Brightland Cooperative Housing ... vs The Division Joint Registrar Coop ...
- Neutral2025:BHC-AS:32482
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Under Section 22(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960, where a housing society receives an application for membership, the society must communicate its decision to admit or refuse membership within three months of receipt of the application. If the society fails to communicate any decision within that period, the applicant is deemed to have been admitted as a member. This deeming fiction operates by force of law regardless of any subsequent assertions by the society about unpaid dues. Where there is a genuine and serious dispute about the quantum of outstanding dues claimed by a housing society against a prospective member, the matter cannot be determined unilaterally by the managing committee of the society; determination by the authorities under the Act is warranted. The mere assertion of outstanding dues, without participation in the inquiry before the Deputy Registrar and without establishing the dues through proper adjudication, cannot sustain a refusal to admit membership, particularly where the society failed to formally refuse membership within the prescribed period. The purchase of a property on an "as is where is" and "whatever there is" basis places upon the purchaser responsibility to conduct due diligence regarding the quality of title and obligations affecting the property, including potential maintenance charges owed by erstwhile members. However, this does not override the statutory procedure for membership under Section 22(2), nor does it permit a society to condition membership on payment of dues that are disputed and unquantified. Where a housing society has failed to decide on an application within three months, failed to communicate any refusal decision, and failed to call upon the applicant to clear specific dues during the period of the applicant's pursuit of membership, the authorities are justified in directing the society to admit the applicant as a member and thereafter pursue separate remedies to recover any outstanding amounts from the erstwhile holders of the property.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2025:BHC-AS:32482 -WP-3466-2025.DOC
SSP
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION NO. 3466 OF 2025
Brightland Co-operative Housing Society Ltd. ...Petitioner Versus 1. The Divisional Joint Registrar, Co-op. Societies, Mumbai Division 2. The Deputy Registrar, C.S. H-West Ward, Mumbai 3. Mrs. Arati Satish Gunjikar 4. Ms. Aditi Satish Gunjikar ...Respondents
Mr. Ashok Satpute, for the Petitioner. Mr. P. V. Nelson Rajan, AGP for the State - Respondent Nos.1 and 2. Mrs. Aarti Gunjikar, Respondent No.3-in-person, present.
CORAM: N. J. JAMADAR, J. RESERVED ON : 25th JULY, 2025 PRONOUNCED ON: 31st JULY, 2025
JUDGMENT:
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1. Rule. Rule made returnable forthwith and, with the
consent of the parties, heard finally.
2. The Petitioner takes exception to a judgment and order
dated 2nd September, 2024 passed by the Divisional Joint
Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Mumbai, in Revision
Application No.38 of 2024, whereby the revision preferred by the
Petitioner against an order dated 4th December, 2023 passed by
the Deputy Registrar, Co-operative Societies (R2) under Section
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22(2) of the Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 ("the
Act, 1960"), came to be dismissed affirming the said order
passed by respondent No.2.
3. Shorn of unnecessary details, the background facts
leading to this petition can be summarised as under:
2.1 The Petitioner is a Housing Co-operative Society registered
under the Act, 1960. Mr. Kanayalal Merani and Mrs. Rakhi
Merani were the members of the Petitioner Society and
occupants of Flat No.11. Punjab National Bank, which had
created security interest over Flat No.11, resorted to enforce the
security interest by auction sale of the said flat. Respondent
Nos.3 and 4 claimed to have purchased the said flat in an online
auction sale, on 30th August, 2018. The physical possession of
Flat No.11 was delivered to respondent Nos.3 and 4 on 30 th
December, 2018.
2.2 Respondent No.3 and 4 claimed to have applied for the
membership of the Petitioner Society and the transfer of shares
in their name. Asserting that despite repeated requests the
Petitioner Society committed default in admitting respondent
Nos.3 and 4 as the members of the Petitioner Society,
respondent Nos.3 and 4 filed an application before the Deputy
Registrar under Section 22(2) of the Act, 1960.
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2.3 The Deputy Registrar issued notices to the Petitioner.
However, the Petitioner did not appear and participate in the
said proceeding before the Deputy Registrar.
2.4 Eventually, by an order dated 4th December, 2023, the
Deputy Registrar was persuaded to allow the application and
direct the Petitioner to admit respondent Nos.3 and 4 as the
members of the Petitioner Society and make entries in the
register of members and issue the share certificate.
2.5 Being aggrieved, the Petitioner Society preferred a revision
before the Joint Registrar. It was contended on behalf of the
Petitioner that since respondent Nos.3 and 4 have not paid the
dues of the Society qua Flat No.11, the membership of the
Society cannot be granted to Respondent Nos.3 and 4. If
respondent Nos.3 and 4 clear the dues, as claimed by the
Society, the latter would grant the membership.
2.6 The Joint Registrar did not find any substance in the
challenge to the order of the Deputy Registrar, mounted on
behalf of the Petitioner. The Joint Registrar after adverting to
the controversy on facts as regards the liability of respondent
Nos.3 and 4 and the quantum of the outstanding dues claimed
by the Society, dismissed the revision opining, inter alia, that
the Petitioner Society was always at liberty to invoke the
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remedies under Sections 91, 101 or 154B-29 of the Act, 1960, to
recover the amount towards maintenance and other society
charges.
4. Being further aggrieved, the Petitioner has invoked the
writ jurisdiction.
5. I have heard Mr. Ashok Satpute, the learned Counsel for
the Petitioner, Mr. P. V. Nelson Rajan, the learned AGP for the
State - respondent Nos.1 and 2 and Ms. Arati Gunjikar,
respondent No.3 in-person, at some length. With the assistance
of the learned Counsel for the parties, I have perused the
material on record.
6. Mr. Satpute, the learned Counsel for the Petitioner,
submitted that the authorities under the Act, 1960 committed a
manifest error in directing the Petitioner to admit the
respondent Nos.3 and 4 as the members of the Petitioner
Society in teeth of an express statutory provision which
warrants the payment of the dues of the housing society before
grant of membership. Mr. Satpute invited the attention of the
Court to the provisions contained in Section 154B-7 subsumed
under Chapter XIII-B, inserted by Maharashtra Act No.23 of
2019 in the Act, 1960, with effect from 9 th March, 2019. Laying
emphasis on Clause (a) of Section 154B-7 which incorporates
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restrictions in the matter of transfer of share or interest of a
member of the housing society unless the dues of the housing
society are paid, Mr. Satpute would urge the learned Joint
Registrar did not delve into this principal objection, and
proceeded on an incorrect premise that the Society was at
liberty to pursue the recovery proceedings against respondent
Nos.3 and 4. Such an approach, which is clearly in derogation
of the express statutory provision, vitiated the entire order.
7. Mr. Satpute further submitted that the Petitioner Society
is not averse to admit respondent Nos.3 and 4 as the members
of the Petitioner Society if they clear the outstanding dues. The
unreasonable stand of respondent Nos.3 and 4 that they are not
liable to pay the maintenance which has accumulated since the
year 2009, as they purchased the Flat No.11 in the year 2018,
when respondent Nos.3 and 4 purchased the subject flat on "as
is where is" basis, could not have been given credence, urged
Mr. Satpute.
8. Mr. Satpute also submitted that, Respondent Nos.3 and 4
had not complied with the mandatory requirement for grant of
membership in respect of Flat No.11 by submitting application
in the prescribed form.
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9. In opposition to this, Ms. Gunjikar (R3) would submit
that, respondent Nos.3 and 4 have duly deposited the
maintenance charges which have fallen due from November
2018. An unreasonable demand of Rs.9,50,000/- to transfer the
shares in the name of respondent Nos.3 and 4 was made. The
office bearers of the Petitioner refused to give a break up of the
outstanding amount. Ms. Gunjikar would further submit that
with a view to harass respondent Nos.3 and 4, the repairs were
not carried out to the terrace of the society building by the
Society, and respondent Nos.3 and 4 were required to incur
huge expenses towards repairs as well. The Petitioner Society
did not appear before the Deputy Registrar and, by way of
afterthought, raised the ground of outstanding dues before the
Joint Registrar.
10. Before appreciating the legality and correctness of the
impugned order, it may be apposite to note few uncontroverted
facts. As it emerges from the record, Mr. Kanhaiyalal Merani
and Rakhi K. Kerani were the original holders of Flat No.11.
Punjab National Bank had extended financial facilities to them
and security interest was created on the said flat. Eventually,
Punjab National Bank enforced the security interest and the
subject flat was put for sale by e-auction. In the said e-auction,
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Respondent Nos.3 and 4 purchased the said flat and a
registered instrument along with the sale certificate dated 30
August 2018 issued under Rule 9(6) of the SARFAESI Rules
came to be executed on 30 August 2018. The subject flat was
sold on 'As is where is basis' and 'Whatever there is basis'.
11. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 seem to have applied for the
transfer of the flat in their names on 28 September 2018.
Indisputably, Respondent Nos.3 and 4 were not admitted as
members of the Petitioner Society till the year 2023, which
necessitated the filing of the Application, being Application
No.10 of 2023, under Section 22(2) of the Act, 1960 in the
month of April 2023. The principal reason sought to be ascribed
by the Petitioner Society for not admitting Respondent Nos.3
and 4 as members of the Petitioner Society was the failure of the
Respondent Nos.3 and 4 to clear the outstanding maintenance /
service charges qua Flat No.11.
12. By and large, the material on record indicates that
Respondent Nos.3 and 4 have paid/deposited the maintenance
charges payable from the date of purchase of the subject flat.
The core controversy between the parties revolves around the
extent of the dues to the society for the period prior to the
purchase of the subject flat by Respondent Nos.3 and 4 (owed
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by the previous holders) and the liability of the Respondent
Nos.3 and 4 to pay the same.
13. This propels me to the justifiability of the action, nay
inaction, on the part of the Petitioner society. Section 22 of the
Act, 1960 enumerates the persons who may become a member
of the Society. In the case at hand, we are primarily concerned
with sub-section (2) of Section 22, which reads as under :
22(2) Person who may become member "Where a person is refused admission as a member of a society, the decision (with the reasons therefor) shall be communicated to that person within fifteen days of the date of the decision, or within three months (from the date of receipt of the application for admission, whichever is earlier. If the society does not communicate any decision to the applicant within three months from the date of receipt of such application the applicant shall be deemed to have been (admitted) as a member of the society. [If any question arises whether a person has become a deemed member or otherwise, the same shall be decided by the Registrar after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to all the concerned parties].
14. Sub-section (2), on its plain reading, indicates that where
a person is refused membership of a society, the society shall
communicate such decision, with the reasons therefor, to such
person within 15 days from the date of the decision or within
three months from the date of receipt of the application for
admission, whichever is earlier. This implies that the Society is
free to resolve to admit or refuse membership to a person who
applies for the membership of the society. The decision to
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refuse along with the reasons therefor is, however, required to
be communicated to such person.
15. What follows is of material significance. If the society does
not communicate the decision to the applicant within three
months from the date of receipt of such application, the
applicant shall be deemed to have been admitted as a member
of the society.
16. It would be contextually relevant to note that the deeming
fiction of admission to the membership of the society upon
failure to communicate the decision within three months came
to be inserted by substituting the word "admitted" for the words
"refused admission" by Maharashtra Act No.20 of 1986. The
legislature, thus, consciously chose to confer deemed
membership upon the failure to communicate the decision by
reversing the legislative policy diametrically. If the society either
does not take the decision or having taken a decision, fails to
communicate the decision, within the stipulated period, it runs
the risk of the membership of a person being foisted on such
society by the deeming fiction.
17. In the latter part of sub-section (2) of Section 22, the
Registrar comes in the frame as an arbiter. It, thus, provides
that if any question arises whether a person has become a
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deemed member or otherwise, the same shall be decided by the
Registrar after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard to
the concerned parties. It is in the exercise of the aforesaid
power, the Deputy Registrar, in this case, by an order dated 4
December 2023 directed the Petitioner Society to admit
Respondent Nos.3 and 4 as members of the Petitioner society
and also transfer the share certificate. Thus, the question that
arises for determination is whether, in the facts of the case, the
deeming fiction came into operation?
18. Mr. Satupte, learned Counsel for the Petitioner, made a
faint effort to urge that Respondent Nos.3 and 4 had not
submitted the application for membership of the Petitioner
Society in the prescribed form. Thus, there was no question of
the society taking a decision on the said application.
19. There are indeed provisions in Rule 19 of the Maharashtra
Co-op. Societies Rules, 1961, which stipulate the conditions to
be fulfilled before a person is admitted as a member of the
Society. Rule 19 reads as under :
"19. Conditions to be complied with for admission for membership, etc. No person shall be admitted as a member of a society unless. -
(i) he has applied in writing in the form laid down by the society or in the form specified by the
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Registrar, if any, for membership;
(ii) his application is approved by the committee of the society in pursuance of the powers conferred on it in that behalf and subject to such resolution as the general body of members may in pursuance of the powers conferred on it in that behalf from time to time pass and in the case of nominal or associate member, by an officer of the society authorized in that behalf by the committee;
(iii) he has fulfilled all other conditions laid down by the Act, the rules and the by-laws;
(iv) in case of a firm, company or body corporate, society registered under the Societies Registration Act, 1860, a public trust registered under any law for the time being in force relating to registration of public trusts or a local authority, the application for membership is accompanied by a resolution authorising it to apply for such membership."
20. Qua a person seeking the membership of the society in
individual capacity, two conditions need to be fulfilled. First, he
shall apply in writing in the form laid down by the society or in
the form specified by the Registrar. Second, he shall fulfill all
other conditions laid down in the Act, rules and the by-laws.
21. At this juncture, it is necessary to note that the thrust of
the submission of Mr. Satpute was that, in view of the
provisions contained in Section 154B-7(a) of the Act, it was
necessary to pay dues of the society before seeking grant of
membership. I will deal with this substantive challenge a little
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later. The procedural challenge deserves to be dealt with first.
22. As noted above, from the material on record, it emerges
that Respondent Nos.3 and 4 had applied for admission as
members of the Petitioner Society as early as 28 September
2018; under a month of the purchase of the subject flat. The
said application was received by the Secretary of the Society on
13 November 2019, as is evident from the acknowledgment
thereon. Along with the said application, Respondent Nos.3 and
4 had annexed a cheque drawn for Rs.25,000/- towards the
transfer fee. It could not be controverted that Respondent Nos.3
and 4 had made such application. It further emerges that
Respondent Nos.3 and 4 submitted repeated applications
seeking transfer of the subject flat. At no point of time, the
Society had communicated to the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 that
their applications were not in order or prescribed form.
23. Moreover, the application dated 3 July 2021 seals the
issue as the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 had submitted the
application in the prescribed Form No.33, under the by-laws
No.38(e)(ii). Therefore, the submission on behalf of the
Petitioner that the society was not required to take a decision on
the application preferred by Respondent Nos.3 and 4 as they
were not in the prescribed form, does not carry any substance.
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At any rate, the authorities under the Act and the Courts, would
be required to look at the substance of the matter rather than
form.
24. In the case at hand, Respondent Nos.3 and 4 had been
pursuing for transfer of the membership for over three years
before filing an application under Section 22(2) of the Act, 1960,
before the Deputy Registrar. Yet, there is not a shred of
material to show that the society ever called upon Respondent
Nos.3 and 4 to file an application in the prescribed form or
otherwise pointed out the deficiencies, or for that matter, the
outstanding dues which were required to be cleared. Nothing
prevented the Petitioner Society from taking a decision to refuse
to grant membership to Respondent Nos.3 and 4 and
communicate the said decision. In that event, Respondent Nos.3
and 4 could have resorted to the remedies provided under
Section 23 of the Act. The only inference which is deducible is
that the Petitioner Society did not take any decision, and,
consequently, the deeming fiction for failure to communicate the
decision came into play with full force and rigour.
25. Resultantly, the determination by the Deputy Registrar on
the aspect as to whether Respondent Nos.3 and 4 deemed to
have become members of the society, on account of the default
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of the society to take a decision within three months from the
application dated 3 July 2021, which was received by the Society
on 9 July 2021 along with the prescribed form, cannot be
faulted at.
26. This propels me to the consideration of the submissions
based on the non-compliance of the provisions contained in
Section 154B-7 of the Act, 1960. It reads as under :
"154B-7. Restriction on transfer of share or interest of a Member
Subject to the provisions of this Act, in case of a housing society, no transfer of share or interest of a Member or the occupancy right, except the transfer of his heir or a nominee, shall be effective unless, -
(a) the dues of housing society are paid;
(b) the transferee applies and acquires Membership of the co-operative housing society in due course of time :
Provided that, the transfer of share or interest in respect of lease hold properties shall be governed by the terms of the lease, which are not inconsistent with lease of land to the co-operative housing society or with lease by housing society to its Members.
Explanation. - for the purpose of this section, occupancy right shall not include right of a tenant or a licensee on leave and license basis."
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27. Chapter XIII-B under the title 'Co-operative Housing
Societies' came to be inserted by Maharashtra Act No.23 of 2019
with effect from 9 March 2019 with the object of providing a
separate Chapter to cater to the specific requirements of the co-
operative housing societies which constitute almost half of the
societies registered for the various objects under the Act, 1960.
28. Section 154B makes certain provisions of the Act, 1960
applicable mutatis mutandis to the housing societies, including
Section 22 and sub-sections (1), (2) and (3) of Section 23.
Section 101 of the Act which relates to the recovery of the dues
or arrears from the members of the society has, inter alia, been
made inapplicable to the housing societies, and, instead a
special provision for recovery under Section 154B-29 has been
inserted.
29. Since Section 154B-7 is expressly made subject to the
provisions of the Act. The provisions contained in Sections 22
and 23 of the Act, would govern the aspect of membership of the
housing societies. However, as noted above, Rule 19 of the
Rules, 1961, mandates that the person seeking membership of
the society shall fulfill all other conditions laid down in the Act,
1960, the Rules and the by-laws. Thus, a harmonious
construction of the provisions contained in Sections 22 and 23,
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on the one part, and Section 154B-7, on the other part, is
required to be made. The legislature's anxiety in insisting for
the payment of the dues of the housing society before the
transfer of interest of the member is appreciable. If the dues of
the society are not paid, it would have cascading effect on the
orderly management of the affairs of the housing society. Thus,
the provisions contained in Section 154B-7 deserve adequate
weight.
30. At the same time, the attendant facts of the case cannot
be lost sight of. Where the dues of the housing society are not
in dispute or indisputable, the requirement to pay the same
before seeking membership can hardly be contested. However,
in cases where there is a serious dispute as to what are 'the
dues' of the society, the matter cannot be left to the sweet will of
the managing committee of the society. Lest the said provision
would operate onerously and may be abused to seek unjustified
sums from the transferor or transferee disguised as dues of the
housing society. Where there is a genuine dispute as regards
the dues of the housing society owed by the erstwhile or
prospective member of the housing society, determination by the
authorities under the Act, 1960, would be warranted. In such
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a situation, the attendant circumstances, acts and omissions on
the part of the parties assume importance.
31. In the case at hand, as noted above, the Petitioner society
claims that the maintenance / service charges were outstanding
from Meranis, the erstwhile members, since January 2009.
The Petitioner society seeks to enforce the said liability qua the
subject flat. Respondent Nos.3 and 4 contested the liability on
the premise that they purchased the subject flat under an
instrument dated 30 August 2018, purportedly free from
encumbrances. To resolve the controversy, it may be necessary
to note the implications of the purchase of the said flat on the
express terms 'as is where is' and 'whatever there is' basis.
32. Respondent No.3 in person made an endeavour to urge
that the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 cannot be called upon to
discharge the alleged liabilities of the erstwhile holders of the
subject flat. Emphasis was laid on a stipulation in the sale
certificate that the sale of the property was made free from all
encumbrances known to the secured creditor (PNB).
33. I am afraid, the aforesaid stipulation in the sale certificate
is of determinitive significance, especially in the face of the
express term of the bargain that the sale of the subject flat was
on "As is where is" and "whatever there is" basis. The import of
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the superimposed conditions of "As is where is" and "Whatever
there is" basis is not confined to the physical condition of the
property which is the subject matter of the sale. Such
conditions, in given circumstances, may extend to the quality of
title to the subject property and the claims against such
property. A greater responsibility is cast on the person who
purchases the property with express superimposed conditions
of "As is where is" and "Whatever there is" basis to carry out
due diligence and find out for himself not only the condition of
the subject property, but also the vulnerability of the title
thereto and the obligations in relation to such property.
34. A useful reference, in this context, can be made to a three
Judge Bench judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
K.C.Ninan V/s. Kerala State Electricity Board and Ors. 1 wherein
the Supreme Court, after a survey of precedents, enunciated the
position in law, as under :
"143. Thus, the implication of the expression "as-is- where-is" or "as-is-what-is-basis" or "as-is-where-is, whatever-there-is and without recourse basis" is not limited to the physical condition of the property, but extends to the condition of the title of the property and the extent and state of whatever claims, rights and dues affect the property, unless stated otherwise in the contract. The implication of the expression is that every intending bidder is put on notice that the seller does not undertake any responsibility to procure permission in respect of the property offered for sale or any liability for the payment of dues, like water/service charges,
1(2023) 14 SCC 431 18/22
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electricity dues for power connection and taxes of the local authorities, among others."
(emphasis supplied)
35. The aforesaid being the position in law, the question as to
whether the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 were required to discharge
the liability to pay the outstanding maintenance / service
charges qua the subject premises cannot be determined solely
on the basis of the stipulation in the sale certificate that, to the
best of the knowledge of the secured creditor (PNB), the subject
property was free from all encumbrances. Therefore, the broad
submission sought to be canvassed by Respondent No.3 that
the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 were not liable to pay outstanding
dues towards the maintenance/service charges for the period
prior to purchase cannot be readily acceded to.
36. Nonetheless, what were the dues of the society is not free
from infirmities. First and foremost, it is imperative to note that
the material on record does not indicate that, the despite
numerous communications, the Petitioner Society had called
upon the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 to pay the alleged
outstanding maintenance / service charges since the year 2009.
Secondly, the Petitioner Society did not resolve to refuse to
admit Respondent Nos.3 and 4 as members of the Petitioner
Society until the dues of the society were cleared. Thirdly, there
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is material to show that the Respondent Nos.3 and 4 had called
upon the Petitioner to give the break-up of the amount payable
towards the maintenance charges, by erstwhile members, since
the year 2009, and, yet, there was no response from the
Petitioner Society. Lastly, a bare perusal of the chart appended
to the maintenance bill for the months of 1 st August 2024 to 31st
December 2024 indicates that the major component of the
amount claimed by the society is of previous accumulated
interest. These factors cumulatively make the determination by
the authorities under the Act, either in a dispute under Section
91 or in a proceeding under Section 154B-29 of the Act, 1960
imperative before the dues of the society are crystalized.
37. A bald assertion that the dues of the society have not been
cleared, in such circumstances, without participating in the
inquiry before the Deputy Registrar, or even diligently pursuing
revision application before the revisional authority, by no stretch
of imagination, can be a sustainable ground to refuse to admit
Respondent Nos.3 and 4 as members of the Petitioner Society.
38. Undoubtedly, the dues of the housing society must be paid
before admitting a person as a member. However, the said
stipulation cannot be construed in an unrealistic manner and
torn out of the factual context. Otherwise, it would give a long
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leash to the society to insist for the payment of the exorbitant
amount under the guise of dues to the society.
39. Moreover, as noted above, in the facts of the case, the
Petitioner society did not decide to refuse to admit Respondent
Nos.3 and 4 as members of the Petitioner Society on the said
count, for over three years. Resultantly, the deeming fiction
operated. The authorities were, thus, justified in directing the
Petitioner to admit Respondent Nos.3 and 4 as the members of
the Petitioner Society, and, then work out its remedies to recover
the outstanding amount towards the maintenance charges from
the erstwhile holders. Such a course, in my considered view,
cannot be said to be unreasonable.
40. The conspectus of aforesaid consideration is that the
impugned order does not warrant interference in exercise of
extra-ordinary writ jurisdiction.
41. Hence, the following order:
:ORDER:
(i) The petition stands dismissed with costs.
(ii) Rule discharged.
(iii) By way of abundant caution, it is clarified that the
observations as regards the liability to pay the
maintenance / service charges for the period prior to the
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purchase of the subject flat by Respondent Nos.3 and 4
were confined to the determination of the legality and
correctness of the impugned order, and, this Court may
not be understood to have expressed any opinion on the
liability of Respondent Nos.3 and 4 on the said count and
all questions would be open for consideration in an
appropriate proceeding before the authorities / courts as
and when the said issue arises for the determination.
[N. J. JAMADAR, J.]
Signed by: S.S.Phadke 22/22 Designation: PS To Honourable Judge Date: 31/07/2025 20:35:21
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