Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. vs Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola .

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1799-1800 OF 2019 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748 of 2014)

BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. Appellant(s)

VERSUS

MAHENDRA PRASAD JAKHMOLA & ORS. Respondent(s)

WITH

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CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 1823-1824 OF 2019 SLP(C) Nos. 33798-33799 of 2014

J U D G M E N T

R. F. NARIMAN, J.

The present appeals arise out of a judgment dated

24.04.2014 and a review dismissal from the aforesaid

judgment dated 11.09.2014, by which the High Court of

Uttarakhand has dismissed a writ petition against a Labour

Court’s Award.

The brief facts necessary to decide these appeals are

as follows:

By Reference Order dated 09.11.2004 under Section 4(k)

of the Uttar Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, the

following dispute was referred to the Labour Court:

“Whether termination of services of workman Shri Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola, s/o Late Shri Vachaspati Jakhmola, Helper by the employer, w.e.f. 13.11.2001, is justified and/or as per law? If not, what benefit/relief the concerned workman is entitled for and with what other details?”

Similar Reference Orders were made in 63 other cases.

Pleadings were filed before the Labour Court at

Haridwar and evidence was led on behalf of the appellant as

well as by the workmen. By an Award dated 01.11.2009, the

Labour Court held, referring to a notification, which is,

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notification dated 24.04.1990 under the Contract Labour

(Regulation and Abolition) Act, 1970 (hereinafter referred

to as ‘1970 Act’), that the said notification, on

application to the appellant, would show that the workmen

were not deployed to do the work mentioned in the

notification. It was further held that based on documentary

evidence in the form of gate passes, the workmen, who were

otherwise employed by a contractor, were directly employed

by the appellant. It was also held to have been fairly

conceded by the employer’s representative that supervision,

superintendence and administrative control of all these

workmen were with the appellant. It was also held that

under the extended definition of “employer” in the Uttar

Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, even if the workmen

are regarded as workmen of a contractor, they would yet be

workmen of the appellant as the appellant was within the

extended definition of “employer” under the Act. This being

the case, it was held that all such workers, being 64 in

number, were entitled to be reinstated with immediate effect

but without backwages. From this Labour Award, a review

petition was filed by the appellant, in which it was clearly

stated that no such concession, as recorded by the Labour

Court, was made before it. Further, notification dated

24.04.1990 had no application as Bharat Heavy Electricals

Ltd. (BHEL) was exempted therefrom and, therefore, to apply

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this notification to the facts of this case was also wrong.

On 18.05.2011, this review was dismissed by the Labour Court

holding:

“Considering the above noted discussion, as made in award dated 01.11.2009, I find force in the argument of opposite part-2 that as far as notification dated 24.04.1990 is concerned, this court has already considered and has given its verdict on this notification and now on review application no contrary inference can be drawn by this court as prayed by the applicant. As far as Notification dated 23.07.2010 (supra) is concerned, this notification was not issued by Government when award was passed. As such, this notification cannot be said applicable at that time and no benefit of later issued notification dated 23.07.2010 can be given to applicant. Moreover, if applicant was exempted vide notification on dated 24.04.1990, in such a case what was the necessity to issue the second notification dated 23.07.2010 (supra) for exemption of contract labour.

On perusal of all the documents and legal preposition of law laid down by Apex Court in Uttar Pradesh State Roadway Transport Corporation versus Imtiaz Hussain (supra). I am in agreement with the Opposite Party-2 that except arithmetical or clerical errors, the order which was passed by the court on merit, cannot be changed, amended or altered. As far as case in hand is concerned no clerical or arithmetical mistake is involved. As such, application A-2 is liable to be rejected.”

A writ petition was filed, being W.P. No. 1021/2011,

against the aforesaid orders. This writ petition was

dismissed by the first impugned order dated 24.04.2014 in

which the High Court recorded that “undisputedly” all

petitioners, i.e., workmen, were performing the duties which

were identical with those of regular employees. Therefore,

it can be said that they were under the command, control,

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management of the BHEL and, concomitantly, the contractor

has absolutely no control over the workmen in performing

such duties. It was, therefore, held that the alleged

contract with the contractor was “sham” and, consequently,

the Labour Court Award was correct in law and was upheld.

Against this order, a special leave petition was filed which

was disposed of as follows: -

“…….

In the impugned order the High Court records, “Undisputedly, all the petitioners, herein, were performing the skilled/unskilled duties with the regularly appionted staff of BHEL in BHEL Factory Premises and were reporting on duties along with regular employees to perform identical duties and had been working for fixed hours along with regular employees of BHEL.” Mr. Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel for the petitioner submits that the above position was seriously disputed and the High Court has wrongly recorded “Undisputedly”.

If that be so, the course open to the petitioner is to approach the High Court seeking review of the impugned order. The submission cannot be entertained for the first time by this Court having regard to the statement of fact recorded in the impugned order.

We observe that if review applications are filed within two weeks, the same will not be dismissed on the ground of delay.

Since special leave petitions are not being entertained on the above ground, liberty is granted to the petitioner to challenge the impugned order, in case, review applications are dismissed by the High Court.

Special leave petitions are disposed of.”

The appellant, then filed a review petition before the

High Court, which disposed of the review stating:

“BHEL has submitted written statement before the learned Labour Court. Paragraph 3 thereof reads

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as under:

“3.The workman concerned in the dispute Sri Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola was never engaged by BHEL Haridwar and he was not their employee and they were not his employers. It appears that he might have been engaged and employed by the contractor Sri Madan Lal who also has been made party as employer in the Industrial Dispute under reference.”

Plain reading of paragraph 3 of the written statement would go to suggest that even BHEL is not sure as to whether workmen were supplied by the contractor or were engaged by the BHEL. That being so, even if there was any Contract Labour Agreement between the BHEL and Madan Lal, alleged contractor, same seems to be sham transaction and camouflage.

Not only this, the BHEL/employer-I has not placed on record any material to demonstrate that under the alleged Labour Contract Agreement payment was ever made in favour of Madan Lal/alleged contractor for supplying labourers/workmen in question; no material is available on the record to say what was the period of supplying the labourers under the contract.

In view of the above discussion, I do not find any good or valid reason to review the judgment under review. Consequently, all the review applications fail and are hereby dismissed.”

Shri Sudhir Chandra, learned senior counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellant, has argued before us that the

Labour Court Award was perverse. Accordingly to him, it

could not have applied the notification dated 24.04.1990 as

his client was excluded from such notification, and being

excluded from such notification, there was, consequently, no

prohibition on employment of contract labour. Further, if

the evidence is to be read as a whole, it is clear that the

representative of BHEL made it clear that, in point of fact,

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there were agreements with contractors and that it is

workers of such contractors, who were paid by them, that are

involved in the present dispute. He also added that no

concession was made before the Labour Court, as was pointed

out in the review petition, but, unfortunately, this plea

was also turned down by the Labour Court, dismissing the

review petition. Merely to state that because gate passes

were given, does not lead to inference that there was any

direct relationship between the appellant and the

respondent-workmen. He also argued that the High Court, in

the first round, not only missed the fact that the Labour

Court Award was perverse, but committed the same error by

stating that the admitted position before the High Court was

also that the labour was directly employed by the appellant.

This is why, according to him, the Supreme Court sent his

client back in review, but the review order, after setting

down a paragraph of the written statement filed by the so-

called employer, then arrived at an opposite conclusion from

what is stated therein. For all these reasons, therefore,

according to him, the judgments of the High Court and the

Labour Court Award ought to be set aside. He also cited

certain judgments before us to buttress his argument that

there was no manner of direct employment between his client

and the workmen.

Ms.Asha Jain, on the other hand, has pointed out to us

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that we should not exercise our discretionary jurisdiction

under Article 136 of the Constitution, inasmuch as the

Labour Court Award is a fair Award, as only reinstatement

was ordered without backwages. She also argued that, at no

stage, had BHEL, which is a Government Company, reinstated

her clients despite the fact that there is no stay granted

in their favour. She went on to add that the concession

that was made was rightly made before the Labour Court, and

that the review petition did not contain any statement by

any authorised representative, who made such concession,

that he had not done so. She countered the argument that

gate passes were not the only basis of the Labour Court,

concluding that a direct relationship exists between the

appellant and her clients. She argued that despite the

change of contractors four times over, the same workers

continued showing, therefore, that there was a direct

relationship between these workmen and the employer. She

also pointed out from certain documents that the contractor

got a 10 per cent profit and otherwise he had nothing to do

with the labour that was provided by him. She then relied

upon certain judgments which state that the power of

judicial review of the High Court ought to be exercised with

circumspection, and that mere errors of law or fact cannot

be interfered with. She also strongly relied upon the

judgment in ‘Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar and Ors.’

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[(1964) (2) SCR 838) to state that, in any event, even if

these employees were employees of the contractor, yet by the

extended definition of ‘employer’ in the Uttar Pradesh

Industrial Disputes Act, a relationship of employer and

workmen would exist under the said Act. She went on to cite

certain passages in the ‘Steel Authority of India Ltd. And

Ors. v. National Union Waterfront Workers and Ors.’ [(2001)

7 SCC 1] to buttress her contention that even if there were

agreements with the contractor, they were only ‘sham’ or

nominal on the facts of this case.

Having heard learned counsel for both the sides, it is

important, first, to advert to the Award of the Labour

Court. The said Award sets down the notification dated

24.04.1990 that was issued under the 1970 Act. A reading of

the aforesaid notification makes it clear that the

appellant, insofar as their UP operations are concerned, in

Haridwar, in particular, are exempted from the aforesaid

notification. Despite this, however, the Labour Court went

on to apply the said notification, which would clearly be

perverse. In addition, though Ms. Jain stated that

documentary evidence was filed, yet the Labour Court based

its finding on direct relationship between the parties only

on the gate passes being issued by the appellant, and on a

concession made by the appellant’s representative.

What is clear from the evidence that was led by the

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parties is that the aforesaid gate passes were issued, as

has been stated by the appellant’s witness, only at the

request of the contractor for the sake of safety and also

from the administrative point of view. The idea was

security, as otherwise any person could enter the precincts

of the factory. This evidence was missed by the Labour

Court when it arrived at a conclusion that a direct

relationship ought to be inferred from this fact alone.

Further, as has been correctly pointed out by Shri Sudhir

Chandra, the appellant has, not only in the first review,

but also in the writ petition filed, taken the plea that no

such concession was ever made. Moreover, quite apart from

this plea and the counter plea of Ms. Jain that the person

who has made such concession should have stated that he did

not do so, concessions on mixed questions of fact and law

cannot decide cases as the evidence as a whole has to be

weighed and inferences drawn therefrom.

Even a concession on facts disputed by a respondent in

its written statement cannot bind the respondent. Thus, in

Swami Krishnanand Govindananad v. Managing Director, Oswal

Hosiery (Regd.) [(2002) 3 SCC 39, this Court held:

“2. ……. It appears that when the case was posted for trial, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent conceded the facts disputed by the respondent in his written statement before the Court. That statement of the advocate was recorded by the Additional Rent Controller thus: “The respondent’s learned counsel has admitted the ground of eviction and also the fact that the applicant is a public

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charitable institution and for that purpose it required the premises.” ……….

3. ………. Whether the appellant is an institution within the meaning of Section 22 of the Act and whether it required bona fide the premises for furtherance of its activities, are questions touching the jurisdiction of the Additional Rent Controller.

He can record his satisfaction only when he holds on these questions in favour of the appellant. For so holding there must be material on record to support his satisfaction otherwise the satisfaction not based on any material or based on irrelevant material, would be vitiated and any order passed on such a satisfaction will be without jurisdiction. There can be no doubt that admission of a party is a relevant material. But can the statement made by the learned counsel of a party across the Bar be treated as admission of the party? Having regard to the requirements of Section 18 of the Evidence Act, on the facts of this case, in our view, the aforementioned statement of the counsel for the respondent cannot be accepted as an admission so as to bind the respondent. Excluding that statement from consideration, there was thus no material before the Additional Rent Controller to record his satisfaction within the meaning of clause (d) of Section 22 of the Act. It follows that the order of eviction was without jurisdiction.”

Equally, where a question is a mixed question of fact

and law, a concession made by a lawyer or his authorised

representative at the stage of arguments cannot preclude the

party for whom such person appears from re-agitating the

point in appeal. In ‘C.M. Arumugam v. S. Rajgopal’ [(1976)

1 SCC 863], this Court held:

“8. ………. That question is a mixed question of law and fact and we do not think that a concession made by the first respondent on such a question at the stage of argument before the High Court, can preclude him from reagitating it in the appeal before this Court, when it formed the subject-matter of an issue before the High Court and full and complete evidence in

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regard to such issue was led by both parties……….”

It would be perverse to decide based only on a

concession, without more, that a direct relationship exists

between the employer and the workmen. Equally perverse is

finding that the extended definition of ‘employer’ contained

in the Act would automatically apply. The extended

definition contained in section 2(i)(iv) of the Uttar

Pradesh Industrial Disputes Act reads as follows:

“2. Definitions.

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

(i)’Employer’ includes-

……………………………………………………………………………………………………………. …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

(iv) where the owner of any industry in the course of or for the purpose of conducting the industry contracts with any person for the execution by or under such person of the whole or any part of any work which is ordinarily part of the industry, the owner of such industry;”

A look at this provision together with the judgment in

‘Basti Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Ram Ujagar and Ors.’ [(1964) (2)

SCR 838) relied upon by Ms. Jain, would show that in order

that section 2(i)(iv) apply, evidence must be led to show

that the work performed by contract labour is a work which

is ordinarily part of the industry of BHEL. We find, on the

facts of the present case, that no such evidence has, in

fact, been led. Consequently, this finding is also a

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finding directly applying a provision of law without any

factual foundation for the same.

This being the case, it is clear that the Labour Court

has arrived at a conclusion which no reasonable person could

possibly arrive at and ought, therefore, to have been set

aside. Apart from the Labour Court dismissing a review from

its own order, we find that the High Court, in the first

impugned judgment dated 24.04.2014, has also arrived at

findings which are contrary to the evidence taken on record.

First and foremost, it could not have said that

“undisputedly”, the labour that was employed through

contractors were performing identical duties as regular

employees and that, therefore, without any evidence, it can

be said that they were under the control, management and

guidance of BHEL. Secondly, when it said that alleged

contracts that were awarded in favour of contractors and how

many labourers, in what type of work etc. were asked for,

were not furnished, is also directly contrary to the

evidence led on behalf of the BHEL, in which such documents

were specifically provided. Thus, Shri Naveen Luniyal, in

his evidence-in-chief, had pointed out:

“………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….. Thus, we entered into contract of workers with the contractors which are document No. 8 and 9 of the above list and the same are marked Exhibit E-6 and E- 7 respectively. The period of contract used to be extended for the completion of assignment in case the work was not completing in time or the same was being extended. The concerned workman filed writs before

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Hon’ble Delhi High Court seeking their regularization while impleading BHEL as a party and it was ordered by the court that you may prefer your suit for regularization before C.G.I.T.

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..

There is no master employer and servant relationship of the workers with BHEL and BHEL was also not making any payment of salary to them as the workers were in the service of the contractor. Thus, there does not arise any question of giving them employment.

The workers were being issued gate passes at the request of the contractor, for the sake of safety and also from administrative point of view, it was specifically bearing the mention that they are the workers of the contractors. Any worker cannot enter in the workplace if such gate passes are not issued. CISF takes care of the safety in our organisation.”

Equally, the review judgment apart from being cryptic,

draws an unsustainable conclusion after setting out

paragraph 3 of the written statement of BHEL in the Labour

Court. What was stated by BHEL in paragraph 3 was that the

workmen were only engaged by the contractor and were not

their employees. The written statement then goes on to be

speculative in stating that it appears that a workman might

have been engaged as an employee by a particular contractor.

A plain reading of this written statement would certainly

not suggest that BHEL is not sure as to whether workmen were

or were not supplied by a contractor, or engaged by BHEL.

What is clear from the written statement is that BHEL has

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denied that the workmen were engaged by BHEL or that the

workmen were BHEL’s workmen. From this to conclude that the

transaction seems to be ‘sham’, is again wholly incorrect.

Apart from this, it is also incorrect to state that BHEL has

not placed on record any material to demonstrate that under

the alleged labour contract, payment was ever made in favour

of Madan Lal, the alleged contractor. It has been correctly

pointed out by learned counsel appearing on behalf of BHEL

that in the very first sentence of the cross examination of

the workmen, before the labour court, the workmen admitted

that payments of their wages were made by four contractors

including Shri Madan Lal. Also, the fact that Madan Lal was

paid under the agreement with BHEL was never disputed.

Indeed, Ms. Jain’s argument that Madan Lal only derived a 10

per cent profit from the agreement with him presupposes

payment to Madan Lal by BHEL under the agreement with him.

This finding again is wholly incorrect.

We, now come to some of the judgments cited by Shri

Sudhir Chandra and Ms. Asha Jain. In ‘General Manager,

(OSD), Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills, Rajnandgaon v. Bharat

Lala and Another’ [2011 (1) SCC 635], it was held that the

well recognised tests to find out whether contract labourers

are direct employees are as follows:

“10. It is now well settled that if the industrial adjudicator finds that the contract between the principal employer and the contractor to be a sham, nominal or merely a camouflage to deny employment

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benefits to the employee and that there was in fact a direct employment, it can grant relief to the employee by holding that the workman is the direct employee of the principal employer. Two of the well-recognized tests to find out whether the contract labourers are the direct employees of the principal employer are: (i) whether the principal employer pays the salary instead of the contractor; and (ii) whether the principal employer controls and supervises the work of the employee. In this case, the Industrial Court answered both questions in the affirmative and as a consequence held that the first respondent is a direct employee of the appellant”

The expression ‘control and supervision’ were further

explained with reference to an earlier judgment of this

Court as follows:

“12. The expression “control and supervision” in the context of contract labour was explained by this Court in International Airport Authority of India v. International Air Cargo Workers’ Union thus: (SCC p.388, paras 38-39) “38…. if the contract is for supply of labour, necessarily, the labour supplied by the contractor will work under the directions, supervision and control of the principal employer but that would not make the worker a direct employee of the principal employer, if the salary is paid by a contractor, if the right to regulate the employment is with the contractor, and the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor.

39. The principal employer only controls and directs the work to be done by a contract labour, when such labour is assigned/allotted/sent to him.

But it is the contractor as employer, who chooses whether the worker is to be assigned/allotted to the principal employer or used otherwise. In short, worker being the employee of the contractor, the ultimate supervision and control lies with the contractor as he decides where the employee will work and how long he will work and subject to what conditions. Only when the contractor assigns/sends the worker to work under the principal employer, the worker works under the supervision and control of the principal employer

19 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

but that is secondary control. The primary control is with the contractor.”

From this judgment, it is clear that test No. 1 is not

met on the facts of this case as the contractor pays the

workmen their wages. Secondly, the principal employer

cannot be said to control and supervise the work of the

employee merely because he directs the workmen of the

contractor ‘what to do’ after the contractor assigns/ allots

the employee to the principal employer. This is precisely

what paragraph 12 explains as being supervision and control

of the principal employer that is secondary in nature, as

such control is exercised only after such workman has been

assigned to the principal employer to do a particular work.

We may hasten to add that this view of the law has

been reiterated in ‘Balwant Rai Saluja and Another v. Air

India Limited and Others’ [2014(9) SCC 407], as follows:

“65. Thus, it can be concluded that the relevant factors to be taken into consideration to establish an employer-employee relationship would include, inter alia:

(i) who appoints the workers;

(ii) who pays the salary/remuneration;

(iii) who has the authority to dismiss;

(iv) who can take disciplinary action;

(v) whether there is continuity of service; and

(vi) extent of control and supervision i.e. whether there exists complete control and supervision.

As regards extent of control and supervision, we have already taken note of the observations in Bengal Nagpur Cotton Mills case [(2011) 1 SCC 635], International Airport Authority of India case [2009 13 SCC 374] and Nalco case [(2014) 6 SCC 756].”

20 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

However, Ms. Jain has pointed out that contractors

were frequently changed, as a result of which, it can be

inferred that the workmen are direct employees of BHEL.

There is no such finding of the Labour Court or any

reference to the same by the High Court. Consequently, this

argument made for the first time in this Court together with

judgments that support the same, is of no consequence.

Ms. Jain also pointed out three judgments of this

Court in ‘Calcutta Port Shramik Union v. Calcutta River

Transport Association and Others [1988 (Supp) SCC 768],

Pepsico India Holding Private Limited v. Grocery Market and

Shops Board and Others [2016 4 SCC 493] and ‘Harjinder Singh

v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation’ [(2010) 3 SCC 192]

for the proposition that judicial review by the High Court

under Article 226, particularly when it is asked to give

relief of a writ of certiorari, is within well recognised

limits, and that mere errors of law or fact are not

sufficient to attract the jurisdicton of the High Court

under Article 226. There is no doubt that the law laid down

by these judgments is unexceptionable. We may only state

that these judgments have no application to the facts of the

present case. The Labour Court’s Award being perverse ought

to have been set aside in exercise of jurisdiction under

Article 226.

Ms. Jain then argued that since no backwages were

21 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

granted but only reinstatement was ordered, we should not

exercise our jurisdiction under Article 136 to set aside the

said Award. When it is found that the findings of the

Labour Court are perverse, it is difficult to accede to this

argument. Equally, the argument that the so-called employer

has not complied with the Labour Court’s Award, despite

there being no stay, is an argument that must be rejected.

In that a contempt petition could always have been moved on

behalf of the workmen for implementation. No such thing has

been done in the present case.

The argument that the contractor, in the facts of the

present case, gets only a 10 per cent profit and nothing

more, is again an argument that needs to be rejected in view

of the clear and unequivocal evidence that has been led in

this case. The workmen have themselves admitted that there

is no appointment letter, provident fund number or wage slip

from BHEL insofar as they are concerned. Apart from this,

it is also clear from the evidence led on behalf of BHEL,

that no wages were ever been paid to them by BHEL as they

were in the service of the contractor. Further, it was also

specifically pointed out that the names of 29 workers were

on the basis of a List provided by the contractor in a bid

that was made consequent to a tender notice by BHEL.

Ms. Asha Jain’s reliance upon the judgment in ‘Steel

Authority of India Ltd. And Others’ [(2001) 7 SCC 1] is also

22 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

misplaced. There is nothing on facts to show that the

contract labour that is engaged, even de hors a prohibition

notification, is in the facts of this case ‘sham’.

Given this, we set aside the impugned judgments of the

High Court and the Labour Court’s Award.

The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms.

………………………………………………………………………., J.

[ ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN ]

………………………………………………………………………., J.

[ VINEET SARAN ]

New Delhi;

February 20, 2019.

23 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

ITEM NO.1 COURT NO.6 SECTION X

S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) Nos. 33747-33748/2014

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 24-04-2014 in WP No. 1021/2011 and 11-09-2014 in RA No. 644/2014 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital)

BHARAT HEAVY ELECTRICALS LTD. Petitioner(s)

VERSUS

MAHENDRA PRASAD JAKHMOLA & ORS. Respondent(s)

(With IA 147436/2018 – STAY APPLICATION and I.A. No. 147441/2018 – EXEMPTION FROM FILING O.T.)

WITH SLP(C) No. 33749-33750/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36689-36690/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 597-598/2015 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36679-36680/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36672-36673/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36683-36684/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36692-36693/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 595-596/2015 (X)

SLP(C) No. 471-472/2015 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36676-36677/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35317-35318/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36674-36675/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36660-36661/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35278-35279/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36487-36488/2014 (X)

24 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

SLP(C) No. 33796-33797/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33773-33774/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33775-33776/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33781-33782/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36662-36663/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35296-35297/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35298-35299/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35280-35281/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36490-36491/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35309-35310/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33783-33784/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33755-33756/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36670-36671/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33794-33795/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35292-35293/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36495-36496/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36664-36665/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33779-33780/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36666-36667/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35315-35316/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35321-35322/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35284-35285/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35301-35302/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33753-33754/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33768-33769/2014 (X)

25 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

SLP(C) No. 35276-35277/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33777-33778/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35305-35306/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35307-35308/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33763-33764/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36668-36669/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35282-35283/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35303-35304/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35290-35291/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35319-35320/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35286-35287/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33790-33791/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35323-35324/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35288-35289/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 35311-35312/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33761-33762/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33757-33758/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33771-33772/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 36687-36688/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33766-33767/2014 (X)

SLP(C) No. 33798-33799/2014 (X)

Date : 20-02-2019 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE VINEET SARAN

26 C.A. NOS. 1799-1800/ 2019 etc. (@SLP (C) Nos. 33747-33748/ 2014 etc.)

For Parties Mr. Sudhir Chandra, Sr. Adv.

Mr. Parijat Sinha, AOR Ms. Reshmi Rea Sinha, Adv.

Mr. Gaurav Ghosh, Adv.

Mr. Rudra Dutta, Adv.

Mr. Devesh Mishra, Adv.

Mr. Anil Kumar Mishra, Adv.

Ms. Asha Jain Madan, AOR Mr. Mukesh Jain, AOR Ms. Madhu Talwar, Adv.

Mr. Rahul Verma, Adv.

Mrs. D. Bharathi Reddy, AOR Ms. Rachna Gandhi, Adv.

UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following O R D E R Leave granted.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed reportable judgment.

Pending applications stand disposed of.

(NIDHI AHUJA) (RENU DIWAN) COURT MASTER (SH) ASSISTANT REGISTRAR

[Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file.]

27