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Avneesh Chandan Gadgil vs Oriental Bank Of Commerce

Supreme Court24 November 2021Sanjiv Khanna · M.R. Shah

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable to appeals against orders of a Recovery Officer under Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993, and therefore the prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) for preferring such an appeal cannot be extended or condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6898 OF 2021

Avneesh Chandan Gadgil & Anr. …Appellant(s)

Versus

Oriental Bank of Commerce & Ors. …Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order dated 16.02.2016 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Writ

Petition (C) No.4207 of 2015 by which the High Court has allowed the

said appeal preferred by the respondent No.1 herein - Bank and has

quashed and set aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery

Appellate Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as “DRAT”) by which the

learned DRAT quashed and set aside the order passed by the Debts

Recovery Tribunal condoning the delay in preferring the appeal under

Section 30 of the Recovery of Debts due to Banks and Financial Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by R Natarajan Institutions Act, 1993 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act, 1993”), the Date: 2021.11.24 15:40:02 IST Reason:

original respondent has preferred the present appeal.

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2. The issue involved in the present appeal is in a very narrow

compass.

3. The short question, which is posed for consideration before this

Court is whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall be applicable to the

appeal against the order of Recovery Officer under Section 30 of the Act,

1993?

4. It is not in dispute that there was a delay of 31 days in the appeal

preferred by the respondent No.1 – Bank preferred against the order of

Recovery Officer. The Debts Recovery Tribunal condoned the delay by

applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The DRAT set aside the

order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal condoning the delay

applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act observing that Section 5 of the

Limitation Act shall not be applicable to the appeal under Section 30 of

the Act, 1993 against the order passed by the Recovery Officer. By the

impugned judgment and order, the High Court has set aside the order

passed by the DRAT relying upon the decision of this Court in the case

of A.R. Venugopal Alias R. Venugopal Vs. Jotheeswaran and Ors.,

(2016) 16 SCC 588.

5. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment

and order passed by the High Court restoring the order passed by the 2 Debts Recovery Tribunal condoning the delay applying Section 5 of the

Limitation Act to the appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993, the

original respondent – Bank has preferred the present appeal.

6. We have heard the learned counsel for the respective parties at

length.

7. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the issue involved in

the present appeal is now not res integra in view of the direct decision of

this Court in the case of International Asset Reconstruction Company

of India Limited Vs. Official Liquidator of Aldrich Pharmaceuticals

Limited and Ors., (2017) 16 SCC 137. Dealing with the appeal under

Section 30 of the Act, 1993 after 2000 amendment, it is held that Section

5 of the limitation Act is specifically excluded so far as appeal under

Section 30 of the Act, 1993 is concerned. While holding so, in

paragraph 13, it is observed and held as under:-

“13. The RDB Act is a special law. The proceedings are before a statutory Tribunal. The scheme of the Act manifestly provides that the legislature has provided for application of the Limitation Act to original proceedings before the Tribunal under Section 19 only. The Appellate Tribunal has been conferred the power to condone delay beyond 45 days under Section 20(3) of the Act. The proceedings before the Recovery Officer are not before a Tribunal. Section 24 is limited in its application to proceedings before the Tribunal originating under Section 19 only. The exclusion of any provision for extension of time by the Tribunal in preferring an appeal under Section 30 of the Act makes it manifest that the legislative intent 3 for exclusion was express. The application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act by resort to Section 29(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 therefore does not arise. The prescribed period of 30 days under Section 30(1) of the RDB Act for preferring an appeal against the order of the Recovery Officer therefore cannot be condoned by application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.”

8. At this stage, it is required to be noted that the decision of this

Court in the case of A.R. Venugopal Alias R. Venugopal (supra),

which has been relied upon by the High Court while passing the

impugned judgment and order has been expressly overruled by this

Court in the decision in the case of International Asset Reconstruction

Company of India Limited (supra).

9. Thus, as per the law laid down by this Court in the aforesaid case

and even otherwise considering Section 30 of the Act, 1993, we are also

of the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act shall not be applicable to

the appeal against the order of Recovery Officer as provided under

Section 30 of the Act, 1993. Therefore, the High Court has committed a

grave error in quashing and setting aside the order passed by the DRAT

and in restoring the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal

condoning the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 30 by

applying Section 5 of the Limitation Act.

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10. In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the present

appeal succeeds, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High

Court and the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal condoning

the delay in preferring the appeal under Section 30 of the Act, 1993,

preferred against the order passed by the Recovery Officer are

unsustainable and deserve to be quashed and set aside and are

accordingly quashed and set aside. The order passed by the DRAT

setting aside the order passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal is

restored. Appeal is allowed accordingly. However, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………….J. [M.R. SHAH]

NEW DELHI; ………………………………….J. NOVEMBER 24, 2021. [SANJIV KHANNA]

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