Bhumika Trust vs Union Of India

2026 INSC 904 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025

Bhumika Trust …Petitioner(s)

versus

Union of India and others …Respondent(s)

WITH

Review Petition (Civil) No. _____________ /2026 (arising out of Diary No. 37749/2025) in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989

Review Petition (Civil) No. 421/2026 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989

Review Petition (Civil) No. 420/2026 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989

AND

Interlocutory Application Nos. 336090 and 336091/2025 Signature Not Verified in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989 Digitally signed by NITIN TALREJA Date: 2026.08.21 12:34:03 IST Reason:

JUDGEMENT

SURYA KANT, CJI. (on behalf of himself and Augustine George Masih, J.)

1. I.A. No. 163059/2025 is allowed, and permission to file Review

Petition is granted.

2. The instant matters seek either clarification or review of this

Court’s judgement dated 20.05.2025 passed in I.A. Nos.

93974/2019; 72900, 73015, and 40695/2021; and 50269 and

201893/2022 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1022/1989

(Judgement under Review), whereby a minimum of 3 years’

practice at the Bar was mandated as an eligibility criteria to be

considered for appointment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior

Division).

3. The cases in the instant batch of matters comprise the following:

(i) Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025, filed by the NGO-

Petitioner, seeking clarification as to the interplay of the

Judgement under Review and the Judgement in In Re:

Recruitment of Visually Impaired in Judicial

Services;1

1 2025 SCC OnLine SC 481.

(ii) Three Review Petitions against the Judgement under

Review, seeking recall of the directions insofar as they

relate to the mandatory eligibility criteria of 3 years’

practice at the Bar;

(iii) I.A. Nos. 336090 and 336091/2025 in Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 1022/1989, seeking directions that the period spent

for higher education in law ought to be also counted

towards the 3 years’ practice requirement.

I. THE SECOND AIJA CASE (1993): INTRODUCTION OF THE 3-YEAR

PRACTICE REQUIREMENT

4. The question as to whether a minimum period of practice at the

Bar ought to be prescribed as an eligibility requirement for

appointment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) first

arose for consideration in Review Petition No. 249/1992 and a

batch of connected Review Petitions arising from Writ Petition

No. 1022/1989. These matters were decided by this Court vide

Judgment dated 24.08.19932, which has consistently been

referred to as the ‘Second AIJA Case’.

5. In the Second AIJA Case, this Court noticed that the

qualifications prescribed and the procedure adopted for

2 All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1993) 4 SCC 288

recruitment of Judges at the lowest rung were not uniform

across the country. It observed that in most States, the

minimum qualification for the post of Civil Judge-cum-

Magistrate First Class, Magistrate First Class or Munsiff

Magistrate was a minimum of three years’ practice as a lawyer

in addition to the degree in law. In some States, however, the

requirement of practice had been dispensed with altogether, and

fresh graduates were eligible to become judicial officers with

simply a law degree.

6. This Court in order to decide this conundrum, placed its reliance

on the provisions of the Constitution itself. During the course of

proceedings therein, it was pointed out that under Article 233(2)

of the Constitution, no person is eligible to be appointed as a

District Judge unless he has been an advocate or a pleader for

not less than seven years, and that Articles 217(2)(b) and

124(3)(b) require at least ten years’ practice as an advocate for

appointment as a Judge of a High Court and of this Court

respectively. If experience at the Bar was thought to be

indispensable at those levels, it could not be dispensed with at

the level where adjudication first begins.

7. Keeping these considerations in mind, this Court directed all

States to take immediate steps to prescribe three years’ practice

as a lawyer as an essential qualification for recruitment as a

judicial officer at the lowest rung. The purpose of this direction,

as described by this Court, was “calculated to ensure recruitment

of competent, independent and honest judicial officers and thus

to strengthen the administration of justice and the confidence of

public in it.”

II. THE SHETTY COMMISSION AND THE THIRD AIJA CASE (2002): THE

REQUIREMENT OF 3-YEAR PRACTICE IS UNDONE

8. Pursuant to the directions issued in the Second AIJA Case, the

Government of India constituted the First National Judicial Pay

Commission on 21.03.1996 under the Chairmanship of Hon’ble

Mr Justice K.J. Shetty (Shetty Commission). Although the

Shetty Commission had been set up principally to examine the

pay structure of judicial officers, its terms of reference were wide,

and it took up, among other things, the question pertaining to

qualifications for entry into judicial service.

9. The Shetty Commission published its report on 11.11.1999, and

recommended that the requirement of three years’ practice can

be done away with. Its reasoning rested essentially upon a

change in the system of legal education in the intervening years.

It noted that the recommendation of the Law Commission in its

Fourteenth Report, which had formed the original basis for

prescribing a minimum period of practice at the Bar, was made

in 1958, at a time when the LL.B. course was of two years’

duration and practical training in law was not part of the

curriculum. However, there had been subsequent evolution in

legal education since, particularly with the introduction of the

three-year LL.B. course and integrated five-year courses such as

the B.A., LL.B., in which practical aspects of legal training had

been incorporated into the curriculum.

10. The Commission further observed that the very purpose of

establishing such institutions, namely to enrich the Indian Bar,

was being defeated by insisting on three years’ practice as a

precondition for judicial service. If intensive induction training

of about a year were provided to young law graduates, it might

be unnecessary to insist on practice at all. Accordingly, it

recommended that the matter be reconsidered by this Court.

11. We may add here that the Shetty Commission was supplanted

by the Law Commission of India, which in its 117th Report dated

28.11.1986 titled ‘Training of Judicial Officers’3, recommended

that fresh law graduates be permitted to enter the judicial

3Law Commission of India, 117th Report on ‘Training of Judicial Officers’, dated 28.11.1986

service, while emphasising the need for intensive training. It

stated that “the two years intensive training would outweigh the

advantage, if any, of three years practice at the Bar which often

enough hardly helps in the matter of equipping oneself”.

12. The recommendations of the Shetty Commission came up for

consideration before this Court and were decided by judgment

dated 21.03.20024 (Third AIJA Case). In that decision, the

Court framed twelve questions arising out of the Commission’s

report. Significantly, the eighth question concerned the issue of

qualifications for appointment to judicial posts at the lowest

rung in the judicial hierarchy.

13. In responding to that particular inquiry, this Court adopted the

recommendation of the Shetty Commission and acknowledged

that, pursuant to the Second AIJA Case, the eligibility rules had

been appropriately amended prescribing a three-year standing

at the Bar as an eligibility criterion. However, it observed that,

due to the compulsory restrictions imposed by this requirement,

the most qualified candidates were not being attracted to the

judicial service. Consequently, the mandatory three-year rule

came to be reversed.

4All India Judges’ Association & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 4 SCC 247.

14. The High Courts and the State Governments accordingly

amended their respective Rules and, resultantly, graduates were

not required to possess any prior experience at the Bar as a

condition of eligibility for entry into the judicial service. Notably,

this Court also recommended that such recruits should be

imparted training for a period of not less than one year and,

preferably, for two years, so as to equip them adequately for the

discharge of their judicial responsibilities.

III. THE JUDGMENT UNDER REVIEW (2025): THE REQUIREMENT IS

RESTORED

15. This position, captured by the Third AIJA Case, continued to

hold the field for more than two decades. However, in 2023, this

Court was once again called upon to consider a myriad of issues

concerning the eligibility requirements for entry into the judicial

service, one of which is material for the purposes of the present

controversy. The issue, as framed by this Court, was as follows:

“Issue No. 7: As to whether the requirement of having minimum three years practice for appearing in the examination of Civil Judge (Junior Division), which was done away with by this Court in the case of All India Judges Association & Ors. (supra), needs to be restored? And if so, by how many years?”

16. In order to aid its inquiry, the responses of every High Court and

every State Government were called for. In addition to these

responses, this Court also placed heavy reliance on the 117th

Report of the Law Commission, the Second AIJA Case, Shetty

Commission’s report, and the Third AIJA Case, and recorded

that fresh law graduates “who may not even have a single day’s

experience in practice as a lawyer” had become eligible to

compete for and enter the judicial service. It further observed

that the time had come to review whether the requirement laid

down in the Second AIJA Case ought to be restored.

17. The Court also found that there was broad consensus amongst

most of the High Courts who were in agreement that the

requirement of a minimum of three years’ experience at the Bar

needed to be restored. Essentially, it had been posited that

candidates appointed directly from college, with no experience

at the Bar, were found to lack familiarity with court procedure

and were unable to handle proceedings properly, and the

difficulty was felt even more acutely when urgent orders had to

be passed in crucial matters. Such officers were reported to be

unacquainted with court decorum and took time to acquaint

themselves with the court environment.

18. It was further stated that oral and written complaints were being

received on a routine basis with regard to their behavioural

attitude towards advocates, litigants, their superiors and the

members of the staff. It was noticed that academic brilliance

was, by itself, no answer to these difficulties, and that fresh law

graduates with no exposure to the court environment are “not

steeped into the culture, etiquette, temper and conduct of the

court proceedings”.

19. Relying upon this material, this Court arrived at the finding that

for the last twenty years, during which the recruitment of fresh

law graduates as Judicial Officers had been permitted, “the said

endeavour has not been a successful experience”, and that the

appointment of such fresh law graduates had led to the many

problems as enumerated in the affidavits of the High Courts.

20. There can be no gainsaying that this Court did not arrive at that

conclusion without weighing what would be lost by it. It

expressly acknowledged that in the initial years the

opportunities available to a young graduate fresh from college

would be minimal. It nonetheless took the view that the exposure

to courts, and more particularly to litigants and to their briefs,

would acquaint such a candidate with the onerous duties and

responsibilities of every stakeholder in the judicial system; that

it would bring in a sensitivity to human problems and greater

clarity in the decision-making process; and that it would educate

the candidate as to the role of the Bar in the dispensation

of justice.

21. Returning to Second AIJA case, this Court concurred with the

observation that Judges from the very day on which they assume

office have to deal with questions of life, liberty, property and

reputation of litigants. In such situations, neither the knowledge

derived from books nor pre-service training can be an adequate

substitute for the first-hand experience of the working of the

court system, which will enable them to effectively adjudicate

these issues. Such an experience is possible only when a

candidate is exposed to the atmosphere of the court by assisting

seniors and observing how lawyers and Judges function.

Keeping the aforesaid observations and findings in mind, this

Court recorded its agreement with the views expressed by most

of the High Courts that the reintroduction of a certain number

of years of practice was necessary.

22. Accordingly, this Court vide judgment dated 20.05.20255,

issued ten directions. Of these, directions (i) to (vi) concerned the

5All India Judges Association v. Union of India, IA. No. 93974/ 2019 in Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 1022 of 1989

Limited Departmental Competitive Examination and the

promotion of Civil Judges to the Higher Judicial Service, and are

not in issue before us. Directions (vii) to (x), which are pertinent

to the issues pending consideration, are reproduced

hereinbelow:

“(vii) All the High Courts and the State Governments in the country shall amend the relevant service rules to the effect that candidates desirous of appearing in the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) must have practiced for a minimum period of 3 years to be eligible for the said examination. To fulfill the said requirement, the Rules shall mandate that the candidate produces a certificate to that effect duly certified either by the Principal Judicial Officer of that Court or by an advocate of that Court having a minimum standing of 10 years duly endorsed by the Principal Judicial Officer of such a District or a Principal Judicial Officer at such a station. Insofar as the candidates who are practicing before the High Courts or this Court, they shall be certified by an advocate who has a minimum standing of 10 years duly endorsed by an officer designated by that High Court or this Court. We further direct that the experience of the candidates which they have gained while working as Law Clerks with any of the Judges or Judicial Officers in the country should also be considered while calculating their total number of years of practice. The Rules shall also mandate that the candidates who are appointed to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) pursuant to their selection through the examination must compulsorily undergo at least 1 year of training before presiding in a Court; (viii) It is directed that the number of years of practice completed by a candidate desirous of appearing in the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) be calculated from the date of their provisional enrolment/registration with the concerned State Bar Council;

(ix) It is further directed that the said requirement of minimum years of practice shall not be applicable in cases where the concerned High Court has already initiated the selection process for the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) prior to the date of this judgment and shall be applicable only from the next recruitment process; and (x) All the amendments in terms of the aforesaid directions shall be carried out by the High Courts within a period of three months from the date of this judgment and the concerned State Governments shall consider and approve the same within a further period of three months.”

23. This Court further clarified that all recruitment processes which

had been kept in abeyance on account of the pendency of these

proceedings would proceed in accordance with the Rules that

were applicable on the date of the advertisement or notification.

IV. THE PRESENT PROCEEDINGS

24. It is in the Judgment so rendered, and in particular against

directions (vii) and (viii) thereof, insofar as they restore the

requirement of three years’ practice at the Bar as a condition of

eligibility for the examination for the post of Civil Judge (Junior

Division), that the present petitions have been instituted.

25. To briefly recapitulate, the genesis of the present proceedings

may be traced to Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025, instituted

by Bhumika Trust, an entity representing several hundred

persons with disabilities, seeking, inter alia, that the

requirement of three years’ practice at the Bar be dispensed with

in respect of the candidates represented by it.

26. In furtherance of the same, when the said petition was taken up

for hearing on 15.01.2026, this Court observed, prima facie, that

the eligibility condition ought to be uniform, rather than vary

across different categories of candidates seeking to compete for

entry into the judicial service.

27. However, before taking a holistic view of the matter, it was

considered appropriate to obtain the views and suggestions of

all the High Courts, as also of Law Universities and National Law

Schools. Accordingly, the Registrar Generals of all the High

Courts were directed to place the order before their respective

Chief Justices and to circulate the same among the Law

Universities and National Law Schools situated within their

respective jurisdictions.

28. In the meanwhile, some Review Petitions came to be filed against

the Judgment under Review. Vide order dated 10.02.2026,

notice was issued, and the Review Petitions were directed to be

listed in open Court for oral hearing. The Review Petitions were

thereafter directed to be tagged with Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 1110/2025.

29. Being seized of the issues arising out of the prescription of three

years’ practice as a precondition for recruitment as Judicial

Officers at the entry level, this Court directed all the High Courts

and the State Public Service Commissions which had already

advertised the posts to extend the last date for submission of

applications up to 30.04.2026, and further directed that any

fresh advertisement issued by a State, a High Court or a State

Public Service Commission shall carry a cut-off date falling

after 30.04.2026.

30. Thereafter, vide order dated 22.05.2026, the interim order dated

13.03.2026 regarding the closing date for submission of

applications for recruitment as Judicial Officers at the entry

level was directed to continue to operate until further orders,

and that the final date for submission of applications stood

extended accordingly.

V. CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES AND THE SUGGESTIONS RECEIVED

31. Having traversed the sequence of events as they unfolded, we

now proceed to examine the contentions and suggestions

advanced by the Petitioners/Review Petitioners in support of the

review of the Judgment under Review.

32. We also had the advantage of considering the affidavits and

suggestions furnished by the High Courts, as well as by Law

Universities, and National Law Schools in compliance with the

order dated 15.01.2026.

Contentions/Suggestions on behalf of the Petitioners/Review

Petitioners

33. We have heard Ms. Pinky Anand, Ms. Vibha Makhija and Mr.

Colin Gonsalves, learned Senior Counsels appearing on behalf

of the Petitioners/Review Petitioners. They have contended as

follows:

a. The Judgment under Review did not sufficiently consider

whether prescribing three years’ practice was the most

effective means of achieving the object sought to be

attained. It was pointed out that although the 117th Report

of the Law Commission, the report of the Shetty

Commission and the reasoning in Third AIJA concerning

the need to improve the training imparted to judicial

officers were noticed, the Judgment under Review did not

adequately consider whether the same objectives could be

achieved through a shorter period of practical exposure at

the Bar, supplemented by structured and enhanced

institutional training after selection;

b. The temperament, etiquette, empathy and familiarity with

court proceedings and the administration of justice are

necessary attributes of a judicial officer. However, it could

not be said that these attributes are better secured

through three years of practice at the Bar, particularly

when the quality and nature of such practice may vary

considerably from candidate to candidate. Practical

experience at the Bar, it was urged, is inherently diverse

and dependent to a considerable degree upon the

circumstances and opportunities available to an individual

candidate.

c. Attention was also drawn to the 116th Report of the Law

Commission for its observation that a short period of

practice may not, by itself, provide effective training and

that candidates should instead be provided with intensive

training. The 117th and 118th Reports were also referred to

for their reservations regarding the assumption that a

prescribed period of practice necessarily qualifies a person

to become a better judge.

d. The evolution and professionalisation of pre-service

judicial training had not been adequately considered in the

Judgment under Review. Since the three year practice

requirement was originally conceived, institutional

training for judicial officers had expanded considerably

and had acquired a more structured character. As of 2026,

almost every State has its own Judicial Academy, and save

for a few smaller States, the States possessed full-fledged

academies with substantial infrastructure.

e. A mandatory period of three years’ practice requirement

would operate as a disincentive to meritorious candidates

and would impair the ability of the judiciary to attract the

best available talent.

f. To offer an illustration, under the present model, a

candidate would ordinarily enter the office of Civil Judge

(Junior Division) at about the age of twenty-nine, after

three years of practice, followed by approximately one year

spent in preparing for and taking the examination and

another year of post-selection training. After the entire

process, such a candidate, in the best-case scenario,

would reach the level of District Judge only after the age of

forty-one. In contrast, a candidate entering the Higher

Judicial Service from the Bar becomes eligible for direct

recruitment at the age of thirty-five after seven years of

practice. This creates a situation wherein a candidate has

very little incentive to appear for the examination, as the

requirement of three years’ practice delays entry into

judicial service and correspondingly compresses the period

available for subsequent career progression.

g. Notably, the requirement would have a disproportionate

impact upon women and candidates belonging to

marginalised and economically weaker sections. It was

contended that the legal profession, particularly outside

metropolitan centres, offers little or no remuneration to

junior advocates, thereby making three years of practice

economically difficult for candidates from disadvantaged

backgrounds.

h. The requirement would ordinarily also mean that women

would become eligible to sit for the examination only at

about the age of twenty-seven. By that stage, many may

have been married or may be under pressure to marry,

leaving them with a comparatively short period in which to

establish themselves professionally. In addition to this,

women candidates are also frequently subjected to the

dual responsibility of discharging household

responsibilities alongside their professional commitments,

which would include examination preparation as well. Due

to these reasons, the requirement of prior practice would

operate as an additional barrier to the participation of

women in the judicial service.

i. The direction issued in Judgment under Review altered the

rules of the game midway and caused retrospective

hardship to candidates who had, for several years,

prepared themselves on the legitimate expectation that

they would be eligible to appear for the examination

immediately upon graduation. It was pointed out that

many such candidates had devoted considerable time and

resources to institutional coaching in preparation for the

examination. In light of that, candidates who graduated in

2025, as well as those who would graduate in 2026, 2027

and 2028, would be bound to face disproportionate

impediments.

j. Certain practical difficulties arising from the

implementation of the requirement were also brought to

our notice. It was submitted that examinations for

appointment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) are

not conducted annually in all States, but are notified

depending upon the occurrence of vacancies.

Consequently, a candidate may be required to remain in

practice for anywhere between four and seven years before

the first opportunity to appear for the examination

becomes available.

k. Finally, in the form of suggestions, it was urged that the

requirement of prior practice at the Bar be replaced by

structured post-selection training, which could include

two years at a Judicial Academy, along with attachments

to District Judges as judges-in-training. Similarly,

monitored judicial clerkships under Judges at different

levels of the judicial hierarchy were also suggested.

Reference was made to the report of the Centre for

Research and Planning of this Court recommending the

introduction of Law Clerks in the district judiciary.

Opinions from High Courts, Law Universities/National Law

Schools, and the Learned Amicus Curiae

34. Having considered the contentions and suggestions advanced on

behalf of the Petitioners/Review Petitioners, we shall now turn

to the suggestions and inputs received from the High Courts and

Law Universities across the country pursuant to order

dated 15.01.2026.

35. The larger number of High Courts, such as, the High Courts of

Calcutta, Chhattisgarh, Delhi, Gauhati, Himachal Pradesh,

Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, Jharkhand, Kerala, Madhya

Pradesh, Odisha Punjab & Haryana, and Telangana responded

that the condition, whatever its period, must apply uniformly,

and that no exemption ought to be carved out in favour of

specially-abled candidates. Their reasons were in substance that

the office of Civil Judge (Junior Division) calls from the outset

for exposure to court procedure, the appreciation of evidence

and the drafting of judicial orders, and as such any relaxation

made for one class would invite claims of parity from others and

fragment the standard.

36. Four High Courts took a different view upon that question. The

High Court of Meghalaya held that the condition ought not to be

dispensed with altogether, but proposed a reduced period of

practice for specially-abled candidates together with an

extension of the upper age limit by three to five years. The High

Court of Uttarakhand and the High Court of Sikkim proposed

that the period be relaxed by one year, to two years. The High

Court of Tripura proposed that the requirement be dispensed

with in the case of specially-abled candidates.

37. The High Courts of Manipur and Jharkhand, in particular,

proposed that such experience may include Law Clerkships or

research attachments with Judges or Courts, apprenticeships

with Senior Advocates or experienced practitioners, etc. These

suggestions proceed on the premise that the underlying object

of the requirement is to ensure meaningful exposure to the

functioning of courts, which may be acquired through more than

one route.

38. The Law Universities, Law Colleges and members of the Bar

addressed themselves more directly to the duration of the

requirement, and a substantial body of that opinion favoured a

period shorter than three years, coupled with a strengthened

regime of training after selection.

39. The National Law University, Jodhpur, proposed a reduced

practice period of one year as a more balanced alternative,

observing that it would provide meaningful exposure to practice

without imposing prolonged financial hardship. It proposed that

the shortened period be reinforced by structured Judicial

Clerkships and intensive institutional training after selection.

The National Law School of India University, Bengaluru, likewise

opined that three years’ standing at the Bar may be unnecessary

in view of the importance of institutional training for selected

candidates.

40. The National Law University, Delhi, proposed a two-year model

comprising academy-based instruction followed by rotational

attachments to civil and criminal courts under judicial

supervision, together with structured practical exposure during

the law degree. The Chanakya National Law University, Patna,

on similar vein, suggested two years of training comprising

judicial academy instruction and attachments to a District or

Additional Sessions Judge and a Senior Advocate, followed by

an assessment of advocacy skills and court etiquette by a

Committee of High Court Judges. The National Law Institute

University, Bhopal, and the Dharmashastra National Law

University, Jabalpur, proposed enhanced institutional training

after recruitment, including supervised attachments to Civil and

District Judges. The National University of Study and Research

in Law, Ranchi, similarly favoured intensive post-selection

training in court procedure, case management, judgment writing

and judicial conduct, coupled with compulsory internships

during the law degree. The Rajiv Gandhi National University of

Law, Punjab, proposed supervised judicial attachments during

probation, with confirmation contingent upon an assessment

of competence.

41. The material placed before us by the Law Universities/National

Law Universities also emphasised that the mere duration of

practice may be an unreliable measure of practical competence.

It was pointed out that young advocates may, during their initial

years, receive limited exposure to substantive advocacy, trial

work, appreciation of evidence or court craft, and that the

quality of experience varies substantially depending upon the

chamber, court and mentoring available. The NALSAR

University of Law, Hyderabad, for instance characterised the

three-year requirement as a potential economic barrier to

candidates from disadvantaged backgrounds and submitted

that competence should be assessed through structured

training rather than the mere duration of formal practice.

Suggestions put forth by the Learned Amicus Curiae

42. Finally, we would also like to record suggestions made by Shri

Siddharth Bhatnagar, learned Amicus Curiae, who placed before

us four possible courses. The first was retention of the three-

year requirement without modification, uniformly applicable to

all candidates. The second was that any relaxation be confined

to women and persons with disabilities, who might be permitted

to appear as fresh graduates or with lesser practice and required

to complete the balance of three years after selection, with

seniority to count only from the date of appointment. The third

was a staggered transition, under which the requirement would

be phased in over the next three recruitment cycles with nil, one,

and two years of practice respectively for 2026, 2027 and 2028,

before being made uniformly applicable thereafter. The fourth

was that reasonable accommodation be made for persons with

disabilities by way of relaxed qualifying benchmarks, and that

the Accessibility Committees of the High Courts be directed to

secure meaningful professional engagement, assistive

infrastructure and, as was separately suggested before us,

engagement as Law Clerks, for such candidates.

VI. ANALYSIS

43. We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions

advanced before us, the material placed on record by the High

Courts, the Law Universities/National Law Universities, the

learned Amicus Curiae, and the reasons which weighed with this

Court in the Judgment under Review. At the outset, we are not

persuaded that the Judgment under Review requires to be

reconsidered on the fundamental question whether some prior

exposure to the working of courts is desirable for a person

seeking entry into the judicial service. In our view, the reasons

postulated by this Court in restoring the requirement retain

considerable force.

44. The more precise question, however, is whether such exposure

necessarily requires three years of conventional practice at the

Bar and the manner in which the requirement is to be

implemented as a condition precedent to even appearing for the

examination.

45. In our view, the Judgment under Review was justified in

emphasising the peculiar nature of the responsibilities which

attach to a judicial officer from the very first day of service. A

Civil Judge is required to deal with questions affecting life,

liberty, property, and personal rights of litigants. It was for this

reason that the Judgment under Review considered exposure to

the atmosphere of the court, including by assisting seniors and

observing the manner in which lawyers and Judges function, to

be of considerable value.

46. The experience placed before this Court also indicates that

persons entering judicial service without any exposure

whatsoever to the functioning of courts may require

considerable time to familiarise themselves with court

procedure, courtroom decorum and the practical demands of

judicial office. These are not insignificant considerations.

A minimum period of practical exposure before assuming

judicial office is therefore neither unreasonable nor inconsistent

with the object of securing a competent and independent

subordinate judiciary.

47. In view thereof, there is considerable merit in the proposition

that a person who is to assume judicial office ought not to be

wholly unfamiliar with the functioning of courts and the

practical consequences of judicial orders. Such exposure may

contribute to the development of judicial temperament, patience,

empathy, courtroom discipline and an appreciation of the

respective roles of the Bench and the Bar. We see no reason, in

this review jurisdiction, to displace that finding.

48. The difficulty, however, lies not in the recognition of this need

but in the manner in which the period of experience is to be

translated into an eligibility requirement. Having considered the

entire material on record and the concerns flagged by the

parties, we are of the view that a requirement of experience must

bear a reasonable relationship with the object which it seeks to

achieve. The passage of time at the Bar, while a meaningful

component, may not be the sole factor behind the meaningful

courtroom experience. The quality of practice may depend upon

the nature of the chamber, the court in which the advocate

practises, the opportunities for appearance, the availability of a

mentor and, in many cases, the financial circumstances of

the candidate.

49. That being so, the arguments advanced before us demonstrate

that the restoration of the requirement has had an immediate

and significant effect upon a generation of law graduates who

pursued their education and prepared themselves for judicial

service at a time when fresh graduates were eligible to compete

for entry into the service. For more than two decades, the legal

position following the Third AIJA case enabled fresh law

graduates to enter the judicial service without any prescribed

period of prior practice. The Judgment under Review altered that

position by restoring three years of practice as a condition for

even appearing in the examination.

50. We are particularly mindful of the position of those candidates

who had already completed, or were in the process of

completing, their legal education when the change was brought

about. The future of such candidates has been severely affected

due to the change in status quo. A candidate who may have

planned to enter judicial service immediately upon graduation

now finds that the opportunity which was available to him or her

under the earlier regime has moved several years away.

51. This consideration assumes greater significance when the

requirement is prescribed not merely as a qualification for

appointment but as a condition for appearing in the examination

itself. A three-year period of practice necessarily postpones the

point at which a young law graduate may even compete for

judicial service.

52. Crucially, the burden of this transition is also not distributed

evenly as it affects certain groups of young aspiring lawyers

disparately. For instance, young advocates, particularly those

without established professional networks or financial support,

may find it difficult to sustain themselves for several years in a

profession in which the initial years of practice frequently

provide little or no assured remuneration.

53. Women candidates especially may face additional social and

familial constraints during the period in which they are expected

to establish themselves at the Bar. Similarly, persons with

disabilities may face difficulties in obtaining meaningful

opportunities for practice at the Bar. We do not consider it

necessary, for the purposes of the present review, to create

separate eligibility regimes for each such category to address

unique challenges faced by different groups. The responses of

several High Courts have also rightly cautioned against creating

fragmented standards for entry into judicial service.

54. There is, at the same time, a second consideration which

deserves our attention. The object of the practice requirement is

to ensure that a person entering judicial office possesses

adequate familiarity with the working of courts. As stated by us

above, three years of practice at the Bar alone does not ensure

this. In our view, practical experience and judicial competence

continue to develop even after a person joins the judicial service.

55. This is relevant to note because the institutional framework for

judicial training has itself evolved substantially. Judicial

Academies now exist across the country and provide an

opportunity to impart, in a structured and supervised manner,

the very skills which a young advocate may otherwise acquire

unevenly at the Bar. The suggestions received pursuant to our

order dated 15.01.2026 have also consistently pointed towards

the importance of combining practical exposure with robust

institutional training.

56. This approach is also consistent with the viewpoint adopted by

this Court in the Third AIJA case. In that case, while dispensing

with the three-year requirement at that stage, this Court did not

proceed on the assumption that a fresh law graduate could

simply enter court and begin presiding without preparation. On

the contrary, it recommended that such recruits should undergo

training for not less than one year and, preferably, two years, so

as to equip them for the discharge of their judicial

responsibilities.

57. The Judgment under Review itself contains an important

indication in the same direction. While restoring the three-year

requirement, it expressly directed that experience gained as a

Law Clerk with any Judge or Judicial Officer should be counted

towards the prescribed period. This recognition is significant

because it acknowledges that a Law Clerk working closely with

a Judge may acquire an understanding of crucial court

processes and the functioning of the court in a way which is

directly relevant to future judicial office. The suggestions

received from the High Courts have echoed this approach as well

and taken this principle further by identifying other forms of

structured legal engagement, some of which we have discussed

below, which may similarly provide meaningful exposure.

58. At this juncture, we also observe the specific submissions

submitted by the Applicants in I.A. Nos. 336090 and

336091/2025, concerning the inclusion of the duration spent

pursuing higher legal education towards the minimum practice

requirements mandated by this Court. For the reasons

previously outlined, particularly the aim of fostering familiarity

and a comprehensive understanding of the functioning of

judicial systems, this petition also warrants rejection.

59. At this stage, we may also distinguish between two questions

which are sometimes conflated as one. The first is whether a

person aspiring to become a Civil Judge should have some

familiarity with the functioning of courts. We answer that

question in the affirmative as it is an indispensable precondition.

The second is whether every aspect of judicial competence which

the requirement seeks to secure must necessarily be acquired

before the competitive examination and through conventional

practice at the Bar. That question admits of a different answer

and needs to be scrutinised by keeping in mind the viability of

other possible means. In this regard, we believe that practical

exposure and judicial training may be acquired through a

combination of professional and institutional experience. As we

noted above, even the Judgment under Review recognised this

distinction when it directed that experience as a Law Clerk be

counted towards the prescribed period.

60. We therefore consider that the present exercise should not be

understood as questioning the wisdom of prescribing three years

of practice. Rather, it is an exercise in ensuring that the rule is

implemented in a manner which is fair to those affected by its

sudden restoration, which gives sufficient time for the legal and

professional ecosystem to adjust to the new requirement, and

which does not unnecessarily narrow the field from which the

subordinate judiciary may draw its future members. The

purpose of an eligibility rule is to secure suitable candidates for

judicial office. It should not, by the manner of its

implementation, exclude candidates whom the judicial system

would otherwise benefit from attracting.

61. This is not to suggest that considerations of convenience or

speed of entry should override the institutional need for

experienced judicial officers. A judicial service which demands

adequate maturity and practical exposure must also remain

sufficiently attractive to the most capable young lawyers. If the

entry requirements become so burdensome that a significant

segment of talented candidates are discouraged from even

competing, the judiciary may lose precisely the pool of

candidates which the requirement was intended to improve. The

object, therefore, must be to secure practical readiness and

intellectual merit, rather than to pursue one at the cost of

the other.

62. Additionally, the intervening period has also seen recruitment

processes being initiated and, in some cases, advertisements

being issued. It would neither be equitable nor administratively

sound to disregard the position of candidates who have already

arranged their professional and educational lives on the basis of

the earlier eligibility framework.

63. These circumstances, taken together, persuade us that a limited

intervention is warranted. We reiterate that we are not

substituting our assessment for that of the Bench which

rendered the Judgment under Review on the desirability of

practical experience. Nor are we holding that the three-year

requirement is inherently unreasonable. The intervention which

we consider necessary is narrower and is directed to its

enforcement and implementation.

64. The immediate object therefore must be threefold: first, to

minimise the hardship caused to fresh and recent law graduates

by the sudden restoration of the requirement; second, to provide

a structured and workable mechanism through which the

requirement can be implemented without uncertainty or

artificial exclusion; and third, to ensure that the judicial service

continues to attract meritorious young persons who may

otherwise be lost to other branches of the legal profession or

public service.

65. The first of these considerations requires a transitional

arrangement. More than a year has now elapsed since the

Judgment under Review restored the three-year requirement.

During this period, candidates have remained uncertain about

their eligibility, while recruitment processes have been affected

by the pendency of these proceedings. In these circumstances,

it would serve little purpose to subject fresh graduates to the full

rigour of a rule whose application they could not have

reasonably anticipated when they pursued their legal education.

In view of this, a defined period is necessary so that the legal

profession, the recruiting authorities and prospective candidates

are all placed on notice of the regime that will govern future

recruitment.

66. We may safely presume that, during the preceding one year,

most law graduates would have either engaged in practice at the

Bar, served as Law Clerks to Hon’ble Judges, or gained

experience in law firms. As a one-time measure, such experience

may reasonably be treated at par with one year of practice at

the Bar.

67. The second consideration demands us to recognise that the

requirement of experience and the requirement of training are

not mutually exclusive and, if anything, they can be

complementary. While the initial practice at the Bar exposes a

candidate to the adversarial process, judicial training prepares

the candidate for the fundamentally different responsibility of

adjudication. It is therefore appropriate that candidates who are

permitted to enter the selection process during the transitional

period should not be placed in the field immediately upon

selection. Their appointment must initially be to the status of

trainee judicial officers, and their independent judicial functions

should follow only after they have undergone an appropriate

period of institutional training.

68. A period of one year of structured training at the State Judicial

Academy would, in our view, serve this purpose. It would provide

a common foundation to candidates irrespective of their

experiences at the Bar. More importantly, it would permit the

State Judicial Academies to assess the candidate not just on

legal knowledge, but also on the practical skills required of

a Judge.

69. We also consider it appropriate to note that this period of

institutional training would serve as equivalent, for the purposes

of the three-year requirement, to a period of one-year practice at

the Bar. This does not proceed upon the assumption that

training and practice are identical. It reflects the more limited

proposition that, once a candidate has been selected through a

competitive judicial examination, planned and guided training

specifically designed to prepare him or her for judicial office

provides relevant practical exposure.

70. The training period at State Judicial Academies must thereafter

be followed by a further period of supervised practical

engagement with the judicial process through Law Clerkship. A

Law Clerkship under the direct supervision of Judges can

expose a candidate to the manner in which court proceedings

are to be held and decorum and attitude to be maintained

towards members of the Bar and litigants. Simultaneously it will

assist in preparation and analysis of cases, the evaluation of

submissions, the application of procedural law and the

discipline involved in preparing judicial orders.

71. We accordingly consider it appropriate that, following successful

completion of the year-long institutional training, the trainee

judicial officers should undergo a further year of structured Law

Clerkship: first under the supervision of a Principal

District/District and Sessions Judge or a Member of the Higher

Judicial Services and thereafter under a sitting Judge of the

concerned High Court. This period shall also be treated as

equivalent to one year of practice at the Bar for the purpose of

satisfying the eligibility requirement. The arrangement has the

further advantage of enabling senior judicial officers to observe

the performance of the trainee over a sustained period before the

trainee is entrusted with independent judicial work.

72. The evaluation at the conclusion of this period assumes

importance. The assessment must, inter alia, include the

candidate’s conduct, diligence, analytical ability, understanding

of procedure, capacity to deal with cases, quality of legal

reasoning and suitability for judicial office. At the same time, the

evaluation, should remain objective and reasoned, and it should

not become an additional or undefined barrier to appointment.

Subject to satisfactory evaluation, the trainee should thereafter

enter regular judicial service with the status and remuneration

attached to the post.

VII. DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUSION

73. In light of the above discussion, we consider it appropriate to

issue the following directions, which would apply to all

recruitment notification/advertisement(s) issued to the post of

Civil Judge (Junior Division) in the transitional period, i.e.,

notification/advertisement(s) issued after the Judgement under

Review up to 31.03.2027:

(i) All law graduates shall be eligible to apply,

notwithstanding the three-year practice requirement.

Having regard to the fact that more than one year has

elapsed since the Judgment under Review was

pronounced, such candidates shall, for the purposes of

their applications, be deemed to have completed one year

of active practice. They shall not be required to furnish a

separate Certificate of Practice in support of the said

deemed period;

(ii) Candidates selected pursuant to the aforesaid recruitment

shall, upon appointment, be designated as “Trainee

Judicial Officers” and shall undergo a compulsory period

of one year of intensive training at the concerned State

Judicial Academy. This period shall be treated as

equivalent to one year of practice at the Bar for the

purposes of the three-year requirement;

(iii) During the period of such training, the Trainee Judicial

Officers shall be paid a fixed emolument equivalent to one-

half of the remuneration payable to a Judicial Magistrate

First Class in the concerned State. They shall, in addition,

be entitled to the facilities and other benefits ordinarily

made available to trainees at the concerned State Judicial

Academy;

(iv) Upon successful completion of the aforesaid training, the

Trainee Judicial Officers shall undergo a further period of

one year of structured Law Clerkship. The first six months

shall be spent as a Law Clerk under the supervision of the

Principal District/District and Sessions Judges or

Members of the Higher Judicial Services, and the

remaining six months under the supervision of a sitting

Judge of the concerned High Court;

(v) The aforesaid one-year period of Law Clerkship shall also

be treated as equivalent to one year of practice at the Bar

for the purposes of satisfying the three-year requirement;

(vi) During the period of Law Clerkship, the Trainee Judicial

Officer shall be paid same emoluments as admissible

during their training in State Judicial Academies, with no

further allowance, etc.; and

(vii) Upon completion of the Law Clerkship, the sitting Judge of

the High Court under whose supervision the Trainee

Judicial Officer has served shall submit a reasoned

evaluation report concerning the performance and

suitability of the trainee. Upon such evaluation being

found satisfactory, the Trainee Judicial Officer shall be

appointed to the regular post in the field and shall

thereafter be entitled to the regular pay scale and other

service benefits attached to the post.

74. We further direct that for the period following the transition

period, i.e., notification/advertisement(s) issued on or after

01.04.2027, the following directions shall govern the

recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division):

(i) Every candidate seeking to appear for the examination for

appointment as Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall possess

at least one year of actual practice from the source and

certification as laid down in direction (vii) and (viii) of the

Judgment under Review for now and thereafter as laid

down hereinafter. Such practice shall be subject to

verification through issuance of a Certificate of Practice,

which shall not be issued unless the candidate’s presence

and participation in effective judicial proceedings, whether

along with a senior member of the Bar with at least 10

years practice or otherwise, have been duly recorded in

accordance with the mechanism to be prescribed by the

High Courts;

(ii) The application of a candidate for recruitment to the

judicial service from the aforesaid recruitment cycle shall

be entertained only upon submission of the requisite

certificate evidencing completion of one year of actual

practice in the District Courts; and

(iii) Candidates selected pursuant to such recruitment shall,

notwithstanding their one year of prior practice, undergo

the same one-year period of intensive training at the State

Judicial Academy followed by 6 months of Law Clerkship

under the Principal District/District and Sessions Judges

or Members of the Higher Judicial Services and thereafter

another 6 months of Law Clerkship under a sitting Judge

of the concerned High Court, in terms of directions (ii) to

(vii) of Paragraph 73.

75. For abundant caution, we reiterate that all

notification/advertisement(s) issued already after the Judgment

under Review was pronounced, as well as all

notification/advertisement(s) to be issued hereafter, for

recruitment to the post of Civil Judge (Junior Division) shall

conform to and will be governed by the aforesaid directions.

76. The State Governments, in consultation with respective

jurisdictional High Courts, shall undertake and officially notify

necessary amendments in the applicable Rules forthwith, and in

any case, within three months from the date of this Judgment. The

interim orders passed in these proceedings shall stand vacated.

77. We may also observe that the directions issued hereinabove should

adequately address the grievances expressed by the Petitioners in

Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025, particularly with regard to the

need for appropriate accommodation for persons with disabilities.

78. In our considered opinion, it merits clarification that the scheme

formulated herein should not be made immutable. Judicial

recruitment is an evolving process, and the effect of the present

arrangement can be properly assessed only after it has operated

for a reasonable period. A period of three years would provide

sufficient institutional experience to evaluate whether the

combination of limited prior practice, structured training and

supervised clerkship is achieving the desired objective. This Court

may thereafter revisit the scheme on the basis of material

concerning the quality of recruitment, performance of trainees,

adequacy of training, and other relevant indicators.

79. Therefore, scheme contained in these directions shall remain in

force for a period of five years from the date of this judgment.

80. Upon completion of the aforesaid period of five years, the

working of this scheme, including the quality of recruitment, the

nature and efficacy of training and clerkship, the performance

of officers recruited under the scheme and such other empirical

material as may be relevant, shall be placed before this Court for

its consideration, and the scheme shall thereafter be revisited, if

necessary.

81. Interlocutory Application Nos. 336090 and 336091/2025 are,

accordingly, dismissed.

82. The Judgment under Review stands modified to the aforesaid

extent, and Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1110/2025 as well as the

Review Petitions stand disposed of in the above terms.

83. Pending interlocutory application(s), if any, shall stand closed.

84. Ordered accordingly.

..........................................CJI. [SURYA KANT]

..............................................J. [AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH]

NEW DELHI DATED: 21.08.2026 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 With Review Petition (C) No…………..of 2026 (@Diary No(s). 37749 of 2025 in W.P.(C) No. 1022 of 1989) R.P.(C) No. 421 of 2026 in W.P.(C) No. 1022 of 1989

R.P.(C) No. 420 of 2026 in W.P.(C) No. 1022 of 1989

I.A. Nos.336090 of 2025 & 336091 of 2025 in W.P. (C) No.1022 of 1989

JUDGMENT

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

1. With all the respect at my command I am unable to persuade myself that a review; of the well-considered, well thought out decision of a three-judge bench, prescribing a three-year ‘practice’1 at the Bar, before embarking on a judicial career, is imperative.

2. The review of the judgment in the All-India Judges Association case (the 6th AIJA) is sought only to the extent of it having provided three years practice, as a necessary requirement for recruitment at the grass roots level of the Judiciary in the States; i.e. the entry point of the Civil Judge (Junior Division)2. Arguments raised, were omnibus as if it was a hearing proper on the merits, but I confine my

1 ‘Practice’, as an Advocate at the Bar 2 hereinafter referred to as, ‘CJ (JD)’

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. consideration to those relevant for a review; within its well- defined contours of ‘an error apparent on the face of the record’. There were also arguments addressed regarding equal opportunities to the persons with disabilities, which though quite impressive and imperative, in my opinion would have to be considered by the regular Bench hearing the matter.

3. The arguments addressed, which according to me are relevant to the review are as follows: -

i) It was a three Judge Bench which removed the condition of a three-year practice for appearing in the CJ (JD) recruitment examinations, which has now been altered by a Coordinate Bench, which is not permissible.

ii) There should be equation with other public services, where there is no requirement of an experience before recruitment even into the higher echelons of the Civil Services, being IFS/IAS/IPS etc. The rigorous training regime as stipulated therein definitely could be brought into Judicial Service also.

iii) A three-year practice does not, in any way, equip the law graduates in dealing with the rigour of judicial service since in the initial gestation period, a fledgling lawyer would not be entrusted with briefs, and he/she would have little chance to argue in Courts.

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc.

iv) There could be a strict training regime extending to more than the period now provided, with the new recruits being posted as an understudy to existing Judicial Officers, ensuring skill enhancement.

4. In seriatim, I answer the above questions put forth, in the following manner: -

i) (a) The argument raised is that the stipulation of three years’ experience removed as per the 3rd All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India case [ (2002) 4 SCC 247 ]; a decision by a three-judge bench, has been restored in the 6th All India Judges’ Association v. Union of India case [ 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1184 ] by a Coordinate Bench, which is not permissible. Quite attractive, in the normal circumstances, but outrightly fallacious in the scenario of a ‘continuing mandamus’.

The 1st All India Judges' Association v. Union of India case [ (1992) 1 SCC 119 ] also decided by a three-judge bench; issued directions to improve the conditions of service of the judicial officers, found necessary to maintain independence of the judiciary. Alive to the burden on the State exchequer, in justification, extracted the observation of Professor Pannick that:

“Judges do not have an easy job. They repeatedly do what the rest of us seek to avoid; make decisions.” and held so: -

“45. These prescriptions for a Judicial Officer, therefore, result in a restricted life. Austerity is a quality to be practised by every Judge Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. personally as also in his public functioning.

This necessarily gives rise to a situation where the Judge must have patience, perseverance and painstaking habits. In order that a Judge may be able to put in these aspects into his public functioning it is absolutely necessary that the Judge enjoys freedom from personal worries. A reasonable salary, appropriate allowances and manageable living conditions are, therefore, required to be provided.”

i) (b) A Review was filed from the said decision which was termed the 2nd All India Judges’ Association v.

Union of India case [(1993) 4 SCC 288] in which the three years’ service condition was introduced as a uniform condition across the country; since the stipulation varied from State to State and in some States, there was no such requirement. A Coordinate Bench made modifications and held so: -

“56. Any clarification that may be required in respect of any matter arising out of this decision will be sought only from this Court and from no other court. Further, the proceedings, if any, for implementation of the directions given in this judgment shall be filed only in this Court and no other court shall entertain them.”

i) (c) The 2nd AIJA case was by a three-judge bench and the 3rd AIJA case which removed the stipulation was a Coordinate Bench. The 3rd AIJA case also reiterated paragraph 56 of the 2nd AIJA case in paragraph No.40.

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. Hence this Court, in a three Judge Bench was considering the augmentation and skill building of the State Judiciary, issuing directions in the best interest of preserving the independence of the judiciary, the cornerstone of any functional and effective judicial dispensation, by resorting to a ‘continuing mandamus’.

ii) (a) Judicial services cannot be equated with other public services and, hence, the AIJA case has been retained before this Court as a ‘continuing mandamus’ for decades together. Unlike in the public services, there is no supervisory control exercised by the officers in the hierarchy of the State Judiciary, insofar as the essential duties of a Judicial Officer. Adjudication of cases which involves procedural aspects, recording of evidence, it’s analysis and delivery of judgments; completely at the discretion of the Officer, upon which/whom none can interfere or impinge. It is trite that a wrong judicial order cannot even lead to a disciplinary enquiry and it can only be corrected by the higher courts in statutory appeals or revisions, or the supervisory jurisdiction conferred on the High Courts by the Constitution of India. Though, the general conduct of a Judicial Officer and her integrity can be brought in question under the administrative jurisdiction conferred on the High Court, the judicial acts are removed from such scrutiny, again to ensure independence of the

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. judiciary. There can hence be no equation to public services; even recruitments to the higher echelons, where too there is a supervisory hierarchy of administration in place, as distinguished from the justice delivery system.

ii) (b) It was held in the 1st AIJA case itself that: -

“20. … There is a marked distinction between the nature of work which executive officers and judicial officers are called upon to discharge. The work of the judicial officers is usually sedentary while that of the executive officers involves a lot of physical movement. This is particularly so in the lower cadres of both the services. In view of this feature physical fitness is more important for an executive officer than in case of a judicial officer while in case of judicial officers, there is thus necessarily more of a mental activity than physical. Experience is an indispensable factor and subject to the basic physical fitness with growing age experience grows. …”

iii) (a) Much has been argued on the futility of the three-year stipulation since no fledgling lawyer would be entrusted with a brief; which is to essentially say that she would not be tasked with the job of conducting a trial or an argument in Court. The question that arises immediately is that when a senior lawyer or litigant would not entrust a case to a lawyer who is fresh out of college, will it be safe to entrust such persons with the decision-making process in a case; when even legal services require an

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. amount of experience to ensure; not mere representation, but quality assistance. It is not the complete entrustment of a case for conducting the trial or argument before Court, that moulds a lawyer in the initial years. It is the familiarity with the files, a lawyer acquires from the office of a Senior and the interactions she has with the fraternity of lawyers in the corridors of the Court that initiates her in the profession. The knowledge garnered from witnessing how a trial is conducted, the procedure shaped, as also arguments addressed within the courts, informs the keen student of how to go about the profession. Though arguing a case, before the Court, provides visibility, that is not the be-all and end-all of the profession. Behind every arguing counsel, whose ability is often measured by the felicity of expression and dexterity, on feet, there are an abundance of skills acquired over the years. Proficiency in drafting, adeptness at research, expertise in cross examination, precision in formulating arguments and much more, are to be learned by the young; observing first hand to become a complete professional. No training schedule, before or after recruitment, can give a budding jurist; be it a lawyer or a judge, the feel of the life and its worries, throbbing in every brief; which she experiences in practise.

(iii) (b) It was held in the 2nd AIJA case that: -

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. “20. …The recruitment of raw graduates as judicial officers without any training or background of lawyering has not proved to be a successful experiment. Considering the fact that from the first day of his assuming office, the Judge has to decide, among others, questions of life, liberty, property and reputation of the litigants, to induct graduates fresh from the Universities to occupy seats of such vital powers is neither prudent nor desirable. Neither knowledge derived from books nor pre-service training can be an adequate substitute for the first-hand experience of the working of the court-system and the administration of justice begotten through legal practice. The practice involves much more than mere advocacy. A lawyer has to interact with several components of the administration of justice. Unless the judicial officer is familiar with the working of the said components, his education and equipment as a Judge is likely to remain incomplete. The experience as a lawyer is, therefore, essential to enable the Judge to discharge his duties and functions efficiently and with confidence and circumspection. …”

(iv) (a) The suggestion to bring in a structured training regime, rather than encouraging academically proficient students to opt for a judicial career, in my opinion would deter them. First of all, they will have to continue for two years without pay and allowances and without the period being reckoned as service. As of now, but for three States; all of the other States induct trainee

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. CJ (JD) into the judicial services, assign them specific courts and enable full emoluments as applicable to a regular CJ (JD). Continuation for two years on half the pay of CJ (JD) will be prejudicial to the new recruits, and a strain on the exchequer, without any constructive work being elicited. The training hiatus would see the Courts unmanned and the vacancies unfilled; multiplying by reason of retirements and promotions.

iv) (b) Further direction insofar as the satisfaction of the sitting Judge of the High Court under whose supervision, the trainee judicial officer has to serve as a Law Clerk would create a further hurdle in the smooth transition from training to an active service on probation. There would also be two classes created of the recruits from the same source; lawyers with one year practice and those with two, three or more, in the identical recruitment. If all were to be put to the same training regime, then there would be the issue of treating unequals as equals. If all are not put under the same regime then there could be allegation of hostile discrimination.

5. In my humble opinion, there is no ground for review, and the controversy should rest there. The Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India has expressed an opinion that the judgment under review does not require to be reconsidered on the fundamental question as to whether some prior experience of the working of the Court is desirable for new entrants into the judicial service; to which I fully concur. Noticing some

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. practical difficulties, a via media is arrived at. With all the respect at my command, despite deep contemplation, I am not able to agree with the structured training programme for two years, as suggested, for students who have one year experience at the Bar, for reasons stated hereinabove.

6. The decision under review, on this particular aspect was arrived at based on the opinion expressed by a vast majority of the High Courts and States, who shaped it by observing the working of the judicial system and the inputs garnered therefrom. Even today, the High Courts, a vast majority of them have opined that experience at the Bar is imperative before stepping on to a judicial career. The Universities, but for a few, have taken a contrary stance, understandably in the perceived interest of students, motivated by the anxiety to propel them into a career at the earliest.

7. I am of the definite opinion, as expressed in the unanimous opinion, that experience at the Bar is essential for students right out of college; steeped in academics, who should have a feel of the affairs of man and the travails of a litigant, before deciding their destinies. This was the earlier norm; the departure from which has proved counterproductive, as is evident from the opinion of the High Courts, a clear reflection and indication of the mind of the largest stakeholder; the litigant public. One of the written submissions, rather uncharitably refers to the decision having been based on ‘anecdotal-observations, prejudices and subjective reviews submitted by the High Courts’, without calling for an empirical, comparative study of the output of

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. existing officers. For one, quality is not achieved, by mere academic excellence, nor can it be assessed based on the source from which the recruitments are made. Then, the High Courts are in administrative control of the District Judiciary, in constant touch with their general conduct and judicial dispensation. Assessment of performance of officers, evaluations for promotions; individually, by the Administrative/Portfolio Judges and collectively, by the Administrative/Standing Committee and the Full Court, which has administrative control of the District Judiciary provides the High Courts with valuable inputs and enlightening insights to evaluate the manner in which the justice delivery system can be bettered. The words employed in the written submissions, are disparaging and unbecoming, which are only to be rejected with the disdain it deserves.

8. The forensic and analytical skills of an adjudicator are better learnt in the profession by observing what happens in the Courts; not necessarily as a Presiding Officer controlling it, but as a keen and eager student of law; the Court room being the most profound of all classrooms. A Presiding Officer’s mistake puts to peril a litigant, and her remedy is only by way of an appeal. A lawyer’s mistake can be remedied by an experienced Presiding Officer, a seasoned Senior or an astute colleague, or even by a ministerial staff of the Court with first-hand experience of the proceedings. The requirement of experience is the need of the hour and essential in the immediate future, otherwise we would be

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc. accused of creating a cadre of careerists rather than of jurists capable of enriching a robust system, alive to the needs of the nation, society and its people.

9. With profound respect and intense regret, I beg to disagree and, in my opinion, there is no scope for a review of the well-considered judgment.

10. The Review Petitions, hence, stand dismissed.

11. The I.A.s and the Writ Petition to be posted before the regular Court concerned with the continuing mandamus.

..………….…………………. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

AUGUST 21, 2026.

Writ Petition (Civil) No.1110 of 2025 etc.