Chief Information Commr.& Anr vs State Of Manipur & Anr

State of Manipur and Another ...Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

GANGULY, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. These appeals have been filed by the Chief

Information Commissioner, Manipur and one Mr.

Wahangbam Joykumar impugning the judgment dated

29th July 2010 passed by the High Court in Writ

Appeal Nos. 11 and 12 of 2008 in connection with

two Writ Petition No.733 of 2007 and Writ Petition

1

No. 478 of 2007. The material facts giving rise to

the controversy in this case can be summarized as

follows:

3. Appellant No.2 filed an application dated 9th

February, 2007 under Section 6 of the Right to

Information Act ("Act") for obtaining information

from the State Information Officer relating to

magisterial enquiries initiated by the Govt. of

Manipur from 1980-2006. As the application under

Section 6 received no response, appellant No. 2

filed a complaint under Section 18 of the Act

before the State Chief Information Commissioner,

who by an order dated 30th May, 2007 directed

respondent No. 2 to furnish the information within

15 days. The said direction was challenged by the

State by filing a Writ Petition.

4. The second complaint dated 19th May, 2007 was filed

by the appellant No. 2 on 19th May, 2007 for

obtaining similar information for the period

between 1980 - March 2007. As no response was

2

received this time also, appellant No. 2 again

filed a complaint under Section 18 and the same

was disposed of by an order dated 14th August, 2007

directing disclosure of the information sought for

within 15 days. That order was also challenged by

way of a Writ Petition by the respondents.

5. Both the Writ Petitions were heard together and

were dismissed by a common order dated 16th

November, 2007 by learned Single Judge of the High

Court by inter alia upholding the order of the

Commissioner. The Writ Appeal came to be filed

against both the judgments and were disposed of by

the impugned order dated 29th July 2010. By the

impugned order, the High Court held that under

Section 18 of the Act the Commissioner has no

power to direct the respondent to furnish the

information and further held that such a power has

already been conferred under Section 19(8) of the

Act on the basis of an exercise under Section 19

only. The Division Bench further came to hold that

the direction to furnish information is without

3

jurisdiction and directed the Commissioner to

dispose of the complaints in accordance with law.

6. Before dealing with controversy in this case, let

us consider the object and purpose of the Act and

the evolving mosaic of jurisprudential thinking

which virtually led to its enactment in 2005.

7. As its preamble shows the Act was enacted to

promote transparency and accountability in the

working of every public authority in order to

strengthen the core constitutional values of a

democratic republic. It is clear that the

Parliament enacted the said Act keeping in mind

the rights of an informed citizenry in which

transparency of information is vital in curbing

corruption and making the Government and its

instrumentalities accountable. The Act is meant to

harmonise the conflicting interests of Government

to preserve the confidentiality of sensitive

information with the right of citizens to know the

functioning of the governmental process in such a

4

way as to preserve the paramountcy of the

democratic ideal.

8. The preamble would obviously show that the Act is

based on the concept of an open society.

9. On the emerging concept of an `open Government',

about more than three decades ago, the

Constitution Bench of this Court in The State of

Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain & others - AIR 1975 SC

865 speaking through Justice Mathew held:

"...The people of this country have a right to

know every public act, everything, that is

done in a public way, by their public

functionaries. They are entitled to know the

particulars of every public transaction in

all its bearing. The right to know, which is

derived from the concept of freedom of

speech, though not absolute, is a factor

which should make one wary, when secrecy is

claimed for transactions which can, at any

rate, have no repercussion on public

security. ... To cover with veil of secrecy,

the common routine business, is not in the

interest of the public. Such secrecy can

seldom be legitimately desired."

(para 74, page 884)

5

10. Another Constitution Bench in S.P.Gupta & Ors. v.

President of India and Ors. (AIR 1982 SC 149)

relying on the ratio in Raj Narain (supra) held:

"...The concept of an open government is the

direct emanation from the right to know

which seems to be implicit in the right of

free speech and expression guaranteed under

Article 19(1)(a). Therefore, disclosure of

information in regard to the functioning of

Government must be the rule and secrecy an

exception justified only where the strictest

requirement of public interest so demands.

The approach of the court must be to

attenuate the area of secrecy as much as

possible consistently with the requirement

of public interest, bearing in mind all the

time that disclosure also serves an

important aspect of public interest..."

(para 66, page 234)

11. It is, therefore, clear from the ratio in the

above decisions of the Constitution Bench of this

Court that the right to information, which is

basically founded on the right to know, is an

intrinsic part of the fundamental right to free

speech and expression guaranteed under Article

19(1)(a) of the Constitution. The said Act was,

6

thus, enacted to consolidate the fundamental right

of free speech.

12. In Secretary, Ministry of Information &

Broadcasting, Govt. of India and Ors. v. Cricket

Association of Bengal and Ors. - (1995) 2 SCC 161,

this Court also held that right to acquire

information and to disseminate it is an intrinsic

component of freedom of speech and expression.

(See para 43 page 213 of the report).

13. Again in Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v.

Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers Bombay

Pvt. Ltd. & others - (1988) 4 SCC 592 this Court

recognised that the Right to Information is a

fundamental right under Article 21 of the

Constitution.

14. This Court speaking through Justice Sabyasachi

Mukharji, as His Lordship then was, held:

"...We must remember that the people at large

have a right to know in order to be able to

take part in a participatory development in

7

the industrial life and democracy. Right to

know is a basic right which citizens of a

free country aspire in the broader horizon

of the right to live in this age in our land

under Article 21 of our Constitution. That

right has reached new dimensions and

urgency. That right puts greater

responsibility upon those who take upon

themselves the responsibility to inform."

(para 34, page 613 of the report)

15. In People's Union for Civil Liberties and Anr. v.

Union of India and Ors. - (2004) 2 SCC 476 this

Court reiterated, relying on the aforesaid

judgments, that right to information is a facet of

the right to freedom of "speech and expression" as

contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution

of India and also held that right to information

is definitely a fundamental right. In coming to

this conclusion, this Court traced the origin of

the said right from the Universal Declaration of

Human Rights, 1948 and also Article 19 of the

International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights, which was ratified by India in 1978. This

Court also found a similar enunciation of

principle in the Declaration of European

Convention for the Protection of Human Rights

8

(1950) and found that the spirit of the Universal

Declaration of 1948 is echoed in Article 19(1)(a)

of the Constitution. (See paras 45, 46 & 47 at

page 495 of the report)

16. The exercise of judicial discretion in favour of

free speech is not only peculiar to our

jurisprudence, the same is a part of the

jurisprudence in all the countries which are

governed by rule of law with an independent

judiciary. In this connection, if we may quote

what Lord Acton said in one of his speeches:

"Everything secret degenerates, even the

administration of justice; nothing is safe

that does not show how it can bear

discussion and publicity"

17. It is, therefore, clear that a society which

adopts openness as a value of overarching

significance not only permits its citizens a wide

range of freedom of expression, it also goes

9

further in actually opening up the deliberative

process of the Government itself to the sunlight

of public scrutiny.

18. Justice Frankfurter also opined:

"The ultimate foundation of a free society

is the binding tie of cohesive sentiment.

Such a sentiment is fostered by all those

agencies of the mind and spirit which may

serve to gather up the traditions of a

people, transmit them from generation to

generation, and thereby create that

continuity of a treasured common life which

constitutes a civilization. "We live by

symbols." The flag is the symbol of our

national unity, transcending all internal

differences, however large, within the

framework of the Constitution."

19. Actually the concept of active liberty, which is

structured on free speech, means sharing of a

nation's sovereign authority among its people.

Sovereignty involves the legitimacy of a

governmental action. And a sharing of sovereign

authority suggests intimate correlation between

the functioning of the Government and common man's

knowledge of such functioning.

(Active Liberty by Stephen Breyer - page 15)

10

20. However, while considering the width and sweep of

this right as well as its fundamental importance

in a democratic republic, this Court is also

conscious that such a right is subject to

reasonable restrictions under Article 19(2) of the

Constitution.

21. Thus note of caution has been sounded by this

Court in Dinesh Trivedi, M.P. & Others v. Union of

India & others - (1997) 4 SCC 306 where it has

been held as follows:

"...Sunlight is the best disinfectant. But it is

equally important to be alive to the dangers

that lie ahead. It is important to realize that

undue popular pressure brought to bear on

decision makers in Government can have

frightening side-effects. If every action taken

by the political or executive functionary is

transformed into a public controversy and made

subject to an enquiry to soothe popular

sentiments, it will undoubtedly have a chilling

effect on the independence of the decision

maker who may find it safer not to take any

decision. It will paralyse the entire system

and bring it to a grinding halt. So we have two

conflicting situations almost enigmatic and we

think the answer is to maintain a fine balance

which would serve public interest."

11

(para 19, page 314)

22. The Act has six Chapters and two Schedules. Right

to Information has been defined under Section 2(j)

of the Act to mean as follows:

"(j) "right to information" means the right to

information accessible under this Act which is

held by or under the control of any public

authority and includes the right to-

(i) inspection of work, documents, records;

(ii) taking notes, extracts, or certified

copies of documents or records;

(iii) taking certified samples of material;

(iv) obtaining information in the form of

diskettes, floppies, tapes, video cassettes or

in any other electronic mode or through

printouts where such information is stored in a

computer or in any other device;"

23. Right to Information has also been statutorily

recognised under Section 3 of the Act as follows:

"3. Right to information.- Subject to the

provisions of this Act, all citizens shall have

the right to information."

12

24. Section 6 in this connection is very crucial.

Under Section 6 a person, who desires to obtain

any information under this Act, shall make a

request in writing or through electronic means in

English or Hindi or in the official language of

the area in which the application is being made,

accompanying such fee as may be prescribed. Such

request may be made to the Central Public

Information Officer or State Public Information

Officer, as the case may be, or to the Central

Assistant Public Information Officer or State

Assistant Public Information Officer. In making

the said request the applicant is not required to

give any reason for obtaining the information or

any other personal details excepting those which

are necessary for contacting him.

25. It is quite interesting to note that even though

under Section 3 of the Act right of all citizens,

to receive information, is statutorily recognised

but Section 6 gives the said right to any person.

13 Therefore, Section 6, in a sense, is wider in its

ambit than Section 3.

26. After such a request for information is made, the

primary obligation of consideration of the request

is of the Public Information Officer as provided

under Section 7. Such request has to be disposed

of as expeditiously as possible. In any case

within 30 days from the date of receipt of the

request either the information shall be provided

or the same may be rejected for any of the reasons

provided under Sections 8 and 9. The proviso to

Section 7 makes it clear that when it concerns the

life or liberty of a person, the information shall

be provided within forty-eight hours of the

receipt of the request. Sub-section (2) of Section

7 makes it clear that if the Central Public

Information Officer or the State Public

Information Officer, as the case may be, fails to

give the information, specified in sub-section

(1), within a period of 30 days it shall be deemed

that such request has been rejected. Sub-section

14

(3) of Section 7 provides for payment of further

fees representing the cost of information to be

paid by the person concerned. There are various

sub-sections in Section 7 with which we are not

concerned. However, Sub-section (8) of Section 7

is important in connection with the present case.

Sub-section (8) of Section 7 provides:

"(8) Where a request has been rejected under

sub-section (1), the Central Public Information

Officer or State Public Information Officer, as

the case may be shall communicate to the person

making the request,-

(i) The reasons for such rejection;

(ii) the period within which an appeal

against such rejection may be preferred;

and

(iii)the particulars of the appellate

authority.

27. Sections 8 and 9 enumerate the grounds of

exemption from disclosure of information and also

grounds for rejection of request in respect of

some items of information respectively. Section 11

deals with third party information with which we

are not concerned in this case.

15 28. The question which falls for decision in this case

is the jurisdiction, if any, of the Information

Commissioner under Section 18 in directing

disclosure of information. In the impugned

judgment of the Division Bench, the High Court

held that the Chief Information Commissioner acted

beyond his jurisdiction by passing the impugned

decision dated 30th May, 2007 and 14th August, 2007.

The Division Bench also held that under Section 18

of the Act the State Information Commissioner is

not empowered to pass a direction to the State

Information Officer for furnishing the information

sought for by the complainant.

29. If we look at Section 18 of the Act it appears

that the powers under Section 18 have been

categorized under clauses (a) to (f) of Section

18(1). Under clauses (a) to (f) of Section 18(1)

of the Act the Central Information Commission or

the State Information Commission, as the case may

be, may receive and inquire into complaint of any

person who has been refused access to any

16

information requested under this Act [Section

18(1)(b)] or has been given incomplete, misleading

or false information under the Act [Section

18(1)(e)] or has not been given a response to a

request for information or access to information

within time limits specified under the Act

[Section 18(1)(c). We are not concerned with

provision of Section 18(1)(a) or 18(1)(d) of the

Act. Here we are concerned with the residuary

provision under Section 18(1)(f) of the Act.

Under Section 18(3) of the Act the Central

Information Commission or State Information

Commission, as the case may be, while inquiring

into any matter in this Section has the same

powers as are vested in a civil court while trying

a suit in respect of certain matters specified in

Section 18(3)(a) to (f). Under Section 18(4) which

is a non-obstante clause, the Central Information

Commission or the State Information Commission, as

the case may be, may examine any record to which

the Act applies and which is under the control of

the public authority and such records cannot be

17

withheld from it on any ground.

30. It has been contended before us by the respondent

that under Section 18 of the Act the Central

Information Commission or the State Information

Commission has no power to provide access to the

information which has been requested for by any

person but which has been denied to him. The only

order which can be passed by the Central

Information Commission or the State Information

Commission, as the case may be, under Section 18

is an order of penalty provided under Section 20.

However, before such order is passed the

Commissioner must be satisfied that the conduct of

the Information Officer was not bona fide.

31. We uphold the said contention and do not find any

error in the impugned judgment of the High court

whereby it has been held that the Commissioner

while entertaining a complaint under Section 18 of

the said Act has no jurisdiction to pass an order

providing for access to the information.

18 32. In the facts of the case, the appellant after

having applied for information under Section 6 and

then not having received any reply thereto, it

must be deemed that he has been refused the

information. The said situation is covered by

Section 7 of the Act. The remedy for such a

person who has been refused the information is

provided under Section 19 of the Act. A reading of

Section 19(1) of the Act makes it clear. Section

19(1) of the Act is set out below:-

"19. Appeal. - (1) Any person who, does

not receive a decision within the time

specified in sub-section (1) or clause (a)

of sub-section (3) of section 7, or is

aggrieved by a decision of the Central

Public Information Officer or the State

Public Information Officer, as the case may

be, may within thirty days from the expiry

of such period or from the receipt of such a

decision prefer an appeal to such officer

who is senior in rank to the Central Public

Information Officer or the State Public

Information Officer as the case may be, in

each public authority:

Provided that such officer may admit the

appeal after the expiry of the period of

thirty days if he or she is satisfied that

the appellant was prevented by sufficient

cause from filing the appeal in time."

19

33. A second appeal is also provided under sub-section

(3) of Section 19. Section 19(3) is also set out

below:-

"(3) A second appeal against the decision

under sub-section (1) shall lie within

ninety days from the date on which the

decision should have been made or was

actually received, with the Central

Information Commission or the State

Information Commission:

Provided that the Central Information

Commission or the State Information

Commission, as the case may be, may admit

the appeal after the expiry of the period of

ninety days if it is satisfied that the

appellant was prevented by sufficient cause

from filing the appeal in time."

34. Section 19(4) deals with procedure relating to

information of a third party. Sections 19(5) and

19(6) are procedural in nature. Under Section

19(8) the power of the Information Commission has

been specifically mentioned. Those powers are as

follows:-

"19(8). In its decision, the Central

Information Commission or State Information

Commission, as the case may be, has the

power to,--

(a) require the public authority to take any

such steps as may be necessary to secure

20

compliance with the provisions of this Act,

including--

(i) by providing access to information, if so

requested, in a particular form;

(ii) by appointing a Central Public

Information Officer or State Public

Information Officer, as the case may be;

(iii) by publishing certain information or

categories of information;

(iv) by making necessary changes to its

practices in relation to the maintenance,

management and destruction of records;

(v) by enhancing the provision of training on

the right to information for its officials;

(vi) by providing it with an annual report in

compliance with clause (b) of sub-section (1)

of section 4;

(b) require the public authority to compensate

the complainant for any loss or other detriment

suffered;

(c) impose any of the penalties provided under

this Act;

(d) reject the application."

35. The procedure for hearing the appeals have been

framed in exercise of power under clauses (e) and

(f) of sub-section (2) of Section 27 of the Act.

They are called the Central Information Commission

(Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2005. The procedure of

21

deciding the appeals is laid down in Rule 5 of the

said Rules.

Therefore, the procedure contemplated under

Section 18 and Section 19 of the said Act is

substantially different. The nature of the power

under Section 18 is supervisory in character

whereas the procedure under Section 19 is an

appellate procedure and a person who is aggrieved

by refusal in receiving the information which he

has sought for can only seek redress in the manner

provided in the statute, namely, by following the

procedure under Section 19. This Court is,

therefore, of the opinion that Section 7 read with

Section 19 provides a complete statutory mechanism

to a person who is aggrieved by refusal to receive

information. Such person has to get the

information by following the aforesaid statutory

provisions. The contention of the appellant that

information can be accessed through Section 18 is

contrary to the express provision of Section 19 of

the Act. It is well known when a procedure is laid

down statutorily and there is no challenge to the

22

said statutory procedure the Court should not, in

the name of interpretation, lay down a procedure

which is contrary to the express statutory

provision. It is a time honoured principle as

early as from the decision in Taylor v. Taylor

[(1876) 1 Ch. D. 426] that where statute provides

for something to be done in a particular manner it

can be done in that manner alone and all other

modes of performance are necessarily forbidden.

This principle has been followed by the Judicial

Committee of the Privy Council in Nazir Ahmad v.

Emperor [AIR 1936 PC 253(1)] and also by this

Court in Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan - [AIR

1961 SC 1527, (para 9)] and also in State of U.P.

v. Singhara Singh reported in AIR 1964 SC 358

(para 8).

36. This Court accepts the argument of the appellant

that any other construction would render the

provision of Section 19(8) of the Act totally

redundant. It is one of the well known canons of

interpretation that no statute should be

23

interpreted in such a manner as to render a part

of it redundant or surplusage.

37. We are of the view that Sections 18 and 19 of the

Act serve two different purposes and lay down two

different procedures and they provide two

different remedies. One cannot be a substitute

for the other.

38. It may be that sometime in statute words are used

by way of abundant caution. The same is not the

position here. Here a completely different

procedure has been enacted under Section 19. If

the interpretation advanced by the learned counsel

for the respondent is accepted in that case Section 19 will become unworkable and especially

Section 19(8) will be rendered a surplusage. Such

an interpretation is totally opposed to the

fundamental canons of construction. Reference in

this connection may be made to the decision of

this Court in Aswini Kumar Ghose and another v.

Arabinda Bose and another - AIR 1952 SC 369. At

24

page 377 of the report Chief Justice Patanjali

Sastri had laid down:

"It is not a sound principle of construction to

brush aside words in a statute as being

inapposite surplusage, if they can have

appropriate application in circumstances

conceivably within the contemplation of the

statute".

39. Same was the opinion of Justice Jagannadhadas in

Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh and another v. State of

U.P. - AIR 1953 SC 394 at page 397:

"It is incumbent on the court to avoid a

construction, if reasonably permissible on the

language, which would render a part of the

statute devoid of any meaning or application".

40. Justice Das Gupta in J.K. Cotton Spinning &

Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Uttar Pradesh

and others - AIR 1961 SC 1170 at page 1174

virtually reiterated the same principles in the

following words:

"the courts always presume that the Legislature

inserted every part thereof for a purpose and

the legislative intention is that every part of

the statute should have effect".

25

41. It is well-known that the legislature does not

waste words or say anything in vain or for no

purpose. Thus a construction which leads to

redundancy of a portion of the statute cannot be

accepted in the absence of compelling reasons. In

the instant case there is no compelling reason to

accept the construction put forward by the

respondents.

42. Apart from that the procedure under Section 19 of

the Act, when compared to Section 18, has several

safeguards for protecting the interest of the

person who has been refused the information he has

sought. Section 19(5), in this connection, may be

referred to. Section 19(5) puts the onus to

justify the denial of request on the information

officer. Therefore, it is for the officer to

justify the denial. There is no such safeguard in

Section 18. Apart from that the procedure under

Section 19 is a time bound one but no limit is

26

prescribed under Section 18. So out of the two

procedures, between Section 18 and Section 19, the

one under Section 19 is more beneficial to a

person who has been denied access to information.

43. There is another aspect also. The procedure under

Section 19 is an appellate procedure. A right of

appeal is always a creature of statute. A right of

appeal is a right of entering a superior forum for

invoking its aid and interposition to correct

errors of the inferior forum. It is a very

valuable right. Therefore, when the statute

confers such a right of appeal that must be

exercised by a person who is aggrieved by reason

of refusal to be furnished with the information.

In that view of the matter this Court does not

find any error in the impugned judgment of the

Division Bench. In the penultimate paragraph the

Division Bench has directed the Information

Commissioner, Manipur to dispose of the complaints

of the respondent no.2 in accordance with law as

expeditiously as possible.

27 44. This Court, therefore, directs the appellants to

file appeals under Section 19 of the Act in

respect of two requests by them for obtaining

information vide applications dated 9.2.2007 and

19.5.2007 within a period of four weeks from

today. If such an appeal is filed following the

statutory procedure by the appellants, the same

should be considered on merits by the appellate

authority without insisting on the period of

limitation.

45. However, one aspect is still required to be

clarified. This Court makes it clear that the

notification dated 15.10.2005 which has been

brought on record by the learned counsel for the

respondent vide I.A. No.1 of 2011 has been perused

by the Court. By virtue of the said notification

issued under Section 24 of the Act, the Government

of Manipur has notified the exemption of certain

organizations of the State Government from the

purview of the said Act. This Court makes it clear

28

that those notifications cannot apply

retrospectively. Apart from that the same

exemption does not cover allegations of corruption

and human right violations. The right of the

respondents to get the information in question

must be decided on the basis of the law as it

stood on the date when the request was made. Such

right cannot be defeated on the basis of a

notification if issued subsequently to time when

the controversy about the right to get information

is pending before the Court. Section 24 of the Act

does not have any retrospective operation.

Therefore, no notification issued in exercise of

the power under Section 24 can be given

retrospective effect and especially so in view of

the object and purpose of the Act which has an

inherent human right content.

46. The appeals which the respondents have been given

liberty to file, if filed within the time

specified, will be decided in accordance with

Section 19 of the Act and as early as possible,

29

preferably within three months of their filing.

With these directions both the appeals are

disposed of.

47. There will be no order as to costs.

.......................J.

(ASOK KUMAR GANGULY)

.......................J.

New Delhi (GYAN SUDHA MISRA)

December 12, 2011

30