Avijit Saha vs Sebi
- CitationAppeal No. 321 of 2020
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
The Tribunal may condone delay in filing an appeal only on sufficient or adequate reasons, and that discretion must be exercised judicially on the facts of each case; where no legal or adequate reason is shown, and the delay is inordinate with no plausible explanation for not filing within the statutory period, the application for condonation must be rejected and the appeal, being time-barred, dismissed. A party that participated in adjudicating proceedings and was duly served with the impugned order, but took no steps to appeal within the statutory period, cannot obtain condonation of inordinate delay merely because it later receives material suggesting that another person misused its name; such material does not by itself constitute sufficient cause. The law of limitation may operate harshly on a particular party but must be applied with full rigour where the statute so prescribes, and the court or tribunal has no power to extend the prescribed period on equitable grounds beyond the limits expressly permitted by statute.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
find that the appellant had participated in the adjudicating
proceedings and was duly served with the impugned order.
No steps were taken by the appellant to file the appeal
within the statutory period nor any plausible explanation
has been given as to why he could not file the appeal
earlier.
7. Merely because he has received some statement of Mr.
Upadhaya does not entitle the appellant for condonation of
the inordinate delay. No valid or bona fide exaplanation
has been given by the appellant for condoning the
inordinate delay.
8. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition
Officer, (2013) 14 SCC 81 the Supreme Court held that
the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised 4
judicially based on facts and circumstances of each case
and that sufficient cause cannot be given a liberal
interpretation if lack of bonafide is attributed to a party.
The Supreme Court further held that delay cannot be
condoned on equitable ground beyond the limits permitted
expressly by statute.
9. The Supreme Court in Ram Nath Sao and Ors. (supra)
held that the expression „sufficient cause‟ should receive a
liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice
when no negligence or inaction or want of bonafide is
imputable to a party. The same view was reiterated by the
Supreme Court in Madanlal vs. Shyamlal, (2002) 1 SCC
535.
10. In Balwant Singh (Dead) vs Jagdish Singh & Ors, (2010)
8 SCC 685 Supreme Court held that the expression
"sufficient cause" means the presence of legal and
adequate reasons. The decisions cited by the learned
counsel for the appellant are of no avail and, in any case,
not applicable in the present circumstance of the case. 5
11. This Tribunal is possessed with the exercise of judicial
discretion in condoning the delay if sufficient or adequate
reason is given. It is also a settled proposition of law that
the law of limitation may harshly affect a particular party
but it has to be applied with all its rigour when the statute
so prescribes. The court has no power to extend the period
of limitation on equitable grounds as held by the Supreme
Court in Basawaraj and Anr. (supra). In the instant case
we do find any legal or adequate reasons to condone the
delay.
12. Thus for the reasons stated aforesaid, we do not find any
reason to condone the inordinate delay in filing the appeal.
The Misc. Application for condoning the delay is rejected
on the ground of laches as a result of which the Appeal is
also dismissed with no order as to costs.
13. During the course of the hearing the learned counsel for
the appellant pointed out that Mr. Devesh Upadhyaya had
made a statement before the Income Tax Authority that he
was using the name of the appellant. This statement has
been annexed to the memorandum of appeal. We find that
this statement was not placed before the Adjudicating 6
Officer ("AO" for convenience) of the Securities and
Exchange Board of India ("SEBI" for convenience).
Without going into the veracity of the document we leave
it open to the appellant to move an appropriate application
before the AO of SEBI.
14. The present matter was heard through video conference
due to Covid-19 pandemic. At this stage it is not possible
to sign a copy of this order nor a certified copy of this
order could be issued by the Registry. In these
circumstances, this order will be digitally signed by the
Presiding Officer on behalf of the bench and all concerned
parties are directed to act on the digitally signed copy of
this order. Parties will act on production of a digitally
signed copy sent by fax and/or email.
Justice Tarun Agarwala Presiding Officer
Dr. C.K.G. Nair Member 7
TARUN Digitally signed by TARUN AGARWAL DN: c=IN, o=PUBLIC WORKS DEPARTMENT UTTAR PRADESH, postalCode=221505, st=Uttar Pradesh, 2.5.4.20=30fcf68685192bbc53e6ff1608a83fb3881de 7ac2ab7954d509c85ed6e0f7c41, Justice M. T. Joshi AGARWAL serialNumber=095f8b286bb0b1cd07ff676611f4f5e7 999727d404aa38ca422f9d3529bdb8a3, cn=TARUN AGARWAL Date: 2020.10.09 15:30:09 +05'30' Judicial Member 09.10.2020 PK
This page reproduces a public judgment and a summary of it. It is research material, not legal advice, and it is no substitute for advice from an advocate on your own facts.
Research this judgment with Miss Lucy
Ask what it holds, what has followed it, and what it means for your matter — in plain English, with the citations.
Try Miss Lucy free