Ashdan Properties (P) Ltd. vs DSK Global Education & Research (P) Ltd., (2026) 263 Comp Cas 599

2025 INSC 959 Non-reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10603 OF 2024

ASHDAN PROPERTIES PVT. LTD. AND OTHERS ..... Appellants

Versus

DSK GLOBAL EDUCATION AND RESEARCH PVT. LTD. AND ANOTHER ….. Respondents

JUDGMENT

SANJAY KUMAR, J

1. Challenge in this appeal, filed under Section 62 of the Insolvency

and Bankruptcy Code, 20161, is to the judgment dated 01.07.2024 passed

by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

Delhi2, in so far as it pertains to Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. Signature Not Verified

1308 of 2023.

Digitally signed by Deepak Guglani Date: 2025.08.12 11:43:08 IST Reason: 1

for short, “IBC” 2 for short, “NCLAT”

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2. Though comprehensive and compendious arguments were

advanced by both sides on the merits of the case, we are of the opinion

that this appeal is amenable to resolution on a purely technical ground

which forecloses examination of the matter on merits.

3. Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 1308 of 2023 was filed by

DSK Global Education and Research Pvt. Ltd., respondent No. 1 herein,

assailing the validity of the order dated 23.06.2023 passed by the National

Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai Bench3, in I.A. No. 1950 of 2021 in

Company Petition (IB) 306/MB/2020. By the said order, the NCLT allowed

the interlocutory application filed by the Resolution Professional and

approved the resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution

applicant, Ashdan Properties Private Limited, the appellant before us.

4. Section 61(2) of the IBC prescribes that every appeal against an

order of the Adjudicating Authority, i.e., the National Company Law

Tribunal concerned, should be filed before the jurisdictional National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal within 30 days. The proviso thereto,

however, allows the said National Company Law Appellate Tribunal to

permit the appeal to be filed even after expiry of the period of 30 days, if

it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing the appeal within

that time but such extended period shall not exceed 15 days.

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for short, “NCLT”

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5. It is an admitted fact that the NCLT pronounced the order in the

subject I.A. on 23.06.2023. According to respondent No. 1, the said order

was uploaded on the website on 26.06.2023. The appeal before the

NCLAT was e-filed by respondent No. 1 on 25.07.2023, vide Diary No.

9910110/05909/2023. It is an admitted fact that a certified copy of the

impugned order dated 23.06.2023 was not filed along with the said

appeal. Rule 22(2) of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

Rules, 20164, mandates that every appeal filed before the Appellate

Tribunal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order.

This is clear from the express language of the provision which reads thus:

“22(2): Every appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order” (emphasis is ours)

6. At that stage, i.e., when the appeal was e-filed by it on 25.07.2023,

respondent No. 1 neither filed an application seeking exemption from filing

a certified copy of the order nor did it file an application seeking

condonation of the delay, if any, in the filing of its appeal. It was only on

23.08.2023 that respondent No. 1 applied for a certified copy of the order

dated 23.06.2023 passed by the NCLT. It received the certified copy on

07.09.2023 and seems to have filed the same only thereafter before the

NCLAT. An application for condonation of the delay of 2 days in the filing

of the appeal was filed by respondent No. 1 only on 22.09.2023. Therein,

4 for short, “NCLAT Rules”

3 respondent No. 1 stated that after the said order was uploaded on

26.06.2023 on the website, a detailed study was made with regard to the

scope of the directions issued and after collating all the documents in

respect of the corporate insolvency resolution process, respondent No. 1

got hold of the resolution plan on or around 10.07.2023. According to it,

steps were then taken to identify a counsel at Delhi for processing the

filing of the appeal and this concluded around 15.07.2023. Thereafter, as

per respondent No. 1, internal discussions were held and it was then

decided to file the appeal, leading to its e-filing on 25.07.2023. Claiming

that its appeal had been filed within the condonable period of 15 days,

respondent No. 1 sought condonation of the delay of 2 days much later.

7. The appellant and others filed their reply before the NCLAT on

27.10.2023 specifically raising the contention that the appeal was barred

by limitation as it was filed beyond the statutorily prescribed period.

Surprisingly, the NCLAT did not deal with the issue of limitation in so far

as the filing of respondent No.1’s appeal was concerned. This, perhaps,

may have been due to the fact that the NCLAT deemed it appropriate to

club as many as 11 appeals for a conjoined disposal through its common

judgment dated 01.07.2024. However, the fact remains that the e-filing of

respondent No.1’s appeal on 25.07.2023 was defective inasmuch as

there was, admittedly, a delay in its filing but no application was filed for

condonation of such delay and, secondly, the appeal was filed without a 4 certified copy of the impugned order but no application was filed seeking

exemption from filing such certified copy or seeking extension of time to

do so. The consequences of such defective filing are what we have to

consider presently.

8. Significantly, in V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat & Power Ltd. and

others5, a three-Judge Bench of this Court considered these very issues.

It was noted that the IBC is a complete code in itself and overwrites any

inconsistencies that may arise in the application of other laws. The further

observations made in paragraph 25, 28 and 29 therein on limitation and

filing of a certified copy are of relevance and are extracted hereunder:

“25. The law on limitation with respect to IBC is settled and emphatic in its denunciation of delays [Essar Steel (India) Ltd. (CoC) v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531, paras 119-123, 127 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 443; Innoventive Industries Ltd. v. ICICI Bank, (2018) 1 SCC 407, para 13 :

(2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 356; Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, (2021) 7 SCC 209, para 69 : (2021) 4 SCC (Civ) 1]. The power to condone delay is tightly circumscribed and conditional upon showing sufficient cause, even within the period of delay which is capable of being condoned. IBC is a watershed legislation which seeks to overhaul the previous bankruptcy regime which was afflicted by delays and indefinite legal proceedings. IBC sought to structure and streamline the entire process of insolvency, right from the initiation of insolvency to liquidation, as a one-stop mechanism. Section 12(3) IBC prescribes a strict timeline for the completion of the corporate insolvency resolution process of one hundred and eighty days which is extendable by ninety days. The proviso to Section 12(3) imposes an outer limit of three hundred and thirty days, including time taken in legal proceedings. While a three-Judge Bench of this Court in Essar Steel (India) Ltd. (CoC) v. Satish Kumar Gupta [Essar Steel India Ltd. (CoC) v. Satish Kumar Gupta, (2020) 8 SCC 531 : (2021) 2 SCC (Civ) 443] held such a time-limit on court proceedings as violative of Article 14, only the word “mandatorily” was struck down and a narrowly defined extension to the outer limit was allowed in exceptional circumstances if the process is at a

5 (2022) 2 SCC 244

5 near conclusion and serves the ends of IBC. Regulation 40-A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations, 2016 provides for a detailed model timeline for the corporate insolvency resolution process, including extensions that are granted as discretionary powers under the procedural eventualities of IBC framework.

……….” “28. In this background, when timelines are placed even on legal proceedings, reading in the requirement of an “order being made available” under a general enactment (Companies Act) would do violence to the special provisions enacted under IBC where timing is critical for the workability of the mechanism, health of the economy, recovery rate of lenders and valuation of the corporate debtor. IBC, as a prescriptive mechanism, affecting rights of stakeholders who are not necessarily parties to the proceedings, mandates diligence on the part of applicants who are aggrieved by the outcome of their litigation. An appeal, if considered necessary and expedient by an aggrieved party, is expected to be filed forthwith without awaiting a free copy which may be received at an indefinite stage. Hence, the omission of the words “from the date on which the order is made available” for the purposes of computation of limitation in Section 61(2) IBC, is a consistent signal of the intention of the legislature to nudge the parties to be proactive and facilitate timely resolution.” “29. On the question of a certified copy for filing an appeal against an order passed by NCLT under IBC, Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules mandates that an appeal has to be filed with a certified copy of the “impugned order”:

“22. Presentation of appeal.—(1) Every appeal shall be presented in Form NCLAT-1 in triplicate by the appellant or petitioner or applicant or respondent, as the case may be, in person or by his duly authorised representative duly appointed in this behalf in the prescribed form with stipulated fee at the filing counter and non-compliance of this may constitute a valid ground to refuse to entertain the same.

(2) Every appeal shall be accompanied by a certified copy of the impugned order.” (emphasis supplied) Therefore, it cannot be said that the parties can automatically dispense with their obligation to apply for and obtain a certified copy for filing an appeal.

Any delay in receipt of a certified copy, once an application has been filed, has been envisaged by the legislature and duly excluded to not cause any prejudice to a litigant's right to appeal.”

9. Thereafter, in paragraph 31 of the judgment, the Bench noted that a

person wishing to file an appeal is expected to file an application for a

certified copy before the expiry of the limitation period upon which ‘the

6 time requisite’ for obtaining a copy is to be excluded. The Bench, however,

cautioned that the time taken by the Court to prepare the decree or order

before an application for a copy is made cannot be excluded for the

purpose of Section 12 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The argument that Rule

14 of the NCLAT Rules empowers the National Company Law Appellate

Tribunal to exempt parties from compliance with the requirement of any of

the rules, in the interest of substantial justice, was also considered and

the Bench noted that though it may well be true that waiver on filing an

appeal without a certified copy is often granted for the purpose of judicial

determination, it does not confer an automatic right on an applicant to

dispense with compliance so as to render Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules

nugatory. It was held that the act of filing an application for a certified copy

is not just a technical requirement for computation of limitation but also an

indication of the diligence of the aggrieved party pursuing the litigation in

a timely fashion. It was further held that, owing to the special nature of the

IBC, the aggrieved party is expected to exercise due diligence and apply

for a certified copy upon pronouncement of the order, it seeks to assail, in

consonance with the requirements of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules. As

regards the power of the NCLAT to grant exemption from complying with

the requirements of the rules, it was observed that Rule 22(2) of the

NCLAT Rules mandates the certified copy being annexed to an appeal,

which continues to bind litigants under the IBC and though it may be true 7 that Tribunals and Courts may choose to exempt parties from compliance

with this procedural requirement in the interest of substantial justice, as

reiterated in Rule 14 of the NCLAT Rules, such discretionary waiver does

not act as an automatic exception where litigants make no efforts to

pursue a timely resolution of their grievance. On facts, the Bench held

that, as the appellant had failed to apply for a certified copy, it rendered

the appeal filed by him clearly barred by limitation.

10. The recent three-Judge Bench judgment of this Court in A Rajendra

vs. Gonugunta Madhusudhan Rao and others6 affirmed this legal

position. Copious reference was made by the Bench to the earlier decision

in V Nagarajan (supra) and other case laws and it was observed that the

incident which triggers limitation to commence is the date of

pronouncement of the order and in a case of non-pronouncement of the

order when the hearing concludes, the date on which the order is

pronounced or uploaded on the website. It was pointed out that when the

judgment is pronounced in open Court, the period of limitation would start

running from that very day and an appellant would be entitled to seek relief

under Section 12(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963, to exclude the period

during which a certified copy was under preparation, if an application was

made therefor within the period of limitation.

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2025 INSC 447

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11. Ergo, in the light of the aforestated settled legal position, respondent

No. 1 could not have banked upon the date of uploading of the order on

26.06.2023 as the order was admittedly pronounced in open Court on

23.06.2023. The limitation, therefore, commenced from that very day.

Though reference was made by the learned counsel for respondent No. 1

to the recent judgment of the NCLAT in Innovators Cleantech Pvt. Ltd.

vs. Passari Multi Projects Pvt. Ltd.7, in the context of filing of a certified

copy of the order impugned, we find that the observations made therein

are at variance with the law laid down by this Court. Though the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal is clothed with the powers to exempt

and to extend time under Rules 14 and 15 of the NCLAT Rules

respectively, such powers cannot be exercised so as to render Rule 22(2)

thereof nugatory, as pointed out in V Nagarajan (supra). Even if an appeal

is entertained within the initial 30 day-period without a certified copy of the

order, by granting exemption under Rule 14, it can only be for a limited

period to enable due compliance with the mandate of Rule 22(2) by filing

a certified copy at least at a later date and within the time stipulated by the

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal. Such exemption cannot be to

the extent of completely dispensing with the filing of a certified copy, which

would annihilate the clear mandate of Rule 22(2) of the NCLAT Rules,

7 (2024) ibclaw.in 452 NCLAT

9 which categorically uses the word ‘shall’ to emphasize that an appeal must

be accompanied by a certified copy of the order impugned.

12. Viewed thus, the fact that respondent No. 1 casually e-filed an

appeal on 25.07.2023, with neither an application for condonation of delay

nor an application seeking exemption from filing a certified copy of the

impugned order, rendered its appeal defective. Admittedly, it was only on

25.08.2023 that respondent No. 1 filed an application seeking permission

to file the appeal and an application for condonation of delay was filed

much later, on 22.09.2023. Presumably, it was at this time that a certified

copy of the impugned order was filed without even seeking exemption or

extension of time to do so. These aspects ought to have been considered

by the NCLAT as the statute peremptorily requires proper institution of an

appeal in conformity with all the prescribed norms and it was incumbent

upon the NCLAT to examine and verify as to whether respondent No. 1’s

appeal was in due compliance with all such norms. More so, when the

appellant herein had specifically raised the issue that such appeal was

barred by limitation. The NCLAT erred in completely brushing aside this

crucial aspect which went to the very root of its appellate jurisdiction.

13. Thus, the impugned judgment delivered on merits is essentially a

superstructure erected on an illusory foundation and cannot, therefore, be

sustained. On this short ground, this appeal deserves to be and is,

accordingly, allowed setting aside the judgment dated 01.07.2024 passed 10 by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

Delhi, in Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) 1308 of 2023.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

..........................., J [SANJAY KUMAR]

.............................................., J [SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA] August 12, 2025 New Delhi.

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