C.S.H.A. University And Anr. vs B.D. Goyal

1. Defendant University Is in appeal against the judgment of the learned single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissing the defendant's Second Appeal R.S.A. No. 564 of 1998. The plaintiff had been appointed as a clerk in the University way back in July, 1976. On dereliction of duties, a set of charges were leveled against him on 24th March, 1992, and on receipt of the reply of the delinquent

plaintiff, the University not having been satisfied, appointed an enquiring officer to enquire into the set of charges. The said enquiring officer gave his report on 17.9.1992 exonerating the plaintiff delinquent from the charges leveled against him. The report was placed before the Vice-

Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor appears to have directed that the matter should be enquired into afresh and fresh enquiring officer should be appointed. It appears that the Registrar was the appointing/punishing authority but since the Registrar was on leave, the matter had been placed before the higher authority, namely, the Vice-

Chancellor. On the basis of the said order of the Vice-Chancellor, another enquiring officer was appointed, who also submitted a report and relying upon the said second report, the appropriate authority passed an order of termination. The order of termination is dated 15.4.1994. The delinquent then filed an appeal, but the appellate authority having dismissed the appeal, he filed the suit. The learned trial Judge dismissed the suit by his order dated 31st March, 1997, but the matter being carried in appeal, the District Judge, Hlssar, allowed the appeal by his judgment dated 5.12.1997. The District Judge came to the conclusion that Initiation of a second enquiry by a second enquiring officer is invalid and inoperative since the authority, who had taken that decision, never disagreed with the conclusion arrived at by the enquiring officer, and had not Indicated any reasons in writing, and as such not only the Initiation of a second enquiry was bad in law but also any subsequent action pursuant to the said second enquiry must be held to be bad in law. With this conclusion, the plaintiffs appeal having been allowed, the University approached the High Court in second appeal. The High Court dismissed the second appeal agreeing with the conclusions of the learned District Judge and held that the punishing authority had not recorded reasons for disagreement with the findings of the enquiring, officer nor has recorded any necessity for appointing another

enquiring officer, therefore, the very initiation of a de novo enquiry through another enquiring officer is bad in law. The second appeal having been dismissed, the University is in appeal.

2. Mr. Mahabir Singh appearing for the University contended that the aforesaid conclusion of the High Court must be held to be erroneous, more so. It was the Vice-Chancellor, in the case in hand, who had recorded his, reasons and grounds for a de-novo enquiry through a different enquiring officer. We had called upon Shri Singh to produce the relevant orders of the Vice-Chancellor whereunder he has disagreed with the conclusions of the enquiring' officer, and today he has produced before us the relevant order, in the order sheet containing the Vice-Chancellor's order. Having examined the same, we are unable to accept the contentions that the Vice-Chancellor has recorded in writing his reasons for disagreement with the finding of the enquiring officer and for directing afresh de novo enquiry through another enquiring officer. It is no doubt true that the punishing authority or any higher authority could have disagreed with the finding of the enquiring officer, but in such a case, the authority concerned is duty bound to record reasons in writing and not on ipse dixit can alter the finding of an enquiring officer. The order of the Vice-Chancellor, which was produced before us, does not satisfy the requirements of law in the matter of differing with the findings of an enquiring officer. In that view of the matter, we do not find any infirmity with the impugned judgment so as to be interfered with by this Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is dismissed.

3. The plaintiff has been directed to be paid his back wages, but in the case In hand, having regard to the facts and circumstances, we think it appropriate to direct that the plaintiff will be entitled to back wages only for the period from the date of the judgment of the lower appellate court namely, 5.12.1997, by which judgment the suit was decreed, and would not be entitled to back, wages from the date of termination till the judgment of the lower appellate court, but the entire period will be taken for continuity of service for all other benefits.