Bhisham Lal Verma vs The State Of Uttar Pradesh

2023 INSC 955 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (Crl.) No. 7976 OF 2023

Bhisham Lal Verma … Petitioner

Versus

State of Uttar Pradesh and another … Respondents

ORDER

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. ‘Is a second petition maintainable under Section 482 Cr.P.C. on

grounds that were available for challenge even at the time of filing of the

first petition thereunder?’

2. This is the short question that arises for consideration.

3. As the issue turned on the very maintainability of the case, Signature Not Verified

Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned senior counsel, was requested to assist the Digitally signed by NIRMALA NEGI Date: 2023.10.30 13:23:05 IST Reason:

Court and, with his usual graciousness, he agreed to do so.

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4. We may first note the relevant facts: Complaint dated 23.06.2012

was filed by the Joint Director, State Urban Development Authority, Uttar

Pradesh, before the Station House Officer, Police Station Kotwali, Rampur,

alleging irregularities in the construction of toilets under the Integrated Low

Cost Sanitation Scheme and embezzlement of public funds by the persons

involved. The petitioner herein, being the Project Director/Additional District

Magistrate, Rampur, at the relevant time, was also implicated. Thereupon,

C.C. No. 1280 of 2012 was registered on the file of Police Station Civil

Lines, Rampur, under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 and 120B IPC read

with Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 (for

brevity, ‘the Act of 1988’). The petitioner was amongst the accused named

therein.

5. In exercise of power under Section 197 Cr.P.C. and Section 19 of

the Act of 1988, by order dated 03.12.2013, the Government of Uttar

Pradesh accorded sanction to prosecute the petitioner for the offences

alleged under Sections 409, 420, 467 and 471 IPC and Sections 7 and 13

of the Act of 1988 and any other offences relating thereto. Upon completion

of the investigation, charge sheet dated 30.04.2015 was laid before the

learned Sessions Judge, Rampur. Therein, the petitioner was charged with

offences under Sections 409, 420, 467, 468, 471 IPC and Sections 7 and

2 13 of the Act of 1988. By order dated 12.06.2015, the learned Sessions

Judge, Rampur, took cognizance. The case was thereafter taken on file by

the Special Court at Bareilly as Special Case No. 19 of 2016.

6. Long thereafter, the petitioner filed his first petition under Section

482 Cr.P.C., viz., Criminal Misc. Application No. 8465 of 2018, before the

Allahabad High Court. Therein, he chose to challenge only the

Government’s sanction order dated 03.12.2013. The State opposed the

application, pointing out that a challenge to the sanction could be made

before the Trial Court. Thereupon, the petitioner’s counsel sought liberty to

approach the Trial Court by way of an appropriate application challenging

the sanction. Accepting that plea, the High Court disposed of the

application, vide order dated 15.12.2020, granting liberty to the petitioner to

approach the Trial Court and challenge the sanction order. Significantly, at

the time of filing of this first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the charge

sheet was very much on record and the learned Sessions Judge, Rampur,

had already taken cognizance.

7. However, it was only in the year 2022 that the petitioner felt

inspired to file a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., viz., Criminal

Misc. Application No. 2014 of 2022. His prayers therein were to quash the

charge sheet dated 30.04.2015; the cognizance order dated 12.06.2015;

3 and the proceedings in Special Case No. 19 of 2016, insofar as he was

concerned. This application was dismissed by the Allahabad High Court,

vide order dated 20.02.2023. Therein, the High Court noted that the

petitioner had earlier filed Criminal Misc. Application No. 8465 of 2018

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a limited prayer - to quash the sanction

order dated 30.12.2013. Holding that it was not open to the petitioner to go

on challenging the proceedings one by one and as he had not felt

aggrieved by the charge sheet or the order of cognizance when he had

filed the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court concluded

that the subsequent petition challenging the same would not be

maintainable and dismissed the application. It is against this order that the

petitioner approached this Court by way of the present case.

8. On behalf of the petitioner, Mr. Pradeep Kumar Singh Baghel,

learned senior counsel, would argue that a second petition is maintainable

under Section 482 Cr.P.C.. He relied on the judgment of this Court in

Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal vs.

Mohan Singh and others1. Therein, it was held that a subsequent

application under Section 561-A of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898,

presently Section 482 Cr.P.C, would be maintainable in changed

circumstances. It was affirmed that a subsequent application, which is not a 1 (1975) 3 SCC 706 4 repeat application squarely on the same facts and circumstances, would be

maintainable. To the same effect was the more recent decision of this Court

in Anil Khadkiwala vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another2. Earlier, in S.M.S. Pharmaceuticals Ltd. vs. Neeta Bhalla and another 3,

this Court held that when the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C was

withdrawn with liberty to avail remedies, if any, available in law, the High

Court would not be denuded of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C. on being petitioned again and the principle of res judicata would not

stand attracted. Again, in Vinod Kumar, IAS. vs. Union of India and

others4, a 3-Judge Bench of this Court observed that dismissal of an

earlier petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C would not bar filing of a

subsequent petition thereunder in case the facts so justify.

9. Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned amicus curiae, would however point

out that entertainment of the second petition in Mohan Singh (supra) was

held permissible as the circumstances obtaining at the time of the

subsequent petition were clearly different from what they were at the time

of the earlier one and that was the distinguishing factor which saved the

second petition. He would further point out that, in Simrikhia vs. Dolley 2 (2019) 17 SCC 294 3 (2007) 4 SCC 70 4 Writ Petition No. 255 of 2021, decided on 29.06.2021 = 2021 SCC OnLine SC 559 5 Mukherjee and Chhabi Mukherjee and another 5, this Court cautioned

that the inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C cannot be invoked to

override the bar of review under Section 362 Cr.P.C. Reference was made

to Sooraj Devi vs. Pyare Lal and another 6 which held that the inherent

power of the Court could not be exercised for doing that which is

specifically prohibited by the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. He also

drew our attention to R. Annapurna vs. Ramadugu Anantha Krishna

Sastry and others7, wherein a quash petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

was dismissed on 28.01.1995 and without mentioning the same, another

petition was filed under Section 482 Cr.P.C. with a similar prayer. Noting

that the second petition was not made on the strength of anything which

had developed after 28.01.1995 but only on the facts which subsisted prior

to that date, this Court held that the second petition was not maintainable,

as the High Court did not have the power to upset the order dated

28.01.1995 which had attained finality.

10. In S. Madan Kumar vs. K. Arjunan 8, the Madras High Court

observed that a person who invokes Section 482 Cr.P.C. should honestly

come before the Court raising all the pleas available to him at that point of

5 (1990) 2 SCC 437 6 (1981) 1 SCC 500 7 (2002) 10 SCC 401 8 (2006) 1 MWN (Cri) DCC 1 = 2006 SCC Online Mad 94 6 time and he is not supposed to approach the Court with instalment pleas. It

was further observed that there may be a change of circumstances during

the course of criminal proceedings which would give scope for the person

aggrieved to invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, but when he is

posted with all the facts and circumstances of a case, he cannot withhold

part of it for the purpose of filing yet another petition seeking the same

relief.

11. We are in complete agreement with these observations of the

Madras High Court. Though it is clear that there can be no blanket rule that

a second petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. would not lie in any situation

and it would depend upon the facts and circumstances of the individual

case, it is not open to a person aggrieved to raise one plea after the other,

by invoking the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C.,

though all such pleas were very much available even at the first instance.

Permitting the filing of successive petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

ignoring this principle would enable an ingenious accused to effectively stall

the proceedings against him to suit his own interest and convenience, by

filing one petition after another under Section 482 Cr.P.C., irrespective of

when the cause therefor arose. Such abuse of process cannot be

permitted.

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12. In the case on hand, the filing of the charge sheet and the

cognizance thereof by the Court concerned were well before the filing of

the first petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., wherein challenge was made

only to the sanction order. That being so, the petitioner was not at liberty to

again invoke the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court in relation to the

charge sheet and the cognizance order at a later point of time. The

impugned order passed by the Allahabad High Court holding to this effect

is, therefore, incontrovertible on all counts and does not warrant

interference.

The Special Leave Petition is devoid of merit and is accordingly

dismissed.

Before parting with the case, we place on record our

appreciation and gratitude to Mr. S. Nagamuthu, learned amicus curiae, for

his able and scholarly assistance.

………………………..,J (C.T. RAVIKUMAR)

………………………..,J (SANJAY KUMAR) October 30, 2023 New Delhi.

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