Bikram Chand Rana vs Himachal Pradesh Road Transport Corporation

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14669 OF 2025

BIKRAM CHAND RANA … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

HIMACHAL PRADESH ROAD TRANSPORT CORPORATION ... RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA, J.

1. The instant Appeal is directed against the judgment dated 23.04.2022

passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Letters Patent

Appeal No. 188/2021, whereby the intra-court appeal preferred by the appellant

against the judgment dated 19.07.2021 of the learned Single Judge in Civil Writ

Petition Original Application No. 5144/2019 came to be disposed of.

2. The appellant was working in the respondent-Himachal Pradesh Road

Transport Corporation1 as a Clerk from 1979 onwards. In 2000, he was

promoted to the post of Senior Assistant. He continued in service until he retired

upon attaining the age of superannuation on 28.02.2009. Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by MINI Date: 2026.04.07 16:38:04 IST Reason:

1 For short, “Corporation”

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 1 of 9

3. The allegation against the appellant is that between May and July 2006,

he was involved in the leak of the question paper of the Combined Pre-Medical

Test, 20062. We note that the respondent-Corporation contends that prior to the

same, in the course of his employment, the appellant had already been

suspended twice for non-performance of delegated duties.

4. On 28.07.2006, FIR No. 140/2006 was registered at Police Station West

Shimla against the appellant and other accused persons under Sections 406,

418, 420 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 18603 for their involvement in the

CPMT paper leak. In connection with the said FIR, the appellant was arrested

on 24.11.2006 at about 5:30 p.m. and was released on bail on the next day by

the Court of the Judicial Magistrate First Class-III, Shimla.

5. Parallel to abovementioned criminal case, the respondent-Corporation

initiated departmental proceedings against the appellant. On 19.01.2007, a

charge-sheet was issued to the appellant under Rule 14 of the Central Civil

Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 vide Memorandum No.

HRTC-DM-HMR-ESTT-3-188/PF/04-5855 by the Divisional Manager, HRTC,

Hamirpur Division. The Memorandum proposed to hold a departmental inquiry

and set out two articles of charge, namely: (i) the allegation of involvement in the

CPMT paper leak; and (ii) the allegation of disregard of Central Civil Services

2 For short, “CPMT” 3 For short, “IPC”

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 2 of 9 (Conduct) Rules, 1964, specifically Rule 3 thereunder. The departmental inquiry

was entrusted to an Officer of the Dharamshala Division.

6. The Inquiry Report, dated 26.02.2009, records that the departmental case

rested primarily on the fact that FIR No. 140/2006 had been registered against

the appellant in respect of the CPMT paper leak scam; that he had been taken

into Police custody and subsequently released on bail; and that his name

appeared at Serial No. 20 in a list of accused persons forwarded by the Home

Department to various departments. Two departmental witnesses were

examined, both of whom merely proved receipt of official correspondence

directing the initiation of departmental action. In his defence, the appellant

admitted being taken into police custody for 22 hours but denied any

involvement in the paper leak. He further provided an explanation of the alleged

financial transactions and mobile phone usage relied upon by the Police, and

asserted that no misconduct had been established against him. Upon analysis

of the oral and documentary evidence, the Inquiry Officer concluded that there

was no material on record establishing the appellant’s involvement in the CPMT

paper leak or any violation of the CCS (Conduct) Rules. We specifically note that

the Inquiry Officer had stated:

“….Apart from this, the case is under consideration of Honourable Court and until the Court's decision, it would not be appropriate to say anything. Based on the documents, it is not seemed that the Accused was involved in the scam.”

7. Shortly after, on 28.02.2009, the appellant superannuated; however, he

was not paid his full retiral benefits. While provisional pension was released to

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 3 of 9 him, his gratuity and other terminal benefits were withheld on account of the

pendency of the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No. 140/2006.

8. The appellant has drawn our attention to the fact that following his

retirement, he made several representations to the respondent-Corporation. On

07.12.2010, he submitted a detailed representation to the Managing Director of

the respondent-Corporation, contending, inter alia, that several others who were

co-accused in the same CPMT paper leak case had not been subjected to

departmental proceedings by their respective departments. In support of this

contention, the appellant relied upon information obtained under the Right to

Information Act, 2005, furnishing a list of such officers, some of whom, according

to the appellant, had initially been suspended but whose suspension orders were

later revoked, and some of whom were even granted promotions.

9. On 18.12.2013, the appellant sought a copy of the departmental inquiry

report from the Divisional Manager of the respondent-Corporation, Hamirpur,

stating that the same was required for defending proceedings before the Court.

As no copy was furnished to him, the Divisional Manager, Hamirpur, by

communication dated 23.12.2013, requested the Managing Director of the

respondent-Corporation to supply a copy of the inquiry report so that it could be

provided to the appellant. The appellant again approached the respondent-

Corporation by way of a representation dated 09.02.2015, reiterating his

grievance regarding the withholding of his gratuity and pensionary benefits.

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 4 of 9

10. Ultimately, on 28.05.2015, the charges against the appellant were found

to be not proved and a copy of the enquiry report was supplied to him. On

04/14.06.2015, the appellant approached the Himachal Pradesh State

Administrative Tribunal vide Original Application No. 1594/2015, seeking

directions for release of his gratuity and regular pension with consequential

benefits. As the Tribunal was subsequently abolished, the Original Application

was transferred to the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla, where it was

renumbered as Civil Writ Petition Original Application No. 5144/2019 and

dismissed by the learned Single Judge on 19.07.2021. Aggrieved, the appellant

approached the Division Bench of the High Court by way of Letters Patent Appeal

No. 188/2021 on 07.09.2021. The Division Bench concurred with the findings

of the learned Single Judge and disposed of the same on 23.04.2022, albeit

impressing upon the concerned Trial Court to expedite the trial arising out of

FIR No. 140/2006, in which the appellant had been arrayed as an accused. The

appellant now prefers the instant Appeal before this Court.

11. The narrow question of law that arises for our consideration is the correct

statutory interpretation of Rule 69(1)(c) of the Central Civil Services (Pension)

Rules, 19724, reproduced below:

“69. Provisional pension where departmental or judicial proceedings may be pending.—

(...)

4 For short, “1972 Rules”

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 5 of 9

(c) No gratuity shall be paid to the Government servant until the conclusion of the departmental or judicial proceedings and issue of final orders thereon:

Provided that where departmental proceedings have been instituted under Rule 16 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965, for imposing any of the penalties specified in Clauses (i), (ii) and (iv) of Rule 11 of the said rules, the payment of gratuity shall be authorized to be paid to the Government servant.”

The appellant contends that the expression “departmental or judicial

proceedings” in Rule 69(1)(c) must be construed to mean that gratuity becomes

payable upon the conclusion of either set of proceedings.

12. Such a submission totally misapprehends the nature of the Rule. As the

learned Single Judge had rightly noted at the first instance, Rule 69(1)(c)

operates as an ‘embargo’ or a statutory bar, not as an enabling provision. The

use of the ordinary disjunctive “or” expands the scope of this bar, indicating that

gratuity shall not be paid so long as either departmental or judicial proceedings

are pending. The appellant places reliance on the case of Babu Manmohan Das

Shah & Ors. vs. Bishun Das5, specifically that:

“…..The ordinary rule of construction is that a provision of a statute must be construed in accordance with the language used therein unless there are compelling reasons, such as, where a literal construction would reduce the provision to absurdity or prevent the manifest intention of the legislature from being carried out. There is no reason why the word “or” should be construed otherwise than in its ordinary meaning. …..”

13. Applying the aforesaid reasoning, it is the construction advanced by the

appellant that would in fact yield an anomalous result. Rule 69(1)(c) of the 1972

Rules has a wide import and operates in respect of any proceeding that may be

5 1967 [1] SCR 836 at p. 839.

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 6 of 9 pending against an employee at the time of retirement; indeed, the breadth of

the provision reflects its protective character. If the appellant’s interpretation

were accepted, an employee could contend that once any one set of proceedings

against him/her stands concluded, the embargo stands lifted and gratuity must

be released. This would altogether defeat the purpose of the provision, which is

to safeguard the financial interests of the State.

14. Even in the instant case, where both the proceedings stem from identical

allegations, their nature, scope, and standard of proof remain fundamentally

different. By way of illustration, let us consider if the converse were true i.e., the

criminal case against the appellant had concluded in an acquittal due to failure

to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It would nevertheless be possible

that the appellant was eventually found liable in the pending departmental

proceedings on a preponderance of probabilities. An acquittal in that case could

not be determinative. If such an approach is impermissible in one direction, it

cannot be countenanced in the other either. Moreover, this distinction assumes

increased significance in the instant case, as the Inquiry Officer had expressly

noted that the matter was sub judice and any definitive conclusion would rest on

the outcome of the criminal trial.

15. The appellant also seeks to take refuge of Rule 9(1) of the 1972 Rules, the

operative portion of which reads as follows:

“9. Right of President to withhold or withdraw pension

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 7 of 9 (1) The President reserves to himself the right of withholding a pension or gratuity, or both, either in full or in part, or withdrawing a pension in full or in part, whether permanently or for a specified period, and of ordering recovery from a pension or gratuity of the whole or part of any pecuniary loss caused to the Government, if, in any departmental or judicial proceedings, the pensioner is found guilty of grave misconduct or negligence during the period of service, including service rendered upon re-employment after retirement.”

16. The appellant relies on the above Rule to urge that the respondent-

Corporation would not be left remediless, as any amounts disbursed could be

recovered in the event of a subsequent conviction. This submission has already

been clearly negatived by the Division Bench in the following terms:

“5. The aforesaid provision of Rule 9 of CCS (Pension) Rules, 1972 has to be considered at the stage when the employee concerned has been found guilty, which situation would arise only upon conclusion of judicial proceedings in the present case, as the same are still said to be pending. …..”

Simply put, the provision is downstream in its operation and cannot be invoked

to justify the release of gratuity during the interregnum when proceedings are

admittedly pending, on the premise that recovery could be effected at a later

stage.

17. All of the appellant’s remaining contentions pertain to questions of fact.

We are not unmindful of his advanced age and the circumstance that he was

exonerated in departmental proceedings. He has also brought to our notice that

the students accused in the CPMT paper leak, who had been charged under

Sections 109, 420 and 120B of the IPC read with Section S-7 of the Himachal

Pradesh Prevention of Malpractices at University, Board or other Specified

Examinations Act, 1984, were acquitted thereof vide judgment dated 28.01.2016

in Criminal Case No. 68-2/2008. These aspects may, no doubt, lend some

C.A. No.14669/2025 Page 8 of 9 support to the appellant’s case in the criminal trial, but cannot alter the

statutory position governing the release of gratuity under Rule 69(1)(c) of the

1972 Rules.

18. Therefore, we find no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. The

Appeal is, accordingly, dismissed. We, however, reiterate the direction issued by

the High Court and impress upon the Trial Court concerned to expedite the trial

arising out of FIR No. 140/2006.

………………………………………J. [PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA]

………………………………………J. [VIPUL M. PANCHOLI]

NEW DELHI;

APRIL 07, 2026.

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