Communidade Of Tivim Tivim, Bardez-Goa vs State Of Goa

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 2025 INSC 835 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO(S). OF 2025) @ DIARY NO. 16901/2025

COMMUNIDADE OF TIVIM, TIVIM, BARDEZ GOA …APPELLANT

Versus

STATE OF GOA & ORS. ..RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

SUDHANSHU DHULIA, J.

1.Delay of 146 days in filing the Special Leave Petition is condoned.

Leave granted.

2.The appellant before this court is a ‘Communidade’ 1 or an

agricultural association of villagers that has properties in

common and the income derived from these properties

accrues in favour of its members. The system is peculiar to

Goa and is based on the concept of collective village

ownership, which was originally called as the ‘Gaunkari

System’ and the village communities owning the land Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by Nirmala Negi Date: 2025.07.14 collectively were known as ‘gaunkaria’ which ultimately came 17:57:08 IST Reason:

1 Portugese translation of the English word ‘Community’.

Page 1 of 12 to be termed as ‘communidades’ during the Portuguese

colonisation of Goa.

3.Under challenge before us in this Appeal is the judgment dated

06.08.2024 by which the Writ Petition filed by the appellant,

stood dismissed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa.

4.The High Court while doing so has upheld the order dated

13.04.2023 by which the Administrative Tribunal, Goa has

refused to grant permission to the Appellant to compromise

proceedings instituted by the private respondents herein

(respondent Nos. 3 to 11) under the Goa, Daman and Diu

Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (hereinafter ‘Tenancy Act,

1964’).

5.At the outset, it is necessary to mention here at this stage that

the administration of Comunidades is governed by the Code

of Comunidades (hereinafter ‘the Code’). Article 154 (3) of

the Code empowers the Administrative Tribunal to grant

permission to the Communidade to compromise terms in any

suit to which the Communidade is a party.

6.The facts which have led to filing of the Writ Petition before the

High Court can be summarised as under:

a) Two properties (hereinafter ‘Suit Properties’) belonging to the appellant, known as “Oiteil-De-Madel” bearing Survey No. 448/0 & “Levelechy Aradi” bearing Survey No. 440/0 are situated in the village of Tivim in the taluka of Bardez

Page 2 of 12 in Goa and were leased to the predecessors-in-interest of the private respondents by the appellant, in July, 1978.

b) A civil suit was filed by the predecessor of the private respondents praying that his name be entered in the Tenants column in the Survey numbers which correspond to the two properties mentioned above. This suit was decreed on 08.01.1986 & consequently, the name of the predecessor of the private respondents was entered as tenant of the two properties. Since no appeal was preferred against the decree passed by the Trial Court, the same attained finality. Thereafter, predecessor of the private respondents herein passed away on 01.02.2015.

c) On 08.12.2016, the private respondents herein filed Tenancy Application No. 71/2016 before the Civil Judge, Junior Division (B-Court), Bicholim (hereinafter ‘Trial Court’) for declaration of Tenancy under Section 7 of the Tenancy Act, 1964. Despite service of notice to the appellant by the Trial Court, no appearance was entered on its behalf, which led to the case being proceeded ex-parte against the appellant.

d) Vide Judgment & Order dated 01.09.2017, Trial Court allowed the Tenancy Application, consequently declaring the private respondents as agricultural tenants of the Suit Properties. Aggrieved by the declaration of tenancy, the appellant preferred Tenancy Appeal before the Ad-hoc District Judge-I at Mapusa, Goa (hereinafter ‘Appellate Court’).

Page 3 of 12 e) The above-mentioned appeal remains pending before the Appellate Court till date. All the same, during pendency of the Tenancy Appeal, an Extraordinary General Body Meeting of the appellant was held on 14.03.2021, in which members of the appellant deliberated upon the Tenancy Appeal and also considered the fact that if the appeal fails, they stand to lose a major chunk of land held by the Communidade. It is at this meeting that the Communidade resolved that as a compromise, the land in dispute could be bifurcated into a 60:40 sharing ratio, with 60% of the land being allotted to the private respondents and 40% of the land to be retained by the communidade.

f) Pursuant to the above, Managing Committee of the Communidade had further deliberations and finally, a General Body Meeting was convened on 31.10.2021 wherein consent terms were finalised and agreed upon. All the same, before filing these consent terms before the Appellate Court, permission was needed from the Administrative Tribunal in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code. Accordingly, on 22.02.2023, respondent No. 2 herein i.e., Administrator of Communidades forwarded the consent terms to the Administrative Tribunal for approval.

g) As stated earlier, by an Order dated 13.04.2023, such permission was denied by the Administrative Tribunal and this Order of the Administrative Tribunal was assailed by the Communidade before the High Court by way of a Writ Petition.

Page 4 of 12 7.The short question that arose for consideration before the High

Court, which will also be before this Court is whether the

Administrative Tribunal was correct in its refusal to grant the

appellant, permission to compromise proceedings with the

private respondents in terms of Article 154 (3) of the Code?

The High Court as we know has already held that this

permission could not have been granted under law.

8.We have heard Mr. Huzefa Ahmadi, learned counsel for the

appellant who submits that the Administrative Tribunal has

erred in refusing to grant permission to the Communidade,

and as such, the High Court ought not to have upheld the

Administrative Tribunal’s decision. He contends that the best

interests of the appellant and its members have to be

considered and both the High Court as well as the

Administrative Tribunal have failed to take into consideration

the fact that the appellant had finalised consent terms,

keeping in mind its best interest and in the absence of such

terms, the suit properties would have to be regarded as

‘tenanted land’ which is allotted to the private respondents

herein, which would in turn be contrary to the appellant’s

best interests.

Page 5 of 12

9.It is Mr. Ahmadi’s second argument that the Code itself by virtue

of Article 30 (4) (g) empowers the Communidade to deliberate

upon, the withdrawal and compromise of civil suits and this

aspect of the matter was completely ignored by the High

Court.

10. For the respondent no. 1-State of Goa and respondent no. 2,

we have heard learned counsel Mr. Abhay Anil Anturkar, who

supports the decision of the Administrative Tribunal and

submits that the same warranted no interference by the High

Court and hence, there is no infirmity with the order

impugned. Learned counsel would argue that the consent

terms sought to be entered into between the appellant and

the private respondents is nothing but an attempt to bypass

and negate the provisions contained in the Tenancy Act as

well as the Goa Land Use (Regulation) Act, 1991 (hereinafter

‘Land Use Act’).

11. In this regard, the learned Counsel has referred to Clauses i),

iii), v), x) and xi) of the consent terms, which essentially

confer to the private respondents ‘all rights and interests,

which rights shall be akin to full ownership rights’ over 60% of

the land and reciprocally, the appellant is to have ‘exclusive

rights free from any tenancy claim’ over 40% of land.

Page 6 of 12 Additionally, these clauses also stipulate that the private

respondents can use and utilise 60% of the land ‘for any

purpose whatsoever’ in lieu of which the appellant is also

entitled to use its share of 40% of land ‘in the manner

deemed fit and proper.’

12. It is therefore the respondent-State’s contention that the

proposed consent terms effectively accord freehold ownership

rights over the land in question to both the parties and also

allows them to use the land for non-agricultural purposes,

which is in blatant violation of statutory provisions contained

in the Tenancy Act as well as the Land Use Act.

13. Having heard learned counsel for both the sides and having

perused the material on record, we are of the considered

opinion that the Administrative Tribunal has rightly refused

to grant permission to the consent terms finalised by the

appellant. A bare perusal of the same indicates that it is

nothing but an attempt to circumvent the statutory

framework laid down in Tenancy Act and also violates the

Land Use Act.

14. We are in complete agreement with the Administrative

Tribunal, Goa which has refused to accord its permission to

the filing of the consent terms. What weighed in with the

Tribunal is the fact that these terms effectively wipe out

Page 7 of 12 tenancy rights of the private respondents which was declared

by the Trial Court vide judgment dated 01.09.2017 and by

the proposed compromise, the parties have agreed that in

lieu of the 60:40 bifurcation of land between them, the

judgment dated 01.09.2017 stands set aside. This prompted

the Tribunal to observe that instead of testing the

correctness of judgment dated 01.09.2017 on merits before

the appellate court, the parties intend to set aside the

judgment by way of compromise.

15. Moreover, the Tribunal also expressed its dismay at the fact

that these consent terms have the effect of bypassing the

Tenancy Act, since it confers full ownership rights to the

private respondents who have been declared as tenants and

any compromise which is contrary to a statute cannot be

entered into by the appellant.

16. Section 9 of the Tenancy Act lists down the modes of

termination of tenancy and specifies that tenancy can only be

terminated via three modes. The first is when the tenant

himself surrenders his right of tenancy to the landlord in the

manner contained in Section 10. Similarly, in the second

situation, the landlord may terminate the tenancy, but only

on the basis of the specific grounds contained in Section 11.

Page 8 of 12 Lastly, Section 9 (c) provides for termination under any other

specific provision of the Tenancy Act. It is abundantly clear

that by means of the proposed compromise, the parties have

essentially terminated the tenancy, without recourse to any

of the modes referred to in Section 9 of the Act.

17. We shall now refer to Chapter IIA of the Tenancy Act which is

titled “Special rights and privileges of tenants.” Section 18A in

this chapter provides that every tenant shall be deemed to

have purchased from his landlord, the land held by him as a

tenant on the tillers’ day, subject to other provisions of the

Act. This chapter then lays out the procedure to be followed.

Section 18C provides for the Mamlatdar to first issue public

notice to the tenants who are deemed to have purchased the

lands as well as the landlords of such lands and other

interested persons. The purchase price payable by a tenant to

the landlord is then indicated in the Table contained in

Section 18D. We must also take note of the fact that Section

18K of the Tenancy Act prohibits a tenant who has

purchased the land from transferring the land without the

Mamlatdar’s prior permission. If the proposed consent terms

are to be allowed, not only would the tenant be conferred full

ownership rights, in complete disregard of the procedure for

Page 9 of 12 purchase mentioned above, but it would also mean that the

tenant would be conferred a right to alienate land, without

seeking permission of any statutory authority.

18. It is also important to take note of the fact that even after a

tenant has purchased the land in question after complying

with the procedure contemplated under Chapter IIA, he is

barred from using the land for any purpose other than

agriculture, as per Section 2 of the Land Use Act, which

reads as under:

“2. Regulation of use of land.— Notwithstanding anything contained in the Goa, Daman and Diu Town and Country Planning Act, 1974 (Act 21 of 1975), or in any plan or scheme made thereunder, or in the Goa Land Revenue Code, 1968 (Act 9 of 1969), no land which is vested in a tenant under the provisions of the Goa, Daman and Diu Agricultural Tenancy Act, 1964 (Act 7 of 1964) shall be used or allowed to be used for any purpose other than agriculture.”

19. A bare reading of the aforementioned provisions is enough to

come to the conclusion that the proposed consent terms or

the compromise sought to be entered by the appellant with

the private respondents falls foul of both the statutes i.e., the

Tenancy Act and the Land Use Act, insofar as it creates

freehold ownership rights over tenanted land, without

resorting to the procedure contemplated for the purchase of

such land by the tenant and secondly, for the reason that

Page 10 of 12 these terms effectively allow the appellant, as well as the

private respondents, to use an agricultural land for non-

agricultural purposes. In other words, the compromise not

only circumvents procedural aspects contained in Chapter

IIA of the Tenancy Act but also allows the parties to use the

suit properties for a purpose which is expressly barred by the

Land Use Act. The compromise sought by the parties is

nothing but an abuse of the process of law. The so called

compromise or agreement is a ploy to defeat the provisions of

law and therefore it has been rightly denied the legal sanctity

which was sought.

20. As regards the submission of the learned counsel relating to

Art. 30 (4) (g) of the Code, it is to be noted that the said

provision merely empowers a Communidade to deliberate

upon terms of compromise, which upon finalisation, has to

be forwarded to the Administrative Tribunal. By no stretch of

imagination can this provision be construed to mean that it

confers an unfettered power on the Communidade to enter

into a compromise, without the Tribunal’s sanction.

21. Hence, we see absolutely no reason to interfere with the order

dated 06.08.2024 passed by the High Court of Bombay at

Goa.

Page 11 of 12

22. Consequently, this appeal stands dismissed. Pending

application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

23. All the same, we deem it necessary to clarify that we have

expressed no opinion whatsoever on the merits of the dispute

between the appellant and private respondents as regard the

claim of Tenancy. The Tenancy Appeal filed by the appellant

before the Appellate Court shall be decided on its own merits,

in accordance with law.

….....................................J. [SUDHANSHU DHULIA]

……..................................J. [K. VINOD CHANDRAN]

NEW DELHI;

JULY 14, 2025.

Page 12 of 12