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Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Saroj Kumar Panda

Supreme Court23 September 2024Rajesh Bindal · J.K. Maheshwari

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

1. When a statute or procedure confers jurisdiction on a tribunal only over disputes involving "workmen," the tribunal must examine whether the respondent falls within that statutory definition before exercising jurisdiction, and mere ex parte proceedings do not obviate this preliminary jurisdictional inquiry into the nature of the respondent's employment status. 2. Proper impleadment of parties is a fundamental requirement in all proceedings before courts or tribunals, and failure to implead the correct party against whom relief is sought—substituting instead individual officers of a corporate entity—constitutes a technical defect that vitiates the award, as a corporate entity has separate legal personality from its officers and any decree or award becomes inexecutable against unimpleaded parties. 3. Where counsel engaged to represent a party before a tribunal has failed to take proper care of proceedings and the officers responsible for managing the litigation and engaging that counsel have departed from the organization during the pendency of the matter, resulting in non-appearance at critical proceedings, such circumstances constitute an acceptable explanation for non-appearance that warrant remitting the matter for fresh hearing rather than dismissing the challenge on technical grounds of the appellant's lapse. 4. An ex parte proceeding before a tribunal does not preclude examination of jurisdictional defects inherent in the claim petition itself, including defects in party impleadment and the complainant's status as a "workman" within the statutory definition.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE2024 INSC 821IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7080 of 2021)

TARUN CHUGH, CEO AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, BAJAJ ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. …APPELLANT(s)

VERSUS

SAROJ KUMAR PANDA …RESPONDENT(s)

ORDER

Rajesh Bindal, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The impugned order1 was passed by the High

Court2 in Writ Petition3 filed by Tarun Chugh4, Ruben

Selvadoray5 and Prabir Ranjan Prusty6 whereby the ex parte

Award7 of the Tribunal8 was upheld.

1 Dated 01.03.2021 2 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack 3 W.P.(C) Signature Not Verified No.8877 of 2020 4 CEO Digitally signed KAVITA PAHUJA by and Managing Director, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd.

5 Chief Date: 2024.10.25 19:12:50 IST Human Resource Officer, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co.Ltd. Reason:

6 Regional Head, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co.Ltd. 7 Dated 05.02.2019 8 Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.86 of 2017

1

3. Initially the Special Leave Petition was filed by one

of the writ petitioners, Tarun Chugh, however, while deleting

the proforma Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from the array of the

parties, as allowed vide order dated 30.06.2021, the name of

the Petitioner in the Amended Cause Title annexed to the

S.L.P. paper book is shown as ‘Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance

Company Ltd.’ herein after referred to as ‘the Company’,

which is different from the original Petitioner. This change was

made without any order of the Court, hence, cannot be

admitted.

4. Briefly, the facts as available on record are that a

statement of claim was filed by the Respondent No.1 before

the Tribunal impugning his termination vide order dated

25.07.2017. Vide ex-parte Award dated 05.02.2019 passed

by the Tribunal, the termination of the Respondent No.1 was

held to be bad. He was directed to be reinstated with back-

wages and other service benefits. The aforesaid ex-parte

Award was challenged by all the parties impleaded by the

Respondent No.1 before the Tribunal, namely, the officers in

person, without joining the company - employer as a party.

The writ petition filed by the writ petitioners/appellants herein

2 before the High Court, impugning the ex-parte Award of the

Tribunal, was dismissed vide order impugned.

5. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that it

is a case in which the matter was entrusted to the counsel for

appearance before the Tribunal, but later he failed to take

care of the proceedings of the case. The Officer in the Legal

Department had left the management company on

26.09.2018 and the Officer in the Human Resource

Department had left the management company on

24.05.2019 respectively, i.e., during the pendency of the

dispute before the Tribunal. It was under these circumstances

that proper representation could not be made.

5.1 The Respondent No.1 had failed to implead the

employer with whom there may be privity of contract. Only

the officers of the company were impleaded. Such officers of

the company had not engaged Respondent No.1 in their

personal capacity. It was argued that the Respondent No.1

was initially appointed as Branch Accountant on 09.05.2006

by the Company. Thereafter, he was promoted as Senior

Divisional Accountant in Grade L(IA) on 01.04.2009. He was

3 redesignated as Business Supporting Officer (Managerial

Post) w.e.f. 01.08.2014. He was transferred from Finance

Department to Sales Administration w.e.f. 01.01.2015 and

again from Agency Sales Administration to Agency Sales w.e.f.

15.05.2017. On account of Departmental restructuring

resulting in changes in roles and responsibilities of different

officers, the Respondent No.1 became surplus and redundant

in the company and there being no alternative work available

for his adjustment, however, his services were dispensed

with, as per the terms of appointment and a communication

was sent to the Respondent No.1 on 25.07.2017 by the

company. A sum of ₹ 1,07,787/- was transferred in his bank

account in lieu of notice for termination. The Respondent No.

1 was earning a salary of ₹ 35,929/- per month, as was his

last drawn salary for the month of June 2017. Further, it was

argued that the Respondent No. 1 was working on a

managerial post, by no stretch of imagination he could be

treated as workman, entitling him to invoke the jurisdiction of

the Tribunal by raising an industrial dispute. The order passed

by the Tribunal was totally without jurisdiction. This basic

issue should have been examined by the Tribunal even on the

4 facts, which were brought on record.

5.2 The order of the Tribunal was challenged before

the High Court placing the aforesaid facts and also explaining

the lapse on the part of the counsel, who was later removed

from the panel of the advocates engaged to conduct cases on

behalf of the company. However, the writ petition was

dismissed. The submission is that an opportunity be granted,

and the matter may be remitted back to the Tribunal for re-

examination on merits after impleadment of proper parties.

6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the

Respondent No.1 submitted that after due service of notice,

no one had appeared before the Tribunal, hence, they were

proceeded against ex-parte. The management was well

within knowledge of the pendency of the matter before the

Tribunal, hence, it cannot be allowed to take the plea that

employer was not impleaded as such, as senior officers were

already before the Tribunal, as such a hyper-technical

submission deserves to be rejected. Once service to the

Respondent No.1 before the Tribunal was complete, which is

not disputed by the Appellant before this Court, there is no

5 good reason for setting aside the Award of the Tribunal only

because of the Appellant’s lapse in appearance. The appeal

deserves to be dismissed.

7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the paper book.

8. The facts as evident from the record are that the

Respondent No.1 was appointed as Branch Accountant on

09.05.2006. Thereafter, he was promoted as Senior

Divisional Accountant in Grade L(IA) on 01.04.2009. He was

redesignated as Business Support Officer (Managerial Post)

w.e.f. 01.08.2014. Further, he was transferred from Finance

Department to Sales Administration w.e.f. 01.01.2015 and

again from Agency Sales Administration to Agency Sales w.e.f.

15.05.2017. It is claimed that on account of Departmental

restructuring resulting in changes in duties and

responsibilities of different officers, the Respondent No.1

became surplus and there being no alternative job available

for his adjustment, his services were dispensed with, as per

the terms of appointment.

9. The Respondent No. 1 challenged his termination

6 before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), which led

to conciliation proceedings. However, no settlement could be

arrived at. The Respondent No. 1 was issued a Certificate

dated 25.10.2017 to approach the Tribunal directly.

10. The Respondent No.1 filed claim petition 9 before

the Tribunal. Three officers of the company were impleaded

and not the company, which was the employer of the

Respondent No.1. Para 3 of the Award of the Tribunal

mentions that in spite of notice, neither the management

company nor the officers who were impleaded as party

appeared. Hence, they were proceeded against ex parte.

However, the fact remains that the management was not a

party before the Tribunal. Finally, while granting the relief

also it was directed that the first party management-Bajaj

Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. is directed to reinstate the

applicant workman whereas the first party impleaded before

the Tribunal was not Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. but

Tarun Chugh, CEO and Managing Director of the company.

10.1 It is to observe that proper impleadment of parties

in any proceedings is sine qua non in any matter coming

9 I.D. Case No.86 of 2017 7 before the court. However, what is noticed is that it has

become a casualty in the process. Due care is not taken at

the time of initiation of any proceedings before any forum to

ensure that proper parties are impleaded.

10.2 The case in hand is not in isolation. It needs to

be appreciated that a corporate has a separate legal entity

as compared to an individual or an officer of the company.

There can be privity of contract between the corporate and

any other individual and that contract or communication

may have been signed by any officer on its behalf as an

authorized signatory. It does not mean that the officer

signing the communication or the agreement or the

executive head of the company becomes individually liable

for any claim against the company except the cases where

any specific claim is made in that regard. Any order or

decree or award passed by the Court, in case proper parties

are not impleaded, becomes inexecutable.

11. The plea taken before the High Court while

challenging the aforesaid Award of the Tribunal was that the

then Human Resource Manager and the Legal Manager were

8 dealing with the matter and had engaged a counsel to

represent the company before the Tribunal. However, the

Legal Manager had left the management company on

26.09.2018 while the Human Resource Manager had left the

management company on 24.05.2019, i.e., during the

pendency of the matter before the Tribunal. The counsel 10

engaged by the management company did not take proper

care of matter, hence, was removed from the panel of the

advocates conducting cases on behalf of the company.

However, the High Court did not accept this plea and rejected

the writ petition.

12. On the facts at hand and the material available on

record, we find that there was a technical defect in the claim

petition filed by the Respondent No.1 as the management

who was his employer was not even impleaded as party

before the Tribunal, still a direction was issued to the

management to reinstate him. The designation and job

profile of the Respondent No.1 and even the material placed

on record by the Respondent No. 1 were required to be

considered by the Tribunal to come to the conclusion whether

10 Name is being withheld

9 he was a workman or not. It is only then jurisdiction is vested

in the Tribunal to deal with the subject. The reason assigned

by the Appellant explaining the non-appearance of the

counsel before the Tribunal seems plausible and acceptable.

As the two officers, who were dealing with the matter and

engaged the then counsel, had also left the organization.

13. Considering the totality of the facts, as discussed

above, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed.

14. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow the

present appeal. The impugned order passed by the High

Court and the Award of the Tribunal are set aside. The matter

is remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration on

merits after proper parties are impleaded, giving due

opportunity to both the parties. There shall be no order as to

costs.

……………………………………., J.

[ J.K. MAHESHWARI ]

….…………………………………., J.

[ RAJESH BINDAL ]

New Delhi September 23, 2024.

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