Delhi Development Authority vs Diwan Chand Anand .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2397 of 2022

Delhi Development Authority ...Appellant

Versus

Diwan Chand Anand & Ors. …Respondents

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2398 OF 2022

Delhi Development Authority …Appellant

Versus

Diwan Chand Anand & Ors. …Respondents

JUDGMENT

M. R. Shah, J.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Date: 2022.07.11 17:11:57 IST Reason: 1

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned

order dated 09.07.2007 passed by the High Court of Delhi in

RFA No.280 of 2001 and the subsequent order dated

13.01.2012 passed by the High Court in R.P. No.314 of 2008

in the very same RFA No.280 of 2001, the original appellant

before the High Court – Delhi Development Authority (‘DDA’

for short) has preferred the present appeals.

2. The facts leading to the present appeals in a nutshell are

as under:

The two plaintiffs, namely, Shri Diwan Chand Anand and

Smt. Chanan Kanta Anand claiming to be the co­owners of the

suit property filed the suit before the Civil Court/learned Trial

Court for declaration and permanent injunction. The suit was

filed challenging the acquisition proceedings under the Land

Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). In

the plaint defendant nos. 8 to 39 were impleaded alleging to

be co­shares as proper parties to the suit. The original

plaintiff no.2, Smt. Chanan Kanta Anand, was the wife of

original defendant no.8 – Shri Dharam Chand Anand. On the

demise of the husband and wife (original plaintiff no. 2 &

2 defendant no. 8) their children were substituted both as

plaintiff nos. 2(i) to 2(x) and defendant nos. 8(i) to 8(x). The

suit was contested by the original defendant nos. 1 to 5 and 7

including the appellant DDA. They filed the written statement

controverting the claim of the plaintiffs. The suit was resisted

on the ground that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction with

respect to a challenge to the acquisition proceedings under

the Land Acquisition Act. Other defendant nos. 8 to 39 did

not file any written statement and they were proceeded ex­

parte vide order dated 22.03.1983 and 06.10.1983.

2.1 The learned Trial Court initially framed four issues as

under:

“Whether the notification dated 16.01.1969 under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act with respect to the land in dispute is illegal due to non­ satisfaction of the appropriate authority as to the existences of the public purpose? OPP

2. Whether the defendants withdrew from the acquisition proceedings? OPP

3. What is the effect of Letter dated 10.01.1967 and February, 1968 filed as Annexure D and G to the Plaint? OPP.

4. Relief”

3 2.2 That thereafter one additional preliminary issue was

framed on 12.12.1995 as under:

“Whether Civil Court has jurisdiction to go into the validity of the notification under Section 4 and 6 under Land Acquisition Act?” 2.3 By judgment and decree dated 12.01.2000, the learned

Trial Court decreed the suit. It is the case on behalf of the

appellant – DDA that despite the learned Trial Court giving a

finding that the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to go into the

question of validity and legality of the notification under

Section 4 of the Act, it decreed the suit and held that the

notifications in question ceased to exist although the

notification under Section 48 of the Act had not been issued.

The contesting defendants were restrained from dispossessing

the plaintiffs and other co­owners land so notified for

acquisition.

2.4 Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the learned Trial

Court, DDA preferred the appeal before the High Court being

RFA No.280 of 2001. The original plaintiff no.1 was arrayed

as Respondent No.38 whereas LRs of plaintiff no.2 and

defendant no.8 were arrayed as Respondent no.39 (2 – 10),

4 and other defendants 9­39 were arrayed as Respondent nos.

7­37 in the appeal. The appeal was admitted for hearing.

The original plaintiff/respondent nos. 38 & 39 were

represented by counsel. That some of the respondents

(original defendants) out of respondent nos. 7 to 37 (out of

original defendant nos. 9 to 39) were not served as some of

them had died. By order dated 09.07.2007 the Division

Bench of the High Court dismissed the entire appeal as

having abated by observing as under:

"Many respondents have died during the pendency of the appeal but no steps have been taken by the appellant to bring their Legal Representatives on record.

This appeal accordingly stands abated.”

2.5 That the appellant – DDA filed Review Petition No.314 of

2008 seeking review of the order dated 09.07.2007 dismissing

the appeal as having abated. The High Court issued notice on

03.09.2008 which remained unserved till the decision in the

impugned order dated 13.01.2012. In the meantime, the

original plaintiff no.1 Shri Diwan Chand Anand was reported

to have expired on 16.11.2010 and after ascertaining about

his legal representatives, application for substitution, being

5 CM No.22449 of 2011 was filed on 08.11.2012, which also

remained pending. By the impugned order dated 13.01.2012

the High Court has dismissed the review application and has

refused to recall the order dated 09.07.2007 dismissing the

appeal as having abated. The original order passed by the

High Court dated 09.07.2007 dismissing the main appeal as

having abated and the subsequent order dated 13.01.2012

dismissing the review application and refusing to recall the

order dated 09.07.2007 are the subject matter of the present

appeals.

3. Shri Sanjay Poddar, learned Senior Advocate has

appeared on behalf of the appellant – DDA and Shri Shyam

Divan, learned Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of the

contesting respondent nos.33 and Shri Sunil Gupta, learned

Senior Advocate has appeared on behalf of respondent nos. 3

to 40.

4. Shri Poddar, learned Senior Advocate appearing on

behalf of the appellant – DDA has vehemently submitted that

the High Court has dismissed the appeal as abated solely on

6 the ground of failure on the part of the appellant to bring on

record the legal representatives of certain respondents

without going into the question as to whether the presence of

such persons was necessary and also without deciding the

application being CM No.22449 of 2011 (for substitution of

legal representatives of original plaintiff ­ Shri Diwan Chand

Anand).

4.1 It is submitted that as a matter of fact the appeal has

not been dismissed on the ground of non­substitution of

plaintiffs, who are necessary parties. It is contended that the

appeal as a whole cannot be treated as abated on failure to

substitute the legal representative of such defendants who

even did not file written statement and even remained ex­

parte, in view of the provisions of Order 22 Rule 4(4) of the

Code of Civil Procedure (for short ‘CPC’).

4.2 It is further urged that the High Court has dismissed the

appeal on hyper technical ground without examining the core

issue, as to, whether, the Appeal can be heard in the absence

of such respondents/defendants or not.

7 4.3 It is also submitted that even during the course of the

hearing of the SLPs, the contesting respondents have argued

that said two plaintiffs filed the suit on behalf of other co­

owners/defendants and they were prosecuting the suit on

their behalf though these defendants remained ex­parte and

thus the learned Trial Court rightly passed the decree in their

favour. Reliance was placed on behalf of the appellants upon

the decision of this Court in the case of A. Viswanatha Pilliai

and others vs. The Special Tehsildar for Land Acquisition

No.4 and others, (1991) 4 SCC 17 in support of the

submission that one co­owner can prefer and prosecute the

legal remedies for and on behalf of other co­owners. It is

submitted that applying the same analogy, the same co­owner

can also defend and represent the entire estate of other co­

owner. That if the entire estate is represented by the

plaintiffs in the suit, then they are deemed to have

represented the same in the appeal. It is submitted that the

respondents/defendants who died did not file written

statement and remained ex­parte and therefore they were not

necessary parties for adjudication of the appeal. Reliance is

8 placed upon the decision of this Court in the case of Mata

Prasad Mathur vs. Jawala Prasad Mathur, (2013) 14 SCC

722 and Kanhiya Lal vs. Rameshwar, (1983) 2 SCC 260

(para 6).

4.4 It is further submitted that it is a well settled law that

whether the appeal abets as a whole has to depend upon facts

of each case and no straight formula is applicable since each

case has its own peculiarities. It is submitted that the

Hon’ble High Court has failed to examine this important and

vital aspect which was required to be considered as observed

and held by the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Hon’ble

Court in the case of Sardar Amarjit Singh Kalra vs. Pramod

Gupta, (2003) 3 SCC 272 (para 26).

4.5 It is urged that in the aforesaid Constitution Bench

Judgment this Hon’ble Court has further held that the

provisions of Order 22 Rule 4 CPC are required to be applied

liberally with the object of protecting the rights of the parties

and not to destroy the same. It is contended that when the

9 land is sought to be acquired and meant for a public purpose

as in the instant case interest of justice warrants that the

appeal be heard on merits in a time bound manner and may

not be dismissed as abated.

4.6 Now so far as on the issue of abatement of present

SLPs/appeals on the alleged ground of non­impleadment of

the LRs of Jagdish Anand in the present SLPs/appeals who

was one of the legal heirs of original plaintiff no.2 and

defendant no.8, it is submitted that Jagdish Anand was one of

the legal representatives of original plaintiff no.2 and

defendant no.8, out of the 10. That the other legal

representatives are already on record and therefore as the

estate is represented by the other legal representatives the

present appeals can proceed in the presence of the other legal

representatives who are already on record as all of them

represent the estate of their father and mother.

4.7 So far as the submission on behalf of the contesting

respondents that on the issue of finality of judgment/decree

on account of non­substitution of legal representatives and/or

there may be conflicting or inconsistent decrees is concerned,

10 it is submitted that as such the judgment and decree passed

by the learned Trial Court is a nullity being without

jurisdiction as this Hon’ble Court in the case of State of Bihar

vs. Dharender Kumar, (1995) 4 SCC 229 has held that the

Civil Court has no jurisdiction to entertain a civil suit in

respect of the Land Acquisition Proceedings/Notifications and

cannot pass an injunction order to restrain the government

from taking possession. It is submitted that the decree being

a nullity the validity of such a decree can be questioned

whenever and wherever it is sought to be relied upon, even at

the stage of execution and even at the collateral stage of

proceedings. It is submitted that the defect of jurisdiction as

to the subject matter of the suit land, strikes at the root of the

matter and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of

the parties.

4.8 Now in so far as the submission on behalf of the

contesting respondents, that there is a huge delay in

challenging the original order dated 09.07.2007 passed in the

First Appeal, it is submitted that the appellant was

prosecuting the Review Application which was filed in the year

11 2008 which remained pending till 13.01.2012. That the delay

in preferring the review was condoned by the High Court.

Therefore, the appellant is entitled to seek exclusion of the

period during the pendency of the review petition and the

same has been challenged in the present proceeding. It is

submitted that the submission of the respondents in this

regard is liable to be rejected. This is because as observed

and held by this Court in the case of Esha Bhattacharjee vs.

Managing Committee of Ragunathpur Nafar Academy and

others, (2013) 12 SCC 649 as well as in the recent decision

in the case of Radha Gajapathi Raju & Ors. vs. P. Maduri

Gajapathi Raju & Ors. In Civil Appeal No.6974­6975/2021

arising out of SLP (C) No.3373­3374 of 2020 decided on

22.11.2021 pendency of the proceedings in another Court

can be said to be a sufficient ground for condonation of delay.

Making above submissions and relying upon the above

decisions, it is prayed to allow the present appeals, set aside

the orders passed by the High Court dismissing the appeal as

a whole as having abated due to non­bringing the legal

representatives of some of the respondents – original

12 defendants on record and to direct to decide the main appeal

on merits.

5. While opposing the present appeals, learned Senior

Advocates appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents,

have, firstly, submitted that as such there is a huge delay of

1811 days in filing Civil Appeal No.2398 of 2022 against the

main order dated 09.07.2007 with no plausible justification

and explanation. As a matter of fact, even the review petition

before the High Court was barred by limitation by 378 days.

5.1 It is further submitted by Learned Senior Advocates on

behalf of the Contesting Respondents that in order to

appreciate the controversy before the learned Trial Court, few

facts are required to be considered which are as under:

“1. Plaintiffs 1 & 2, Diwan Chand Anand and Smt. Chanan Kanta Anand, along with Sh. Dharam Chand Anand, Sh. Gian Chand etc. were migrants from Lahore, Pakistan. The said plaintiffs along with Sh. Dharam Chand Anand & others, in and around 1947­48, purchased the disputed land, situated in Village Kharera, Tehsil Mehrauli, bearing Khasra no.393, 394 & 395, admeasuring 30 bighas 6 biswas of land, along with super structure, from one Sh. Mohd Ishaq. Sh. Dharam Chand Anand re­started his business of body building on Trucks by

13 constructing a factory on the said parcels of land in the name of Anand Automobiles and supplied bus bodies to the Military.

2. Since Mohd Ishaq migrated to Pakistan, the properties were claimed by Custodian of Evacuee Properties. Representation was made by the Plaintiffs & others to de­notify the same as Evacuee Property. The same was duly considered and on 5 th December 1953, the Custodian of Evacuee Properties confirmed the sale of the said land with the super­ structure, in favour of Plaintiffs & other co­sharers.

Sale Certificate was filed with the plaint. The said land is situated within “Lal Dora”.

3. Subsequently, two Deeds of Conveyance with respect to 30 bighas 6 biswas of land, were executed by the President of India, in the year 1962, in favour of the said Plaintiffs along with Sh. Dharam Chand Anand, Sh. Gian Chand & other co­sharers. The deeds neither specified the shares of he said six persons in the parcels of land nor allocated or demarcated any portions of the land between them.

4. In the year 1964, Notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 was issued in respect to number of parcels of land including the aforesaid land.

5. On 1st May, 1964, the co­sharers filed objections against the notification and nothing was heard for almost 5 years. On 19th September, 1966, one of the co­sharer of the said property, made representation against the proposed acquisitions to GoI.

6. On 23th December, 1966, the Central Govt wrote to the Lt. Governor of Delhi to release the land comprised in Khasra nos. 393, 394 & 395, covered by notification dated 21st March, 1964

7. Release Policy: On 7th January, 1967, Central Govt. made a policy decision that lands which were isolated and situated amidst built up areas and not required for public purposes were to be released from acquisition. On 10th January, 1967, the Central Govt. wrote to one of the co­owners, viz Shiv Raj

14 Bahadur that Delhi Administration has been directed to de­notify the land in dispute.

8. Thereafter, on 6th February, 1967, the Lt. Governor of Delhi wrote to Central Govt. confirming necessary draft to de­notify the land to ensure directions.

9. Again on 10th October 1967, one of the co­sharer made another representation requesting for release of land.

10. On 9th February 1968, the GoI wrote to Delhi Administration that decision in letter dated 23.12.1966 stands and directed to de­notify the parcels of land, which are subject matter of the SLPs.

11. However, on 16th January, 1969, Notification under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act was issued with respect to the land aforesaid.

12. Two out of the six persons, in whose favour the Deeds of Conveyance were executed, viz Dewan Chand Anand & Chanan Kanta Anand w/o Dharam Chand Anand, filed a suit in the High Court of Delhi, in the year 1974, seeking declaration that the Notification dated 21.03.1964 issued under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act stands withdrawn and or cancelled/waived and that the Section 6 Notification is mala­fide, null and void, inoperative in law and without and or in excess of jurisdiction and acquisition. It was inter alia the plea of the plaintiffs in the suit, that the Central Government, upon being approached by some of the owners of the land, who were impleaded as defendants, had by a communication to the then Delhi Administration stated that the subject land was not required for the stated purpose and thus the Notification under Section 6 was bad and without application of mind.

13. The suit was instituted by 2 plaintiffs i.e. 2 of the co­owenrs. However, out of the remaining 4 persons, in whose favour conveyance deeds were executed, 3 had already died and accordingly in the said suit, Dharam Chand Anand, the co­owner and the legal heirs of the remaining 3 co­owners had to be and were also impleaded as defendants, as being proper

15 parties, besides the Land Acquisition Authorities and DDA.”

5.2 It is submitted that the other owners of the land

impleaded as defendants, did not contest the suit, as the suit

was in mutual interest. A preliminary issue, namely, whether

a civil suit impugning the notifications under Sections 4 & 6

of the Act is maintainable was decided against the plaintiffs.

However, ultimately, the suit was decreed vide judgment and

decree dated 12.01.2000 by which a decree of declaration was

passed holding that the notifications under Sections 4 & 6 of

the Act had ceased to exist even before filing of the suit and

the suit lands stood released from the ambit and scope of the

notifications. The learned Trial Court also passed a decree of

permanent injunction restraining the official defendants from

dispossessing the plaintiffs and other co­sharers from the suit

property. It is submitted that thereafter in an appeal

preferred by DDA alone, a number of opportunities were given

to bring the legal representatives (LRs) of some of the

respondents on record. But the DDA failed to bring on record

the LRs of many of the respondents who died. It is submitted

that, at one point of time, the suit was dismissed for non­ 16 prosecution which was later restored. Several of the five

respondents i.e. the original purchasers of the lands and their

heirs died. Even the plaintiff – original plaintiff no.1 –

respondent died on 16.11.2010. Though opportunities were

given for substitution of LRs. They were not substituted. It is

submitted that in these circumstances, the High Court vide

final order dated 09.07.2007 dismissed the appeal as abated.

It is submitted that owing to the original plaintiff no.1 –

respondent dying and also a number of other private

respondents dying, the High Court in the said order, appears

to have not given their details. It is submitted that however, it

is not in dispute that a large number of private respondents

did die during the pendency of the appeal and the LRs were

not brought on record despite more than thirty opportunities

being given to the DDA.

5.3 Now so far as the main issue on merits, that is, whether

on the non­substitution of legal representatives of some of the

respondents ­ owners of the land and/or whether on demise of

the some of the respondents during the pendency of the first

appeal and the appellant therein not bringing the LRs on

17 record despite repeated opportunities, whether the entire

appeal stood abated or only in so far as the particular

deceased respondents, it is vehemently submitted by the

learned Senior Advocate for the contesting respondents that

there would be conflicting decrees qua the respondents who

are already served and whose LRs are brought on record and

qua the deceased respondents whose legal representatives are

not brought on record. It is submitted by the learned Senior

Advocate that decree dated 12.01.2000 will be in favour of the

legal representatives of all the deceased respondents and if the

appeal succeeds in High Court, there will be conflicting

decrees since the property is jointly owned and the decree is

inseparable or inseverable as the property remains undivided

with each party having right, title and interest in the entire

property.

5.4 It is submitted that factually there were two deeds of

conveyance in respect of the entire land in favour of six

owners, without demarcating their respective shares. Thus, in

law each of the six owners or their heirs were the owners of

the entire land having right, title and interest in every part

18 and parcel of land along with others and it cannot be said that

the said owners were exclusive owners of any portion of the

suit lands. It is submitted that in the case of K.

Vishwanathan Pillai versus Special Tehsildar for Land

Acquisition No.IV, (1991) 4 SCC 17, it has been held that

one of the co­owners can file a suit and recover the property

against the stranger and the decree would enure to the benefit

of all the co­owners. It is submitted that no co­owner has

right, title and interest in any of the item or portion of the

property but has a right, title and interest in every part and

parcel of the joint property.

5.5 It is submitted that in the present case the learned Trial

Court vide judgment and decree had decreed that firstly, the

notifications had ceased to exist even before filing of the suit

and therefore, the suit land stood released from the scope of

the said notifications. Secondly, the permanent injunction

was granted in favour of the plaintiffs and private respondents

(co­sharers) and against the land acquisition authorities as

well as the DDA, where the DDA was restrained from

19 dispossessing them. It is submitted that considering the

aforesaid facts of the case, in the absence of legal

representatives of the deceased respondents, the decree in

respect of the suit property would become final vis­à­vis the

said persons. But in the present proceedings in respect of the

self­same suit property are allowed to continue as against the

other respondents, the enforcement of the decree consequent

to the possible success of the proceedings would lead to

conflict of decrees not permissible in law. The relief of

permanent injunction in favour of the deceased respondents

would continue to be in force, whereas it would not be in force

as against the respondents. This also will result in passing of

two conflicting decrees which shall be incapable of

enforcement.

5.6 It is submitted that the present is the case of “joint and

indivisible decree”/“joint and inseverable or inseparable

decree”. Hence when there is omission or lapse or failure to

bring on record the LRs of one or more deceased respondents

on time, it would be fatal and would require the appeal to be

dismissed in toto and it would result in abatement of entire

20 proceedings. Otherwise, inconsistent or contradictory decrees

would result with respect to same subject matter vis­à­vis the

others.

Making the above submissions it is vehemently

submitted that the High Court has rightly dismissed the entire

appeal as having abated and the same is not required to be

interfered with by this Court.

6. Making above submissions and relying upon the

decisions of this Court in the case of State of Punjab vs.

Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89; Hemareddi vs.

Ramachandra, (2019) 6 SCC 756; Sunkara

Lakehminarassama vs. Sagi, (2019) 11 SCC 787 and the

recent decision of this Court Venigalla Koteswaramman vs.

Malempati Suryamba, (2021) 4 SCC 246, it is prayed to

dismiss the present appeals.

7. We have heard learned counsel for the respective parties

at length.

21

8. At the outset, it is required to be noted that by order

dated 09.07.2007, the High Court dismissed the First Appeal

preferred by the appellant herein as having abated on the

ground that with respect to some of the original defendants –

respondents in appeal who died, their legal representatives

were not brought on record. Thus, on non­bringing the legal

representatives of some of the respondents who died during

the pendency of the appeal on record, the High Court

dismissed the appeal as a whole as having abated. The said

order dated 09.07.2007 reads as under:

“R.F.A. No.280/2001

Many respondents have died during the pendency of the appeal but no steps have been taken by the appellant to bring their Legal representatives on record. This appeal accordingly stands abated.”

8.1 Thereafter the appellant preferred the review application

in the year 2008 which has been dismissed by the High Court

by the impugned order dated 13.01.2012. At this stage, it is

required to be noted that there was a delay in preferring the

Review Application which came to be condoned by the High

Court. That subsequently the appellant herein – DDA –

22 original appellant, preferred the present two appeals, one,

challenging the original order dated 09.07.2007 dismissing

the appeal as a whole as having abated and the second,

challenging the order dismissing the review application. It is

sought to be contended on or behalf of the contesting

respondents that there is a huge delay in preferring the appeal

challenging the order dated 09.07.2007 and therefore present

Appeal may not be entertained. However, the appellant was

bona fide prosecuting the review application. That after

dismissal of the review application in which the appellant

prayed to review and recall the order dated 09.07.2007, that

the appellant has preferred two separate appeals, one,

challenging the dismissal of the review application and

another, challenging the original order dated 09.07.2007.

Therefore, once the appellant was bona fide prosecuting the

review application, it was justified in waiting for the outcome

of the Review Application. If, without waiting for the outcome

of the review application, the appellant would have preferred

the appeal at that stage, the appellant would have been non­

suited on the ground of the pendency of the review application

and the appellant would have been told to wait till the

23 outcome of the review application. Therefore, in the facts and

circumstances of the case the time taken in prosecuting the

review application is to be excluded and the appeal preferred

challenging the order dated 09.07.2007 is to be considered on

merits. Therefore, the objection on behalf of the contesting

respondents not to consider the substantive appeal

challenging the order dated 09.07.2007 on merits is hereby

overruled and we may proceed to consider the order dated

09.07.2007 dismissing the appeal as a whole as having abated

on merits.

8.2 Before we consider the order dated 09.07.2007 on merits

the relevant pleadings and the necessary averments in the

plaint which would have a direct bearing on the controversy in

the present appeal are required to be referred to. It is

required to be noted and it is not in dispute that the suit was

filed by only two co­owners and rest of the co­owners/co­

sharers were joined as defendants as proper parties.

According to the original plaintiffs, the land in question was

owned jointly by the original plaintiffs and the other co­

24 sharers which can be culled out from the following averments

in the plaint:

“4. That by order dated 5th December, 1953, the Custodian of Evacuee Properties confirmed the sale regarding the said land in favour of the Plaintiffs and the other co­sharers on condition that they will pay the amount of Rs. 65,399.00 to the Custodian of Evacuee Properties. That amount of Rs. 65,339.00 was paid to the Custodian by the Plaintiffs and other Co­sharers.

5. That on the 26th April, 1962, the Custodian of Evacuee Properties issued Sale Certificates regarding the said land in favour of the Plaintiff and the other co­ sharers. A copy of the Sale Certificate is attached herewith as Annexure "B".

7. That after the purchase, the Plaintiffs and the other cosharers began to reside on land bearing Khasra No. 395 and some of the co­sharers made a number of improvements and constructions from 1947­48 to 1963 in the land comprised in the said Khasra and some co­ sharers also set up an Automobile Factory for the manufacture of automobiles and ancillary parts and body building for mechanically propelled vehicles, in the said land.

11. That on 1st May, 1964, the co­sharers of this property filed objections against the said Notification and thereafter for almost 5 years, no hearing was fixed for the said objections and no notice of any kind was received by any of the cosharers.

12. That on 19th September, 1966, Mrs. Shiv Raj Bahadur, who is one of the co­sharers of this property, made a representation against the proposed acquisition to the Government of India, through the Hon'ble Minister Shri Mehar Chand Khanna of the Ministry of Works & Housing. A copy of the representation made, is attached herewith as Annexure "C".

25 44. That the Plaintiffs and the other co­sharers have all along been harassed for reasons unknown, for acquiring the said property by the Local Administration in spite of two specific directions and decisions of the Central Government to denotify the said property.

(45) That the legal representatives of the co­ sharers who had died, were entitled to be heard and although it was brought to the notice of the Land Acquisition Collector that there were legal representatives of the deceased owners, but they were not given any opportunity of being heard, and no notice was issued to them, therefore, the entire proceedings are vitiated.

47. That Defendants nos. 8 to 39 are co­sharers in the land in dispute and have been impleaded as proper parties to the suit”

8.3 That the plaintiffs being co­owners/co­sharers of the

entire suit land in question prayed for the following reliefs:

“(a) It is declared that the­entire proceedings adopted under Section SA of the Land Acquisition Act are malafide, illegal and incomplete violation of the letter and spirit of. the Land Acquisition Act and is contrary to the principles of natural justice, fair­play, equity and good conscience.

(b) It is declared that the Notification no.

F.19(93­A)/63­ L&H(ii) dated 21st March, 1964 issued under, Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act stands withdrawn and/ or cancelled and waived by your own conduct.

(c) It be declared that the Notification No. F.19(93­A)/63­ L&H dated 16th January, 1969 issued under Section 6 of the Land Acquisition Act is malafide, illegal, null and void, ultra vires, inoperative in Law and without jurisdiction and/ or in excess of jurisdiction.

26

(d) A permanent injunction be issued against the Defendants not to dispossess the Plaintiffs and the other co­sharers from the property and land bearing Khasra no. 395, 394 and 708/393 of Village Kharera.

(e) An ad interim ex­parte injunction in terms of the proceedings prayer.

(f) The costs of the suit be allowed to the Plaintiff against the Defendants.

(g) The Defendants be ordered to pay to the Plaintiffs the cost of incidentals.

(h) The Court may pass such other and further orders as may be just, proper and necessary under the circumstances of the case.”

8.4 Thus, from the aforesaid it can be seen that the original

plaintiffs – two co­owners/co­sharers of the entire land in

question fought with respect to the entire land belonging to

the plaintiffs and the co­owners jointly. It can be said that the

original plaintiffs instituted the suit for themselves as well as

for and/or on behalf of the other co­owners – co­sharers with

respect to the entire land jointly owned by all of them. Thus,

it can safely be held that the entire estate was represented

through original plaintiffs in which even the co­sharers/co­

owners were also joined as defendants as proper parties.

Therefore, even when the learned Trial Court passed the

judgment and decree, it passed the judgment and decree with

27 respect to the entire land and even granted the permanent

injunction to protect the ownership and protection of the

plaintiffs as well as the other co­sharers over the suit land. In

light of the above factual scenario the order passed by the

High Court dated 09.07.2007 in dismissing the first appeal as

a whole as having been abated on not taking step to bring on

record the legal representatives of some of the original

defendants/respondents in the appeal is required to be tested

and/or considered in light of the settled legal principles.

9. While considering the impugned order passed by the

High Court dated 09.07.2007, dismissing the appeal as having

abated, the law on abatement and on Order 22 CPC is

required to be discussed. Order 22 CPC fell for consideration

before this Court in the recent decision in the case of

Venigalla Koteswaramman (supra) in which this Court

considered in detail the earlier decisions of this Court in the

case of Nathu Ram (supra) as well as the other decisions

including the later decision in the case of Hemareddi (supra).

28 The relevant discussion on Order 22 CPC in paragraphs 42 to

44.8 are extracted as under:

“42. The rules of procedure for dealing with death, marriage, and insolvency of parties in a civil litigation are essentially governed by the provisions contained in Order 22 of the Code.

42.1. Though the provisions in Rule 1 to Rule 10­ A of Order 22 primarily refer to the proceedings in a suit but, by virtue of Rule 11, the said provisions apply to the appeals too and, for the purpose of an appeal, the expressions “plaintiff”, “defendant” and “suit” could be read as “appellant”, “respondent” and “appeal” respectively.

42.2. Rule 1 of Order 22 of the Code declares that the death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives. When read for the purpose of appeal, this provision means that the death of an appellant or respondent shall not cause the appeal to abate if the right to sue survives.

42.3. Rule 2 of Order 22 of the Code ordains the procedure where one of the several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff(s) alone, or against the surviving defendant(s) alone. The same procedure applies in appeal where one of the several appellants or respondents dies and right to sue survives to the surviving appellant(s) alone, or against the surviving respondent(s) alone. The procedure is that the Court is required to cause an entry to that effect to be made on record and the appeal is to proceed at the instance of the surviving appellant(s) or against the surviving respondent(s), as the case may be.

29 42.4. However, by virtue of Rule 4 read with Rule 11 of Order 22 of the Code, in case of death of one of the several respondents, where right to sue does not survive against the surviving respondent or respondents as also in the case where the sole respondent dies and the right to sue survives, the contemplated procedure is that the legal representatives of the deceased respondent are to be substituted in his place; and if no application is made for such substitution within the time limited by law, the appeal abates as against the deceased respondent.

42.5. Of course, the provisions have been made for dealing with the application for substitution filed belatedly but the same need not be elaborated in the present case because it remains an admitted fact that no application for substitution of legal representatives of Defendant 2 (who was Respondent 3 in AS No. 1887 of 1988) was made before the High Court.

42.6. The relevant provisions contained in Rules 1, 2, sub­rules (1), (2) and (3) of Rule 4 and Rule 11 of Order 22 could be usefully reproduced as under

“1. No abatement by party's death, if right to sue survives.—The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause the suit to abate if the right to sue survives.

2. Procedure where one of several plaintiffs or defendants dies and right to sue survives.— Where there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one, and any of them dies, and where the right to sue survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to

30 be made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or against the surviving defendant or defendants.

***

4. Procedure in case of death of one of several defendants or of sole defendant.—(1) Where one of two or more defendants dies and the right to sue does not survive against the surviving defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue survives, the Court, on an application made in that behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the deceased defendant to be made a party and shall proceed with the suit.

(2) Any person so made a party may make any defence appropriate to his character as legal representative of the deceased defendant. (3) Where within the time limited by law no application is made under sub­rule (1), the suit shall abate as against the deceased defendant.

***

11. Application of Order to appeals.—In the application of this Order to appeals, so far as may be, the word “plaintiff” shall be held to include an appellant, the word “defendant” a respondent, and the word “suit” an appeal.”

43. For determining if Order 22 Rule 2 could apply, we have to examine if right to sue survived against the surviving respondents. It is not the case that no legal heirs were available for Defendant 2. It is also not the case where the estate of the deceased Defendant 2 passed on to the remaining parties by survivorship or otherwise. Therefore, applicability of Order 22 Rule 2 CPC is clearly ruled out.

31

44. Admittedly, steps were not taken for substitution of the legal representatives of Defendant 2, who was Respondent 3 in AS No. 1887 of 1988. Therefore, sub­rule (3) of Rule 4 of Order 22 of the Code directly came into operation and the said appeal filed by Defendants 16 to 18 abated against Defendant 2 (Respondent 3 therein). We may profitably recapitulate at this juncture that in fact, the other appeal filed by Defendants 4, 13 and 14 (AS No. 1433 of 1989) was specifically dismissed by the High Court as against the deceased Defendant 2 on 25­4­2006.

44.1. Once it is found that the appeal filed by Defendants 16 to 18 abated as against Defendant 2 (Respondent 3), the question arises as to whether that appeal could have proceeded against the surviving respondents i.e. the plaintiff and Defendants 1 and 3 (who were Respondents 1, 2 and

4). For dealing with this question, we may usefully refer to the relevant principles, concerning the effect of abatement of appeal against one respondent in case of multiple respondents, as enunciated and explained by this Court.

44.2. The relevant principles were stated and explained in depth by this Court in State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram [State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89]. In that case, the Punjab Government had acquired certain pieces of land belonging to two brothers jointly. Upon their refusal to accept the compensation offered, their joint claim was referred to arbitration and an award was passed in their favour that was challenged by the State Government in appeal before the High Court. During pendency of appeal, one of the brothers died but no application was filed within time to bring on record his legal representatives. The High Court dismissed

32 [Province of East Punjab v. Labhu Ram, 1954 SCC OnLine P&H 132] the appeal while observing that it had abated against the deceased brother and consequently, abated against the surviving brother too. The order so passed by the High Court was questioned before this Court in appeal by certificate of fitness.

44.3. While dismissing the appeal and affirming the views of the High Court, this Court in Nathu Ram case [State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89] enunciated the principles concerning the effect of abatement and explained as to why, in case of joint and indivisible decree, the appeal against the surviving respondent(s) cannot be proceeded with and has to be dismissed as a result of its abatement against the deceased respondent; the basic reason being that in the absence of the legal representatives of deceased respondent, the appellate court cannot determine between the appellant and the legal representatives anything which may affect the rights of the legal representatives. This Court pointed out that by abatement of appeal qua the deceased respondent, the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent becomes final and the appellate court cannot, in any way modify that decree, directly or indirectly.

44.4. The Court observed in that case, inter alia, as under: (Nathu Ram case [State of Punjab v. Nathu Ram, AIR 1962 SC 89] , AIR pp. 90­91, paras 4­6 &

8)

“4. It is not disputed that in view of Order 22 Rule 4, Civil Procedure Code, hereinafter called the Code, the appeal abated against Labhu Ram, deceased, when no application for bringing on record his legal representatives had been made within the time

33 limited by law. The Code does not provide for the abatement of the appeal against the other respondents. Courts have held that in certain circumstances, the appeals against the co­ respondents would also abate as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. They have not been always agreed with respect to the result of the particular circumstances of a case and there has been, consequently, divergence of opinion in the application of the principle. It will serve no useful purpose to consider the cases. Suffice it to say that when Order 22 Rule 4 does not provide for the abatement of the appeals against the co­respondents of the deceased respondent there can be no question of abatement of the appeals against them. To say that the appeals against them abated in certain circumstances, is not a correct statement. Of course, the appeals against them cannot proceed in certain circumstances and have therefore to be dismissed. Such a result depends on the nature of the relief sought in the appeal.

5. The same conclusion is to be drawn from the provisions of Order 1 Rule 9 of the Code which provides that no suit shall be defeated by reason of the misjoinder or non­joinder of parties and the court may, in every suit, deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the parties actually before it. It follows, therefore, that if the court can deal with the matter in controversy so far as regards the rights and interests of the appellant and the respondents other than the deceased respondent, it has to proceed with the appeal and decide it. It is only when it is not possible for the court to deal with such matters, that it will have to refuse to proceed further with the appeal and therefore dismiss it.

34

6. The question whether a court can deal with such matters or not, will depend on the facts of each case and therefore no exhaustive statement can be made about the circumstances when this is possible or is not possible. It may, however, be stated that ordinarily the considerations which weigh with the court in deciding upon this question are whether the appeal between the appellants and the respondents other than the deceased can be said to be properly constituted or can be said to have all the necessary parties for the decision of the controversy before the court. The test to determine this has been described in diverse forms. Courts will not proceed with an appeal

(a) when the success of the appeal may lead to the court's coming to a decision which be in conflict with the decision between the appellant and the deceased respondent and therefore which would lead to the court's passing a decree which will be contradictory to the decree which had become final with respect to the same subject­matter between the appellant and the deceased respondent; (b) when the appellant could not have brought the action for the necessary relief against those respondents alone who are still before the court; and (c) when the decree against the surviving respondents, if the appeal succeeds, be ineffective, that is to say, it could not be successfully executed.

***

8. The difficulty arises always when there is a joint decree. Here again, the consensus of opinion is that if the decree is joint and indivisible, the appeal against the other respondents also will not be proceeded with and will have to be dismissed as a result of the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent. Different views exist in the case of joint decrees in favour of respondents whose rights in the subject­matter of the decree are specified. One view

35 is that in such cases, the abatement of the appeal against the deceased respondent will have the result of making the decree affecting his specific interest to be final and that the decree against the other respondents can be suitably dealt with by the appellate court. We do not consider this view correct. The specification of shares or of interest of the deceased respondent does not affect the nature of the decree and the capacity of the joint decree­holder to execute the entire decree or to resist the attempt of the other party to interfere with the joint right decreed in his favour. The abatement of an appeal means not only that the decree between the appellant and the deceased respondent has become final, but also, as a necessary corollary, that the appellate court cannot, in any way, modify that decree directly or indirectly. The reason is plain. It is that in the absence of the legal representatives of the deceased respondent, the appellate court cannot determine anything between the appellant and the legal representatives which may affect the rights of the legal representatives under the decree. It is immaterial that the modification which the Court will do is one to which exception can or cannot be taken.”

9.1 After referring to the decision of this Court in the case of

Nathu Ram (supra), in the case of Vennigalla

Koteswaramma vs. Malampati Suryamba and Others,

(2003) 3 SCC 272, it is observed by this Court that the

nature and extent of the abatement in a given case and the

decision to be taken thereon will depend upon the facts of

36 each case and, therefore, no exhaustive statement can be

made either way and that the decision will ultimately depend

upon the fact whether the decree obtained was a joint decree

or a separate one. It is further observed that this question

cannot and should not also be tested merely on the format of

the decree under challenge or it being one or the manner in

which it was dealt with before or by the Court which passed it.

Thus, as observed and held by the Court:

(i) The death of a plaintiff or defendant shall not cause

the suit to abate if the right to sue survives;

(ii) If there are more plaintiffs or defendants than one,

and any of them dies, and where the right to sue

survives to the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs alone, or

against the surviving defendant or defendants alone,

the Court shall cause an entry to that effect to be

made on the record, and the suit shall proceed at the

instance of the surviving plaintiff or plaintiffs, or

against the surviving defendant or defendants (Order

22 Rule 2);

37 (iii) where one of two or more defendants dies and the

right to sue does not survive against the surviving

defendant or defendants alone, or a sole defendant or

sole surviving defendant dies and the right to sue

survives, the Court, on an application made in that

behalf, shall cause the legal representative of the

deceased defendant to be made a party and shall

proceed with the suit. Where within the time limited

by law no application is made under sub­rule 1 of

Order 22 Rule 4, the suit shall abate as against the

deceased defendant;

(iv) the provision of Order 22 shall also apply to the

appeal proceedings also.

9.2 As observed and held by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions while considering whether the suit/appeal has

abated due to non­bringing the legal representatives of

plaintiffs/defendants or not, the Court has to examine if the

right to sue survives against the surviving respondents.

Thereafter the Appellate Court has to consider the question

whether non­bringing the legal representatives of some of the

38 defendants, the appeal could have proceeded against the

surviving respondents. Therefore, the Appellate Court has to

consider the effect of abatement of the appeal against each of

the respondents in case of multiple respondents.

9.3 Applying the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid

decisions to the impugned judgment and order dated

09.07.2007 passed by the High Court, it appears that the

High Court has mechanically and without holding any further

enquiry which was required to be conducted as observed

hereinabove, has simply dismissed the entire appeal as having

abated due to non­bringing on record the legal representatives

of some of the respondents – the original defendants who, as

such, neither contested the suit nor filed the written

statements. At the cost of repetition, it is observed that as

such the original plaintiffs instituted the suit being co­

owners/co­sharers and for and on behalf of all the co­

owners/co­sharers of the entire land sought to be acquired

under the Land Acquisition Act.

39 9.4 As observed and held by this Court in the case of K.

Vishwanathan Pillai (supra), the co­owner is as much an

owner of the entire property as a sole owner of the property.

No co­owner has a definite right, title and interest in any

particular item or a portion thereof. On the other hand, he

has right, title and interest in every part and parcel of the

joint property. He owns several parts of the composite

property along with others and it cannot be said that he is

only a part owner or a fractional owner in the property. It is

observed that, therefore, one co­owner can file a suit and

recover the property against strangers and the decree would

enure to all the co­owners. The aforesaid principle of law

would be applicable in the appeal also. Thus, in the instant

case, when the original plaintiffs – two co­owners instituted

the suit with respect to the entire suit land jointly owned by

the plaintiffs as well as defendants nos. 9 to 39 and when

some of the defendants/respondents in appeal died, it can be

said that estate is represented by others – more particularly

the plaintiffs/heirs of the plaintiffs and it cannot be said that

on not bringing the legal representatives of the some of the co­

40 sharers – defendants – respondents in appeal the appeal

would abate as a whole.

9.5 While passing the impugned order dated 09.07.2007, the

High Court has neither considered the relevant provisions of

CPC namely Order 22 Rule 1 to 11 nor held any enquiry

which was required to be conducted as observed hereinabove.

9.6 One another important aspect which is also required to

be noted is that the suit was filed challenging the acquisition

proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, that too, with

respect to the land in question. It was the specific case on

behalf of the appellant and even the issue was framed by the

learned Trial Court on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to

entertain the suit challenging the acquisition proceedings

under the Land Acquisition Act. From the findings recorded

by the learned Trial Court, it appears that though the learned

Trial Court held the issue of jurisdiction in favour of the

appellant herein, still thereafter it granted the relief and

decreed the suit which was the subject matter before the High

Court. Thus, according to the appellant ­ DDA – the judgment

and decree passed by the learned Trial Court was a nullity

41 and wholly without jurisdiction. If that be so, then, another

question which may be required to be considered is, when the

original plaintiffs/legal heirs are on record, can it be said that

the entire appeal has abated, if in the appeal it is held that the

decree was a nullity and/or wholly without jurisdiction then

the decree will be nullity for all purposes. The aforesaid

aspect is also required to be determined.

9.7 In any case what would have been the consequences of

not bringing the legal representatives of some of the

respondents/defendants who died during the pendency of the

appeal and whether the right to sue survives against the

original plaintiffs and/or surviving respondents/defendants

was to be considered by the High Court, which the High Court

failed to consider in the instant case.

10. In view of the above discussion and for the reason stated

above both these appeals succeed. The impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court dated 09.07.2007

dismissing the appeal as a whole as having abated for not

bringing the legal representatives of some of the

42 respondents/original defendants who died during the

pendency of the appeal is hereby set aside. The High Court to

consider the Appeal now in accordance with law and on its

own merits and in light of the observations made hereinabove,

more particularly, the High Court shall have to consider and

hold an enquiry, whether, on the death of some of the

respondents in the appeal (defendants in suit) the right to sue

against the remaining respondents – original plaintiffs/the

remaining original defendants would survive or not including

the fact that the estate is being represented by surviving

original plaintiffs/heirs of the original plaintiffs/surviving

defendants having a bearing on the enquiry to be held.

With these observations the present Appeals are Allowed

accordingly to the aforesaid extent. However, there shall be

no order as to costs.

…………………………………J. (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA) New Delhi, July 11, 2022.

43