Biecco Lawrie Ltd. & Anr vs State Of West Bengal & Anr

Biecco Lawrie Ltd. & Anr. ...Appellants

Versus

State of West Bengal & Anr. ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

TARUN CHATERJEE, J.

1. The judgment and order dated 30th of September, 2005 passed

by a Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court affirming the judgment

and order dated 4th of October, 2004 of a learned Judge of the same

High Court and the order dated 31st of October, 2003 of the Vth

Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal is under challenge before us at the

instance of Biecco Lawrie Ltd. and another, the appellants herein.

2. By the order of Vth Industrial Tribunal, West Bengal, dated

31st of October, 2003, the order of dismissal passed by the appellants

1 against Provash Chandra Mondal - respondent No.2 [hereinafter

referred to as the `respondent'] was set aside.

3. The respondent was appointed as general mazdoor in the

Switch Gear works of the appellants and his duty, inter alia, was to

bring materials from the shop rack to the working benches and

afterwards to take them to their respective racks. On 4th of August

1984, a charge sheet was issued against the respondent on charges

of major misconduct, namely, instigation, insubordination and using of

abusive and filthy languages against his superiors and dilatory

tactics, which are major misdemeanor in terms of Section "L"

Appendix "D" of the certified standing orders of the appellant-

Company, which are reproduced below:

Appendix "D" Clause (2) Major Misdemeanor

(i) Willful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful and

reasonable order of a superior,

(iv) Willful slowing down in performance of work

(xi) Commission of any act subversive of good behavior or of

the discipline of the company

(xxix) Instigation, incitement, abetment or furtherance of the

forgoing punishable as major misdemeanor

2

4. By the charge sheet, the respondent was called upon to submit

his explanation and he was suspended from service with payment of

subsistence allowance pending inquiry. The respondent filed his

written explanation on 6th of August, 1984 to the charge sheet which

being found unsatisfactory, an inquiry committee was constituted with

Mr. P.K.Mukherjee (the company lawyer) as the Inquiry Officer who

submitted his report on 29th of August, 1985 following domestic

inquiry and held that the respondent was guilty of major misconduct.

Accordingly, relying upon the inquiry report, the respondent was

dismissed from service. The respondent through a letter dated 22nd of

November, 1985 admitted all the charges and sought condonation

and mercy attributing his acts to his mental illness which was not

considered by the appellants on account that the respondent was on

earlier occasion also charged with similar grounds and was given a

chance to amend his conduct. It was alleged by the appellants that

the respondent had developed a habit of misconducting himself in an

undesirable manner despite opportunities being given to rectify his

conduct.

3

5. Subsequent to this, the dispute was referred under Section 7A

of the Industrial Disputes Act on 2nd of April, 1987 by the Labour

Department, Government of West Bengal to the Vth Industrial

Tribunal, West Bengal for adjudication. Both the parties filed their

written statements presenting their cases before the Tribunal and on

9th of October, 1990 the Tribunal held that the inquiry conducted by

Mr. P. K. Mukheree, the Inquiry Officer, was in violation of the

principles of natural justice and accordingly the matter was heard

afresh on merits. The witnesses of the appellants were examined and

cross examined. The respondent was also examined and cross

examined. In course of examination of the witnesses of the

appellants, a witness specifically mentioned the abusive and slang

language used by the respondent which was recorded in vernacular.

These witnesses were also examined by the respondent. The Vth

Industrial Tribunal, on consideration of the Inquiry Report and

evidence on record, affirmed the order of dismissal passed against

the respondent and gave a reasoned order whereby it specifically

found the charges leveled against the respondent deemed to have

been proved and while doing so had also taken into consideration the

prior conduct of the respondent. The respondent challenged the order

4 of the Tribunal before the High Court by filing a writ petition and by an

order dated 12th of October 1999, the order of the Tribunal was set

aside and the matter was remitted back to the Tribunal for

reconsideration on the basis of existing evidence but only with

respect to charge no. 1, viz., disobedient in not carrying out the

orders of his superiors.

6. Pursuant to the order of the High Court, after remand, the Vth

Industrial Tribunal heard the matter on the basis of the same

evidence on record and by an order dated 31st of October 2003 held

that the respondent was illegally terminated by the appellants and the

dismissal order was not justified and hence liable to be set aside. It

also directed the reinstatement of the respondent with full back

wages. The Tribunal held that the appellant had failed to establish by

cogent evidence that the respondent had developed the habit of

being negligent in his duties and using abusive language. It was

further held that the charge sheet had not disclosed the specific

abusive language used by the respondent and without recording such

language, the charge sheet was bad.

5

7. The appellants subsequently challenged the aforesaid order of

the Vth Industrial Tribunal by filing a writ petition before the High Court

which was dismissed on 4th of October, 2004 without assigning any

reasons of its own. It passed the order on the basis of the findings of

the Tribunal and held that the court in exercise of its jurisdiction was

not authorised to re-appreciate the findings of the Tribunal. Feeling

aggrieved, the appellants preferred an appeal before a Division

Bench of the High Court which also dismissed the same on 30th of

September, 2005 affirming the order of the learned Single Judge on a

finding that the charge sheet did not contain the specific materials in

detail. Feeling aggrieved by the Order of the High Court, the

appellants have filed these special leave petitions which, on grant of

leave, were heard in the presence of the learned counsel for the

parties.

8. The pivotal questions that need to be considered by us are as

follows:

a. Whether the principles of natural justice have been

violated?

b. Whether the dismissal is vitiated by the same and is thus

bad and unjustified?

6 c. Whether the tribunal was justified in reversing its own

decision subsequently when there had been no further

evidence adduced?

d. Whether the High Court was right in their appreciation of

evidence and exercising power in the matter of interfering

with the order of dismissal?

9. We have heard the learned counsel for both the parties and

also examined the impugned order of the Division Bench as well as

the orders of the learned Single Judge of the High Court and also of

the Industrial Tribunal setting aside the order of dismissal passed

against the respondent and other materials on record including the

orders passed by the High Court as well as the tribunal in earlier

matters by which the High Court had sent back the case for re-

hearing. At the first instance, the learned counsel for the appellants

strongly argued that there was perversity and illegality involved in the

decision rendered by the Tribunal which was affirmed by the High

Court. It was also argued on behalf of the appellants that a fair and

reasonable opportunity of hearing was afforded to the respondent

and the charge sheet did not suffer any discrepancy as it sufficiently

7 enabled the respondent to defend his case. Furthermore, it was

contended that the charges framed were not vague or unintelligible

and were serious cases of misconduct. It was further argued that the

Tribunal and the High Court had appreciated the evidence wrongly

and it would not be in the interest of appellant-company to keep a

workman who has developed the habit of abusing superiors with filthy

language and disobeying their orders. Accordingly, the learned

counsel for the appellants prayed for setting aside the judgment of

the High Court as well as of the Industrial Tribunal and restoration of

the order of dismissal passed against the respondent.

10. Submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants

were strongly contested by the learned counsel appearing on behalf

of the respondent.

11. The learned counsel for the respondent contended that the

respondent was denied a fair hearing and was dismissed in violations

of the principles of natural justice. It was argued on behalf of the

respondent that the charge sheet did not contain the specific abusive

language and thus it was difficult for him to defend his case. He

8 further argued that the respondent was not furnished with the list of

witnesses and copy of the documents to be treated as evidences and

materials on which the management was to rely and he was also

denied a chance of being represented by a lawyer or a representative

who is equipped with legal background during the enquiry

proceedings. Learned counsel for the respondent also contended that

the appellants had not presented before the court any documentary

evidence to prove that he had on earlier occasion misconducted

himself and was thus in a habit of disobeying his superiors. The

learned counsel also strongly argued that the work assigned to the

respondent was not part of his duty as he was appointed to carry

things from one place to another outside the shop and not to fix the

top planks on the braker stand. Finally, the learned counsel for the

respondent argued that since the concurrent findings of fact arrived at

on the question formulated hereinabove, it is not open to this Court to

exercise its discretionary power under Article 136 of the Constitution

to interfere with the impugned order on such concurrent findings of

fact.

9

12. Let us first delve into the most crucial question raised in this

appeal, i.e. : whether there was violation of principle of natural justice.

Principle of natural justice is attracted whenever a person suffers a

civil consequence or a prejudice is caused to him by an

administrative action. In other words principle of natural justice is

attracted where there is some right which is likely to be affected by

any act of the administration including a legitimate expectation. (See:

Ashoka Smokeless Coal India (P) Ltd. v. Union of India &

Ors.[(2007) 2 SCC 640] The procedure to be followed is not a matter

of secondary importance and in the broadest sense natural justice

simply indicates the sense of what is right and wrong (Voinet v.

Barrett (1885) 55 LJQB 39) and even in its technical sense it is now

often equated with fairness. As a well-defined concept, it comprises

of two fundamental rules of fair procedure that- a man may not be a

judge in his own cause (nemo judex in re sua) and that a man's

defence must always be fairly heard. Judgments dealing with the

administrative decisions proceed on the footing that the presence of

bias means the tribunal is improperly constituted so that it has no

power to determine or decide the case and accordingly its decision

must be void and a nullity. Generally the courts pass a declaratory

10 judgment stating that the award is a nullity and secondly they may

send it back to the authority to decide the matter afresh. The instant

case might appear to be a case of departmental bias as it is

persistently lodged by the respondent that the Enquiry Officer was

biased being a company lawyer and had favoured the company in

causing miscarriage of justice. Departmental bias arises when the

functions of a Judge and the prosecutor are combined in the same

department as it is not uncommon to find that the same department

which initiates the matter also decides it, therefore, at times,

department fraternity and loyalty militates against the concept of fair

hearing. In Hari Khemu Gawali v. The Deputy Commissioner of

Police [AIR 1956 SC 559] an externment order was challenged on

the ground that since the police department which heard and decided

the case was the same, the element of departmental bias vitiated

administrative action and this Court rejected the challenge on the

ground that so long as two functions (initiation and decision) were

discharged by two separate officers, though they were affiliated to the

same department, there was no bias. In The General Secretary,

South Indian Cashew Factories Workers' Union v. The Managing

Director, Kerala State Cashew Development Corporation Ltd.

11 and Ors. [(2006) 5 SCC 201], it was held that the inquiry had been

conducted by the Assistant Personnel Manager of the Corporation

and the Union raised an industrial dispute in which Labour Court set

aside the inquiry on the ground of institutional bias as the Enquiry

Officer was part of the same institution and had also made certain

uncorroborated remarks against the employee. This Court in appeal

held that mere presumption of bias cannot be sustained on the sole

ground that the officer was a part of the management and where

findings of the Enquiry Officer were based on evidence and were not

perverse, the mere fact that the inquiry was conducted by an officer

of the management would not vitiate the inquiry. On a bare perusal of

these decided cases, it could be strongly established that the fact that

P.K.Mukherjee, the Enquiry Officer, who was also the company

lawyer cannot be considered as being "biased and partisan" who

favoured and was partial towards the management of the company.

13. It is fundamental to fair procedure that both sides should be

heard - audi alteram partem, i.e., hear the other side and it is often

considered that it is broad enough to include the rule against bias

since a fair hearing must be an unbiased hearing. One of the

12 essential ingredients of fair hearing is that a person should be served

with a proper notice, i.e., a person has a right to notice. Notice should

be clear and precise so as to give the other party adequate

information of the case he has to meet and make an effective

defence. Denial of notice and opportunity to respond result in making

the administrative decision as vitiated. The adequacy of notice is a

relative term and must be decided with reference to each case. But

generally a notice to be adequate must contain the following: (a) time,

place and nature of hearing; (b) legal authority under which hearing is

to be held; (c) statement of specific charges which a person has to

meet. However in The State of Karnataka & Anr. v. Mangalore

University Non-Teaching Employee's Association & Ors. [(2002)

3 SCC 302] the requirement of notice will not be insisted upon as a

mere technical formality when the party concerned clearly knows the

case against him and is not thereby prejudiced in any manner in

putting up an effective defence, then violation of the principle of

natural justice cannot be insisted upon. In the present case, the

materials on record show that the respondent had been furnished

with proper notices intimating him the date, time and place of hearing

well before time and the respondent has also received notices as is

13 indicated from the postal acknowledgements made by him in his own

letters addressed to the management.

14. It was made the major bone of contention that the charge sheet

was bad as it did not mention specifically the abusive language used

by the respondent. In this connection, reliance can be placed on a

decision of this Court in Punjab National Bank Ltd. v. Their

Workmen [(1959) 2 LLJ 666 (SC)] wherein it was held that before the

management could dismiss its workman, it must hold a proper

domestic enquiry into the alleged misconduct of such a workman and

such an enquiry must begin with the supply of a specific charge sheet

to him. In the instant case, on a perusal of the charge sheet it is

evident that the charges laid down are precise and specific in nature

along with the relevant provision of the standing order and neatly lays

down the consequences thereof. We do not also find from the said

charge sheet that there was any patent or latent vagueness involved

and they are unintelligible. This is clearly evident from the

explanation furnished by the respondent dated 6th of August, 1984

where he clearly denied all the charges and also mentioned the name

of the four appellant-witnesses who were examined in the enquiry

14 proceedings subsequently. This is a clear indication that the

respondent was fully aware of the charges and even their

specifications and also the probable witnesses for his misconduct and

hence the entire plea falls flat on the face of it.

15. A proper hearing must always take in its ambit a fair opportunity

to those who are parties in the controversy for correcting or

contradicting anything that is prejudicial to their view. Lord Denning

has observed the following in Kanda v. Government of Malaya

[1962] AC 322 -

" If the right to be heard is to be a real right which is worth anything, it must carry with it a right in the accused man to know the case which is made against him. He must know what evidence has been given and what statements have been made affecting him and then he must be given a fair opportunity to correct or contradict him."

Thus every person before the administrative authority exercising

adjudicatory powers has the right to know the evidence to be used

and this was firmly established in the case of Dhakeshwari Cotton

Mills Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [AIR 1955 SC 65]. It is,

however, very well accepted principle that supply of the adverse

15 material need not be, unless the law otherwise provides, in its original

form and it is sufficient if the summary of the contents of the material

is supplied provided it is not misleading. Thus, what is essential is

substantial fairness and this may be in many situations be adequately

addressed and achieved by telling the affected party the substance of

the case that he has to meet, without precisely discussing the precise

evidence or the sources of information. The respondent has been

provided with various chances to present his case before the Enquiry

Officer and also present evidence that he could do to justify his

defence. Further the respondent cannot claim that he is unaware of

the broad charges framed against him and the witnesses against him

due to the reasons stated earlier in the preceding paragraph.

16. Fair hearing also calls for a right to rebut any evidence that

necessarily involves essentially two factors namely - (a) cross

examination; and (b) legal representation (State of J & K vs. Bakshi

Ghulam Mohammed [AIR 1967 SC 122]. In S.C .Girotra vs.

United Commercial Bank [(1996) 2 LLJ 10], the Bank obtained

certain reports prepared on which the charges were based and these

reports were submitted by bank officers who were examined by the

16 Enquiry Officer. On the basis of the report an employee was

dismissed and the court held that there was violation of the principles

of natural justice as the employee was not allowed to cross-examine

the officers who deposed orally before the Inquiry Officer. In the

present case, the Inquiry Officer had sent due notice and postponed

the date of hearing various times with an intention to permit the

respondent to present his case, nevertheless the respondent did not

present himself except on three days and ultimately the Enquiry

Officer conducted the inquiry ex parte. Therefore, this was not a case

where the respondent was not afforded a chance to cross examine

the witnesses done by the prosecution witnesses rather it seems to

be a case where the respondent, had waived his right to cross

examine by absenting himself from the inquiry on the grounds that he

was not permitted legal representation nor was furnished with the

documents or list of evidences upon which the management was

relying. In Kalindi & Ors. v. Tata Locomotive & Engg.Co.Ltd. [AIR

1960 SC 914], this court held that a representation through a lawyer

in any administrative proceeding is not considered as an

indispensable part of natural justice as oral hearing is not included in

the minima of fair hearing. To what extent it is allowed depends upon

17 the provisions of the statute, like the Factories Law does not permit it

whilst Industrial Disputes Act allows it with the permission of the

Tribunal. In Crescent Dyes and Chemicals Ltd. v. Ram Naresh

Tripathi [(1993) 2 SCC 115], this Court held that right to legal

representation through a lawyer or agent of choice may be restricted

by a standing order also and it would amount to denial of natural

justice. Further more in the case of Harinarayan Srivastava v.

United Commercial Bank and Another [(1997) LLR 497 (SC)], this

Court again held that refusal of Inquiry Officer to permit

representation by an advocate even when the management was

being represented by a law graduate will not be violative of the

principles of natural justice if the charges are simple and not

complicated. In this case, the respondent had based his case firmly

on the fact that he was denied legal representation but nonetheless

he could have resorted the help of a friend who could have presented

his case or the registered Union could have very well taken up the

matter of the concerned workman. The High Court had decided on

the fact that the management was represented by a person who was

a commerce graduate and passed the diploma course of social

welfare who even though was not a lawyer, yet was a legally trained

18 person and thus there was violation of the principles of natural justice,

which this court believes is untenable as the respondent would have

sought permission from the tribunal or would have asked help from

the registered trade union. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the

charges were specific and simple and not difficult to comprehend.

Assuming but not admitting that there has been a denial of the

principles of natural justice to the respondent to the extent that he did

not know the specifications of the charges leveled, was denied a right

to engage a lawyer and not furnished with the copies of the

documents and list of witnesses to be relied upon by the

management, even then, we are of the firm opinion that observance

of the principles of natural justice to the respondent would be a

useless formality which is an exception to the rationale underlying the

principles of natural justice. In S.L. Kapoor vs. Jagmohan & Ors.

[(1980) 4 SCC 379], this Court under similar circumstances dealing

with the denial of the principles of natural justice held that -

"it is yet another exception to the application of the principles of natural justice. Where on the admitted or undisputed facts only one conclusion is possible and under the law only one penalty is permissible, the court may not insist on the observance of the principles of natural justice because it would be futile to order its observance."

19 17. In Karnataka SRTC vs. S.G.Kotturappa, [(2005) 3 SCC 409],

this Court again observed as follows-

" where the respondent had committed repeated acts of misconduct and had also accepted minor punishment he is not entitled to the principles on natural justice as it would be a mere formality, that too misconduct in the case of a daily wager. The question as to what extent principles of natural justice are required to be complied within a particular case would depend upon the factual situation obtained in each case and the principles cannot be applied in a vacuum. They cannot be put in a straight jacket formula."

In the present case, in the letter dated 22nd of November, 1985,

the respondent had admitted all the charges and had stated

unequivocally that his behavior was due to mental sickness and

prayed for sympathy and mercy. This along with the fact that the

respondent was earlier charged on similar grounds and dismissed

but, on his request, was exonerated and given a chance to amend his

conduct also goes a long way to project the fact that observance of

the principles of natural justice would be merely a useless formality

since he had admitted the charges against him. The High Court

found that a poor workman in such a situation would be left with no

20 option but to seek sympathy by accepting the allegations raised and

praying for mercy. But we are of the opinion that it is too far fetched

an imagination of the High Court, adhering to the belief that these are

the erstwhile time preceding industrial revolution where the employer

was the God and the employee was the slave.

18. At this juncture it is important to mention that this would be a

futile, elongated and over stretched exercise to decide on the matter

on the ground that whether the inquiry report is vitiated by the

violation of the principles of natural justice. The Single Judge as well

as the Division Bench of the High Court had failed miserably to

perceive that on 9th of October, 1990, the tribunal deciding upon the

validity of the inquiry proceedings held that it had violated the

principles of natural justice and subsequently for a span of 31 months

the tribunal dealt with the matter afresh, examined and cross

examined both the parties and their witnesses and came to the

conclusion, on basis of reasons and evidence, that the respondent

was guilty of the charges. At that point, the respondent was fully

aware of the charges, the specific abusive languages used, the

witnesses present and had been afforded every opportunity to defend

21 his case in the most desirable manner. Yet the High Court kept on

reverting back and adjudicating upon the validity of the inquiry

conducted and its report resulting into a dismissal order which is

nothing but a sheer wastage of time and understanding. So the

question only remains that whether the award of the tribunal dated

30th of March, 1994 upholding the dismissal was valid or not? and

secondly, whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the

decision and quashing and remanding it back to the tribunal for

reconsideration?

19. While dealing with the domestic inquiry and misbehaviour by an

employee at one inquiry and refusal to attend the next inquiry, this

Court in Management of M/s. Eastern Electric & Trading Co. vs.

Baldev Lal [(1975) 4 SCC 684] observed that the misbehaviour by an

employee at one inquiry and refusal to attend the next inquiry held

even after adjournment if the employee did not appear in the

domestic inquiry, the ex parte inquiry held by the Inquiry Officer

cannot be vitiated and must be held to be valid.

22

20. In The Chartered Bank, Bombay vs. The Chartered Bank

Employees' Union [1960 (3) SCR 441], this Court observed that the

tribunal or the court can interfere with the decision of the

management and industrial adjudication and it would be entitled to

examine the substance of the matter and decide whether the

termination was in fact discharge simpliciter. If the Industrial court is

satisfied that the order of discharge is punitive in nature, that it is

mala fide, or that it amounts to victimization or unfair labour practice,

the court or the industrial tribunal is competent to set aside the order

of dismissal issued by the management and direct reinstatement of

the employee.

21. Similar is the view expressed in The Tata Oil Mills Co. Ltd.

Vs. Workmen & Anr. [1964 (2) SCR 125]. This Court observed in the

matter of order of discharge of an employee the form of the order is

not decisive. It further observed that an Industrial Tribunal has

jurisdiction to examine the substance of the matter and decide

whether the termination is in fact discharge simpliciter or it amounts

to dismissal which has put on the cloak of discharge simpliciter. It

was further observed that the test always has to be whether the act of

23 the employer is bona fide or whether it is a mala fide and colourable

exercise of the powers conferred by the terms of contract or by the

standing orders. However, in some cases, the termination of the

employee's services may appear to the industrial court to be

capricious or so unreasonably severe that an interference may

legitimately and reasonably be drawn that in terminating services, the

employer was not acting bona fide and the test always has to be

whether the act of the employer is bona fide or not. This test has

been reiterated and applied in cases like Tata Engineering &

Locomotive Company Ltd. v. S.C.Prasad [(1969) 2 LLJ 799],

L.Michael Ltd. v. M/s Johnson Pumps Ltd.[AIR 1975 SC 661],

Gujarat Steel Tubes v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sangh

[(1980) 1 LLJ 137 (SC)].

22. Moreover, in our view, the punishment was not harsh in

comparison to the charges leveled against the respondent. In this

connection, reference can be made to a decision of this Court in UP

State Road Transport Corpn. v. Subhash Chandra Sharma and

Others [AIR 2000 SC 1163]. Here the charge against the respondent

was that he in a drunken state along with the conductor went to the

24 Assistant Cashier in the cash room of the appellant and demanded

money from him. When the Assistant cashier refused, the respondent

abused him and threatened to assault him. On these facts, this Court

observed as follows -

"It was certainly a serious charge of misconduct against the respondent. In such circumstances, the Labour Court was not justified in interfering with the order of removal of respondent from the service when the charge against him stood proved. Rather we find that the discretion exercised by the Labour Court in the circumstances of the present case was capricious and arbitrary and certainly not justified. It could not be said that the punishment awarded to the respondent was in any way "shockingly disproportionate" to the nature of the charge found proved against him. In our opinion, the High Court failed to exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution and did not correct the erroneous order of the Labour Court which, if allowed to stand, would certainly result in miscarriage of justice."

Similarly in L.K.Verma v. H.M.T. Ltd (2006) LLR 296 (SC), it

was observed that -

" as regards the quantum of the punishment is concerned suffice it to say that verbal abuse has been held to be sufficient for inflicting a punishment of dismissal. Once the appellant accepted that he had made utterances which admittedly lack civility and he also threatened a superior officer it was for him to show that he later on felt remorse therefore and should have tendered an apology".

25 23. From a perusal of these observations, made in the aforesaid

decisions of this Court as noted herein above, it is crystal clear that

the general trend of judicial decisions is to minimize the interference

when the punishment is not harsh and definitely for charges that are

leveled against the respondent and in the instant matter, dismissal is

absolutely not shocking to the conscience of the court.

24. The learned Single Judge also misused the power vested in

him by remanding back the matter to the industrial tribunal for

reconsideration when the charges were found to be proved. The

tribunal also erred in reversing its own decision on the same evidence

for which we fail to see as to how the same forum can appreciate the

same evidence differently. The arguments advanced by the

respondent that there was violation of the principles of natural justice

does not stand true and if it does it was duly redressed by the fresh

inquiry conducted by the tribunal after its order dated 9th of October,

1990.

25. The argument that the work assigned to the respondent was

not a part of his job even, if accepted does not entitle him to abuse

26 his superiors and create an unhealthy atmosphere where the

remaining might just take a clue from the unruly behaviour and

subsequently use it to the detriment of the company. Further the letter

by which he accepted all the charges sets up a strong proof against

the respondent beyond which nothing remains to be analyzed.

26. In view of our discussions made herein above, we are of the

view that the impugned judgment and order of the Division Bench of

the High Court as well as of the learned Single Judge are liable to be

set aside and the order of dismissal passed against the respondent

herein must be restored. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. There

will be no order as to costs.

.................................J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE]

New Delhi; ................................J. July 28, 2009. [HARJIT SINGH BEDI]

27