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City & Industrial Devt.Corp vs Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors

Supreme Court14 November 2008B. Sudershan Reddy · S.H. Kapadia

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

(1) Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of the High Court to issue writs, particularly mandamus, is highly discretionary, and relief cannot be claimed as of right; inordinate delay and laches in approaching the court are adequate grounds for refusing a writ, as courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not encourage agitation of stale claims where third-party rights may have accrued in the interim. (2) When exercising jurisdiction under Article 226, a High Court is duty-bound to consider whether the writ petition involves complex and disputed questions of fact that cannot be satisfactorily resolved in that forum, whether the petitioner has disclosed all material facts, whether the petitioner has alternative or effective remedies, whether the petitioner is guilty of unexplained delay and laches, whether the petition is barred by limitation, and whether granting relief would be against public policy or prohibited by law; the court need not restrict itself to the pleadings of the State but must independently satisfy itself whether any case is made out for invoking its extraordinary jurisdiction. (3) An oral statement by government officers through counsel or vague and self-defeating averments in affidavits by themselves cannot form the basis for granting relief in a public law remedy, nor can a mere statement that land is private land confer title to immovable property on an individual without proper findings on ownership and title. (4) Relief cannot be granted in a public law remedy merely because the State failed to file a counter-affidavit opposing a writ petition; in cases involving public revenue and public interest, the High Court may in its discretion direct the State to file proper affidavits placing all relevant facts truly and accurately, and such directions must be complied with by the State.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6652 OF 2008(Arising out of SLP(c) No. 23385 of 2007)
City and Industrial DevelopmentCorporation ...Appellant
Versus
Dosu Aardeshir Bhiwandiwala & Ors. ...Respondent
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6653 OF 2008[Arising out of SLP(c) No. 27475 of 2008(CC No. 2044/08)]
JUDGMENT
B.SUDERSHAN REDDY,J.
1. Delay condoned in SLP(c) No. ____ of 2008 (CC No.
2044/08).
2. Leave granted.
2
3. On 20.04.2005 the first respondent herein filed
a writ petition claiming the following reliefs:
"A) The impugned action of using theland without acquisition isunconstitutional and contrary to theprovisions of Article 300-A of theConstitution of India. No state of anyAuthority of the State is entitled todeprive any citizen of India isproperty without following dueprocess of law and without acquiringsuch property in accordance with law.
Since the land in question is beingused for CIDCO without payment ofany compensation or withoutacquiring the same, the entire actionis illegal.
B) The respondent no. 1 is being acorporation owned by the respondentno. 2 is not expected to usurp andillegally take over private land ownedby the said Trust of which thepetitioner is a Trustee. For suchunauthorized user, the respondentno. 1 is liable to pay compensation tothe Trust.
C). In the alternative, if therespondent no. 1 is not in a positionto return the land, it is liable to allotalternate land to the Trust onfreehold tenure."
3
4. The appellant herein and as well as the State of
Maharashtra through its Secretary to the Ministry of
Revenue and the Collector, Raigad have been impleaded
as party respondents in the said Writ Petition. The first
respondent/writ petitioner claims to be one of the
Trustees of Sir Khan Bahadur Hormasji Bhiwandiwala
Trust (hereinafter referred to as `the said Trust') and the
writ petition itself has been filed in his capacity as
Trustee. The first respondent in his writ petition pleaded
that the said Trust is the owner of land bearing Gat No.
8/0 of village Belpada, Taluka Panvel, District Raigad
admeasuring 19 Acres 26.4 gunthas which presently
bears Survey No. 465 of village Kharghar Taluka Panvel,
District Raigad admeasuring 9 Hectors 96 Aars. The
entries in the revenue records according to him disclose
the ownership of the said Trust in respect of the land in4
question. For the purposes of implementation of New
Bombay Project vast extent of lands from Panvel Taluka
of Raigad district and Thane district were acquired in the
year 1972 or thereabout but so far as the land in
question is concerned the Trust continued to be the
owner since the same were not acquired by the
Government at any point of time.
5. The complaint in the writ petition was "that the
CIDCO has been illegally and unauthorisedly using the
said land without acquiring the same or without paying
any compensation thereof." Reliance in this regard was
placed upon internal correspondence between CIDCO
and Government of Maharashtra and the Collector,
Raigad. He is stated to have sent a representation
dated 16.8.2004 to Tehsildar requiring the Tehsildar to
record his name as an "heir". Having failed to receive
any response from the concerned authorities he filed the5
writ petition in the High Court of Bombay. The summum
bonum of the case set up by the first respondent in the
writ petition was that the appellant herein used the said
land without acquiring the same depriving the Trust of
its ownership and possession of the land.
6. The appellant herein filed its affidavit in reply
opposing the admission of the writ petition in the High
Court. In the reply affidavit the appellant inter alia
pleaded that the writ petitioner has kept silent for more
than 35 years and has chosen to file the writ petition
with inordinate delay which itself constitutes a ground
to dismiss the writ petition summarily. It was also
pleaded that several disputed questions of facts are
involved which cannot be satisfactorily adjudicated in a
proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
In para 11 of the said reply affidavit the appellant took
the plea that the land is required for the Navi Mumbai6
Project. The land continued to be in its possession for
the last more than 35 years. However, having taken
those pleas it was also stated in the affidavit that the
CIDCO "has come to know from the Government letter
that this is a private land and since it is a private land, in
possession of CIDCO and is required for the Navi
Mumbai Project, the CIDCO is requesting to (sic;) the
Government to acquire it by following due process of
law."
7. The State of Maharashtra and the Collector
Raigad not only failed to file their reply affidavits but
their officers who were present in the court instructed
the learned A.G.P., who in turn made an oral statement
which is para phrased by the High Court in its judgment
to the effect "the learned A.G.P. Mr. Malvankar on
instructions from Mrs. Revathi A. Gaikar, Special Land
Acquisition Officer, Panvel and Mr. M.N. Sanap,7
Tahsildar, Panvel who are present in the court makes a
statement that on consideration of the documents in
their possession that except for 93 Ars they have no
documentary evidence to show that rest of the land was
acquired."
8. The High Court relying upon the oral statement
made by the learned A.G.P. and the reply affidavit of
the appellant disposed of the Writ Petition directing
Collector, Raigad to take steps to acquire the land by
following due procedure and complete the acquisition
proceedings within one year of receiving the requisition
from the appellant. The question as to whether the first
respondent/writ petitioner was entitled to payment of
any compensation from the appellant for occupation of
the land for over a period of 35 years was left open to
be agitated in appropriate proceedings.8
9. Aggrieved by the order passed by the High Court
dated 07.02.2006 the appellant filed Special Leave
Petition (c) No. ..../2007 (CC 2080/2007) but withdrew
the same with the permission to move in review before
the High Court. This Court vide order dated 08.03.2007
dismissed the Special leave Petition as withdrawn.
Thereafter review petition was filed on various grounds
which was also dismissed vide order dated 10.08.2007.
Hence these appeals by special leave.
10. Shri Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel appearing
on behalf of the appellant strenuously contended that
the High Court ought to have summarily dismissed the
writ petition on the ground of laches and delay in as
much as the respondent/writ petitioner approached the
court after a period of more than 35 years of loosing
possession of the land. It was also submitted that
number of disputed questions concerning the title of the9
land in question arise for consideration which cannot be
decided in a proceeding under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. The learned counsel further

contended that the first respondent is guilty of

suppression of material facts which itself is sufficient to

dismiss the writ petition. It was submitted that the

respondent was not the owner of the land at any point of

time and therefore no relief could have been granted in

the Writ Petition.

11. Shri R.F. Nariman, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the respondent contended that there is no

dispute as regards the title of the respondent inasmuch

as State of Maharashtra and District Collector through

their officers made a statement in the open court that

the land in question was not earlier acquired and the

same continued to be a private land. Shri Nariman also

relied on the averments made by the appellant herein in 1 0

the reply affidavit opposing the writ petition in the High

Court stating that CIDCO has come to know from the

Government letter that the land is a private land and

therefore, it had requested the Government to acquire

the land by following the due process of law.

12. We have carefully considered the rival submissions.

13. The High Court in its decision appears to have

mostly relied upon the oral statement made through the

learned A.G.P. and also some vague averments made by

the appellant in its reply affidavit and accordingly

disposed of the Writ Petition directing the acquisition of

the land. The High Court did not consider as to what is

the effect of the said oral statement and the averments

made by the appellant in its reply affidavit. Whether

such an oral statement coupled with the averments

made to the effect that the land is a private land by 1 1

themselves would amount to recognising the title of the

respondent? The fact remains that there is no whisper in

the impugned order that Sir Khan Bahadur Hormasji

Bhiwandiwala Trust continued to be the true and

absolute owner of the land possessing valid and

subsisting title as on the date of the filing of the writ

petition. Nor there is any finding by the High Court as

regards the nature of the land which is one of the most

important factor that may have a vital bearing on the

issue as to the entitlement of the respondent to get any

relief in the writ petition. There is also no finding that

the writ petitioner who filed the Writ Petition as an

individual is the trustee of the said trust and thus

entitled to prosecute the litigation on behalf of the trust.

The High Court did not consider as to what is the effect

of filing of the Writ Petition claiming to be a trustee

without impleading the trust as the petitioner. The High

Court ignored the statement made by the respondent in 1 2

his Writ Petition about his representation to Tehsildar

requiring to record his name as an "heir". How can an

individual's name be recorded in the revenue records to

be an "heir" of a trust property? The High Court never

considered the effect of such a statement made by the

writ petitioner in the writ petition itself. The High Court

also did not consider whether the reliefs claimed could at

all be granted in a public law remedy under Article 226

of the Constitution of India.

14. The High Court obviously relied upon the oral

statement purported to have been made by the officers

present in the court through the learned A.G.P. and

considered the same to be concession as regards the

title/ownership of the land in question. The appellant in

its reply affidavit merely referred to a letter received by

it from the Government informing it the land in question

to be a private land. We fail to appreciate as to how the

said statement and the averments made in the reply 1 3

affidavit amount to concession recognising the

title/ownership of the land in question in favour of the

respondent. Such a statement by itself cannot confer

title in respect of immovable properties on any

individual. The courts are not relieved of their burden to

weigh and evaluate the relevancy and effect of such

statements in adjudicating the lis between the parties.

15. The Writ petition was filed on 20th April, 2005 but

whereas the petitioner executed the Deed of

Confirmation on 13th April, 2005 describing himself as

vendor in favour of Ms. Hemlata Bedi and Urmish

Udani as the purchasers of the land in question. The

appellant in its review application filed in the High Court

pointed out that as on the date of the filing of the Writ

Petition the first respondent was not the owner of the

land in as much as he executed the Deed of

Confirmation on 13th April, 2005 itself. When the 1 4

appellant pointed out this in its review application the

High Court brushed aside the same and dismissed the

Review Petition relying on the explanation offered by

the writ petitioner that the writ petition was drafted

much earlier to 13th April, 2005 for filing in the court on

20th April, 2005. The fact remains that the respondent

never brought this fact on record during the pendency of

the writ petition. The High Court ought to have

considered whether there was any suppression of

material facts from the court. The High Court did not

consider the effect of respondent describing himself as

the vendor in the Confirmation Deed which is not in tune

with the recitals in the Deed of Conveyance dated 26th

August, 1982. The High Court did not address to itself as

to whether such complex and disputed facts could be

satisfactorily adjudicated in a proceeding under Article

226 of the Constitution. The Court was carried away by

the fact that the relief had already been granted 1 5

inasmuch as the acquisition proceedings have

commenced after the disposal of the Writ Petition. We

are constrained to express our reservation about the

manner and approach of the High Court in disposing of

the Writ Petition and the Review Petition.

16. In our view, the High Court ought to have

examined the contents of Deed of Confirmation as well

as the Deed of Conveyance dated 26th August, 1982

before granting the relief as prayed for by the

respondent. It is plainly evident from the Deed of

Conveyance dated 26th August, 1982 that it was

executed in favour of only one person namely Ms.

Hemlata Bedi as the purchaser whereas in the Deed of

Confirmation the name of Urmish Udani is also shown as

the purchaser along with Ms. Hemlata Bedi. It is not

clear from the document as to how all of a sudden

Urmish Udani's name is shown as the purchaser. The 1 6

circumstances may lend credence to the submission

made by learned senior counsel for the appellant that

Urmish Udani did not purchase the land but the

litigation. However, we do not wish to express any

conclusive opinion on the question as to whether the

parties are indulging in any speculative litigation. These

are the aspects which ought to have been taken into

consideration by the High Court before granting relief to

the respondent.

In the absence of finding on the vital issue noticed

herein above no relief could have been granted to the

respondent.

17. Having regard to the magnitude and complexity of

the case the High Court in all fairness ought to have

directed the official respondents to file their detailed

counter affidavits and produce the entire material and

the records in their possession for its consideration. Be 1 7

it noted the reply affidavit filed by the appellant herein

obviously was confined to opposing the admission of writ

petition. The writ petition was disposed of at the

admission stage, of course after issuing Rule as is

evident from the order : "Rule. Heard forthwith...."

18. We are constrained to confess the case has left us

perplexed. The stance adopted by the State of

Maharashtra and the District Collector is stranger than

fiction. It is difficult to discern as to why they remained

silent spectators without effectively participating in the

proceedings before the Court. No explanation is forth

coming as to why they have chosen not to file their

replies to the Writ Petition in the High Court. However,

in these appeals the State Government as well as the

appellant filed detailed affidavits disputing each and

every statement and assertion of the writ petitioner

made in the Writ Petition opposing grant of any relief 1 8

whatsoever to the writ petitioner. But even in this court

the State of Maharashtra having filed its affidavit did not

participate in the proceedings and rendered any

assistance in the matter.

19. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our

hands that under Article 226 of the Constitution, the

jurisdiction of a High Court to issue appropriate writs

particularly a writ of Mandamus is highly discretionary.

The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the

grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching

the High Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the

laches. Inordinate delay in moving the court for a Writ

is an adequate ground for refusing a Writ. The principle

is that courts exercising public law jurisdiction do not

encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming

matters where the rights of third parties may have

accrued in the interregnum.

1 9

20. The appellant in its reply opposing the

admission of Writ Petition in clear and categorical terms

pleaded that the writ petitioner has kept silent for more

than 35 years and filed belated writ petition. It was

asserted that on account of inordinate delay and laches

the writ petition suffers from legal infirmities and

therefore liable to be rejected in limine. The High Court

did not record any finding whatsoever and ignored such

a plea of far reaching consequence.

21. As noticed hereinabove the High Court obviously

was impressed by the oral statement made during the

course of the hearing of the writ petition and some

vague and self defeating averments made in the affidavit

filed by the appellant in the High Court.

22. In our opinion, the High Court while exercising its

extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the 2 0

Constitution is duty bound to take all the relevant facts

and circumstances into consideration and decide for

itself even in the absence of proper affidavits from the

State and its instrumentalities as to whether any case at

all is made out requiring its interference on the basis of

the material made available on record. There is nothing

like issuing an ex-parte writ of Mandamus, order or

direction in a public law remedy. Further, while

considering validity of impugned action or inaction the

court will not consider itself restricted to the pleadings of

the State but would be free to satisfy itself whether any

case as such is made out by a person invoking its extra

ordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

Constitution. The court while exercising its jurisdiction

under Article 226 is duty bound to consider whether :

(a) adjudication of writ petition involves any complex

and disputed questions of facts and whether they

can be satisfactorily resolved; 2 1

(b) petition reveals all material facts;

(c) the petitioner has any alternative or effective

remedy for the resolution of the dispute;

(d) person invoking the jurisdiction is guilty of

unexplained delay and laches;

(e) ex facie barred by any laws of Limitation;

(f) grant of relief is against public policy or barred by

any valid law; and host of other factors.

The court in appropriate cases in its discretion

may direct the State or its instrumentalities as the case

may be to file proper affidavits placing all the relevant

facts truly and accurately for the consideration of the

court and particularly in cases where public revenue and

public interest are involved. Such directions always are

required to be complied with by the State. No relief

could be granted in a public law remedy as a matter of

course only on the ground that the State did not file its

counter affidavit opposing the writ petition. Further, 2 2

empty and self-defeating affidavits or statements of

Government spokesmen by themselves do not form

basis to grant any relief to a person in a public remedy

to which he is not otherwise entitled to in law.

23. None of these parameters have been kept in view

by the High Court while disposing of the Writ Petition

and the Review Petition.

24. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the

impugned orders and remit the matter for fresh

consideration by the High Court on merits.

Consequently, all the notifications issued under the

provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 including

the award passed and the reference made to the Civil

Court are set aside.

2 3

25. During the course of hearing of these appeals not

only affidavits and additional affidavits but also some

documents which may have a vital bearing on the merits

of the case are placed on record. These affidavits and

the documents filed into this court shall form part of the

writ proceedings. The matter requires fresh

consideration by the High Court.

26. Parties are given liberty to supplement their

respective pleadings if they so choose and file additional

documents, if any, which shall be received by the High

Court for its consideration. We may hasten to add that

we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the

case. All the contentions of both sides are expressly

kept open for their determination by the High Court.

27. It will not be appropriate to dispose of the matter

without one word about the conduct of the State 2 4

Government reflecting highly unsatisfactory state of

affairs. We express our grave concern as to the manner

in which State has conducted in this case. It is the

constitutional obligation and duty of the State to place

true and relevant facts by filing proper affidavits

enabling the court to discharge its constitutional duties.

The State and other authorities are bound to produce

the complete records relating to the case once Rule is

issued by the court. It is needless to remind the

Governments that they do not enjoy the same amount

of discretion as that of a private party even in the matter

of conduct of litigation. The Governments do not enjoy

any unlimited discretion in this regard. No one need to

remind the State that they represent the collective will of

the society.

28. The State in the present case instead of filing its

affidavit through higher officers of the Government 2 5

utilised the lower ones to make oral statements and that

too through its A.G.P. in the High Court. This malady

requires immediate remedy. We hope the Government

shall conduct itself in a responsible manner and assist

the High Court by placing the true and relevant facts by

filing a proper affidavit and documents that may be

available with it. We also hope and trust that the Legal

Advisors of the Government will display greater

competence and attention in drafting affidavits.

Let not the fence eat the grass.

29. With these observations, we allow the appeals

accordingly.

..........................................J. (S.H. Kapadia)

..........................................J. (B. Sudershan Reddy) 2 6

New Delhi;

November 14, 2008

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