Central Bureau Of Investigation vs M/S Sarvodaya Highways Ltd

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). OF 2025 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) No(s). 11108 of 2022)

CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION ….APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

M/S. SARVODAYA HIGHWAYS LTD. AND ORS. ….RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

Mehta, J.

1. Heard.

2. Leave granted.

3. The instant appeal at the instance of Central

Bureau of Investigation1 takes exception to the

judgment and final order dated 18th July, 2022

passed by the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by NEETU KHAJURIA Date: 2025.11.26 17:02:39 IST Reason: 1 Hereinafter, referred to as “appellant-CBI”.

1 Chandigarh in CRMM No. 31272 of 2018 (O&M)2. By

the impugned judgment, the High Court allowed the

petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973,3 [Section 528 of the Bharatiya

Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS)] filed by

respondent No. 1-M/s. Sarvodaya Highways Ltd.4

and its Directors i.e., respondent No. 2-Gurinder

Kumar Garg, respondent No.3-Aruna Garg,

respondent No.4-Aashutosh Garg and respondent

No.5-Aayush Garg, and thereby quashed the entire

proceedings arising out of the FIR RC No.

BD1/2015/E/0002/CBI/BS&FS/DLI registered by

the appellant-CBI for the offences punishable under

Section 120B read with Sections 406, 420, 467, 468

and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 18605 and Sections

2 Hereinafter, referred to as “High Court”. 3 Hereinafter, referred to as “CrPC”. 4 Hereinafter, referred to as “respondent No.1-Company or defaulter

company”.

5 Hereinafter, referred to as “IPC”.

2 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of

Corruption of Act, 19886. Consequently, the

proceedings arising out of the chargesheet No.

RC.BD/2015/E/2002 dated 30th November, 2016

filed pursuant to investigation in the aforesaid FIR

also came to be quashed.

BRIEF FACTS

4. The FIR mentioned supra came to be lodged on

3rd February, 2015 at the instance of the Branch

Manager of the erstwhile State Bank of Bikaner and

Jaipur (now merged with State Bank of India)7,

alleging, inter alia, that the Bank had sanctioned

credit facility of Rs.50 crores under fund based-limits

and Rs.10 crores under non-fund based limits to

respondent No.1-Company through its Managing

Director. While applying for the loan, it was projected

6 Hereinafter, referred to as “PC Act”. 7 Hereinafter, referred to as “Bank”.

3 on behalf of respondent No.1-Company that it was

engaged in the construction of

residential/commercial complexes, townships,

highways, bridges and flyovers across India and had

been awarded 10 work orders to the tune of

Rs.348.24 crores. Acting on the aforesaid information

and financial standing provided by respondent No.1-

Company, the Bank sanctioned the credit facilities in

the above terms.

5. However, when the amounts were not repaid as

per the schedule and the accounts became irregular,

an internal inquiry was initiated and it was found

that lien of the Bank had not been marked in the

revenue records by the Patwari Halqa, Dhakoli,

Zirakpur and that the records had been manipulated.

The account of respondent No.1-Company was

declared to be a Non-Performing Asset8 on 28th July,

8 Hereinafter, referred to as “NPA”.

4 2013 by the Bank. The internal inquiry concluded

that a fraud of Rs.52.50 crores had been committed.

Consequent to these findings, a complaint was lodged

by the Branch Manager of the Bank on 9th January,

2015, on the basis of which the aforesaid FIR dated

3rd February, 2015 came to be registered with the

appellant-CBI, and investigation was commenced.

6. During the course of investigation, the

investigating agency (i.e., the appellant herein)

collected detailed evidence, oral and documentary,

and came to the conclusion that the officers of

respondent No.1-Company and the then Branch

Manager of the Bank, Mr. Nishan Lal, had connived

together to defraud the Bank by furnishing false

information and provided fabricated work orders for

procuring the cash credit limit, which was thereafter

utilized and remained unpaid.

5

7. The investigation further revealed that the

accused persons had submitted false and fabricated

stock statements and receivable statements, thereby

cheating the Bank, despite no actual work having

been executed by them. The investigating officer also

found that 3 out of the 10 work orders were entirely

fabricated, as the companies to whom these work

orders were allegedly issued expressly stated that

they had not issued any such orders to respondent

No.1-Company. The remaining 7 work orders were,

as a matter of fact, issued to the associate companies

of the defaulter, one of whose Directors was a

common Director in all these 7 companies. Based on

the evidence collected, the investigating agency drew

the following conclusions in the chargesheet:-

“It was therefore, further revealed in the investigation by the Petitioner Department that the said Respondents knowingly and dishonestly submitted false and forged work orders purportedly issued by the aforesaid companies to induce the Respondent Bank to sanction

6 credit facilities to the Respondent No.1/A-1. In addition to the aforesaid, the investigation further confirmed that marking of hens on 3 properties, which were offered by the Respondent No. 1/Accused Company, as collateral securities to the Respondent Bank were also forged.

The aforesaid facts constitute the commission of offences against M/s Sarvodaya Highways Ltd. (A-1) through its Directors (A-2) to (A-5), Sh. Gurinder Kumar Garg (A-2), Smt. Aruna Garg (A-

3), Sh. Aashutosh Garg (A-4), Sh. Aayush Garg (A-5) and Sh. Nishan Lal, the then Branch Manager, SBBJ, Panchkula, all committed offences punishable u/s 120 B r/w 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Section 13(2) r/w Section 13(1)(d) of PC Act, 1988 and substantive offences thereof.”

8. Sanction was granted by the Competent

Authority to prosecute the Bank Manager, Mr.

Nishan Lal, and pursuant to conclusion of the

investigation, chargesheet came to be filed in the

Court of the Special Judge for CBI9, Panchkula,

Haryana against respondent No. 1-Company, its

Directors and the Bank Manager for offences

punishable under Sections 120B read with Sections

9 Hereinafter, referred to as “trial Court”.

7 420, 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC and Section 13(2)

read with Section 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

9. While the case was pending before the trial

Court, respondent No.1-Company claims to have

entered into a one-time settlement dated 5th March

2018 with the Bank. The cash credit liability was

settled on payment of Rs. 41 crores to the Bank. It is

on the basis of this one-time settlement that

respondent Nos. 1 to 5, being the defaulting company

M/s. Sarvodaya Highways Ltd., and its Directors,

approached the High Court by way of a petition under

Section 482 of the CrPC seeking quashing of the

aforesaid FIR and the chargesheet dated 30th

November, 2016.

10. The learned Single Judge of the High Court was

persuaded to invoke the inherent jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the CrPC and quashed the proceedings

arising from the chargesheet based on the aforesaid

8 one-time settlement, vide judgment and order dated

18th July, 2022, which is subject matter of challenge

in this appeal by special leave.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT

11. Mr. Vikramjit Banerjee, learned Additional

Solicitor General, representing the appellant-CBI

vehemently and fervently contended that the High

Court committed gross error in law in quashing the

proceedings arising out of the chargesheet based on

the one-time settlement entered into between the

defaulting company, i.e., respondent No.1 and the

Bank. He submitted that the investigation conducted

by the appellant-CBI resulted into an unimpeachable

finding regarding fabricated documents having been

used to procure the cash credit facility. The one-time

settlement has been entered by the Bank under

compulsion because the account of the defaulter

company had been declared to be NPA and

9 proceedings under the Securitisation and

Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement

of Security Interest Act, 2002 were also initiated.

Ultimately, realizing that it would not be possible to

recover the entire outstanding amount along with

interest, the Bank opted for a safer course of settling

the account by accepting a substantially lesser

amount than what would have been recovered had

the terms of the cash credit account been adhered to

by respondent No. 1-Company. Thus, significant loss

was suffered by the Bank which has a direct and

adverse bearing on the public exchequer.

12. The learned Additional Solicitor General placed

reliance on the following observations made by this

Court in the case of Gian Singh v. State of

Punjab10, to urge that merely because a settlement

has been arrived at in respect of the loan account, the

10 (2012) 10 SCC 303.

10 same cannot, by itself, furnish a valid ground for

quashing the criminal proceedings:

“57. Quashing of offence or criminal proceedings on the ground of settlement between an offender and victim is not the same thing as compounding of offence. They are different and not interchangeable. Strictly speaking, the power of compounding of offences given to a court under Section 320 is materially different from the quashing of criminal proceedings by the High Court in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. In compounding of offences, power of a criminal court is circumscribed by the provisions contained in Section 320 and the court is guided solely and squarely thereby while, on the other hand, the formation of opinion by the High Court for quashing a criminal offence or criminal proceeding or criminal complaint is guided by the material on record as to whether the ends of justice would justify such exercise of power although the ultimate consequence may be acquittal or dismissal of indictment.

…

61. The position that emerges from the above discussion can be summarised thus : the power of the High Court in quashing a criminal proceeding or FIR or complaint in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction is distinct and different from the power given to a criminal court for compounding the offences under Section 320 of the Code. Inherent power is of wide plenitude with no statutory limitation but it has to be exercised in accord with the guideline engrafted in such power viz. : (i) to secure the ends of justice, or (ii) to prevent abuse of the process of any court. In what cases power to quash the criminal proceeding or complaint or FIR may be exercised where

11 the offender and the victim have settled their dispute would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case and no category can be prescribed. However, before exercise of such power, the High Court must have due regard to the nature and gravity of the crime.

Heinous and serious offences of mental depravity or offences like murder, rape, dacoity, etc. cannot be fittingly quashed even though the victim or victim's family and the offender have settled the dispute. Such offences are not private in nature and have a serious impact on society. Similarly, any compromise between the victim and the offender in relation to the offences under special statutes like the Prevention of Corruption Act or the offences committed by public servants while working in that capacity, etc.; cannot provide for any basis for quashing criminal proceedings involving such offences. But the criminal cases having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil flavour stand on a different footing for the purposes of quashing, particularly the offences arising from commercial, financial, mercantile, civil, partnership or such like transactions or the offences arising out of matrimony relating to dowry, etc. or the family disputes where the wrong is basically private or personal in nature and the parties have resolved their entire dispute. In this category of cases, the High Court may quash the criminal proceedings if in its view, because of the compromise between the offender and the victim, the possibility of conviction is remote and bleak and continuation of the criminal case would put the accused to great oppression and prejudice and extreme injustice would be caused to him by not quashing the criminal case despite full and complete settlement and compromise with the victim. In other words, the High Court must

12 consider whether it would be unfair or contrary to the interest of justice to continue with the criminal proceeding or continuation of the criminal proceeding would tantamount to abuse of process of law despite settlement and compromise between the victim and the wrongdoer and whether to secure the ends of justice, it is appropriate that the criminal case is put to an end and if the answer to the above question(s) is in the affirmative, the High Court shall be well within its jurisdiction to quash the criminal proceeding.” [Emphasis supplied]

13. It was submitted that the investigation

establishes the submission of forged documents, and

misrepresentation by the respondent No. 1-Company

and its Directors for procuring the cash credit facility.

The material collected reveals grave economic

offences committed by the accused. The connivance

between the defaulter company, its Directors and the

Bank Manager to defraud the Bank stands

conclusively proved. Sanction for prosecution of the

Bank Manager has been duly granted by the

competent authority. It was argued that quashing of

13 the chargesheet by the High Court would, in effect,

result in the indirect exoneration of the Bank

Manager as well, and therefore, the impugned order

cannot be sustained in law.

14. Reliance was also placed by Mr. Banerjee on the

judgments of this Court in Central Bureau of

Investigation v. Jagjit Singh11, State of

Maharashtra through CBI v. Vikram Anantrai

Doshi & Ors.12, and Anil Bhavarlal Jain v. State

of Maharashtra13.

15. In Jagjit Singh (supra), this Court stated that

offences involving bank fraud affect society at large,

observing as follows: -

“15. The debt which was due to the Bank was recovered by the Bank pursuant to an order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a compromise between the offender and the victim. The offences when committed in relation with banking activities including offences under Sections 420/471 IPC have harmful effect on the public and threaten

11 (2013) 10 SCC 686.

12 2014 SCC OnLine SC 745.

13 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3823.

14 the well-being of the society. These offences fall under the category of offences involving moral turpitude committed by public servants while working in that capacity. Prima facie, one may state that the bank is the victim in such cases but, in fact, the society in general, including customers of the bank is the sufferer. In the present case, there was neither an allegation regarding any abuse of process of any court nor anything on record to suggest that the offenders were entitled to secure the order in the ends of justice.” [Emphasis supplied]

16. Further this court in Vikram Anantrai Doshi

(supra) stated that economic offences against banks

are social wrongs, and repayment or settlement

cannot justify quashing criminal proceedings. This

Court in Paragraph 26 observed as follows:-

“26. We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid view. Be it stated, that availing of money from a nationalised bank in the manner, as alleged by the investigating agency, vividly exposits fiscal impurity and, in a way, financial fraud. The modus operandi as narrated in the charge-sheet cannot be put in the compartment of an individual or personal wrong. It is a social wrong and it has immense societal impact. It is an accepted principle of handling of finance that whenever there is manipulation and cleverly conceived contrivance to avail of these kinds of benefits it cannot be regarded as a case having overwhelmingly and predominatingly civil character. The ultimate victim is the collective. It creates a hazard in the financial interest of the society. The gravity of the

15 offence creates a dent in the economic spine of the nation. The cleverness which has been skillfully contrived, if the allegations are true, has a serious consequence. A crime of this nature, in our view, would definitely fall in the category of offences which travel far ahead of personal or private wrong. It has the potentiality to usher in economic crisis. Its implications have its own seriousness, for it creates a concavity in the solemnity that is expected in financial transactions. It is not such a case where one can pay the amount and obtain a “no dues certificate” and enjoy the benefit of quashing of the criminal proceeding on the hypostasis that nothing more remains to be done. The collective interest of which the Court is the guardian cannot be a silent or a mute spectator to allow the proceedings to be withdrawn, or for that matter yield to the ingenuous dexterity of the accused persons to invoke the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution or under Section 482 of the Code and quash the proceeding. It is not legally permissible. The Court is expected to be on guard to these kinds of adroit moves. The High Court, we humbly remind, should have dealt with the matter keeping in mind that in these kinds of litigations the accused when perceives a tiny gleam of success, readily invokes the inherent jurisdiction for quashing of the criminal proceeding. The Court’s principal duty, at that juncture, should be to scan the entire facts to find out the thrust of allegations and the crux of the settlement. It is the experience of the Judge that comes to his aid and the said experience should be used with care, caution, circumspection and courageous prudence. As we find in the case at hand the learned Single Judge has not taken pains to scrutinise the entire conspectus of facts in proper perspective and quashed the criminal proceeding. The said quashment neither helps to secure the ends of

16 justice nor does it prevent the abuse of the process of the court nor can it be also said that as there is a settlement no evidence will come on record and there will be remote chance of conviction. Such a finding in our view would be difficult to record. Be that as it may, the fact remains that the social interest would be on peril and the prosecuting agency, in these circumstances, cannot be treated as an alien to the whole case. Ergo, we have no other option but to hold that the order [Vikram Anantrai Doshi v. State of Maharashtra, Criminal Application No. 2239 of 2009, order dated 22-4- 2010 (Bom)] of the High Court is wholly indefensible.

[Emphasis supplied]

17. It was submitted that this Court, in Anil

Bhavarlal Jain (supra), declined to quash criminal

proceedings on the ground that a settlement had

been arrived at between the parties, observing that,

as the case involved a special statute i.e., PC Act, and

that quashing the proceedings would have grave and

far-reaching consequences on the society at large.

This Court in paragraphs 17 and 18 observed as

follows: -

“17. A profitable reference in this regard can be made to the judgment in State v. R Vasanthi Stanley9 wherein this Court declined to quash the

17 proceedings in a case involving alleged abuse of the financial system. It was observed as under:

“15. …….. A grave criminal offence or serious economic offence or for that matter the offence that has the potentiality to create a dent in the financial health of the institutions is not to be quashed on the ground that there is delay in trial or the principle that when the matter has been settled it should be quashed to avoid the head on the system. That can never be an acceptable principle or parameter, for that would amount to destroying stem cells of law and order in many a realm and further strengthen the marrow of unscrupulous litigations. Such a situation should never be conceived of.”

18. In the instant case, it is on record that consent terms were submitted by the parties before the DRT. It is admitted that the bank had suffered losses to the tune of Rs. 6.13 Crores approximately. Hence, a substantial injury was caused to the public exchequer and consequently it can be said that public interest has been hampered. Keeping in view the fact that in the present case a special statute i.e. PC Act has been invoked, we are of the view that quashing of offences under the said Act would have a grave and substantial impact not just on the parties involved, but also on the society at large. As such the High Court committed no error in declining to exercise its inherent powers in the present case, thereby refusing to quash the criminal proceedings.”

18. It was thus urged that the impugned judgment

does not stand to scrutiny and should be set aside

18 and the proceedings of the chargesheet should be

revived.

SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENTS

19. Per contra, Mr. Siddarth Dave, learned senior

counsel representing the respondents, vehemently

and fervently opposed the submissions advanced by

the learned ASG appearing for the appellant-CBI. It

was urged that not only has the Bank agreed to one-

time settlement but thereafter all the pledged assets

have also been released. The proceedings before the

Debt Recovery Tribunal have been closed on

instructions of the Bank. In these circumstances, it

was urged that continuation of the criminal

prosecution against the respondent No. 1-Company

and its Directors would serve no useful purpose and

would amount to an exercise in futility.

20. In support of his contentions, Mr. Dave placed

reliance on the judgments of this Court in Jaswant

19 Singh v. State of Punjab & Another14, CBI New

Delhi v. B.B. Aggarwal & Others15, and CBI, ACB,

Mumbai v. Narendra Lal Jain & Others16. He

urged that the monetary disputes inter se between

the Bank and the defaulter company have been

settled and no dues settlement certificate has been

issued by the Bank and so also that the proceedings

before the Debt Recovery Tribunal stand closed with

the settling of the accounts. Hence, no useful

purpose would be served by continuing with the

criminal prosecution of the defaulter company and its

Directors. He urged that it is a lame prosecution,

which the appellant CBI wants to pursue in this

matter.

14 2021 SCC OnLine SC 1007.

15 2019 (5) RCR (Crl.) 573.

16 2014 (5) SCC 364.

20 ANALYSIS

21. We have given our thoughtful consideration to

the submissions advanced at bar and have gone

through the impugned order and also the material

placed on record.

22. The High Court, while quashing the

proceedings, assigned the following reasons: -

“After hearing learned counsel for the parties, I find merit in the present writ petition, for the following reasons:-

(a) It is admitted case that cash credit facility was availed in the year 2012 and on account of account being declared NPA, some proceedings were initiated before DRT, where the petitioners had paid back the amount as per settlement arrived at between the petitioners and the bank.

(b) It is also admitted case of the bank that at no point of time, the petitioners tried to sell off or siphon off of the loan amount to any third party and it is a simple case where the loan was not repaid in time, for which it was declared NPA and once the recovery proceedings were initiated before DRT, the petitioners repaid the entire amount along with interest to the respondent Bank in installments and similarly, in the same manner, the respondent-

Bank was releasing the mortgaged properties by issuing the letters, as noticed above.

(c) The respondent-Bank as well as CBI have filed affidavits that the entire amount stands paid and at no point of time, any action of the petitioner was

21 of any criminal intent except that the loan amount was not paid in time.

In view of the observations made above and also in view of judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in B.B. Aggarwal’s case (supra), present petition is allowed and FIR bearing RC No.BD1/2015/E/0002/CBI/BS&FS/DLI dated 03.02.2015 and final report dated 30.11.2016 as well as the consequential proceedings arising out of the FIR are ordered to be quashed.”

23. Having gone through the reasons assigned by

the High Court, it is apparent that while quashing the

proceedings on the basis of one-time settlement, the

High Court failed to advert to the following vital facts

of the case which were duly established during

investigation.

(i) That there was a specific finding in the

chargesheet that the defaulter company

through its directors had submitted

fabricated documents and misrepresented to

the Bank for the purpose of procuring the

cash credit facility.

22 (ii) That the appellant-CBI, on the basis of

evidence collected during investigation,

found that the offences of criminal

conspiracy, fabrication of documents, and

offences under the PC Act, were clearly made

out.

(iii) That sanction for prosecution had been duly

issued against the then Bank Manager, Mr.

Nishan Lal.

(iv) That the amount of settlement under the one-

time settlement did not cover the actual

amount due to the Bank and that there was

a deficit of more than 5 crores plus interest

which was a direct loss to the public

exchequer.

24. The High Court, while exercising jurisdiction

under Section 482 CrPC, did not consider these vital

facts and quashed the proceedings merely on the

23 basis of the alleged one-time settlement. The blanket

order quashing the chargesheet in its entirety would

have the effect of terminating the prosecution against

the Bank Manager as well, against whom prosecution

sanction has been granted.

25. There are plethora of judgments of this Court,

some of which we have referred to above, which

categorically hold that in cases involving economic

offences, it is not merely the Bank that stands

defrauded, but the society at large is also impacted.

26. It can be said without a shadow of doubt that

the one-time settlement would not fetch the entire

amount to which the Bank was otherwise entitled,

had the cash credit account been maintained

regularly. The settlement was made at around Rs.41

crores whereas, admittedly, the liability was of Rs. 52

crores approximately. One-time settlements are, as a

rule, effected under circumstances where the Bank

24 under duress is compelled to accept lesser amount in

order to secure the maximum possible recovery

against the defaulting account.

27. In this background, we feel that the High Court

committed error apparent in the eyes of law by

quashing the proceedings.

28. In the case of Jaswant Singh (supra), the

dispute involved was inter se between private parties

and the prosecution had been initiated only for the

offences punishable under Sections 406 and 420 of

the IPC. This Court thought it fit to quash the

proceedings considering the fact that the accused

and the complainant had settled all their disputes

amicably and no useful purpose would be served by

allowing the prosecution to continue.

29. In the case of B.B. Aggarwal (supra), this

Court upheld the order of the High Court quashing

the proceedings against the accused on the ground

25 that the civil suits filed by the Bank against the

defaulter companies and their directors for recoveries

of the outstanding dues, which were subsequently

transferred to Debt Recovery Tribunal stood settled

by entering into a one-time settlement.

30. On going through the aforesaid judgments, we

find that this Court did not consider the judgment in

the case of Gian Singh (supra) which expressly

prohibits quashing of proceedings of a criminal case

on strength of a compromise where loss to public

exchequer is evident and the offences under the PC

Act, 1988 are applied.

31. In the Case of Narendra Lal Jain (supra), the

offences were under Sections 420 and 120B of the

IPC. This Court held that Section 420 IPC was

compoundable whereas Section 120B IPC was not.

In this background, the Court was persuaded to

quash the proceedings holding that allowing the

26 criminal prosecution to continue would be nothing

short of an exercise in futility. Additionally, in

Narendra Lal Jain (supra), there was no indication

about use of forged documents to procure the

loan/advance facilities from the Bank.

32. Furthermore, in none of these three cases did

the Court observe that the amount of the one-time

settlement did not cover the actual outstanding dues

of the Bank.

33. In this background, we are of the clear opinion

that the facts involved in the three precedents relied

upon by learned counsel for the respondents are

clearly distinguishable and the same have no

application to the case at hand.

34. Thus, we are of the opinion that the impugned

judgment and order do not stand to scrutiny and

deserves to be set aside. We, therefore, allow the

appeal, set aside the impugned judgment and order

27 and restore the proceedings arising out of the

chargesheet dated 30th November, 2016 before the

trial Court.

35. We further make it clear that this order should

not be construed as making any observations on the

merits of the case which may prejudice the defence of

the accused persons before the trial Court which

shall proceed with the trial of the case uninfluenced

by any of the observations made hereinabove.

36. The appeal is allowed in these terms.

37. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

disposed of.

….……………………J. (VIKRAM NATH)

...…………………….J. (SANDEEP MEHTA) NEW DELHI;

NOVEMBER 11, 2025.

28