Chittar Lal vs State Of Rajasthan

Conviction for offence punishable under Section 302,

Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short 'IPC') made by learned

Sessions Judge, Kota, having been confirmed by a Division

Bench of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, this appeal

has been preferred by the accused.

Factual scenario as unfolded during trial is as

follows:

On 26.4.1994, septuagenarian Lattor Lal (hereinafter

referred to as 'the deceased') lost his life at about 7.30

a.m. He was going with his cows in front of one Madan Lal's

house. Accused-appellant Chittar Lal gave him a knife blow

resulting in instantaneous death. This incident was

witnessed by Dhan Raj (PW3), Shiv Prakash (PW5), Nathu Lal

(PW6) and others. Son of the deceased, Heera Lal (PW1)

lodged the report at the police station at about 8.15 a.m.

On being told that accused was coming towards the house of

Heera Lal (PW1), his mother closed the door. When he went

to the roof, he saw accused who had a knife in his hand was

running towards the hospital. He reached the spot and found

his father dead. The background motive for the assault was

said to be execution of a Will of one house by Moti Lal,

father of the accused in favour of his daughter Smt. Ganga

Bai (PW16), who later on sold the house to Bharat Kumar

(PW8) (brother of the informant). Accused did not like the

transaction and had developed animus towards the deceased.

On registration of the First Information Report,

investigation was undertaken and charge sheet was filed.

Post-mortem was conducted by Doctor (PW18), who found two

stab injuries; one in pleural cavity along with fracture of

mid sternum V arranged and other ¾" x ¼" deep into abdominal

cavity 4", 2" left to umbilicus. The case was committed to

the court of Sessions Judge, Kota and trial was held by it.

Prosecution examined 18 witnesses to further its version.

Accused pleaded innocence.

During trial two witnesses who claimed to be eye-

witnesses (PWs 5 and 6) made departure from the statements

made during investigation. However, Dhanraj (PW3)

implicated the accused.

The Trial Court relying on his evidence held the

accused guilty of offence punishable under Section 302 IPC

and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life.

In support of the appeal, learned counsel for the

appellant submitted that evidence of PW3 could not have been

relied upon as his name did not find place in the FIR.

Additionally on the sole testimony of a young boy of 15, the

conviction could not have been made. The evidence of PW3 is

not cogent and credible and lacks reliability. His presence

at the spot of occurrence is doubtful. The incident was

claimed to have taken place at about 7.30 a.m. when he was

supposed to be in the examination hall. He was student of

class VI and it is hard to believe that he secured 20 marks

in the oral examination, as claimed by him. On the contrary

it appears that the marks were secured by him at the

examination held on that date. If he appeared at the

examination; question of his having seen the incident does

not arise.

None appeared for the State of Rajasthan when the

matter is called.

Evidence of the person whose name did not figure in the

FIR as witness does perforce become suspect. There can be

no hard and fast rule that the names of all witnesses more

particularly eye-witnesses should be indicated in the FIR.

As was observed by this Court in Shri Bhagwan vs. State of

Rajasthan (2001 (6) SCC 296) mere non-mention of the name of

an eye-witness does not render prosecution version fragile.

The information was not lodged by an eye-witness. Mental

condition of a person whose father has lost life inevitably

gets disturbed. Explanation offered by witnesses for non-

mention of PW3's name is plausible. Additionally it is to

be noted that in the present case the statement of PW3 was

recorded on the same date of incident, immediately after the

investigation process was set into motion. Therefore, the

plea that PW3's testimony is doubtful lacks substance. The

other plea was that conviction should not have been made on

the basis of a single witness (PW3)'s testimony. This plea

is equally without essence. The legislative recognition of

the fact that no particular number of witnesses can be

insisted upon is amply reflected in Section 134 of the

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (in short 'Evidence Act').

Administration of justice can be affected and hampered if

number of witnesses were to be insisted upon. It is not

seldom that a crime has been committed in the presence of

one witness, leaving aside those cases which are not of

unknown occurrence where determination of guilt depends

entirely on circumstantial evidence. If plurality of

witnesses would have been the legislative intent cases where

the testimony of a single witness only could be available,

in number of crimes offender would have gone unpunished. It

is the quality of evidence of the single witness whose

testimony has to be tested on the touchstone of credibility

and reliability. If the testimony is found to be reliable,

there is no legal impediment to convict the accused on such

proof. It is the quality and not the quantity of evidence

which is necessary for proving or disproving a fact. This

position has been settled by a series of decisions. The

first decision which has become locus classicus is Mohamad

Gugal Esa Mamasan Ger Alalah v. The King (AIR 1946 PC 3).

The Privy Council focused on the difference between English

Law where a number of statutes make conviction impermissible

for certain categories of offences on the testimony of a

single witness and Section 134 of Evidence Act. The view

has been echoed in Vadivelu Thevar v. The State of Madras

(AIR 1957 SC 614), Guli Chand and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan

(AIR 1974 SC 276), Vahula Bhushan alias Vehuna Krishnan v.

State of Tamil Nadu (AIR 1989 SC 236), Jagdish Prasad and

Ors. v. State of M.P. (AIR 1994 SC 1251), and Kartik Malhar

v. State of Bihar (1996 (1) SCC 614).

Evidence of PW3 comes unscathed on the acid test of

credibility and reliability and, therefore, there can be no

justification in doubting his testimony. Factual aspect

regarding his alleged appearance at examination has been

elaborately analysed by both the Trial Court and the High

Court and it has been found that PW3 did not appear at the

examination and his presence at the spot of occurrence has

been established. That being the position, the said plea of

the accused-appellant also fails. Though there was no

appearance on behalf of the State of Rajasthan, Ms. Minakshi

Vij who has appeared as amicus curiae very fairly placed the

entire material on record for consideration, and we record

our appreciation for the fair approach.

The appeal fails and is dismissed.