Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
A collective right of enjoyment of usufruct (the right to collect and pluck coconuts) exercised through a trustee (Mooppan) on behalf of villagers, without any demarcation of individual property or individual rights over specific land or trees, does not constitute occupation of land that would give rise to a right of occupancy under Sections 83 and 84 of the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Revenue and Tenancy Regulation, 1965. A right of occupancy over land cannot be acquired merely by enjoying a limited right of collection of produce from trees standing on that land, where the person claiming the right has no proprietary interest in the land itself or the trees thereon. The Administrator, in exercise of powers conferred under Article 240 of the Constitution of India and Section 121 of the Regulation, has authority to frame Rules providing for the allotment of specific plots of land to individual inhabitants, notwithstanding that those inhabitants previously enjoyed collective rights of usufruct through a trustee system, because such allotment serves the purpose of preventing exploitation and promoting the peace, progress and good government of the territory.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
PETITIONER:DEPUTY COLLECTOR, MINISTER AND ORS.
Vs.
RESPONDENT:NAVADIGOTHI MOHAMMED AND ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/09/1996
BENCH:G.B. PATTANAIK (J)BENCH:G.B. PATTANAIK (J)RAMASWAMY, K.
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
J U D G M E N TPATTANAIK. J.
Leave granted.
These appeals by special leave are directed against thejudgment of the Division Bench of the Kerala High Courtdated 8th February, 1984 in Writ Appeal No. 525/81 andbatch. Notices were issued under the Lakshadweep LandRevenue and Tenancy (Allotment of Pandaram Land) Rules, 1979(hereinafter referred to as 'Rules') and challenging thosenotices the respondents herein filed writ applications. Thelearned Single judge dismissed the writ applications. Inappeal the Division Bench of the High Court by the impugnedjudgement quashed notices issued and allowed the writappeals filed and thus these appeals by special leave.
The case of the appellants is that South Pandaram Landsare the Government lands. Before the Minicoy Island cameunder the British Rule the Raja of Cannanore was enjoyingthe usufruct of the coconut trees standing on the SouthPandaram Lands. The inhabitants of the Islands were gettingsome mamul for collecting and stacking the coconuts. Afterthe British Rule the inhabitants of the islands continued tocollect the coconut from the trees and for that purpose theyare getting some remuneration in kind but at no point oftime they had any right to the trees or the land on whichthe trees stood. Sometimes prior to 1942 the Governmentevolved a scheme conferring rights to the inhabitants of theisland to collect and enjoy the fruits from the coconuttrees. After India became independent when Five Year Planwas implemented, on the representation of the people ofMinicoy a new scheme was proposed and under that scheme theinhabitants were permitted not only to collect the coconutfalling from the trees but also to pluck the nuts from thetrees itself. And after this right was conferred as acollective right in favour of inhabitants through theirMooppans, the Mooppan thus as a trustee for all thevillagers had the right to enjoy usufruct of the coconuttrees for himself as well as for all the villagers togetherand the Mooppan was distributing the coconuts amongst thevillagers. While the Mooppans continued to enjoy usufructof the coconut trees for themselves as well as for thevillagers, gradually a demand for abolition of Mooppanssystem began. The administration considering the grievancesof the villagers finally thought of granting separate plotsof land individually to the inhabitants and ultimatelyLaccadive , Minicoy and Amindivi Islands Revenue and TenancyRegulation, 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the'Regulation') was promulgated under Article 240 of theConstitution of India. The Administrator thereafter framedRules in exercise of power conferred under Section 121 ofthe Regulation. It is the further case of the appellantsthat the people of Minicoy Island never had any vested righton the land on which the coconut trees stood though theywere enjoying the right of collection of yield of thecoconut trees standing on the South Pandaram Land andtherefore they cannot be held to have acquired right ofoccupancy. In accordance with the Rules framed under theRegulation notices having been issued by the appropriateauthority for allotting different parts of South PandaramLand to different persons, writ applications came to befiled by the respondents herein contending inter alia thatthey have acquired right of occupancy being in occupancy ofSouth Pandaram Lands prior to the Regulation coming intoforce and therefore the notices issued under the Rules woulddeprive them of their right of occupancy. The learnedSingle judge on consideration of the relevant provisions ofthe Regulations and the rights enjoyed by the Mooppans inrespect of the usufruct of the coconut trees came to holdthat no right of occupancy accrued in favour of the Mooppansunder Sections 83 and 84 of the Regulation. It was alsofurther found that the Mooppans as well as the inhabitantsof the Island merely enjoyed a right of plucking coconutfrom the trees without having any right over the land or thetrees itself and therefore they cannot be held to be inoccupation of the land in question and their claim of rightof occupancy is unsustainable. With these findings the writapplications having been dismissed, the respondentspreferred appeals to the Division Bench. The Division Benchby the impugned judgment came to hold that the Mooppans werein occupation of the Pandaram Lands at the commencement ofthe Regulation on behalf of the inhabitants of the villageand therefore they are entitled to their claims of right ofoccupancy over the land in question. The notices issued bythe appropriate authority under the 1979 Rules can only beapplicable in respect of fresh lands and will not divest thepersons who have already acquired right of ocupancy.Accordingly, the Division Bench allowed the writ appeals andhence these appeals by special leave.
Mr. Chowdhary, the learned senior counsel appearing forthe appellants contended that in view of the limited rightof collection of coconut from the trees conferred upon theMooppans and the inhabitants of the village without anyright over the land on which the trees stood, the DivisionBench of the High Court was wholly in error to hold thatthey were in occupation of the land prior to Regulationcoming into force. He further contended that the Mooppan ofthe village had been conferred certain privileges as he wasrepresenting the interest of village community at large. TheMooppans were acting as trustee but as complaints receivedfrom several villagers the Government decided to conferindividual rights on the inhabitants under the Regulationand therefore there is no infirmity with the notices issued.Mr.Nambiar, the learned senior counsel appearing for therespondents on the other hand contended that the Lakshadweepgroup of Islands have its own peculiar concept of rightsand the Mooppans were merely representing the entire villagecommunity. There was total unity of enjoyment and theMooppans and the villagers had absolute right over thecoconut trees and therefore the Division Bench rightly heldthat they held the right of occupancy which right can't betaken away by the Regulation or the Rules framed thereunder.
In view of the rival submissions at the Bar thequestion that arises for consideration is whether theDivision Bench of the High Court was right in its conclusionthat the Mooppans and the villagers can be said to haveacquired the right of occupancy over the land on which thecoconut trees stood prior to Regulation coming into force?If it is held that right of occupancy had accrued in theirfavour then that right cannot be taken away by theadministration in exercise of its power under the Regulationand Rules framed thereunder. But on examination of thematerials on record and the history of the bundle of rightswhich the inhabitants of these Islands were enjoying, it iscrystal clear that there was no demarcation of anyindividual property. The villagers through their Mooppanswere initially getting some remuneration for collecting andstacking coconuts. In course of time they got the right topluck coconuts from the trees but no specific individual hadany specific right over any specific tree and it was a caseof collective right of collection and enjoyment of thefruits through their Mooppans. Mooppan was acting as thetrustee and was equally distributing the usufruct of thecoconut trees. At no point of time either the Mooppans orany individual villager had an iota of right over the landor the coconut trees standing thereon. This being theposition, it is difficult to accept the conclusion of theDivision Bench of the High Court that the respondents hadacquired a right of occupancy prior to the Regulation cominginto force. Further the so-called collective rights whichwere being exercised by the Mooppans on behalf of thevillagers as trustees were complained of when the Mooppansstarted arbitrarily exercising their power. After dueenquiry the Government decided to confer right of occupancyover specific parts of land in favour of each individual inaccordance with the Regulation and the Rules framedthereunder. We see no infirmity with the Regulation as wellas the Rules framed thereunder and it has been so framed inexercise of power conferred under Article 240 of theConstitution for the peace, progress and good government ofthe Lakshadweep group of Islands. The Regulation and theRules sub-serve the purpose for which power has beenconferred on the President under Article 240 of theConstitution and the Regulation and the rules would achievethe object of allotting specific parts of the land in favourof each individual, so that, the Mooppans will not be ableto exploit the individuals.
In view of our aforesaid conclusion we have no hesitation to hold tha t the Division Bench of the High Court was wholly in error in granting right of occupancy in favour of the respondents and in quashing the impugned notices issued by the Administrator in exercise of his power under the Regulation and the Rules framed thereunder. Appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgement of the Division Bench of the High court in writ appeal No. 525/81 and batch is set aside. writ applications filed by the respondents stand dismissed. There will be no order as to costs.