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D. Hanumanth Sa & Ors vs State Of Karnataka & Ors

Supreme Court27 October 2010Swatanter Kumar · Mukundakam Sharma

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. When a preliminary notification under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 specifies that land is required for a public purpose—such as for the benefit of a statutory corporation like the Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation—and a final notification under Section 6 states that the same land is required for related facilities (workshop, residential quarters, approach road) in furtherance of that public purpose, there is no material inconsistency between the two notifications that would render the acquisition invalid, provided the land is shown in proceedings to be part of a comprehensive plan serving that public purpose. 2. The Land Acquisition Act does not contemplate the acquisition of any interest belonging to the Government in land; accordingly, the Government cannot acquire its own land, and a second notification cannot validly acquire land that already stands acquired and vested in the Government under a prior notification issued by a separate authority under separate statutory provisions.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 17-20 OF 2005

D. HANUMANTH SA & ORS. ....... Appellants

Versus

STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. ......Respondents

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 22 OF 2005

JUDGMENT

Dr. Mukundakam Sharma, J.

1. By filing the present appeals the appellants have

challenged the validity of the notification issued under

Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 [hereinafter referred to as "the Act") and also the notification issued

under Section 6 of the Act whereby the respondents sought

to acquire land admeasuring 3 acres 34 guntas situated in

Kengeri Village and Hobli, Bangalore, Karnataka.

2. Initially appellants filed writ petitions registered as Writ

Petition Nos. 20083-20085 of 1993 before the Karnataka

High Court challenging the validity of the notification issued

under Section 4 invoking the emergency clause. The High

Court of Karnataka, while issuing notice, granted stay.

Subsequently, an order dated 30.08.1993 was passed in the

writ petition regarding the statement/submission on behalf

of the State Government that they would not proceed with

the acquisition proceeding of invoking the emergency

provision under the Act. Consequent to the same, the

appellants herein were given opportunity to file objections.

3. The appellants thereafter filed detailed objections

contending inter alia that the vast extent of land that is

already possessed by the Karnataka State Road Transport

Corporation [for short `KSRTC'] and some of the State-

2 owned land is still laying vacant and, therefore, the purpose

of acquiring the land of the appellants for formation of link

road is unjustified and that the same cannot be said to be

required for formation of link road. The appellants also

contended that despite the aforesaid objection filed and a

report submitted by the Land Acquisition Officer in favour

of the claimants, the State Government issued a final

notification under Section 6(1) of the Act by holding that the

land belonging to the appellants are required for the

purpose of workshop and providing residential quarters to

its employees.

4. Being aggrieved by the aforesaid action on the part of the

State Government in issuing a notification under Section 6

of the Land Acquisition Act, the appellants filed Writ

Petition Nos. 25361-25364 of 1994 and 25264 of 1994

before the Karnataka High Court challenging the legality

and the validity of the preliminary and final notifications.

5. The Single Judge of the Karnataka High Court, by his

judgment and order dated 01.02.2000, allowed the said writ

3 petitions holding that in the proceedings prepared by the

State Government, the purpose of acquisition was stated to

have a link road and in the final notification under Section

6 of the Act, the purpose of acquisition having been shown

as completely different, the entire purpose was not justified

and tenable. The said fact was also stated to be so, and had

been held as unjustified by the Land Acquisition Officer. By so

holding the learned Single Judge of the Karnataka High

Court allowed the writ petitions and quashed the said

notifications issued under Section 4 and Section 6 of the

Land Acquisition Act.

6. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order the

respondent filed a writ appeal before the High Court of

Karnataka. By judgment and order dated 02.07.2003 the

Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court allowed the

appeal filed by the State Government and set aside the

judgment and order of the learned Single Judge holding

that the acquisition for the land was for a public purpose

and that there was no ambiguity in the two notifications

issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act.

4

7. Being aggrieved by the said judgment and order passed by

the Division Bench of the High Court the present appeals

have been filed by the claimants-appellants on which we

have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties.

8. In the light of the submissions made before us we now

proceed to decide the contentions raised before us by the

counsel appearing for the parties. Counsel appearing for the

appellants submitted that the notification issued by the

respondent under Section 4 was vague and the purpose for

which the land was sought to be acquired as disclosed from

the entire records of the proposed acquisition including the

said notification was different than what was sought to be

stated in the notification under Section 6. It was also

submitted that the Government had failed to give detailed

reasons for issuing the said notifications to satisfy that the

land was required for public purpose, particularly when the

Land Acquisition Officer had given his reasons to indicate

that the purpose for which the land is sought to be acquired

was not justified in the facts and circumstances of the case.

In order to appreciate the aforesaid contentions raised, we

5 have considered all the notifications relevant to the facts

and circumstances of the case and also relevant records

useful for our purpose.

9. In the notification issued under Section 4(1) which is dated

14.10.1992, it is specifically stated that the State of

Karnataka required the land under acquisition for a specific

public purpose, viz., for the benefit of Karnataka State Road

Transport Corporation. The part of the notification invoking

the provisions of Section 17(4), i.e., applying the urgency

requirement of the Government was set aside by the writ

court which became final and binding and we are not

required to address the aforesaid issue. But, so far as the

requirement of the land for public purpose is concerned, the

same was necessarily for a public purpose, viz., for the

benefit of Karnataka State Road Transport Corporation.

10.Counsel appearing for the appellants however drew our

attention to the proceedings regarding acquisition of 7 acres

15 guntas of land. We have perused the said copies of the

proceedings also. In the said proceedings, it was stated that

6 in order to meet the increasing traffic in the surrounding

area of Bangalore city, and also with a view to provide better

transport service to the public, it is proposed by the

Government to establish a large workshop and city bus

depot in the said land and also for establishment of

residences to workers, training centre and others are also

proposed to be undertaken and in order to construct/form

the road the said land is required. The said proceedings on

careful analysis would also indicate that the land which was

sought to be acquired also figured in a comprehensive plan

for construction of a road as also workshop and residential

building of the staff of KSRTC. The said fact also came to be

reiterated by the State Government by filing an affidavit

wherein it is stated that the entire land in dispute is in fact

required not only for making an approach road but also for

building a workshop and staff residential quarters.

11.The aforesaid reasons and the purpose for which the land

was sought to be acquired is definitely of a public character

and therefore, the respondent-State Government, in our

considered opinion, is fully competent to issue such a

7 notification under Section 4 as also under Section 6 of the

Land Acquisition Act. Counsel appearing for the appellant

at one stage also drew our attention to the fact that

subsequently, another notification came to be issued by the

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board stating that

the land as mentioned in the letter dated 16.12.2004 which

is annexed as Annexure R-5 is being acquired by the

Karnataka Industrial Areas Development Board. The said

land was sought to be acquired by issuing notification

under the State Act, viz., under Section 28(1) and Section

28(4) of the State Act.

12.A preliminary notification was issued by the said authority,

viz., Development Board, including land admeasuring 39

guntas from Survey No. 128/1 and 34 guntas from Survey

No. 128/2. The said letter itself also indicates that

subsequently, a final notification came to be issued under

Section 28(4) of the State Act only for 34 guntas covered by

Survey No. 128/2. Incidentally, the land falling under

Survey No. 128/2 was not notified either under Section 4 or

8 under Section 6 under the notifications dated 14.10.1992

and 28.03.1994, respectively.

13.So far as 39 guntas covered by Survey No. 128/1 is

concerned, which is sought to be acquired as indicated from

letter dated 10.12.2004, we find that the same is not

included in the final notification. A bare perusal of the

notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6 of the Act

would indicate that the land covered by Survey No. 128/1

was a part of the said notification but since the same came

to be excluded in the final notification under Section 28(4),

the contentions raised by the counsel appearing for the

appellants that the said land stood acquired for a different

purpose and, therefore, the purpose for which the land was

sought to be acquired under Section 4 and 6 was

unjustified, is not tenable.

14.Even otherwise, if land already stands acquired by the

Government and if the same stands vested in the

Government there is no question of acquisition of such a

land by issuing a second notification, for the Government

9 cannot acquire its own land. The same is by now settled by

various decision of this Court in a catena of cases. In State

of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma, reported at 1995 Supp

(3) SCC 249, this Court has held that the Land Acquisition

Act does not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of

any interest belonging to the Government in the land on

acquisition; This position was reiterated in a subsequent

decision of this Court in Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of

India, reported at (2004) 7 SCC 362. In paragraphs 15

and 16 of the said judgment, this Court has held that the

High Court clearly erred in setting aside the order of the

Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a reference since

it is settled law that in land acquisition proceedings the

Government cannot and does not acquire its own interest. While laying down the aforesaid law, this Court has referred

to its earlier decision in the case of Collector of Bombay v.

Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri reported at (1955) 1 SCR

1311.

15.However, on a close scrutiny of the records we find that

same is not the case in the present case at hand. It cannot

10 be said that the land which stood acquired under the

notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act are in

any manner connected with the notifications issued by

State Government for Karnataka Industrial Areas

Development Board for Bangalore Mysore Infrastructure

Corridor Project and even assuming a part of the said land

is now sought to be acquired for a different purpose to that

extent, the same cannot be said to be a proper acquisition

as the land already stands acquired under a different

notification issued by a separate authority under separate

provisions of law.

16.In that view of the matter, we find no merit in these appeals

and the same are disposed of by this common judgment

and order. Parties are left to bear their own costs.

......................................J. [Dr. Mukundakam Sharma]

......................................J. [ Swatanter Kumar ]

New Delhi, October 27, 2010

11

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