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Chander Bhan Gosain vs State Of Orissa & Ors

Supreme Court5 April 1963A.K. Sarkar · S.K. Das · M. Hidayatullah

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a single petition under Article 226 of the Constitution challenges the validity of multiple assessment orders together, and the High Court passes one order on that petition, only one set of court fees is payable on the appeal to the Supreme Court, not multiple sets corresponding to the number of orders challenged, because there is only one proceeding notwithstanding the multiplicity of orders impugned.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

PETITIONER:CHANDER BHAN GOSAIN
Vs.
RESPONDENT:STATE OF ORISSA & ORS.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:05/04/1963
BENCH:SARKAR, A.K.BENCH:SARKAR, A.K.DAS, S.K.HIDAYATULLAH, M.
CITATION:1967 AIR 767 1964 SCR (2) 879

ACT: Supreme Court Practice-Appeal-Court Fee-One petition filed under Art. 226 to challange many assessment orders--Appeal against one order of High Court-Court fee payable.

HEADNOTE: This appeal was against the order of the Deputy Registrar directing the present case to be registered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court fees. The case originated out of one petition under Art. 226 of the Constition challenging the validity of various assessment orders. The High Court passed one order on the petition and one appeal was filed in this Court. 886 Held that the appellant should pay only one set of court fee and other charges as in a single appeal. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders as the appellant had by a single petition challenged them all together. Lajwanti Sial's case, Petition for special leave No. 673 of 1959 and Kishinchand Chellaram's case, C.A. Nos. 462 to 465 of 1960, referred to.

JUDGMENT:

CIVIL APPELLATE, JURISDICTION: Civil Misc. Petition No. 1398 of 1962.

Appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar dated March 28, 1962 in Civil Appeals Nos. 41 to 49 of 1962. A.Ranganadham Chetty, B.D. Dhawan, S.K. Mehta and K.L. Mehta, for the petitioner.

C. K. Daphtary, Attorney-Generalfor India, R. Ganapathy Iyer and R. N. Sachthey, for the respondents. 1963. April 5. The Order of the court was delivered by SARKAR J. -This is an appeal against the order of the Deputy Registrar directing the present case to be registered as nine appeals and requiring the appellant to pay nine sets of court-fees. The Deputy Registrar had relied on two cases of this Court, namely, Lajwanti Sial's case (Petition for Special Leave No. 673 of 1959) and Kishinchand Chellaram's case (Civil Appeals No. 462 to 465 of 1960). We do not think that these precedents cover the present case. In Lajwanti's Case there were a number of applications under s. 66 (2) of the Income-tax Act for reference of the same question. There were in tact a number of separate references but they were 887 dealt with by one judgment from which the appeal to this Court arose. That was really a case of five appeals for the common judgment must be taken to have been delivered in each of the different reference cases.

Kishinchand Chellaram'8 case is also not helpful because there four applications by four different assessees had been made for reference of three identical questions arising in each assessment case under s. 66 (1) of the Income-tax Act. Though it appears that there was one order of reference to the High Court and the High Court treated the case as a single case of reference, it could be said that there were in fact a number of references.

The present case however originated out of one petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution challenging the validity of various assessment orders. Obviously here, there was only one proceeding. It could not be said that there were as many proceedings as there were assessment orders for the petitioner had by a single petition callenged them all together. When an appeal is taken to this Court from the judgment of the High Court in such a petition, it is impossible to contend that there are more appeals than one. Therefore, the appellant before us is liable only to pay one set of court-fee and other charges as in a single appeal. Action may be taken accordingly by the office, if necessary, by refunding the excess charges made.

888

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