Charan Preet Singh vs Municipal Corporation Chandigarh

2026 INSC 248 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3446 OF 2026 (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P. (CIVIL) NO.16533/2025)

CHARAN PREET SINGH APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

MUNICIPAL CORPORATION CHANDIGARH & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This Appeal would call in question the judgment dated 29.5.2025

rendered by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in

LPA No.286-2022 (O&M) to set aside the judgment dated 7.2.2022 passed

by the learned Single Judge in CWP No.1007 of 2022 whereby the writ

petition preferred by the third respondent – Amit Kumar Sharma was

dismissed. Consequently, the writ petition filed by the third respondent

stands allowed and the official respondents were directed to revise the third

respondent’s score in the recruitment exam for one post of Law Officer in the

Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh and, accordingly, to reconsider his case

for selection to the said post.

Signature Not Verified

As a result of such reconsideration, the Digitally signed by MINI present appellant, who was selected in the recruitment, would secure less Date: 2026.03.17 16:38:10 IST Reason:

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.16533/2025 Page 1 of 7

marks than the third respondent and, thus, could be ousted from

consideration.

3. To put the facts in hand very briefly and concisely, the first

respondent – Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh, issued an advertisement

inviting applications for various posts, including for one post of Law Officer.

The selection for the post of Law Officer was to be made only on the basis of

a written test where 100 questions of multiple-choice type carrying one

mark each were to be attempted. For each wrong answer, 1/4th mark was to

be deducted as negative marking. The appellant and the third respondent

applied for the said post.

4. In the abovesaid examination, one of the questions, question no.73,

was asked as under:

“73. Which of the following schedule of the Constitution is immune from judicial review on the grounds of violation of fundamental rights?

A) Seventh Schedule B) Ninth Schedule

C) Tenth Schedule D) None of the above”

5. The dispute in the present matter relates to the correct answer to the

abovesaid question. The third respondent/writ petitioner answered and

claimed that option ‘D’ (None of the above) is the correct answer, whereas,

according to the recruiting body, option ‘B’ (Ninth Schedule) is the correct

answer. According to the recruiting body, the third respondent gave a

wrong answer. The third respondent secured one mark less for giving a

wrong answer and further 1/4th mark was deducted by way of negative

marking. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition preferred by

the third respondent on the reasoning that Article 31B of the Constitution of

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.16533/2025 Page 2 of 7 India which provides immunity from challenge to the law on mere violation

of a fundamental right still exists in the Constitution and the validity thereof

has been upheld by this Court in Shankari Prasad Singh Deo vs. Union

of India and State of Bihar1, which was not only followed with approval,

rather it was reiterated with more emphasis in the case of Sajjan Singh

and Others vs. State of Rajasthan and Others2, though in the later

decision in the matter of C. Golak Nath and Others vs. State of Punjab

and Another3, this Court declared Article 31B as invalid prospectively.

However, the same survived for a short time as decision rendered in C.

Golak Nath (supra) was overruled by this Court in His Holiness

Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru vs. State of Kerala and

Another4 and, thus, Article 31B again became valid and constitutional,

which was further reinforced by this Court in the matter of I.R. Coelho

(Dead) by LRs vs. State of T.N.5.

6. Thus, on the above reasoning, the learned Single Judge held that the

question and answer, which the official respondents have framed in the

subject recruitment exam, are fully supported by even the bare language of

the Constitution. According to the learned Single Judge, once Article 31B,

which excluded violation of fundamental right as the test for pronouncing

upon the validity of the laws, was upheld, there was no alternative except to

reconcile with such validity. However, an alternate test to pronounce upon

the validity of laws included in the Ninth Schedule has been devised and,

1 1951 SCC 966: (1952) SCR 89 2 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25: AIR 1965 SC 845 3 1967 SCC OnLine SC 14: (1967) 2 SCR 762 4 (1973) 4 SCC 225 5 (2007) 2 SCC 1

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.16533/2025 Page 3 of 7 accordingly, the tests of extent and nature of violation of some of the

fundamental rights considered as basic feature of the Constitution or impact

of such violation on some essential features of the Constitution, has been

devised. The net result is that the immunity granted to the Ninth Schedule

laws qua violation of fundamental rights has not been done away with and it

continues. But some effect of such violation has been brought within the

purview of the judicial review so as to reclaim power to pronounce upon the

validity of laws included in the Ninth Schedule. But the reference test for

such invalidity is not the violation of the fundamental rights, per se, but the

effect of the same on the ‘basic features’ of the Constitution, which are

spread over the entire body of the Constitution, even beyond the

fundamental rights. The learned Single Judge quoted paragraphs 126 and

148 of the I.R. Coelho (supra). Thus, according to the learned Single Judge,

the laws included in the Ninth Schedule are immune from judicial review on

the ground of violation of fundamental rights even today and the recruiting

body was, therefore, right by mentioning option ‘B’ as the correct answer.

7. In the intra-court appeal, the Division Bench, in its judgment, which

is impugned herein, has again referred to paragraph 148 of I.R. Coelho

(supra) to observe that while Article 31B grants certain immunities to laws

placed in the Ninth Schedule, these immunities are not absolute and are

subject to test of basic structure. Consequently, it is incorrect to state, in

categorical terms, that the Ninth Schedule is immune from judicial review

merely on the ground of violation of fundamental rights. Therefore, the

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.16533/2025 Page 4 of 7 Division Bench held that the third respondent’s6 selection of option ‘D’ (None

of the above) was legally correct and aligned with the settled position of law

as laid down by this Court. According to the Division Bench, the reliance

placed by the respondents (before the learned Single Judge) on paragraph

148 of I.R. Coelho (supra) is misplaced as it overlooks the core contention of

the third respondent herein (Amit Kumar Sharma) that no Schedule of the

Constitution, including the Ninth Schedule, is absolutely immune from

judicial review merely for infringing the fundamental rights.

8. The Division Bench, thus, found that the third respondent (Amit

Kumar Sharma), being a law graduate, answered the question in

consonance with the binding law declared under Article 141 of the

Constitution and deduction of 1.25 marks materially altered his merit

ranking and deprived him of fair consideration for selection. As regards the

appointment of the appellant (Charan Preet Singh), the Division Bench

observed that though he has already joined services, the Constitutional right

of a deserving candidate cannot be defeated solely on account of delay in

judicial determination. The Division Bench further observed that this Court

in Vikas Pratap Singh and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and

Others7 authorises creation of a supernumerary post in such circumstances

to balance equities.

9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties at great length and

perused the material on record.

6 Appellant before the Division Bench of the High Court 7 (2013) 14 SCC 494

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10. Question No.73 was included in the recruitment test for selection to

the post of Law Officer in the Municipal Corporation, Chandigarh. To

evaluate as to whether Option ‘D’ (None of the above) answered by the third

respondent was correct or Option ‘B’ (Ninth Schedule) which according to

the recruiting body is correct, the learned Single Judge and the Division

Bench as well have considered the Constitutional provisions and the

decisions rendered by this Court in its celebrated judgments in the matter of

Shankari Prasad Singh Deo (supra); Sajjan Singh (supra); C. Golak

Nath (supra); His Holiness Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru

(supra); and I.R. Coelho (supra). When the Judges of the High Court are at

variance in their opinion as to the correct answer to Question No.73, it is

least expected from mere law graduates, who are competing for a post of

Law Officer in the Municipal Corporation, to reach to a correct conclusion

while answering the multiple-choice question by process of interpretation of

Constitutional provisions involving this Court’s judgments in several

decades. Thus, we are of the considered view that both the candidates

deserve to be accommodated. From a law graduate’s point of view, both the

answers may be correct, although Option ‘B’ (Ninth Schedule) appears to be

more appropriate considering the language of the question asked. However,

on a deeper analysis of this Court’s judgments mentioned above, Option ‘D’

(None of the above) can also be considered to be correct as has been held by

the Division Bench.

11. In the above view of the matter, we direct the Municipal Corporation,

Chandigarh, to accommodate both, the appellant as well as the third

Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No.16533/2025 Page 6 of 7 respondent/writ petitioner, by creating a supernumerary post and appoint

the third respondent as well. Upon appointment of the third respondent,

the appellant, who was initially selected and joined and presently working

on the post, will be treated as senior.

12. The Appeal is disposed of in the above stated terms.

………………………………………J. (SANJAY KAROL)

………………………………………J. (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 17, 2026

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