Co Mathews vs M/S Srivatsa Estate Pvt Ltd

-1- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KARNATAKA AT BENGALURU

DATED THIS THE 25TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2024

PRESENT THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR AND THE HON'BLE MR JUSTICE UMESH M ADIGA REGULAR FIRST APPEAL NO. 1368 OF 2016

Between:

C.O.Mathews Since deceased represented by his Legal Representatives

1. Susheela Mathews Aged about 55 years, D/o Late C.O.Mathews

2. Anitha Mathews Aged about 52 years Digitally signed by D/o Late C.O.Mathews VEERENDRA KUMAR K M Location: HIGH 3. Sam Mathews COURT OF Aged about 48 years KARNATAKA S/o Late C.O.Mathews

Appellants No.1 to 3 are R/at River View Estate Hadageri Village Somwarpet Taluk Pin-571236.

...Appellants (By Sri T.V. Vijay Raghavan, Advocate) -2- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

And:

1. M/s Srivatsa Estate Pvt. Ltd.,

2. M/s Suryakiran Estate Pvt. Ltd.,

(Respondents No.1 & 2 are Registered Companies Represented by its Directors)

3. Shri A.Nanda Belliyappa Aged about 54 years S/o Late A.M.Belliyappa

4. Smt. Anitha Nanda Aged about 45 years W/o A.Nanda Belliyappa

Respondents No.3 & 4 are R/at Hadageri Village, Hatti Post Madapura, Somawarpet Taluk Kodagu District-571236.

5. Mrs A.Oomen Since deceased by her LR

Mrs Leelamma Mathews W/o K.T.Mathews Aged about 79 years P.B No.3562, Safat Kuwaith.

...Respondents (By Sri K.Shashikiran Shetty, Senior Counsel for Sri Ismail Zabiulla, Advocate, for R1 to R4; Sri K.Mohan, Advocate, for R5)

This RFA is filed under section 96 of CPC against the judgment and decree dated 13.07.2016 passed in O.S.No.32/2007 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Madikeri, decreeing the suit for declaration and possession and etc., -3- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

Date on which the appeal was 27.08.2024 reserved for judgment

Date on which the judgment was 25.09.2024 pronounced

This appeal, having been heard & reserved, coming on for pronouncement this day, judgment was delivered therein as under:

CORAM: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR and HON'BLE MR JUSTICE UMESH M ADIGA

CAV JUDGMENT

(PER: HON'BLE MR JUSTICE SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR)

By judgment dated 13.07.2016 the Senior Civil

Judge at Madikeri decreed the suit declaring the plaintiffs

to be the owner of the suit properties and directed the

legal representatives of the defendant to hand over

possession thereof to the plaintiffs within a month and

aggrieved by the same the legal representatives of the

defendant have preferred this appeal. -4-

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2. The substance of the pleadings is as follows :

Under a partition deed dated 11.09.1984, four

persons namely Smt. Acheyamma Oomen, C.O.Mathews,

K.T.Mathews and Leelamma Mathews effected partition of

the suit properties and other properties that belonged to

them. The properties described in 'B' and 'C' of the

partition deed fell to the share of K.T.Mathews and

Leelamma Mathews respectively and the property

described in schedule 'A' of the partition deed was allotted

to C.O.Mathews, the defendant. On 12.06.1987

K.T.Mathews and Leelamma Mathews jointly sold the

properties that fell to their shares to a partnership firm

called M/s Carolina Plantations and put it in possession of

the properties. Under three sale dates dated 02.09.1991

Carolina Plantations sold all its properties including the suit

property to Srivatsa Estate Private Limited, Suryakiran

Estate Private Limited and Sri K.N.Murali, and delivered

the possession to the purchasers. The plaintiffs purchased

all the shares of the companies namely Suryakiran and -5- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

Srivatsa Estates and thereafter plaintiffs No.3 and 4

became the directors of the company. Plaintiff No.3 also

purchased items 1 and 2 of the suit property from

K.N.Murali under registered sale deed dated 31.1.2000.

The properties of the plaintiffs and the defendant are

situate adjacent to each other. The suit properties were

earlier being managed by Smt. Anjana Murali in the

capacity of Managing Director of the companies. But she

was living in Bengaluru and taking advantage of her

absence, the defendant encroached upon the suit

properties in June 1998. The plaintiffs approached the

defendant on several occasions to demand possession of

the suit properties to be delivered to them and in fact the

defendant agreed for the survey and delivery of

possession if encroachment was traced. But he kept quite.

On 21.05.2001 the plaintiffs issued a notice to the

defendant who in turn replied to it on 30.5.2001

untenably. The plaintiffs thereafter issued a correction

notice on 27.6.2002. Ultimately the plaintiffs had to file -6- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

suit for declaration of their title over and possession of the

suit properties.

3. In the written statement the defendant admitted

the plaint averments from paras 2 to 4 in regard to

partition deed dated 11.09.1984 and the subsequent

sales, but denied the other averments including transfer of

shares of the companies to the plaintiffs. The specific

contention of the defendant was that on 11.09.1984, there

came into existence a Memorandum of Understanding

('MOU') among the parties to the partition deed, and

according to this MOU the existing common road would

divide the properties allotted to the share of K.T.Mathews

and Leelamma Mathews, and the defendant. The

properties situate towards the western side of the road as

also the properties allotted to him under the partition deed

fell to his share and thus he held lawful possession of the

suit properties. He denied encroachment as stated by the

plaintiffs. Alternatively he pleaded that he perfected his

title over the suit properties by adverse possession -7- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

because the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs admitted

his possession in view of MOU dated 11.09.1984. He also

pleaded that the boundaries and the area of the suit

properties do not conform to the boundaries and area of

the properties described in schedules 'B' and 'C' to the

partition deed and with these pleadings he prayed for

dismissal of the suit.

4. Out of six issues framed by the trial court, the

following three issues were the deciding issues.

"1. Whether the plaintiffs prove that, they are the absolute owners in possession of the suit schedule properties?

2. Whether plaintiffs prove that in June 1998 the defendant encroached and took possession of the suit schedule properties and in illegal possession of the same?

3. Whether the defendants prove that, he has perfected his title to the properties as averred in para-6 of the written statement?

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5. The findings of the trial court on these three

issues are :

5.1. The defendant does not dispute the partition

deed dated 11.09.1984 as per Ex.P1 and the subsequent

sale from K.T.Mathews and Leelamma Mathews in favour

of M/s Carolina Plantations as per Ex.P2 and in turn in

favour of the two companies and K.N.Murali as per Exs.P3

to P5. In this view the plaintiffs were able to prove the

title over the properties. Then referring to specific

contention of the defendant about MOU dated 11.09.1984

as per Ex.D5 it is held that the said MOU was the subject

matter in the other two suits O.S.19/2001 and

O.S.35/2001 between the same parties. From the

judgment in the said suits, three appeals RA 59/2007, RA

69/2007 and RA 74/2007 arose. In these appeals the

MOU or the agreement was rejected holding that it was

not admissible in evidence. That apart the contents of

Ex.D5 would disclose that it came into existence on the

day when the partition deed-Ex.P1 was executed. The -9- NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

MOU effected modification of shares allotted to the parties

in Ex.P1 in such a way that two sharers would take the

property on one side of the road and another would take

the property on the other side of the road, that means the

road would divide the properties of the sharers. If this

kind of an understanding came into existence on the same

day because of some typographical error in the partition

deed, the parties should have gone for rectification deed.

Ex.P1 was a registered document and the terms therein

cannot be changed or modified by an unregistered

document. Defendant has no explanation as to why the

parties opted for unregistered document. Therefore the

unregistered document would not create any right over

the property and hence the possession of the defendant

over the suit properties cannot either be treated as

permissive possession or lawful possession.

5.2. The plea of adverse possession of the defendant

cannot be accepted in as much as he claims possession as

per MOU or the supplementary agreement dated

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11.09.1984 and he has failed to produce any document to

show that he has been in possession over the suit

properties since 1984 and therefore he has not been able

to prove that his possession is adverse to the interest of

the plaintiffs. Since the plaintiffs have proved their title

and that the defendant has admitted to be in possession of

the suit properties, there was no need to appoint a

surveyor as sought in I.A.4 filed under Order 26 Rule 9 of

CPC. The suit is not time barred. In view of this the

plaintiffs are to be declared as the owners of the suit

properties and to be entitled to possession also.

6. Sri T.V.Vijay Raghavan, learned counsel for the

appellants, while arguing contended firstly that, according

to the plaintiffs themselves the cause of action first arose

in June 1998 and at that time the plaintiffs had not

purchased the suit properties. If really there was illegal

encroachment, the predecessors in title of the plaintiffs

would have initiated action to take possession of the

encroached portion and the very fact that they kept quite

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would show that there was no encroachment by the

defendant and his possession of the suit properties was

lawful. Before instituting the suit, the plaintiffs should

have applied for survey to ascertain the extent of

encroachment if there was really encroachment according

to them. In fact in Ex.P16, the notice issued by the

plaintiffs, it is stated that the defendant agreed for survey

to be conducted. That means the plaintiffs were not sure

whether there was encroachment or not and without its

ascertainment, the suit should not have been instituted.

6.1. His second contention is that the plaintiffs 3 and

4 just purchased the shares of plaintiffs 1 and 2

companies as per Ex.P15. It appears that the entire

consideration of the shares was not paid to K.N.Murali and

Anjana Murali. There is no document in this regard.

Moreover what they purchased under Ex.P15 was only

shares, there was no transfer of immovable property

under this document. In schedule 'B' to Ex.P15, 13 items

are shown to have been sold. An immovable property

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cannot be sold under unregistered document. Therefore

the plaintiffs did not derive any title over the suit property

under Ex.P15. This is not a document in proof of their

title. He also referred to Ex.P6 to argue that plaintiffs 3

and 4 purchased only 4 items of the properties in Sy.Nos.

107/2, 80, 81 and 75 from K.N.Murali. For this reason

plaintiff No.3 cannot claim to have become owner of the

other properties. Plaintiffs 3 and 4 claim to be

representing plaintiffs 1 and 2 companies. As per Ex.P15

they only purchased the shares and became directors of

the companies, but there is no document evidencing the

authorization given to plaintiffs 3 and 4 to institute a suit

on behalf of the companies. Even there is no proof in

regard to transfer of shares as per Ex.P15 and their

becoming directors as per Company Law. Therefore the

suit is not maintainable for this reason. The evidence on

record discloses that the plaintiffs did not acquire any title

over all the suit properties and for this reason possession

cannot be delivered to them because the suit for

possession is based on title.

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6.2. The defendant has also taken the plea of

adverse possession. He can set up inconsistent defence

being the defendant. The findings of the trial court on this

issue are wrong. In the sale deeds Exs.P3 to P6 and

Ex.P15, boundaries of the properties are not mentioned.

Without boundaries, properties cannot be identified. The

commissioner was also not appointed. With these

infirmities the suit should not have been decreed.

7. Sri Shashikiran Shetty, learned Senior Counsel

arguing on behalf of respondents 1 to 4, submitted that

plaintiffs 3 and 4 purchased lands from K.N.Murali that he

had purchased under Ex.P4. The plaintiffs 1 and 2

companies had already become owner of the other

properties as per Exs.P3 and P5. The plaintiffs 3 and 4

then purchased the shares of the plaintiffs 1 and 2

companies and became directors in regard to which Form

No. 32 was filed before the Registrar of Companies.

Therefore the suit is filed by both the companies and the

plaintiffs 3 and 4. The defendant does not dispute the sale

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deeds and also the fact that he is in possession of the suit

properties. The plaintiffs 3 and 4 represent the companies

as directors. In this view all the plaintiffs are entitled to

claim possession of the suit properties as their title is not

disputed by the defendant. Once title is admitted, the true

owner would become entitled to possession. Defendant

has failed to prove adverse possession, and he cannot

contend about adverse possession because he claims to be

in lawful possession of the suit properties by referring to

MOU-Ex.D5. Therefore the plea of adverse possession is

not available to him. The entire argument of Sri Vijay

Raghavan was contrary to the contents of the written

statement. For this reason appeal deserves to be

dismissed.

8. From the above argument, the following points

arise for discussion :

(i) Has the trial court erred in holding that the

plaintiffs have proved their title over suit properties?

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(ii) Has the trial court rightly rejected the

defendant's plea of adverse possession?

(iii) Are there grounds to interfere with the

impugned judgment? What order?

Point No. (i)

9. The documentary evidence is more evincing than

oral evidence of witnesses. Defendant does not dispute

paras 1 to 4 of the plaint. The defendant was one of the

parties to the partition deed-Ex.P1, but he states about

contemporaneous transaction of effecting certain

modifications to Ex.P1 by all the parties to the partition in

accordance with MOU marked Ex.D5 which will be dealt

with later. The obtaining picture from Exs.P1 to P6 is

this: After partition as per Ex.P1, K.T.Mathews and

Leelamma Mathews sold away their properties allotted to

each of them to a partnership firm called 'Carolina

Plantations'. This is evidenced by sale deed dated

12.06.1987 marked Ex.P2. Thereafter Carolina Plantations

executed three sale deeds on 02.09.1991 as per Exs. P3 to

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P5. Ex.P3 evidences sale of eight items of properties in

favour of Srivatsa Estates Private Limited. Ex.P4 shows

that Carolina Plantations sold four items of properties to

Sri K.N.Murali. And Ex.P5 shows that Surya Kiran Estates

Private Limited was purchaser of five items of properties

from M/s Carolina Plantations. These three deeds make it

very clear that Carolina Plantations sold away all the

properties that it purchased from K.T.Mathews and

Leelamma Mathews. Then Ex.P6-a sale deed dated

31.01.2000 shows that Sri K.N.Murali sold the properties

that he had purchased under Ex.P4 to Sri Nanda Belliappa,

i.e., plaintiff No.3.

10. Ex.P15 is not a sale deed, it is a document

evidencing transfer of shares from Sri K.N.Murali and his

wife Smt. K.Anjana Murali to Sri A.Nanda Belliappa and

Smt. Anita Nanda. Precisely stated, contents of Ex.P15

are that K.N.Murali and Anjana Murali sold away whole of

their equity shares in two companies Srivatsa Estates

Private Limited and Suryakiran Estates Private Limited to

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Nanda Belliappa and Anita Nanda for a certain

consideration and agreed to deliver possession of

plantations belonging to two companies. That means

Nanda Belliappa and Anita Nanda i.e., plaintiffs 3 and 4

respectively having purchased equity shares of two

companies from K.N.Murali and Anjana Murali, became

directors of the companies, and probably this could be the

reason for transferring the possession of the plantations to

them. It is true, as argued by Sri Vijay Raghavan that

Ex.P15 is not a sale deed in relation to transfer of

plantations to plaintiffs' 2 and 3. It is just a document

evidencing transfer of shares; the properties purchased by

the companies under Ex.P3 and Ex.P5 remained with the

companies only. Though it is written in Ex.P15 that

possession of plantations was agreed to be handed over, it

only amounted to handing over management of the

plantations to plaintiffs 2 and 3, and nothing more. The

argument of Sri Vijay Raghavan that there is no proof for

having paid entire consideration regarding transfer of

shares as stipulated in Ex.P15 cannot be accepted because

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if at all consideration had not been paid, Sri K.N.Murali

and Smt. Anjana Murali should have raised that issue, and

the defendant has no right to question it.

11. It may not appear inappropriate if it is opined

here that plaint is inarticulate, para 6 of the plaint is

extracted here to demonstrate that it conveys ambiguous

meaning.

"6. The plaintiffs purchased all the shares of the company viz., Suryakiran and Srivatsa Estates and Nanda Belliappa and Anitha Nanda Belliappa became the Directors of the Company. The Memorandum of transfer of shares is produced herewith. Nanda Belliappa and Anitha Nanda are the Directors of the Company and Form No. 32 is produced herewith."

12. This is a mistake committed by the advocate.

The meaning that can be gathered from para 6 is that all

the plaintiffs purchased the shares of the two companies.

But from Ex.P15, it becomes clear that only plaintiffs 3 and

4 purchased the shares and they having become directors

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NC: 2024:KHC:39832-DB RFA No. 1368 of 2016

of the companies, represented the companies. It was

argued by Sri Vijay Raghavan that no proof was produced

indicating change in management of the companies and in

this regard he has placed reliance on a judgment of the

Supreme Court in State Bank of Travancore vs M/s

Kingston Computers (I) Private Limited [2011 AIR

SCW 1948], and of a judgment of Delhi High Court in

M/s Nibro Limited vs National Insurance Company

[AIR 1991 Del 25]. It may be stated with all humility

that these two judgments operate in different factual

context, and here the plaintiffs 3 and 4 being directors of

private limited company are entitled to represent the

companies. If Exs.P31 to P33 are seen it becomes clear

that information in Form 32 of the Companies Act was

given to the Registrar of Companies regarding change in

directorship of the companies. The names of plaintiffs 2

and 3 are written in Form No. 32.

13. The actual factual position as to ownership of

properties is,

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(i) Plaintiff No.1 is the owner of properties sold to it

under Ex.P3.

(ii) Plaintiff No.2 is the owner of properties sold to it

under Ex.P5.

(iii) Plaintiff No.3 is the owner of properties sold to

him under Ex.P6.

(iv) Plaintiff No.3 also represents the companies as

its director, and instead of indicating Smt. Anita

Nanda as another director representing the

companies, she was made a party individually.

14. Now if the properties described in plaint

schedule i.e., suit properties are seen, what becomes

further clear is that they are part of some of the properties

comprised in Exs.P3, P5 and P6. That means plaintiffs

could have filed the suits separately, but they joined

together in instituting the suit which is permitted

according to Order 1 Rule 1 of CPC which reads as below :

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"Order 1. Parties to suits

1. Who may be joined as plaintiffs.--All persons may be joined in one suit as plaintiffs where--

(a) any right to relief in respect of, or arising out of, the same act or transaction or series of acts or transactions is alleged to exist in such persons, whether jointly, severally or in the alternative; and

(b) if such persons brought separate suits, any common question of law or fact would arise."

The position in this case fits into above rule.

15. If Ex.D5 is considered, it appears that

subsequent to partition as per Ex.P1, the parties agreed

for effecting change in distribution of properties. This

document has been rightly disbelieved by the trial court.

Very pertinently it may be mentioned here that O.S.

19/2001 and O.S. 35/2001 were the two suits filed by

Srivatsa Estates Private Limited and C.O.Mathews against

each other and in these suits the MOU was projected by

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the defendant, and his plea based on it was not accepted.

A First Appeal arising from one of the suits, O.S.35/2001

has been dismissed and therefore defendant cannot

contend the same point again.

16. Ex.P1 and Ex.D5 bear the same date. If

allocation of shares was not proper and was found

inconvenient to the parties, they could have thought of it

before execution of Ex.P1, or if they did not think of it at

that time, they should have executed a rectification deed.

Any subsequent change or modification in a registered

instrument can be made only through a registered

instrument. Therefore Ex.D5 is of no consequence. That

apart the defendant admits Exs.P1 to P5, that means he

does not dispute their contents. He cannot contend to

vary the allocation of shares as made in Ex.P1 and dispute

the title of plaintiffs 1, 2 and 3.

17. It is true that in Exs.P1 to P6, the boundaries of

the properties are not given. It is for this reason Sri Vijay

Raghavan argued that without identification of the

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properties with boundaries, title cannot be declared. This

line of argument cannot be accepted because in Ex.P1,

through which his share became crystallized, boundaries

of the properties are not mentioned and for this reason the

defendant cannot take an objection if the boundaries are

not mentioned in the sale deeds to which he is not a party.

But the suit properties i.e., encroached portions are

described with boundaries, and the defendant admits to be

in possession of suit properties.

18. Though plaintiff filed an application under Order

26 Rule 9 of CPC for conducting survey probably to

ascertain the encroachment, the trial court did not

consider it in view of clear admission by the defendant

that he is in possession of the extent of lands shown in the

plaint schedule. If he had disputed his possession over

suit properties there was need for appointment of

commissioner. There is no infirmity in the finding of the

trial court that there was no need to appoint a

commissioner.

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19. Therefore conclusion is that the plaintiffs 1 to 3

have proved their title over properties that belong to each

of them. The trial court has rightly answered issue No.(i)

and consequently point No.(i) is answered in negative.

Point No. (ii)

20. Defendant can take inconsistent pleas. In this

case also defendant has pleaded about adverse

possession. But the defendant cannot claim to have

perfected title by adverse possession because he does not

admit plaintiffs 1 to 3 to be true owners of suit properties.

Para 6 of the written statement shows that defendant

claims adverse possession referring to MOU dated

11.09.1984 i.e., Ex.D5. As already discussed, Ex.D5

shows effecting modification of shares that means he

claims lawful possession. But Ex.D5 is held to be not

acceptable. Trial court has correctly rejected the

defendant's claim of adverse possession. Sri T.V. Vijay

Raghavan has placed reliance on some decided cases, viz.,

L.N.Aswathama and Another vs P.Prakash [(2009)

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13 SC 229]; Constancio Luis Caetano Rubina Lobo vs

Leandrina Antao and Others [(2021) SCC Online

Bom 12180], and Sarvinder Singh and Another vs

Vipul Tandon [(2022) SCC Online Del 2046]. In all

these decisions, the principle set out is that defendant is

entitled to take alternative plea of adverse possession.

Since this is a settled principle of law, there is no need to

refer to every one of these decisions, however it is

necessary to refer to one para in Aswathama where it is

held as under :

"17. The legal position is no doubt well settled. To establish a claim of title by prescription, that is, adverse possession for 12 years or more, the possession of the claimant must be physical/actual, exclusive, open, uninterrupted, notorious and hostile to the true owner for a period exceeding twelve years. It is also well settled that long and continuous possession by itself would not constitute adverse possession if it was either permissive possession or possession without animus possidendi. The pleas based on title and adverse possession are

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mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced. Unless the person possessing the property has the requisite animus to possess the property hostile to the title of the true owner, the period for prescription will not commence. (Vide :

Periasami vs. P. Periathambi - 1995 (6) SCC 523, Md. Mohammad Ali (dead) by LRs. vs. Jagdish Kalita - 2004 (1) SCC 271 and P.T. Munichikkanna Reddy vs. Revamma - 2007 (6) SCC 59)."

(emphasis supplied)

21. That means even if plea of adverse possession is

taken, animus possidendi must be forthcoming and the

evidence must disclose it. In the case on hand possession

is claimed referring to Ex.D5, and even PW1 is more

questioned based on Ex.D5. Very interestingly DW1 has

stated nothing about being in adverse possession of the

suit properties in his affidavit filed in lieu of examination-

in-chief, and instead admits the sale deeds executed in

favour of the companies. He has stated that the plaintiffs

took over management of the properties. These

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averments firstly dislodge the plea of adverse possession

and secondly the whole argument of Sri T.V.Vijay

Raghavan about competency of the plaintiffs 3 and 4 to

file suit without authorization by Board of Directors. The

conclusion therefore is that the defendant cannot plead

adverse possession; the trial court has not erred and

hence point No. (ii) is answered in affirmative.

Point No. (iii)

22. In para 10 of the plaint it is stated that

defendant encroached upon the suit properties in the year

1998 itself. Sri Vijay Raghavan, therefore, made it a point

of argument that since the defendant was in possession in

the year 1998 itself, suit filed in the year 2007 was beyond

12 years and plaintiff cannot claim possession. In regard

to this argument the answer is that the suit is for

declaration of title and possession. Possession cannot be

ordered unless title is proved. Limitation question arises if

defendant succeeds in establishing adverse possession. If

adverse possession is not pleaded and if pleaded, but not

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proved, limitation of 12 years cannot be applied. Here as

discussed on point No.2, plea of adverse possession has

not been established. Therefore though dispossession was

in the year 1998, the plaintiffs being the true owners are

entitled to possession. The trial court may not have

discussed the issue in detail, but its final conclusions to

decree the suit is not incorrect.

23. Before giving conclusion, interest of justice

requires to mould the reliefs specifying title of each of

plaintiffs 1 to 3 in accordance with sale transactions in

Exs.P3, P5 and P6. Therefore,

(i) Plaintiff No.1 is declared as absolute owner of

items 3 and 4 of plaint schedule.

(ii) Plaintiff No.2 is the absolute owner of items 5

and 6 of the plaint schedule.

(iii) Plaintiff No.3 is the absolute owner of items 1

and 2 of plaint schedule.

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(iv) Plaintiffs 1 to 3 are entitled to possession of their

respective properties and the defendant has to hand over

possession.

(v) Plaintiff No.4 being one of the directors of

plaintiff 1 and 2 can join with plaintiff No.3 to execute the

decree if defendant does not deliver possession forthwith.

(vi) To obviate further complications it is made clear

that a joint execution petition can be filed even though

individual title of plaintiffs 1 to 3 is declared.

24. In the result appeal fails. It is dismissed with

costs.

Sd/-

(SREENIVAS HARISH KUMAR) JUDGE

Sd/-

(UMESH M ADIGA) JUDGE CKL List No.: 1 Sl No.: 1