Babu Lal vs Hryana State Agricultural Mkt. Board

Babu Lal ...Appellant

VERSUS

Haryana State Agricultural Mkt. Board ..Respondent

JUDGMENT

TARUN CHATTERJEE,J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This is a plaintiff's appeal in a suit for a decree for payment

of salary from 2nd of November,1995 to 30th of March, 2001

and for other incidental reliefs which is directed against the

judgment dated 27th of November, 2006 passed by the High

Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No.

2795 of 2005 (O & M) whereby the High Court had allowed

the second appeal and dismissed the suit of the plaintiff -

appellant.

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3. The parties went into trial and adduced evidence in

support of their respective cases. After framing issues and

after considering the evidence, documentary and oral, the

trial Court dismissed the suit. In appeal, the appellate

court, relying on a judgment of this Court in the case of

Union of India etc. etc. vs. K.V.Jankiraman etc.etc. [AIR

1991 SC 2010] reversed the decision of the trial court and

decreed the suit of the plaintiff - appellant. In the second

appeal, the High Court relied on the aforesaid decision of

this Court on which reliance was also placed by the

appellate court, but after applying the principles laid down

in the said decision and also on consideration of Exhibit P-5

held that the appellant was not entitled to any relief and

allowed the second appeal and dismissed the suit.

4. Feeling aggrieved, the plaintiff, who is now appellant before

us, filed a special leave petition, which on grant of leave,

was heard in the presence of the learned counsel for the

parties.

5. We have heard Mr.Mahinder Singh Dahiya, learned counsel

for the plaintiff - appellant and Mr.Ambuj Agarwal for the 3

defendant - respondent. We have examined the judgment of

the High Court passed in the second appeal as well as the

judgments of the courts below and other materials on

record. At the risk of repetition, while dismissing the suit

and setting aside the judgment of the appellate court, the

High Court relied on the decision of this Court in

Jankiraman's case (supra) and on a document being

Exhibit P-5, which shows that the plaintiff - appellant had

only worked as Executive Officer of the respondent from

28th of March, 1997 to 31st of July, 1997.

6. A reading of the aforesaid decision of this Court would show

that the authorities are vested with power to decide whether

an employee at all deserves any salary for the intervening

period and if he does, the extent to which he deserves it.

This decision also clearly suggests that there is no inflexible

rule that in every case when an employee is exonerated

from disciplinary/criminal proceedings, he should be

automatically entitled to salary including all benefits for the

intervening period. This decision of this Court would also

show that where the acquittal of an employee in a criminal 4

proceeding was on benefit of doubt, the employer has a

right to decide whether or not such an employee deserves

any salary for the intervening period. Keeping these

observations of this Court in mind, let us now consider

whether the High Court was justified in holding that in the

admitted facts of this case, the appellant was entitled to the

salary as claimed. The Office Memorandum of the

respondent clearly shows that the appellant who was

working as Assistant Secretary, Marketing Board, Hasanpur

was promoted to the post of E.O.-cum-Secretary with effect

from 2nd of November, 1995 in the pay scale of Rs.2000-20-

2300-EB-75-3200 and further revised with effect from 1st of

January, 1996 to Rs.7450-225-11500. In the said office

memorandum, it was also made clear that no arrears of pay

would be made for the period for which he had actually not

worked.

7. The High Court, in its impugned judgment, reversed the

finding of the Appellate Court on consideration of Exhibit

P5 and also applying the principles laid down in

Jankiraman's case (supra) held that Exhibit P-5 would 5

show that the plaintiff - appellant had worked with the

respondent as an Executive Officer only from 28th of March,

1997 to 31st of July, 1997. Relying on this document and

also on the aforesaid decision of this Court, the High Court

dismissed the suit and held that the plaintiff/appellant was

not entitled to salary from 2nd of November, 1995 to 30th of

March, 2001. Although the findings of the High Court, as

noted herein above, may not be very clear, but on

consideration of the entire materials on record including

Exhibit P-5 and the principles laid down in Jankiraman's

case (supra), we do not find any reason to set aside the

judgment of the High Court passed in the aforesaid second

appeal. The Appellate Court, while reversing the finding of

the trial Court, as noted herein earlier, held that the

competent authority had not recorded any legal, valid and

acceptable reasons for denying the arrears of salary to the

plaintiff - appellant to whom promotion was denied due to

criminal prosecution and departmental proceeding which

exonerated him ultimately. A bare perusal of Exhibit P-5 on

which reliance was also placed by the High Court in the 6

impugned judgment would show that the plaintiff-appellant

had worked as Executive Officer from 28th of March, 1997

to 31st of July, 1997, but this would not mean that he

would be entitled to salary from 2nd of November, 1995 to

30th of March, 2001. A further perusal of Exhibit P-5 would

also show that the plaintiff-appellant was only given

additional charge to look after work of EO-cum-Secretary in

addition to his duties as Assistant Secretary until further

orders. It would also be evident from Exhibit P-5 that

additional charge was given without any extra

remuneration. At the risk of repetition, the aforesaid office

memorandum would also make it clear that no arrears of

pay will be made for the period for which he had actually

not worked. That being the position, we are not in a

position to upset the conclusions arrived at by the High

Court in the aforesaid second appeal which is impugned

before us in this appeal.

8. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the High Court and

restore the judgment of the trial court and dismiss the suit

of the plaintiff -appellant.

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9. For the reasons aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed and the

judgment and decree of the High Court passed in the

aforesaid second appeal is hereby affirmed and that of the

trial court is restored. There will be no order as to costs.

..............................J. [TARUN CHATTERJEE]

NEW DELHI; .. ..........................J. FEBRUARY 11, 2008. [V.S.SIRPURKAR]