Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. vs Saroj Kumar Panda
- SCC(2024) 19 SCC 620
- Neutral2024 INSC 821
- SCR[2024] 9 SCR 981
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. When a statute or procedure confers jurisdiction on a tribunal only over disputes involving "workmen," the tribunal must examine whether the respondent falls within that statutory definition before exercising jurisdiction, and mere ex parte proceedings do not obviate this preliminary jurisdictional inquiry into the nature of the respondent's employment status. 2. Proper impleadment of parties is a fundamental requirement in all proceedings before courts or tribunals, and failure to implead the correct party against whom relief is sought—substituting instead individual officers of a corporate entity—constitutes a technical defect that vitiates the award, as a corporate entity has separate legal personality from its officers and any decree or award becomes inexecutable against unimpleaded parties. 3. Where counsel engaged to represent a party before a tribunal has failed to take proper care of proceedings and the officers responsible for managing the litigation and engaging that counsel have departed from the organization during the pendency of the matter, resulting in non-appearance at critical proceedings, such circumstances constitute an acceptable explanation for non-appearance that warrant remitting the matter for fresh hearing rather than dismissing the challenge on technical grounds of the appellant's lapse. 4. An ex parte proceeding before a tribunal does not preclude examination of jurisdictional defects inherent in the claim petition itself, including defects in party impleadment and the complainant's status as a "workman" within the statutory definition.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2024 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 7080 of 2021)
TARUN CHUGH, CEO AND MANAGING DIRECTOR, BAJAJ ALLIANZ LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY LTD. …APPELLANT(s)
VERSUS
SAROJ KUMAR PANDA …RESPONDENT(s)
ORDER
Rajesh Bindal, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The impugned order1 was passed by the High
Court2 in Writ Petition3 filed by Tarun Chugh4, Ruben
Selvadoray5 and Prabir Ranjan Prusty6 whereby the ex parte
Award7 of the Tribunal8 was upheld.
1 Dated 01.03.2021 2 High Court of Orissa, Cuttack 3 W.P.(C) Signature Not Verified No.8877 of 2020 4 CEO Digitally signed KAVITA PAHUJA by and Managing Director, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd.
5 Chief Date: 2024.10.25 19:12:50 IST Human Resource Officer, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co.Ltd. Reason:
6 Regional Head, Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co.Ltd. 7 Dated 05.02.2019 8 Central Government Industrial Tribunal, Bhubaneswar in I.D. Case No.86 of 2017
1
3. Initially the Special Leave Petition was filed by one
of the writ petitioners, Tarun Chugh, however, while deleting
the proforma Respondent Nos.2 and 3 from the array of the
parties, as allowed vide order dated 30.06.2021, the name of
the Petitioner in the Amended Cause Title annexed to the
S.L.P. paper book is shown as ‘Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance
Company Ltd.’ herein after referred to as ‘the Company’,
which is different from the original Petitioner. This change was
made without any order of the Court, hence, cannot be
admitted.
4. Briefly, the facts as available on record are that a
statement of claim was filed by the Respondent No.1 before
the Tribunal impugning his termination vide order dated
25.07.2017. Vide ex-parte Award dated 05.02.2019 passed
by the Tribunal, the termination of the Respondent No.1 was
held to be bad. He was directed to be reinstated with back-
wages and other service benefits. The aforesaid ex-parte
Award was challenged by all the parties impleaded by the
Respondent No.1 before the Tribunal, namely, the officers in
person, without joining the company - employer as a party.
The writ petition filed by the writ petitioners/appellants herein
2 before the High Court, impugning the ex-parte Award of the
Tribunal, was dismissed vide order impugned.
5. Learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that it
is a case in which the matter was entrusted to the counsel for
appearance before the Tribunal, but later he failed to take
care of the proceedings of the case. The Officer in the Legal
Department had left the management company on
26.09.2018 and the Officer in the Human Resource
Department had left the management company on
24.05.2019 respectively, i.e., during the pendency of the
dispute before the Tribunal. It was under these circumstances
that proper representation could not be made.
5.1 The Respondent No.1 had failed to implead the
employer with whom there may be privity of contract. Only
the officers of the company were impleaded. Such officers of
the company had not engaged Respondent No.1 in their
personal capacity. It was argued that the Respondent No.1
was initially appointed as Branch Accountant on 09.05.2006
by the Company. Thereafter, he was promoted as Senior
Divisional Accountant in Grade L(IA) on 01.04.2009. He was
3 redesignated as Business Supporting Officer (Managerial
Post) w.e.f. 01.08.2014. He was transferred from Finance
Department to Sales Administration w.e.f. 01.01.2015 and
again from Agency Sales Administration to Agency Sales w.e.f.
15.05.2017. On account of Departmental restructuring
resulting in changes in roles and responsibilities of different
officers, the Respondent No.1 became surplus and redundant
in the company and there being no alternative work available
for his adjustment, however, his services were dispensed
with, as per the terms of appointment and a communication
was sent to the Respondent No.1 on 25.07.2017 by the
company. A sum of ₹ 1,07,787/- was transferred in his bank
account in lieu of notice for termination. The Respondent No.
1 was earning a salary of ₹ 35,929/- per month, as was his
last drawn salary for the month of June 2017. Further, it was
argued that the Respondent No. 1 was working on a
managerial post, by no stretch of imagination he could be
treated as workman, entitling him to invoke the jurisdiction of
the Tribunal by raising an industrial dispute. The order passed
by the Tribunal was totally without jurisdiction. This basic
issue should have been examined by the Tribunal even on the
4 facts, which were brought on record.
5.2 The order of the Tribunal was challenged before
the High Court placing the aforesaid facts and also explaining
the lapse on the part of the counsel, who was later removed
from the panel of the advocates engaged to conduct cases on
behalf of the company. However, the writ petition was
dismissed. The submission is that an opportunity be granted,
and the matter may be remitted back to the Tribunal for re-
examination on merits after impleadment of proper parties.
6. On the other hand, learned counsel for the
Respondent No.1 submitted that after due service of notice,
no one had appeared before the Tribunal, hence, they were
proceeded against ex-parte. The management was well
within knowledge of the pendency of the matter before the
Tribunal, hence, it cannot be allowed to take the plea that
employer was not impleaded as such, as senior officers were
already before the Tribunal, as such a hyper-technical
submission deserves to be rejected. Once service to the
Respondent No.1 before the Tribunal was complete, which is
not disputed by the Appellant before this Court, there is no
5 good reason for setting aside the Award of the Tribunal only
because of the Appellant’s lapse in appearance. The appeal
deserves to be dismissed.
7. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused
the paper book.
8. The facts as evident from the record are that the
Respondent No.1 was appointed as Branch Accountant on
09.05.2006. Thereafter, he was promoted as Senior
Divisional Accountant in Grade L(IA) on 01.04.2009. He was
redesignated as Business Support Officer (Managerial Post)
w.e.f. 01.08.2014. Further, he was transferred from Finance
Department to Sales Administration w.e.f. 01.01.2015 and
again from Agency Sales Administration to Agency Sales w.e.f.
15.05.2017. It is claimed that on account of Departmental
restructuring resulting in changes in duties and
responsibilities of different officers, the Respondent No.1
became surplus and there being no alternative job available
for his adjustment, his services were dispensed with, as per
the terms of appointment.
9. The Respondent No. 1 challenged his termination
6 before the Regional Labour Commissioner (Central), which led
to conciliation proceedings. However, no settlement could be
arrived at. The Respondent No. 1 was issued a Certificate
dated 25.10.2017 to approach the Tribunal directly.
10. The Respondent No.1 filed claim petition 9 before
the Tribunal. Three officers of the company were impleaded
and not the company, which was the employer of the
Respondent No.1. Para 3 of the Award of the Tribunal
mentions that in spite of notice, neither the management
company nor the officers who were impleaded as party
appeared. Hence, they were proceeded against ex parte.
However, the fact remains that the management was not a
party before the Tribunal. Finally, while granting the relief
also it was directed that the first party management-Bajaj
Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. is directed to reinstate the
applicant workman whereas the first party impleaded before
the Tribunal was not Bajaj Allianz Life Insurance Co. Ltd. but
Tarun Chugh, CEO and Managing Director of the company.
10.1 It is to observe that proper impleadment of parties
in any proceedings is sine qua non in any matter coming
9 I.D. Case No.86 of 2017 7 before the court. However, what is noticed is that it has
become a casualty in the process. Due care is not taken at
the time of initiation of any proceedings before any forum to
ensure that proper parties are impleaded.
10.2 The case in hand is not in isolation. It needs to
be appreciated that a corporate has a separate legal entity
as compared to an individual or an officer of the company.
There can be privity of contract between the corporate and
any other individual and that contract or communication
may have been signed by any officer on its behalf as an
authorized signatory. It does not mean that the officer
signing the communication or the agreement or the
executive head of the company becomes individually liable
for any claim against the company except the cases where
any specific claim is made in that regard. Any order or
decree or award passed by the Court, in case proper parties
are not impleaded, becomes inexecutable.
11. The plea taken before the High Court while
challenging the aforesaid Award of the Tribunal was that the
then Human Resource Manager and the Legal Manager were
8 dealing with the matter and had engaged a counsel to
represent the company before the Tribunal. However, the
Legal Manager had left the management company on
26.09.2018 while the Human Resource Manager had left the
management company on 24.05.2019, i.e., during the
pendency of the matter before the Tribunal. The counsel 10
engaged by the management company did not take proper
care of matter, hence, was removed from the panel of the
advocates conducting cases on behalf of the company.
However, the High Court did not accept this plea and rejected
the writ petition.
12. On the facts at hand and the material available on
record, we find that there was a technical defect in the claim
petition filed by the Respondent No.1 as the management
who was his employer was not even impleaded as party
before the Tribunal, still a direction was issued to the
management to reinstate him. The designation and job
profile of the Respondent No.1 and even the material placed
on record by the Respondent No. 1 were required to be
considered by the Tribunal to come to the conclusion whether
10 Name is being withheld
9 he was a workman or not. It is only then jurisdiction is vested
in the Tribunal to deal with the subject. The reason assigned
by the Appellant explaining the non-appearance of the
counsel before the Tribunal seems plausible and acceptable.
As the two officers, who were dealing with the matter and
engaged the then counsel, had also left the organization.
13. Considering the totality of the facts, as discussed
above, in our opinion, the appeal deserves to be allowed.
14. For the reasons mentioned above, we allow the
present appeal. The impugned order passed by the High
Court and the Award of the Tribunal are set aside. The matter
is remitted back to the Tribunal for fresh consideration on
merits after proper parties are impleaded, giving due
opportunity to both the parties. There shall be no order as to
costs.
……………………………………., J.
[ J.K. MAHESHWARI ]
….…………………………………., J.
[ RAJESH BINDAL ]
New Delhi September 23, 2024.
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