant was induced to part with valuable

consideration.

Whether these allegations are true or otherwise is a

matter of trial.

The High Court, in our view, was not justified in taking

recourse to its power under Section 482 CrPC to quash the

proceedings.

For these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the

impugned order of the High Court dated 11.2.2016. However, we

clarify that we have expressed no opinion on the merits of the

accusation which is a subject matter of the criminal trial.

The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of.

Pending applications, if any, shall also stand

disposed of.

………………….…...…................J. (DR. DHANANJAYA Y. CHANDRACHUD)

…...………………………................J. (M.R. SHAH)

NEW DELHI, December 3, 2018 5

ITEM NO.41 COURT NO.13 SECTION II-B

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No(s). 3958/2016

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 11-02-2016 in CRM No. 35679/2014 passed by the High Court Of Punjab & Haryana At Chandigarh)

DILBAG RAI Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 03-12-2018 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE M.R. SHAH

For Petitioner(s) Dr. Sukhdev Sharma, Adv. Mr. J.B. Mudgil, Adv.

Dr. Shivani, Adv.

Mr. Rameshwar Prasad Goyal, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Vishwa Pal Singh, AOR

Mr. Vijay Kumar, AOR

Dr. Monika Gusain, AOR Manpreet K. Bhallu, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(MANISH SETHI) (SAROJ KUMARI GAUR) COURT MASTER (SH) BRANCH OFFICER

(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)

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