Charul Shukla vs State Of U.P
- Neutral2026 INSC 297
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. In matrimonial criminal cases invoking Section 498A IPC and dowry-related offences, particularly where allegations are made against parents-in-law and other in-laws, mere vague and generalised allegations unsupported by cogent material evidence cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Specific factual allegations indicating active involvement of each accused must be present; a mere reference to family members' names without substantiating material should not trigger the criminal machinery of the State. 2. In the context of Section 498A IPC offences, an unexplained delay of several years between the alleged incident and lodging of the FIR—particularly where delay exceeds six years—casts serious aspersions on the credibility of the prosecution's case and, coupled with absence of corroborating material evidence, weighs heavily against allowing the continuation of criminal proceedings, especially in matrimonial disputes where the personal nature of allegations and relationships between parties already result in insufficiency and inadequacy of evidence. 3. To constitute an offence under Section 354 IPC (outraging modesty), the allegations must be substantiated by specific factual details and material evidence. Mere statements that an accused held the complainant's hand and engaged in "inappropriate conduct" or "obscene acts" without elaboration, substantiation, or supporting evidence from investigation cannot form the basis for criminal proceedings. 4. Where allegations of serious offences (such as causing miscarriage under Section 313 IPC) are made in an FIR but the investigating officer, upon investigation and examination of medical evidence, drops such charges as unsustainable, and the chargesheet proceeds only on lesser offences, this indicates material loopholes in the prosecution's case and suggests the allegations were unsubstantiated, warranting examination of whether the remaining allegations meet the threshold for criminal prosecution. 5. In exercising the power to quash criminal proceedings under Article 226 or inherent powers, the court may apply the principles laid down in State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal (1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335) where allegations, even if taken at face value, do not prima facie constitute an offence, or do not disclose sufficient evidence of guilt, or are so absurd and inherently improbable as to preclude any prudent conclusion of sufficient grounds to proceed, or where the proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide or maliciously instituted.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2026 INSC 297 NON-REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.555 of 2024)
CHARUL SHUKLA …APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. & OTHERS …RESPONDENTS
WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.609 of 2024)
JUDGMENT
NAGARATHNA, J.
Leave granted.
2. The present criminal appeals have been preferred by the
appellants assailing the order dated 18.12.2023 passed by the
Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench in Criminal Miscellaneous Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by BORRA LM VALLI Date: 2026.03.25 18:00:27 IST Reason: 1 Writ Petition No.9354 of 2023, wherein the High Court declined to
quash the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.758 of 2023
registered at Police Station Mohammadi, District Khiri, at the
instance of respondent No.4 (hereinafter referred to as “the
complainant”) against the accused/appellants. The said FIR
invoked offences punishable under Sections 498A, 323 and 313 of
the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as “IPC”), as
well as Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961
(hereinafter referred to as “DP Act”) and subsequently a
chargesheet was filed under Sections 323, 354, 498A of IPC and
Sections 3 and 4 of DP Act.
3. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the
accused/appellant in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No.555/2024 is the sister-in-law of the complainant, whereas the
accused/appellants in Criminal Appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.)
No.609/2024 are the mother-in-law and father-in-law (parents-in-
law) respectively of the said complainant. It is an admitted fact that
the marriage between the complainant and her husband, Utkarsh
2 Awasthi was solemnised on 16.04.2017 as per the Hindu rites and
ceremonies.
4. It has been alleged by the prosecution–State/respondent No.1
and the complainant that from the inception of the marriage
solemnised at Kanpur, her husband and accused/appellants
herein frequently demanded dowry to the tune of Rs.8,50,000/-
(Rupees Eight Lakhs and Fifty Thousand) and a car. Due to the
financial incapacity and constraints of the parents of the
complainant, the said dowry demand could not be acceded to
leading to the accused/appellants allegedly harassing and
torturing the complainant.
5. As the complainant’s husband was employed in Ghaziabad,
the complainant moved in with him within five days of their
marriage and thereafter, it has been alleged that the sister-in-law,
who also lives in Ghaziabad with her husband, namely, Atul,
frequently stayed at the complainant’s residence and instigated the
complainant’s husband against her by making false accusations
that the complainant was engaged in an illicit relationship with
Atul.
3
6. Furthermore, it has been alleged that in the month of July,
2017, when the complainant was two months’ pregnant, her
husband and the appellants, upon becoming aware of the factum
of the said pregnancy, raised strong objections to the continuation
of her pregnancy and in furtherance of the said objection, her
husband, her sister-in-law and parents-in-law allegedly barged
into the complainant’s room and caught hold of her; the sister-in-
law allegedly grabbed the complainant by her hair and threw her
on the ground and caught hold her legs whereas the mother-in-law
caught hold of the complainant’s hand, after which the husband
proceeded to kick the complainant on her stomach due to which
she became unconscious and suffered a miscarriage.
7. Thereafter, in October 2017, the complainant travelled with
her husband to Kanpur to visit her parents-in-law to celebrate
Diwali festival. During this period also, she was subjected to
harassment and was compelled to reside in a hostile environment.
In the absence of her husband, the father-in-law held the
complainant’s hand and engaged in inappropriate conduct with
her. The complainant states that when she objected to the said
4 conduct, he physically assaulted and slapped her. When the
complainant subsequently informed her husband about the
aforesaid conduct of the father-in-law, he did not consider the
matter objectionable and did not take any action in that regard.
The complainant has further alleged that she was subjected to
mental distress and harassment by the appellants.
8. On 12.11.2023, the complainant’s husband, along with the
appellants, acting in concert, allegedly assaulted her and forcibly
took away her jewellery and compelled her to leave the matrimonial
home. The complainant thereafter contacted the police authorities,
pursuant to which she was provided protection.
9. Owing to the fact that the accused/father-in-law is a well
reputed advocate practicing in Kanpur, the complainant did not
lodge a complaint there apprehending threat to her life. It was only
after returning to her parental home at Mohammadi and informing
her mother of her plight, she submitted a complaint before the
concerned Police Station at Mohammadi, District Khiri, Uttar
Pradesh. Based on the said written complaint submitted by the
complainant, FIR No.758/2023 was lodged with P.S. Mohammadi,
5 District Khiri, Uttar Pradesh on 15.11.2023 against her husband
and the appellants herein under Sections 498A, 323 and 313 of the
IPC and under Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act.
10. Aggrieved by the lodgment of the said FIR, the
accused/appellants preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition
No.9354 of 2023 before the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad,
Lucknow Bench praying for the relief of quashment of FIR
No.758/2023 and a direction to respondent No.1/State not to take
any coercive steps against the accused/appellants in connection
with the said FIR.
11. By the impugned order dated 18.12.2023, the High Court
dismissed the Criminal Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.9354 of
2023 while observing that there were specific allegations contained
in the FIR which detailed as to how the complainant was beaten
up leading to her forcible abortion. Furthermore, the High Court
took note of the fact that there were allegations of sexual
misconduct against one of the accused/appellants and therefore
held that the FIR in question disclosed cognisable offence not
necessitating any interference of the High Court.
6
12. Being aggrieved by the initiation of criminal proceedings
against the accused/appellants at the behest of the complainant
and dismissal of the quashing petition by order dated 18.12.2023
by the Allahabad High Court, Lucknow Bench, the appellants have
preferred the instant criminal appeals.
13. This Court by order dated 19.01.2024 directed that the
accused/appellants shall not be arrested in connection with FIR
No.758/2023 dated 15.11.2023 registered at Police Station
Mohammadi, District Khiri, Uttar Pradesh subject to the condition
that they shall cooperate with the investigation. Thereafter, the
investigating officer proceeded to file Chargesheet bearing
No.01/2024 on 18.02.2024 against the appellants herein under
Sections 323, 354 and 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of DP Act.
14. At the outset, we must point out that the allegations under
Section 354 of IPC have only been invoked against the father-in-
law of the complainant. Furthermore, the charges under Section
313 of IPC invoked in FIR No.758/2023 have been dropped by the
investigating officer in the said chargesheet. The Chargesheet
7 No.01/2024, culminated into Criminal Case No.634/2025 before
the Court of Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Mohamaddi Khiri
and by order dated 04.04.2025, the Chief Judicial Magistrate took
cognizance upon the said chargesheet for the offences under
Sections 498A and 323 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of DP Act
against the sister-in-law and mother-in-law of the complainant and
under Sections 498A, 323 and 354 of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of
the DP Act against the father-in-law of the complainant.
15. We have heard learned counsel for the accused/appellants
and learned counsel for the respondent/State.
16. Learned counsel appearing for appellant/sister-in-law
submitted that she is educated and has a degree in B.Tech and
M.Tech. Furthermore, it has been submitted that she is gainfully
employed at a college in the capacity of a professor and therefore
has been living separately and away from the complainant and her
husband and that after her marriage in 2010, she has never
resided in Kanpur except while visiting Kanpur for participating in
ceremonial functions during complainant’s wedding and therefore
the possibility of sharing a household with the complainant is
8 highly improbable. It is further submitted that the FIR in question
was lodged after a period of six years and seven months from the
date of the complainant's marriage i.e. 16.04.2017 and within this
period not even an iota of complaint was raised by the complainant.
17. It was also argued that the allegations with respect to the
termination of pregnancy are vague and omnibus inasmuch as
neither the spot of occurrence nor the date and time of the
occurrence is mentioned in the FIR. The fact that the complainant
has not given any proof of the pregnancy nor any medical note
regarding the termination of the pregnancy in the FIR, is sufficient
to show that the said allegations are flimsy and concocted. The fact
that the complainant neither informed her maternal family nor her
relatives nor did she file any complaint before the police about said
incident, goes to the root of the matter and fortifies its falsity.
18. Similar submissions have been made on behalf of the
parents-in-law of the complainant including that they have been
living in Kanpur, separately from the complainant and her
husband and as such no domestic relationship could have been
established between them and the complainant. Further, it has
9 been submitted by learned counsel for the appellant that the
father-in-law of the complainant is a senior citizen aged 73 years
and that the mother-in-law is a retired BSNL employee who is also
a septuagenarian, aged 71 years. It is submitted that the
complainant had deserted her husband in the year 2018 and since
then she has been living separately. It was further contended that
the FIR in question, lodged at the instance of the complainant,
constitutes a blatant abuse of the process of law and is intended to
harass the aged parents-in-law, who are 73 and 71 years’ old,
respectively and that by no stretch of imagination, it could be
stated that they harassed the complainant and threw her out of the
house.
19. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent/State, in
support of the impugned order, submitted that the allegations
made by respondent No.4/complainant, in the FIR discloses the
commission of a cognisable offence and therefore warrants no
interference from this Court. It is submitted that the veracity of the
defence taken by the appellants is a subject matter of investigation
and trial and hence this Court may refrain, while exercising its
10 authority in the quashing petition and rather enable adjudication
upon the merits of the case. At this juncture, it is pertinent to take
cognizance of the fact that there is no appearance on behalf of the
complainant to oppose the present appeals for quashment of legal
proceedings despite service of notice on her.
20. Having heard the learned counsel appearing for the respective
parties and upon a careful perusal of the material placed on record,
we note that the allegations contained in the Chargesheet are
under Sections 498A, 323 and 354 of the IPC and under Sections
3 and 4 of the DP Act. In order to understand the nature of the
offences and to correlate the same with the allegations contained
in the FIR, the relevant provisions under the IPC as well as the DP
Act are extracted as hereunder:
“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.—Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—
11
(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or
(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”
Section 323 of the IPC provides for punishment for voluntary
causing hurt as defined under Section 321 of the IPC. The relevant
provisions are extracted as hereunder:
“321. Voluntarily causing hurt.—Whoever does any act with the intention of thereby causing hurt to any person, or with the knowledge that he is likely thereby to cause hurt to any person, and does thereby cause hurt to any person, is said “voluntarily to cause hurt”.
323. Punishment for voluntarily causing hurt.— Whoever, except in the case provided for by section 334, voluntarily causes hurt, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to one thousand rupees, or with both.”
Section 354 of the IPC provides for definition and punishment
of assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her
modesty. The relevant provision is extracted as hereunder:
12 “354. Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her modesty.—Whoever assaults or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing it to be likely that he will thereby outrage her modesty, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which shall not be less than one year but which may extend to five years, and shall also be liable to fine.”
Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the DP Act provide the penalty for
giving or taking dowry as well as for demanding dowry. The said
provisions are reproduced as follows:
“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.—(1) If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years. (2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,—
(a) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride (without any demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act;
13 (b) presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom (without any demand having been made in that behalf):
Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act:
Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.
4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:
Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”
Upon a plain reading of Section 498A of the IPC, it can be
understood that an offence is punishable under the said provision
when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which
may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years
and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines
“cruelty” for the purpose of the said provision to mean any of the
14 acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of
the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that “cruelty”
means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to
drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a)
of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty
means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave
injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical)
of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section
498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment
of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any
property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or
any person related to her to meet such demand.
21. At the outset, we find it important to underline and highlight
that the husband is not a party in the present appeals and
therefore we have been mindful of the fact that the said allegations
have to be viewed from the standpoint of only the
accused/appellants herein who are the sister-in-law and parents-
in-law of the complainant. From a perusal of the instant FIR it is
15 apparent that the complainant has alleged that at the time of her
marriage with the accused/husband, her family had given gifts as
per the status of his family. Despite that from the very first day
after the marriage on 16.04.2017, when the complainant started
residing at her matrimonial home, the husband along with the
accused/appellants started harassing the complainant and
demanded Rs.8,50,000/- (Rupees Eight lakhs Fifty Thousand)
along with a car as additional dowry. Furthermore, the allegations
against the sister-in-law of the complainant is that she instigated
the husband of the complainant by making false accusations about
the complainant having an illicit affair outside the marriage.
Firstly, with reference to the allegations of dowry demand and
related harassment of the complainant, it is noted by us that the
complainant and the prosecution have failed to put forth any
material evidence or substance which support the allegations
contained in the FIR and the chargesheet. A mere statement
stating that the accused/appellants herein frequently demanded
dowry and harassed the complainant for the same is not sufficient
to initiate criminal proceedings against them when the same are
not corroborated or bolstered by other materials placed on record.
16 At the same time, the said allegations also have to be juxtaposed
with the fact that the complaint was registered by the complainant
only on 15.11.2023 i.e. after a delay of more than six years and
seven months from the alleged dowry demand. The prosecution
has failed to put forth any sufficient cause for such delay and this
casts aspersions on their story. At this juncture, we find it apposite
to underline the importance of taking an early recourse to pursue
and prosecute criminal complaints. We find that the citizens who
allege commission of an offence should not dawdle on their rights
but should rather pursue them in real time in order to achieve the
ends of justice as vigilantibus non dormientibus jura subveniunt
meaning, law protects those who are vigilant about their rights.
The delay or lack thereof assumes greater importance in the
matrimonial cases or criminal cases between the spouses as due
to the personal nature of the allegations and relationship shared
between the parties, there is already an insufficiency and
inadequacy of evidence to support or rebut the claims and
counterclaims. A delay of nearly seven years can therefore be fatal
to the prosecution’s case especially when the same has not been
properly explained.
17
22. Furthermore, with respect to the allegations against the
sister-in-law regarding the incitement of the complainant’s
husband in relation to the alleged extra-marital affair, the
prosecution has failed to provide any specific detail and has not
been able to elaborate upon the nature of the relationship or how
those accusations purportedly affected complainant’s relationship
with her husband. It is apposite to note that upon the perusal of
the records of the case, nothing material has been put forth to
advance or substantiate the said allegations. Time and again, this
Court has observed that merely stating certain vague and omnibus
allegations without any cogent material evidence to support the
same should not become a fillip to jump-start the criminal
machinery of the State. At this juncture, we find it appropriate to
quote the observations of this Court in Dara Lakshmi Narayana
vs. State of Telangana, (2025) 3 SCC 735 which is extracted as
under:
“27. A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s
18 family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. …
xxx
30. The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise Page 22 of 26 in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family.
Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.
31. We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second
19 respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.”
23. Further, it has been alleged by the complainant herein that
in the month of July 2017, the sister-in-law, in concert with other
accused/appellants, barged into the complainant’s room for
restraining her while the husband kicked the complainant on her
stomach leading to a miscarriage. However, upon bare perusal of
the Chargesheet No.01/2024 and the medical examination report
annexed thereto, no offence under Section 313 of IPC has been
made out. The attached medical examination report fails to ascribe
or delineate any particular injury that relates to or supports the
claim of the complainant either. We must hasten to add that upon
completion of the investigation, the investigating officer also
deemed it fit to drop the charges under Section 313 of IPC against
the accused/appellants. Therefore, the only reasonable
conclusion, keeping in mind the relevant facts of the case and lack
of medical evidence to substantiate or elaborate the assertions of
20 the complainant points towards loopholes in the story of the
prosecution. In this context, we find it apposite to mention that
although the Allahabad High Court in the impugned order dated
18.12.2023, took cognizance of the fact that the complainant has
alleged that due to critical injuries received by her due to the
alleged acts of domestic violence by her husband and in-laws, the
High Court did not have the benefit of perusing the chargesheet
which was only filed by the investigating officer on 18.02.2024
wherein, as mentioned earlier, the said charges of causing
miscarriage have been dropped and therefore only offences with
lesser punishment are alleged against the accused/appellants
herein.
24. It would not be out of place to mention that the delay of almost
seven years between the alleged incident and lodgment of the FIR
has not been explained sufficiently by the complainant. The
reasons ascribed by her for the said delay is the affluent position
held by her father-in-law who is stated to be a reputed advocate in
Kanpur but she has failed, in our opinion, to aver any specific
instances wherein the father-in-law, using the said position of
21 reputation, threatened or restrained the complainant for more than
six years so as to prevent her from filing any written complaint or
approaching the appropriate authorities. At this point, we reiterate
the observations made in State of Punjab vs. Sarwan Singh,
(1981) 3 SCC 34, wherein this Court stated the object of the Code
of Criminal Procedure in putting a bar of limitation as follows:
“3. … The object of the Criminal Procedure Code in putting a bar of limitation on prosecutions was clearly to prevent the parties from filing cases after a long time, as a result of which material evidence may disappear and also to prevent abuse of the process of the court by filing vexatious and belated prosecutions long after the date of the offence. The object which the statutes seek to subserve is clearly in consonance with the concept of fairness of trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It is, therefore, of the utmost importance that any prosecution, whether by the State or a private complainant must abide by the letter of law or take the risk of the prosecution failing on the ground of limitation. …”
25. As against the father-in-law, there are additional allegations
under Section 354 of IPC wherein the complainant has alleged that
he forcibly held the complainant's hand and engaged in sexually
inappropriate behaviour. To attract the offence of Section 354, the
ultimate test to ascertain whether the modesty of a woman has
been outraged, assaulted or insulted is that the action of the
22 offender should be such that it may be perceived as one which is
capable of shocking the sense of decency of a woman. Upon the
perusal of the material on record, we again fail to see any cogent
evidence to support the said allegation. The complainant claims
that the father-in-law held her hands and engaged in inappropriate
conduct but merely making such statements claiming that there
was sexual misconduct when the same are not substantiated or
supported by any material detail in the Final Report filed by the
Investigating Officer cannot be allowed to stand in the court of law.
In this regard, the Allahabad High Court has observed that one of
the allegations against the one of the accused/appellants, the
father-in-law, is that he allegedly molested the complainant. In this
regard the High Court failed to see that no such specific allegation
or any specific instance has been stated either in the FIR or in the
Chargesheet. On the contrary, it is merely stated that the father-
in-law held her hands and tried to commit obscene acts with her.
The complainant has failed to elaborate upon said ‘obscene acts’
allegedly committed by him. It is trite that the FIR cannot be an
encyclopaedia of the events but even upon the perusal of the
chargesheet as presented by the investigation officer, the counsel
23 for prosecution/State has not been able to substantiate or discern
any substantive material in support of the allegation under Section
354 of IPC. At this juncture, it would not be out of place to mention
that the complainant herself has failed to enter appearance in the
present proceedings despite service of notice upon her. The said
non-appearance, despite the service of notice being complete upon
her, inevitably draws our attention towards an adverse inference
that the complainant herself is indifferent and uninterested in
contesting the said appeals.
26. Finally, it has also been contended by the complainant that
after the day of Diwali, i.e. on 12.11.2023, when the complainant
was at her matrimonial home at Kanpur, her husband, along with
the accused/appellants herein, acting in concert, assaulted the
complainant, forcibly took away her jewellery and drove her out of
the matrimonial home. However, no evidence, documentary or
otherwise has been provided by either the prosecution or the
complainant with respect to the jewellery taken from her, the
manner in which the assault took place or in what circumstances
she was compelled to leave her matrimonial home. A statement
24 making bald allegations are fatal to the case of the prosecution
when the same are not supported by material facts and
circumstances. At this juncture, it is pertinent to point out that
although the Allahabad High Court, through its impugned
judgment dated 18.12.2023 has taken due cognizance of the fact
that the allegations prima facie make out a cognizable offences, but
upon perusal of the material on record, it is apparent that the High
Court has failed to take note of the fact that the said allegations
are made without any evidentiary backing or material support for
the same and hence the ingredients of the sections invoked are not
fulfilled.
27. Keeping the aforesaid observations and judicial dicta laid
down by this Court in mind, coupled with the delay in lodging of
the FIR makes the allegations against the accused/appellants
highly improbable and implausible and therefore it is neither
expedient nor in the interest of justice to permit the present
prosecution emanating from the FIR and consequent Criminal
Case No.634/2025. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on
the judgment in the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal,
25 1992 Suppl (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference
to paragraph 102 therein, where this Court observed as under:
“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.
(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the Accused.
(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.
(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the Accused.
26 (4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.
(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the Accused.
(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.
(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”
28. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial
dictum, we find that the offence alleged against the
accused/appellants herein is not made out and therefore, the
judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal squarely applies
to the facts of this case having regard to sub-paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 5,
and 7. It is further noted that the parents-in-law are senior
citizens. Similarly, the other accused, sister-in-law, is a well
27 educated woman who has completed her M.Tech and B.Tech and
is gainfully employed as a professor in college. In such
circumstances keeping the age of the said accused persons and the
future career prospects of the accused/sister-in-law in mind, this
Court, is of the opinion that it is neither expedient nor in the
interest of justice to permit the continuation of the present
prosecution emanating from the FIR No.758/2023 and consequent
Criminal Case No.634/2025 to continue qua the appellants.
29. In the aforementioned circumstances, keeping the judicial
dicta laid down by this Court in mind, the impugned order dated
18.12.2023 of the High Court is set aside and consequently, FIR
No.758/2023 dated 15.11.2023 lodged with P.S. Mohammadi,
District Khiri; Chargesheet No.01/2024 dated 18.02.2024; and
Criminal Case No.634/2025 before the Court of Additional Chief
Judicial Magistrate, Mohamaddi Khiri thereto stand quashed qua
the accused/appellants herein who are complainant’s sister-in-law
and parents-in-law.
30. It is needless to observe that the observations made in the
present appeals shall not come in the way of any matrimonial or
28 other proceedings pending between the parties which shall be
decided on their own merits and in accordance with law.
The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.
…………………………………..J. (B.V. NAGARATHNA)
…………………………………..J. (UJJAL BHUYAN)
NEW DELHI;
MARCH 25, 2026.
29
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