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Bhanei Prasad @Raju vs State Of Himachal Pradesh

Supreme Court4 August 2025Aravind Kumar

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. Under Section 29 of the POCSO Act, once foundational facts are established, a statutory presumption of guilt arises; this presumption may be rebutted by the accused, but where it remains unrebutted, it supports a conviction. 2. The testimony of a child victim in a sexual offence case, if found credible and trustworthy by the trial court, does not require independent corroboration to sustain a conviction, though corroborating evidence strengthens the prosecution case. 3. Where two courts have concurrently found guilt after full trial and appeal, and the victim's testimony is clear, cogent, and corroborated by medical and forensic evidence, the findings are not shown to be perverse, and interference under Article 136 is neither warranted nor justified. 4. A prayer for interim relief of bail cannot be casually granted where conviction has been rendered after full trial, affirmed in appeal, in serious offences under the POCSO Act involving familial betrayal of trust, particularly where the victim's testimony is clear and corroborated. 5. Under Article 142 of the Constitution read with the Compensation Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault framed by the National Legal Services Authority, this Court may direct enhanced compensation for child victims of sexual abuse beyond the prescribed scheme maximum, and may direct a portion be secured in fixed deposit for the victim's future protection and interest.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2025 INSC 934 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) DIARY NO. 33114/2025

BHANEI PRASAD @ RAJU …PETITIONER

VS.

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH …RESPONDENT(S)

ORDER

1. Heard. Delay condoned.

2. The present petition assails the judgment and final order dated

03.07.2024 passed by the High Court of Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in

Criminal Appeal No.562 of 2019, whereby the conviction and sentence

of the petitioner under Section 6 of the Protection of Children from

Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (hereinafter, 'POCSO Act') and Section 506

of the Indian Penal Code has been affirmed.

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by KAVITA PAHUJA Date: 2025.08.06

3. The facts of the case reveal a story of unspeakable betrayal of 11:25:28 IST Reason:

trust by none other than the father of the victim, who stands convicted

1 for repeatedly committing aggravated penetrative sexual assault upon

his own minor daughter, who was just around ten years old at the time

of the incident. The acts were not isolated incidents but sustained,

deliberate assaults within the safety of the home, a place where every

child expects protection.

4. The Trial Court, upon meticulous evaluation of the oral

testimony of the victim (PW3), the corroborating evidence of her elder

sister (PW2), and the compelling forensic and medical records, had

rightly returned a verdict of guilt. The High Court, in a well-reasoned

judgment, has affirmed the conviction and imposed the sentence of life

imprisonment, in addition to fine.

5. The jurisprudence under the POCSO Act has evolved as a

bulwark against the predatory crimes targeting the innocence of

childhood. Section 29 of the POCSO Act creates a statutory

presumption of guilt, once foundational facts are established. In the

present case, this presumption stood unrebutted. The victim’s testimony

was unwavering, medically corroborated, and free from embellishment.

Her disclosure, though delayed, was truthful and borne out of perennial

trauma and threats she has undergone.

2

6. It is now well settled that the testimony of a child victim, if found

credible and trustworthy, requires no corroboration. The Courts below

have not merely accepted the victim’s account, they have validated it

through unimpeachable scientific evidence. The DNA report sealed the

evidentiary chain and has dispelled all doubts in the prosecution case

which is sought to be assailed by the petitioner.

7. The argument raised before us is that the petitioner was falsely

implicated due to strained domestic relationships and disapproval of

romantic alliances of his daughters is completely hollow. No daughter,

however aggrieved, would fabricate charges of this magnitude against

her own father merely to escape household discipline.

8. This Court has repeatedly underscored that in offences involving

sexual abuse, especially against children, the trauma suffered by the

victim is lifelong. The scars are not merely physical but psychological,

cutting across every fibre of trust, safety, and dignity. When the

perpetrator is none other than the father, the natural guardian, the crime

assumes a demonic character.

9. Such offences deserve nothing but the severest condemnation

and deterrent punishment. To pardon such depravity under any guise

3 would be a travesty of justice and a betrayal of the child protection

mandate embedded in our constitutional and statutory framework.

10. As per ancient scriptures:

“Yatra nāryastu pūjyante ramante tatra devatāḥ, yatraitaastu na pūjyante sarvāstatra aphalāḥ kriyāḥ.” "Where women are honoured, divinity flourishes; and where they are dishonoured, all acts become fruitless."

This verse reflects not merely a cultural principle but a constitutional

vision. The dignity of women is non-negotiable, and our legal system

must not permit repeated intrusion into that dignity under the guise of

misplaced sympathy or alleged procedural fairness.

11. A prayer for interim relief of bail is also sought in the petition

and our judicial conscience does not permit casual indulgence in a

prayer for interim relief of bail where the conviction has been rendered

after full-fledged trial, affirmed in appeal, and the testimony of the

victim is clear, cogent, and duly corroborated. This Court has

repeatedly held that in serious offences under the POCSO Act,

particularly those involving familial betrayal of trust, relief cannot be

granted as a matter of routine. Where two courts have concurrently

4 found guilt and the findings are not shown to be perverse, interference

under Article 136 is neither warranted nor justified in the present case.

12. Let it be stated unambiguously that entertaining of the present

petition or remotely considering the grant of bail in a case of this nature,

after the guilt has been proved and affirmed, would not merely

undermine the majesty of the law, it would amount to a betrayal of the

constitutional promise made to every child of this country. It would be,

in the considered view of this Court, a judicial insult to the sanctity of

womanhood and a blow to every mother who teaches her child to

believe in justice.

13. When a father who is expected to be a shield, a guardian, a moral

compass, becomes the source of the most severe violation of a child’s

bodily integrity and dignity, the betrayal is not only personal but

institutional. The law does not, and cannot, condone such acts under the

guise of rehabilitation or reform. Incestuous sexual violence committed

by a parent is a distinct category of offence that tears through the

foundational fabric of familial trust and must invite the severest

condemnation in both language and sentence. The home, which should

be a sanctuary, cannot be permitted to become a site of unspeakable

5 trauma, and the courts must send a clear signal that such offences will

be met with an equally unsparing judicial response. To entertain a plea

for leniency in a case of this nature would not merely be misplaced, it

would constitute a betrayal of the Court’s own constitutional duty to

protect the vulnerable. When a child is forced to suffer at the hands of

her own father, the law must speak in a voice that is resolute and

uncompromising. There can be no mitigation in sentencing for crimes

that subvert the very notion of family as a space of security.

14. In such exceptional circumstances, this Court cannot rest content

with the imposition of penal consequences alone. The arc of

constitutional justice, particularly under Article 142, extends beyond

punishment to encompass rehabilitation, reparation, and the affirmation

of human dignity. As held in Nipun Saxena v. Union of India1, this

Court accepted and directed the implementation of the “Compensation

Scheme for Women Victims/Survivors of Sexual Assault/Other Crimes,

2018” framed by the National Legal Services Authority. Under the said

Scheme, the maximum compensation prescribed for victims of rape is

1 (2019) 2 SCC 703

6 Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Only) which is to be enhanced by

50% in cases involving minor victims.

15. Having regard to the age of the victim at the time of the offence,

the sustained nature of the abuse, and the constitutional obligation to

provide meaningful redress, we direct that a sum of Rs.10,50,000/-

(Rupees Ten Lakhs and Fifty Thousand only) be paid to the victim as

compensation as per the Scheme by the State of Himachal Pradesh in

the peculiar facts of the case. Though the victim has now attained the

age of majority, we are of the considered view that in order to protect

her future interest, some amount if ordered to be kept in a fixed deposit,

it would secure her best interest. Hence, we direct that a sum of

Rs.7,00,000/- (Rupees Seven Lakhs Only) be kept in a fixed deposit in

any nationalised bank for a period of 5 years in the name of the victim

and she would be entitled to withdraw the quarterly interest. The

balance, Rs.3,50,000/- (Rupees Three Lakhs and Fifty Thousand Only)

shall be paid to her by transferring the said amount to her account, the

details of which shall be furnished by her to the Member Secretary,

Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority. It is needless to state

that on maturity of the fixed deposit, the proceeds thereof shall be

7 transferred to her account, and this process shall be monitored by the

Himachal Pradesh State Legal Services Authority.

16. This Court reiterates that justice must not be limited to

conviction, it must, where the law so permits, include restitution. In

awarding this compensation, we reaffirm the constitutional

commitment to protect the rights and dignity of child survivors, and to

ensure that the justice delivered is substantive, compassionate, and

complete.

17. In view of our observations made above, we find no infirmity or

perversity in the concurrent findings of the Courts below, the conviction

and sentence awarded by the courts below are found to be just, lawful

and necessary. Hence, the Special Leave Petition stands dismissed in

limine. Pending applications, if any, shall also stand disposed of.

…..……………………J. (ARAVIND KUMAR)

…..……………………J. (SANDEEP MEHTA)

New Delhi, August 4, 2025

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