Bhupal Singh vs State Of Uttarakhand

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA 2025 INSC 82 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S).1408/2013

BHUPAL SINGH & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

STATE OF UTTARAKHAND RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

ABHAY S. OKA, J.

1. The appellants/accused have been convicted for the offences

punishable under Sections 304B and 498A of the Indian Penal Code,

1860 (for short, the “IPC”). For the offence punishable under

Section 304B of the IPC, the appellants/accused have been sentenced

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and for the offence

punishable under Section 498A of the IPC, the appellants have been

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for two years with a

fine of Rs.2,000/- each.

2. The first appellant is the father-in-law of the deceased

(Kamla Devi) and the second appellant is the husband of the

deceased. The marriage between the deceased and the second

appellant was solemnized in February 1996. On the night of

13th/14th June 1999, the deceased was found in burnt condition.

There are only two material prosecution witnesses. The first

witness, Shri Khim Singh Nagarkoti (PW-1), is the father of the

deceased, and the second witness, Shri Mohan Singh (PW-2), is the Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by ASHISH KONDLE Date: 2025.01.18

uncle of the deceased.

14:20:35 IST Reason:

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3. With the assistance of the learned senior counsel appearing

for the appellants/accused and the learned counsel representing the

respondent/State, we have carefully perused the testimony of both

the prosecution witnesses. In the examination-in-chief, PW-1 has

stated that:

(a) One year before the incident, the deceased had

disclosed to him that the first appellant used to tell her

that considering his status as a Captain in the Army, her

family members had not given adequate dowry;

(b) Once or twice a year, the second appellant (who was

in military service) used to come home on leave. He used to

demand money from her;

(c) Pursuant to the said demands, he had paid

approximately a total amount of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/-

to the in-laws of his daughter; and

(d) When he met the deceased last time, she disclosed to

him that the appellants used to tell her to bring dowry and

used to make a demand for payment of money.

4. PW-1 has not disclosed when he last met the deceased before

her death. We have perused the cross-examination of PW-1. The

four factual statements which we have set out above are omissions

as admitted by PW-1. He also accepted that he was unable to

recollect the dates on which the amounts comprising of a sum of

Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- were paid by him. In the report

submitted by him, on the basis of which the First Information

Report was registered, he accepted that the fact of sending the

2 amount of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- was not mentioned therein. He

also accepted that in the complaint, it is not mentioned that what

was demanded was towards dowry. Therefore, the testimony of PW-1

regarding the demand for dowry by the appellants and payment of a

sum of Rs.40,000/- to Rs.45,000/- is an omission. These omissions,

being significant and relevant, become contradictions by virtue of

the explanation to Section 162 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

1973.

5. Apart from the contradictions, PW-1 was confronted with

letters dated 19th December 1997, 18th January 1999 and 17th March

1999. PW-1 accepted that the letters were in his handwriting and

bore his signatures. He accepted that in the said letters, he did

not mention the demand for dowry.

6. PW-2 is the uncle of the deceased. We may note here that in

the cross-examination, PW-1 stated that PW-2 was residing

separately. In his examination-in-chief, PW-2 stated that he

received a letter from the deceased which was marked as exhibit Ka-

2. After receiving the letter, he met the deceased in May 1999,

and upon making an enquiry with her, she disclosed that due to

insufficient dowry paid by her parents, her in-laws used to taunt

her. It is an admitted position that though the Investigating

Officer collected the alleged admitted handwriting of the deceased,

the said alleged handwriting, along with the letter, were not sent

to a handwriting expert to secure his opinion. Therefore, an

adverse inference needs to be drawn against the prosecution.

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7. PW-2 accepted that when his statement was recorded by Naib

Tehsildar, he did not disclose to him the receipt of the said

letter. Thereafter, he admitted that he could not definitely state

whether the letter was in the handwriting of the deceased because

he was in doubt. Even the statement of PW-2 that the deceased

disclosed to him that her father-in-law used to pressurise her to

bring more dowry is an omission, which, again being significant and

relevant, will constitute a contradiction.

8. Section 304B of the IPC reads thus:

“304B. Dowry death.—(1) Where the death of a woman is caused by any burns or bodily injury or occurs otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, such death shall be called “dowry death”, and such husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused her death.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this sub- section, “dowry” shall have the same meaning as in section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (28 of 1961).

(2) Whoever commits dowry death shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than seven years but which may extend to imprisonment for life."

9. For proving the offence of dowry death, the prosecution must

prove that (i) the death of the woman is caused by any burns or

bodily injury or has occurred otherwise than in normal

circumstances, (ii) the death has occurred within seven years of

her marriage, (iii) soon before her death, she was subjected to

cruelty or harassment by her husband or his any relative and (iv)

4 the cruelty or harassment was for or in connection with the demand

for dowry.

10. We must note that both the witnesses have not deposed about

the specific instances of cruelty or harassment apart from stating

that there was a demand for dowry. As stated earlier, the version

of both the witnesses regarding the demand for dowry is an

omission. In the circumstances, the necessary ingredients of the

offence under Section 304B of the IPC were not established.

11. Section 498A of the IPC reads thus:

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

As stated earlier, there was no legally admissible evidence of the

demand for dowry made by the present appellants. There is no

specific evidence of any cruelty.

5 12. In the absence of legally admissible evidence, it is not

possible to sustain the conviction of the appellants. According to

the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellants, the second

appellant has undergone the sentence.

13. Hence, we pass the following order:

(i) The impugned judgment dated 21st March 2013, passed by the

High Court and the impugned judgment dated 27th October 2001,

passed by the Sessions Court, are hereby quashed and set

aside. The appellants are acquitted of the offences alleged

against them. The bail bonds furnished by the first appellant

stand cancelled.

(ii) The Appeal is, accordingly, allowed.

..........................J. (ABHAY S. OKA)

..........................J. (UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 09, 2025.

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