Bhagwan Budha Prathmik Technical Training College vs State of Bihar

Bhagwan Budha Prathmik Technical Training College Nirmali ...Appellant

Versus

The State of Bihar & Others ...Respondents with

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9897 OF 2010 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 9378 OF 2009)

Bhagwan Budha Prathmik Technical Training College Nirmali ...Appellant

Versus

Union of India & Others ...Respondents

JUDGMENT

Gokhale J.

Leave Granted.

2. These two appeals raise the questions as to whether after

coming into force of the National Council for Teacher Education Act 1993

(hereinafter referred to as `the NCTE Act') the State Governments have the

power to grant recognition to the colleges which train the teachers, and 2

whether students from the colleges not recognized by National Council for

Teacher Education (in short NCTE) can be permitted to appear for the requisite

examination to become teachers. Since both these appeals are filed by the

same institution, they are being disposed of by a common judgment.

3. Both these matters have had a chequered history. There have

been several rounds of litigation which are being recorded herein below.

4. The appellant claims to be an institution set up by the minority

Buddhist religious community. The appellant has established a Teachers'

Training College at Nirmali, District Supaul (Bihar), in the year 1987. It claims

that the Chief Minister's Secretariat instructed the Director, Research and

Training, Primary Education, Patna (vide a letter dated 13.02.1987) to issue a

permission to the appellant to establish this minority educational institution.

Thereupon, the appellant proceeded to admit students pending the

approval/recognition of its course, by the State Government for training of the

students to become primary teachers.

5. The appellant waited for the order of recognition for more than

three years, and thereafter filed a Writ Petition bearing CWJC No. 5084 of 1990

in the High Court of Patna, seeking a direction to the State Government to

grant the recognition. The prayers in the petition were two-fold. Firstly, a

direction to the State Government to consider and finally dispose of the matter

regarding recognition, and secondly, a direction to the Bihar School 3

Examination Board (for short-Board) to allow the students of the appellant

institution to appear for the ensuing primary teachers training examination.

The appellant claimed that two batches of its students had completed their

course in the meanwhile, i.e. 1987-89 and 1988-90. A Division Bench of the

High Court issued three-fold directions on that petition vide its order dated

3.11.1990 :

(i) to the State Government to decide one way or the other the question of recognition of the institution and

(ii) to the Board, if it was so satisfied, as to the bona fides and genuineness of the claims of the students of the two batches, to allow them to appear for the examination.

(iii) to the Secretary of the appellant college also, to submit full particulars of its students (not exceeding 100 in number for each session) within 10 days from the date of the order. The High Court, however, made it clear that the students appearing in the examination will be appearing at their own risk and no right shall enure to them merely on that basis. Their results will not be published until the question of recognition of institution is finally decided by the State Government, and the publication of results will abide by the final decision in the recognition matter, that is to say, results will be published only in case recognition is granted.

6. Accordingly, students of the appellant institution appeared for the

examination conducted by the Board in January 1991. However, the decision

of the State Government on the aspect of recognition was not forthcoming, and

hence the appellant institution filed the second Writ Petition bearing CWJC

No.293 of 1992. When this Writ Petition was heard, it was pointed out on

behalf of respondents that the appellant had yet not submitted the application

for inspection and grant of recognition in proper proforma, and other 4

requirements were also not fulfiled. In view of this position, the Division Bench

declined to pass any direction in this behalf. It, however, granted liberty to the

appellants to apply afresh in proper proforma, which shall be considered and

disposed of by the concerned authorities in accordance with law. Thus, this

petition was disposed of by order dated 28.8.1992.

7. It is the case of the appellant that they did furnish the necessary

particulars with an application on 27.03.1993, followed by a reminder dated

27.11.1994, with a request to carry out the inspection of the institution for

necessary approval.

8. It appears that the inspection was accordingly carried out, and a

report recommending grant of approval was made by the Director, Research

and Development, Education Department on 28.05.1995. He recommended

grant of approval from 1987 till 1995-97. Another three member committee

carried out one more inspection and made a similar recommendation to the

Special Secretary to the Government.

9. Since, the recognition was still not forthcoming, some of the

students, namely one Vidyanand Choupal and others filed a Writ Petition

bearing CWJC No. 517 of 1998 and prayed for a writ of mandamus that their

results be declared for the examination which was conducted on 24.01.1991

for the training session of 1987-89. The Learned Single Judge who heard the

matter noted that the college was not recognized in spite of the earlier order 5

dated 3.11.1990 in CWJC No.5084 of 1990, which order had also made it clear

that the results can not be declared until recognition is granted. The Learned

Single Judge, therefore, disposed of this third Writ Petition by order dated

28.01.1998 with a direction to the Government to pass a final order on the

question of recognition.

10. In the meanwhile, the NCTE Act had already come into force on

1.7.1995, but the appellant did not take any steps to seek recognition

thereunder. It merely made one more representation on 05.08.2005, that is

some ten years later to the State Government for grant of recognition. The

students who were stated to be waiting for the results filed one more Writ

Petition at this stage bearing CWJC No.1829 of 2006. That petition came to be

dismissed by a Single Judge, and hence those students viz. Ajay Kumar Narala

and others filed LPA No. 609 of 2006. The Division Bench disposed of that

appeal by order dated 13.02.2007 in view of the statement by the counsel on

behalf of the Government that the recognition will be processed very soon and

in all probability, the decision shall be taken finally latest by four weeks.

11. The appellants accordingly made another representation on the

same day i.e. 13.02.2007 to the Education Commissioner pointing out this

order in LPA No.609 of 2006. The Commissioner for the Human Resource

Development Department thereupon issued order Memo No. 57 on 16.03.2007.

He recorded in this order that the departmental inspection committee had

requested for the grant of recognition to the college from 1987-89 onwards. In 6

paragraph 3, of his order the Commissioner in fact noted that in the

meanwhile, the NCTE Act had come into force, but the college had not made

any application to NCTE for its recognition as required under that Act. The

approval/recognition was no longer within the power of the State Government.

However, since the approval ought to have been granted in view of the

inspection report, he recommended that college can be considered to be a

recognized one w.e.f. 1987-89. Para 3 of this order reads as follows: -

"(3) In this process, from 17 August 1995 the National Council for Education Teachers education bill 93 was passed. Under the act, the right to grant approval to the training colleges is now given to the National Council for Teachers Education. Thus in the aforesaid circumstances the concerned college has to make an application for permission before the National Council for Teachers Education (Eastern Zone, Bhubneshwar). The matter pertaining to approval/recognition is not within the power of the State Govt. But the college can be considered to be recognized one with effect from 1987-89 to 1995, because the approval ought to have been granted in view of the inspection report."

12. Inasmuch as, the results were still not being declared, the

appellant filed another Writ Petition bearing CWJC No.7055 of 2007. A Single

Judge of the Patna High Court who heard the matter referred to Sections 14

and 16 of the NCTE Act. He noted that under Section 14 of the Act, the

institute which is giving teachers training has to apply for its recognition to

NCTE within six months of the Act coming into force. The appellant had not so

applied after the appointed day. The students of an institution recognized by

NCTE alone can appear for the qualifying examination as per Section 16 of the 7

Act. The Learned Single Judge, therefore, dismissed the petition by his order

dated 24.08.2007.

13. The appellant filed LPA No.780 of 2007 to challenge the order

dated 24.08.2007. The State Government, however, reviewed the

recommendation for recognition dated 16.03.2007 and cancelled that order

memo by its order dated 02.09.2008, which was on the basis of the above

referred Sections 14 and 16. Having referred to the facts of the case and the

two Sections, this order dated 02.09.2008 recorded as follows: -

"Under the aforesaid facts it becomes clear that after the application of the National teachers training council (N.C.T.E.) Act 1993, the right to grant recognition to the training colleges is the authority of the regional council, National council for Teacher education and not of the State Government or of any other authority. It is also laid down in the order memo 57 dated 16.03.07 that now it is not within the authority of the State Government to consider matters relating to recognition.

Hence it is clear that the order memo 57 dated 16.3.2007 is not relevant to the provisions of the N.C.T.E. act 1993. Henceforth, after reviewing the order memo 57 dated 16.3.07 is being cancelled as per the order of the Government."

14. Therefore, when LPA No.780 of 2007 reached before the Division

Bench on 12.11.2008, the Division Bench noted that the order Memo No. 57

dated 16.03.2007 had been withdrawn by the subsequent order dated

02.09.2008. In view thereof, the Division Bench had no option but to dismiss

the LPA. It is this order dated 12.11.2008 which is challenged in the first

Special Leave Petition No.6511 of 2009.

8

15. While dismissing LPA No.780 of 2007, the Division Bench made it

clear that the order of the Division Bench will not preclude the appellant from

challenging the legality and correctness of the order dated 02.09.2008 by

means of an independent substantive proceeding.

16. The appellant accordingly filed another Writ Petition bearing

CWJC No.18181 of 2008 to challenge this order dated 02.09.2008. Two points

were raised before the Division Bench. Firstly, with respect to the legality of

the NCTE Act. On this aspect the Division Bench noted that the subject of

education was listed at Entry No. 25 in List No. III (concurrent list in the 7th

Schedule to the Constitution of India) and, therefore, the enactment was within

the powers of the Central Government and could not be held to be bad on

account of legislative competence. Secondly, it was argued that the State

Government could not have rescinded the impugned order. The Division Bench

noted that after coming into force of the NCTE Act, there is no power to grant

recognition retained with the State Government, and therefore the order

rescinding the earlier recommendation for recognition could not be said to be

illegal. The Court dismissed the petition by its order dated 9.2.2009 with cost

quantified at Rs.30,000/- to be paid to the State Government, the Union

Government and NCTE in equal proportion. It is this order dated 09.02.2009

which is challenged in the second Special Leave Petition No. 9378 of 2009. 9

17. As stated earlier, the only question which is to be considered in

both these matters is whether the State Government had the authority to issue

the order dated 16.03.2007 granting recognition for the period 1987-95 when

the NCTE Act had already come in force way back in July 1995. Consequently,

whether there was any error on the part of the State Government in rescinding

the order dated 16.03.2007 by its subsequent order dated 02.09.2008.

18. Mr. K.V. Vishwanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

appellant assailed the two impugned orders in the two appeals and particularly

the High Court's order dated 09.02.2009 on various grounds. He submitted

that the High Court has erred in not interfering with the order of the State

Government dated 02.09.2008, withdrawing the earlier order of recognition

dated 16.03.2007. He pointed out that during the period when the order of

recognition dated 16.03.2007 was subsisting, the appellant had filed one more

Writ Petition CWJC No.6991 of 2007 for the declaration of the results of the

two batches of 1987-89 and 1988-90, and that direction had been given by a

Learned Single Judge on 06.05.2008, and the same was left undisturbed by a

Division Bench by dismissing the appeal filed by the Board being LPA No.550 of

2008 by its order dated 22.08.2008. He submitted that, in fact, because of the

non-implementation of the order dated 06.05.2008, the appellant has filed a

contempt petition bearing MJC No. 1747 of 2008, and with a view to avoid the

action in contempt the respondents have withdrawn the recognition order

dated 16.03.2007, and the withdrawal was mala fide.

10

19. Now, as far as this submission is concerned, a power to issue an

order includes a power to withdraw the same for valid reasons. In the instant

case it is material to note that even the order dated 16.03.2007 recorded that

after coming into force of the NCTE Act, it was no longer within the authority of

the State Government to consider the matters relating to recognition. Yet, it

was further recorded that because the approval ought to have been granted in

view of the inspection report, the college can be considered to be recognized

one with effect from 1987-89 to 1995. In the subsequent order of withdrawal

dated 02.09.2008, the above fact has been recorded, and then it is noted that

after the application of the NCTE Act 1993, the right to grant recognition is no

longer with the State Government or with any other authority. It is for this

reason that the State Government has withdrawn the earlier order dated

16.03.2007. If an administrative order is based under an erroneous

assumption of one's own power and if it goes to the root of the matter, the

authority concerned can certainly review it for valid reasons, and if that is so

done, the withdrawal can not be called to be a mala fide one. The appellant

had challenged Government's order dated 2.9.2008 withdrawing its earlier

order dated 16.3.2007, and the order dated 2.9.2008 having been left

undisturbed by the High Court by its subsequent order dated 9.2.2009, now a

submission cannot be entertained on the basis of previous orders in Writ

Petition CWJC 6991/2007 passed at a time when the earlier order dated

16.3.2007 was subsisting.

11

20. It was then submitted on behalf of the appellant that prior to the

coming into force of NCTE Act, it was the State Government which was

authorized to grant recognition and that the NCTE Act has been held to be a

prospective legislation in Sunil Kumar Parimal and Another Vs. State of

Bihar and Others reported in [2007 (10) SCC 150]. It is contended that

the appellant is not asking for any recognition for a period subsequent to the

act coming into force. In fact thereafter the appellant institution has been

closed down. Appellant submits that since the Act is silent about the period

prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, the State Government continues to be

the authority to grant recognition for this earlier period. With respect to this

submission we must note that in the case of Sunil Kumar Parimal (supra) the

examination Board had failed to discharge its function of conducting

examination of Tirhut Physical Education College, Muzaffarpur in spite of

repeated directions from the State Government. As seen from para 19 of the

judgment, the college had already been recognized by the State Government.

The students had completed their course prior to the derecognition of the

college by NCTE. It is due to the sheer inefficiency of the Board that the

students were not permitted to take their examination. In view of these

peculiar facts of that case this Court gave the direction to conduct their

examination by specifically invoking Article 142 of the Constitution. As against

that, in the instant case there was no such direction from the State

Government at any point of time to allow the students of the appellant college

to take their examination, nor was any formal order of recognition issued by 12

the State Government prior to the NCTE Act coming into force. In the instant

case, the appellant is asking for a direction for the students of batches from

1987-89 to 1995-97 to be permitted to appear in the examinations in the year

1994-97 or thereafter. This would amount to allowing the students to take

their examination after the NCTE Act coming into force, when the institution

conducting the course was never recognized either by the State Government or

by NCTE. Obviously that can not be done in the teeth of Section 16 of the Act.

21. Nor can the State Government be directed now to recognize the

appellant for the earlier period, since that power vests with the NCTE after the

appointed day. The proviso to Section 14 of the Act however permits such an

existing institution offering a course of training in teacher education, to apply

within a period of six months from the appointed day for recognition to the

Regional Committee of the NCTE. Appellant has not made any such

application. Section 16 (b) lays down thereafter that after the appointed day

no examining body shall hold examination for a course or training conducted by

an institution, unless it has obtained a recognition from the Regional

Committee of NCTE. Sections 14 (1) and 16 read as follows:-

"14. Recognition of institutions offering course or training in teacher education - (1) Every institution offering or intending to offer a course or training in teacher education on or after the appointed day, may, for grant of recognition under this Act, make an application to the Regional Committee concerned in such form and in such manner as may be determined by regulations:

13 Provided that an institution offering a course or training in teacher education immediately before the appointed day, shall be entitled to continue such course or training for a period of six months, if it has made an application for recognition within the said period and until the disposal of the application by the Regional Committee."

"16. Affiliating body to grant affiliation after recognition of permission by the Council -

Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force, no examining body shall, on or after the appointed day,-

(a) grant affiliation, whether provisional or otherwise, to any institution; or

(b) hold examination, whether provisional or otherwise, for a course or training conducted by a recognized institution,

unless the institution concerned has obtained recognition from the Regional Committee concerned, under section 14 or permission for a course or training under section 15."

22. `Appointed day' has been defined under Section 2 (a) of the Act

as the date of establishment of National Council for Teacher Education.

Section 3 (1) of the Act lays down that with effect from a date as the Central

Government may by notification in the official gazette appoint, there shall be

established a council to be called the National Council for Teacher Education.

This being the position, after that date the State Government could not have

conducted the examination and issued the certificate to the students of the

appellant institution. Prior to 1995, the NCTE had existed since about 1973 as a

government advisory body (and not as a separate institution) to look after

development and progress of "teacher education". The NCTE was then only a

department of the National Council of Educational Research and Training. The 14

National Council for Teacher Education, in its previous status since 1973, was

an advisory body for the Central and State Governments on all matters

pertaining to teacher education, with its Secretariat in the Department of

Teacher Education of the National Council of Educational Research and Training

(NCERT). Despite its commendable work in the academic fields, it could not

perform essential regulatory functions, to ensure maintenance of standards in

teacher education and preventing proliferation of substandard teacher

education institutions. The National Policy on Education (NPE) 1986, and the

Programme of Action thereunder, envisaged a National Council for Teacher

Education with statutory status and necessary resources as a first step for

overhauling the system of teacher education. The NCTE Act came into force

on 1.7.1995, vide S.O. 620(E), dated 1.7.1995, published in the Gazettee of

India, Ext. Pt. II, S.3(ii), dated 10.7.1995 by exercising the power under

Section 1 (3) of the NCTE Act. The National Council for Teacher Education as a

statutory body came into existence in pursuance of the NCTE Act, 1993 (No. 73

of 1993) on 17.8.1995.

23. The appellant relied upon the judgment of this Court in Civil

Appeal No. 8239-8240 of 2009 decided on 16.03.2010 in the case of Zakir

Hussain Primary Education Vs. State of Bihar. In that matter also the

relief sought was with respect to the period from 1979-81 to 1994-96. What is

however important to note is that in that matter the Director, Research and

Training, Primary Education, Bihar had granted recognition to the said

institution on 26.04.1995 which was prior to the Act coming into force, and the 15

order dated 4.9.1999 withdrawing that recognition was challenged in that

petition. In that matter, it was noted by this Court that the Writ Petition and

LPA of the institution were dismissed by the High Court only on the ground of

delay and latches, and since it was dismissed in limini, the Board did not get

the opportunity to file its counter. It is for this reason that this Court interfered

with the orders passed by the Single Judge as well as by Division Bench and

remanded the matter to the High Court for reconsideration. That case is quite

dis-similar to the present case. In the present matter although the inspection

was carried out earlier, the order of recognition was not issued by the State

Government prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, and after the act came

into force it no longer had the authority to issue the same.

24. The counsel for the respondent on the other hand pressed into

service the judgments of this Court in N.M. Nageshwaramma Vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh reported in [1986 Supl. SCC 166] , St. John's Teachers

Training Institute (For Women), Madurai and Others Vs. State of

Tamil Nadu and Others reported in [1993 (3) SCC 595] and L.

Muthukumar and Another Vs. State of Tamil Nadu and Others reported

in [2000 (7) SCC 618]. In Nageshwaramma, this court observed in para 3

as follows:-

"The Teachers Training Institutes are meant to teach children of impressionable age and we cannot let loose on the innocent and unwary children, teachers who have not received proper and adequate training. True they will be required to pass the examination but that may not be 16

enough. Training for a certain minimum period in a property organized and equipped Training Institute is probably essential before a teacher may be duly launched."

The observations of this Court in para 12 of State of Maharastra Vs.

Vikas Sahebrao Roundale reported in [1992 (4) SCC 435] are also quite

instructive:-

"........For equipping such trainee students in a school or a college, all facilities and equipments are absolutely necessary and institutions bereft thereof have no place to exist nor entitled to recognition. In that behalf compliance with the statutory requirement is insisted upon. Slackening the standard and judicial fiat to control the mode of education and examining system are detrimental to the efficient management of the education."

25. In L. Muthukumar's case (supra) this Court held that mere

passing of a public examination is not enough. It must be coupled with proper

training in a recognized institution. Candidates having undergone training in

institutions which do not have recognition may at the highest get the

declaration of their exam results, but would not be entitled to marks sheets,

certificates or diplomas in teacher training. The Court observed in paragraph

14 that before the teachers are allowed to teach innocent children, they must

receive appropriate and adequate training in a recognized training institute

satisfying the prescribed norms, otherwise the standard of education and

careers of children will be jeopardized.

26. In the instant case, the prayer of the appellant is that the

candidates of all these earlier years be permitted to give the board 17

examination, and later on, be given the degree of Bachelor of Education and

Training (BET). The very first order of the High Court dated 3.11.1990 had

laid down two conditions for the same, viz. that the students were to be

allowed for the examination only if the board was satisfied as to the bonafides

and genuineness of the students, and secondly the results were not to be

published until the question of recognition was decided finally by the State

Government. The order also made it clear that the students were to appear for

the examination at their own risk and no rights were to enure therefrom. The

training to become teachers consists of theoretical as well as practical aspects.

The performance of the candidates is to be judged on both these aspects and a

mere theoretical examination does not suffice. The students intending to

become teachers have to undergo practical training. The institution is now

closed down. The Board cannot ascertain the bonafides and genuineness of

the claims of the students (including the entries concerning their practical

training) after so many years to permit them to appear for the examination.

What facilities were available in this institution at the relevant time can also not

be now ascertained by NCTE. Thus the students of the appellant cannot be

permitted to take the Board examination since the appellant does not have the

recognition either from the State Government or from NCTE. Thus, the two

requisite conditions are not fulfilled.

27. It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that the students of

the appellant institution should not be made to suffer and it was pointed out 18

that this Court by an interim order passed in these appeals on 25.05.2009 has

allowed these students to appear in the examination in view of the decision in

Sunil Kumar Parimal's case (supra). We must however note that this order also

made it clear that the examination was to be conducted and the results were to

be declared subject to the decision of the petition. That apart, as pointed out

by the counsel for the respondents, in the event these candidates get the

degrees or diplomas, they will claim seniority in Government Employment over

teachers properly trained in recognized institutions and that would be certainly

prejudicial to the public interest. As held in the case of

L. Muthukumar (supra), if such candidates are issued mark-sheets, certificates

or diplomas in teacher training, that will defeat the objective of having teachers

with proper training as expected under the NCTE Act. It will cause serious

damage to the education of the children who would be studying under these

teachers. This Court has observed in para 18 in St. John's Teachers Training

Institute (supra), that the teachers appearing for the examination on the basis

of interim orders cannot derive any benefits on the basis of such interim

orders. Whatever education and training these students have taken in the

appellant's institution may help them get employment in some private schools

as noted in L. Muthukumar's case (supra), or they may otherwise seek their

remedy against the appellant.

28. As the preamble of the NCTE Act lays down it is enacted to

achieve planned and coordinated development for teacher education system 19

throughout the Country. The Act is also passed to bring about the regulation

and proper maintenance of norms and students in teacher education system.

Sections 14 and 16 of Act are enacted with that purpose, and recognition of

the teacher training institute vests with the NCTE after the appointed day.

These provisions answer the two questions which are set out at the beginning

of this judgment. Every institution offering a course of training in teacher

education has to obtain a recognition from the Regional Committee of NCTE

after the appointed date. That authority is vested only in the Regional

Committee as per Section 14 of the Act. The State Government cannot

exercise that power after the appointed date. Nor can the examining body hold

examination of the students of a teacher training institute after the appointed

day unless the institute is recognized by Regional Committee of the NCTE as

laid down in Section 16 of the Act. These provisions have to be implemented

with full force in the interest of the education of the children whom these

teachers will be subsequently teaching, the teacher-candidates themselves, and

for bringing about proper standard and norms in the field of teachers'

education. In the present case the order granting recognition dated 16.3.2007

was outside the powers of the State Government and therefore the

Government was quite right in rescinding the same by a subsequent order

dated 2.9.2008.

29. It was contended by the appellant that its students should not be

made to suffer on account of the delay on the part of the State Government in 20

taking the decisions. We quite see the agony of the students who might have

joined the appellant institute bona fide. We are told that the appellant

institution is in a backward area and the students are coming from

economically and socially backward classes of the society. An institution

claiming to teach such students should conduct itself with all the more

responsibility and ought to be more careful and diligent. When the NCTE Act

came into force in 1995, the institution should have applied to the concerned

authorities diligently within the time stipulated. Having not so applied

thereunder, it is the appellant institution which is responsible for the situation

in which the students have landed. From what is narrated earlier, it is seen

that even prior to the NCTE Act coming into force, inspite of High Court's order

dated 3.11.1990, the appellant did not submit the application for inspection of

the institution and the required particulars in the prescribed proforma to the

State Government until 27.3.1993. The students also sought their remedy

belatedly in the year 1998 by filing Writ Petition No. CWJC 517 of 1998 for the

declaration of the result of the examination of the 1987-1989 batch held on

24.1.1991 (conducted pursuant to the order of the High Court dated

3.11.1990). By the time this petition was filed, the NCTE Act had already come

into force on 1.7.1995, and hence although the State Government considered

the case of the appellant in pursuance to the direction dated 28.1.1998 in Writ

Petition No. CWJC 517 of 1998 and order dated 13.2.2007 in LPA No. 609/2006

for the period 1987 to 1995, it rescinded the same on realizing that it no longer

had the power to grant the recognition. Thus, it is very clear that the appellant 21

and the students were also not diligent in furthering their cause, for reasons

which are not stated. The State Government alone cannot be blamed for the

fate of the students for its initial inaction.

30. Even so, in our view the part of the order in CWJC No.18181 of

2008 imposing cost of Rs. 30,000/- on the appellant was not called for. The

same requires to be deleted.

31. In the circumstances, we do not find any error in the two

impugned orders. Accordingly, both the appeals are dismissed. The order in

CWJC No.18181 of 2008 is however modified to the extent of deleting the cost

of Rs. 30,000/-. As far as the present proceedings are concerned, there will

be no order to costs in both these appeals. In view of the dismissal of both

appeals all the interim applications pending therein stand disposed of.

........................................J. ( R.V. Raveendran )

.........................................J. ( H.L. Gokhale ) New Delhi Dated: November 23, 2010