Arun Patiyal vs Navneet Sharma And Anr

Neutral Citation No. ( 2024:HHC:4750 ) Page |1

IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA Cr. MMO No.773 of 2022 Reserved on: 12.06.2024 Date of Decision: 08.07.2024

.

Arun Patiyal ....Petitioner

Versus Navneet Sharma and anr. ....Respondents Coram

Hon'ble Mr Justice Rakesh Kainthla, Judge. Whether approved for reporting? Yes For the Petitioner : Mr. Bonit Thakur, Advocate.

For Respondent No.1 : Mr. Rajul Chauhan, Advocate. For Respondent No.2 : Ms. Jyoti Chauhan, Advocate vice Mr. Sanjay Dalmia, Advocate.

Rakesh Kainthla, Judge

The petitioner (accused before learned Trial Court) has

filed the present petition for quashing of complaint No.52-3 of

2019 bearing registration No.39/2019 titled Navneet Sharma vs.

Arun Kumar and the order dated 30.01.2019 summoning the

accused. (Parties shall hereinafter be referred to in the same manner as

they were arrayed before the learned Trial Court for convenience).

2. Briefly stated, the facts giving rise to the present

petition are that the complainant filed a complaint against the

accused for the commission of an offence punishable under Section

138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (in short 'NI Act'). It was

asserted that the complainant is the registered owner of a private

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passenger vehicle bearing registration No. HP-35C-3300. He sold it

to the accused on 10.09.2020 for ₹7,50,000/-. The accused issued a

post-dated cheque of ₹7,50,000/- in the discharge of his legal

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liability. The complainant presented the cheque before his Bank but

it was dishonoured with an endorsement of 'insufficient funds'.

The complainant served a notice upon the accused but the accused

failed to pay the amount despite the receipt of the notice; hence, a

complaint was filed against the accused for taking action against

him as per the law.

3. The learned Trial Court found sufficient reasons to

summon the accused and passed an order on 30.01.2019 to summon

him.

4. Being aggrieved from the order passed by the learned

Trial Court, the petitioner/accused has filed the present petition

asserting that the learned Trial Court erred in summoning the

accused. The complainant had filed an undertaking before the

Notary Public stating that he had received full and final payment

from the petitioner/accused for the vehicle. The accused applied for

a No Objection Certificate, which was issued and the vehicle was

registered with the Registration and Licensing Authority,

Sundernagar. The ownership was also transferred in the name of

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the accused. The complainant sent a false notice. The accused sent

a reply denying his liability. The complainant filed a false

complaint. Learned Trial Court summoned the accused without

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complying with the requirements of Section 138 of the NI Act. He

filed an application to stop the proceedings under Section 258 of

Cr.P.C., which was dismissed by the learned Trial Court. The cheque

has not been issued on the account number of the accused. The

complainant filed a false complaint and its continuation would

amount to the abuse of the process of the Court; hence, it was

prayed that the present petition be allowed and the complaint be

quashed.

5. The respondent/complainant filed a reply reproducing

the facts mentioned in the complaint. It was asserted that power

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. is extraordinary, which has to be

exercised sparingly. The facts in the present case do not warrant

the exercise of such power. It was specifically denied that the

accused had made the full and final payment of the sale

consideration. It was asserted that there is nothing on record to

show that the cheque was not drawn on an account maintained by

the complainant. Therefore, it was prayed that the present petition

be dismissed.

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6. I have heard Mr. Bonit Thakur, learned counsel for the

petitioner, Mr Rajul Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent

No.1/complainant and Ms Jyoti Chauhan, learned counsel for the

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respondent/Bank.

7. Mr. Bonit Thakur, learned counsel for the petitioner

submitted that the cheque was not drawn on an account

maintained by the complainant and the complaint under Section

138 of the NI Act is not maintainable. He relied upon the judgment

of the Kerala High Court in Ameer Shah versus the State of Kerala,

2017: KER:28375 in support of his submission.

8. Mr. Rajul Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent

No.1/complainant submitted that the Court should not conduct an

inquiry regarding the truthfulness or otherwise of the contents of

the complaint in the proceedings under Section 482 of Cr. P.C.. The

complainant should be given a fair chance to prove his complaint

by a regular trial. He relied upon the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan v. State (NCT of Delhi), 2022 SCC

OnLine SC 513 and the judgment of this Court in Bhim Singh versus

State of Himachal Pradesh in Cr.MP(M) No. 176 of 2021 decided on

11.03.2022 in support of his submission. He prayed that the present

petition be dismissed.

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9. Mr. Jyoti Chauhan, learned counsel for respondent No.2

submitted that the Bank has been wrongly impleaded as a party-

respondent in the present case and it has nothing to do with the

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dispute between the parties. Hence, she prayed that the present

petition be dismissed against respondent No.2.

10. I have given considerable thought to the submissions at

the bar and have gone through the records carefully.

11.

The parameters for exercising jurisdiction under Section

482 of Cr.P.C. were laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in A.M.

Mohan v. State, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 339, wherein it was observed: -

9. The law with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of Cr. P.C. to quash complaints and criminal

proceedings has been succinctly summarized by this Court in the case of Indian Oil Corporation v. NEPC India Limited (2006) 6 SCC 736: 2006 INSC 452 after considering the earlier

precedents. It will be apposite to refer to the following

observations of this Court in the said case, which read thus:

"12. The principles relating to the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure to quash complaints and criminal proceedings have been stated and reiterated by this Court in several decisions. To mention a few--Madhavrao Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1 SCC 692: 1988 SCC (Cri) 234], State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1992 SCC (Cri) 426], Rupan Deol Bajaj v. Kanwar Pal Singh Gill [(1995) 6 SCC 194: 1995 SCC (Cri) 1059], Central Bureau of Investigation v. Duncans Agro Industries Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 591: 1996 SCC (Cri) 1045], State of

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Bihar v. Rajendra Agrawalla [(1996) 8 SCC 164: 1996 SCC (Cri) 628], Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi [(1999) 3 SCC 259: 1999 SCC (Cri) 401], Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. v. Biological E. Ltd. [(2000) 3 SCC 269: 2000 SCC (Cri) 615], Hridaya

.

Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC

168: 2000 SCC (Cri) 786], M. Krishnan v. Vijay Singh [(2001) 8 SCC 645: 2002 SCC (Cri) 19] and Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.

Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122: 2005 SCC (Cri) 283]. The principles, relevant to our purpose are:

(i) A complaint can be quashed where the

allegations made in the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety, do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out the case alleged against the raccused.

For this purpose, the complaint has to be examined as a whole, but without examining the merits of the allegations. Neither a detailed inquiry nor a meticulous analysis of the

material nor an assessment of the reliability or genuineness of the allegations in the complaint is warranted while examining prayer for

quashing a complaint.

(ii) A complaint may also be quashed where it is a clear abuse of the process of the court, as when the criminal proceeding is found to have

been initiated with mala fides/malice for wreaking vengeance or to cause harm, or where the allegations are absurd and inherently improbable.

(iii) The power to quash shall not, however, be used to stifle or scuttle a legitimate prosecution. The power should be used sparingly and with abundant caution.

(iv) The complaint is not required to verbatim reproduce the legal ingredients of the offence alleged. If the necessary factual foundation is

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laid in the complaint, merely on the ground that a few ingredients have not been stated in detail, the proceedings should not be quashed. Quashing of the complaint is warranted only where the complaint is so bereft of even the

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basic facts which are necessary for making out

the offence.

(v.) A given set of facts may make out: (a)

purely a civil wrong; or (b) purely a criminal offence; or (c) a civil wrong as also a criminal offence. A commercial transaction or a contractual dispute, apart from furnishing a

cause of action for seeking remedy in civil law, may also involve a criminal offence. As the nature and scope of a civil proceeding are different from a criminal proceeding, the mere r fact that the complaint relates to a commercial

transaction or breach of contract, for which a civil remedy is available or has been availed, is not by itself a ground to quash the criminal proceedings. The test is whether the allegations

in the complaint disclose a criminal offence or not.

12. Similar is the judgment Maneesha Yadav v. State of U.P.,

2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held: -

12. We may gainfully refer to the following observations of

this Court in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal1992 Supp (1) SCC 335: 1990 INSC 363:

"102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein

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such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

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guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an

exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if

any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a

cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section

155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations

made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do

not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused. (4) Where the allegations in the FIR do not

constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

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there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a

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criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is

manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with

a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.

103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a

criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases;

that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the

complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

13. The accused asserted that the cheque was not drawn on

an account maintained by him and the present complaint is not

maintainable. There is nothing on record to establish this fact. The

copy of the cheque (Annexure P4) shows that it was drawn on

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Allahabad Bank and is payable to the complainant. The

complainant specifically asserted that the cheque was dishonoured

with an endorsement 'insufficient funds'. The memo of dishonour

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was not placed on record to contradict this fact. Hence, this plea

cannot be accepted and the judgment of Kerala High Court in Ameer

Shah (supra) does not apply to the present case.

14. Reliance was placed upon various documents annexed to

the present petition and a seller undertaking, in which it was

mentioned that the complainant had received full and final

payment to submit that nothing is due to the complainant. It is not

permissible to look into the documents annexed to the petition

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in MCD v. Ram Kishan Rohtagi, (1983) 1 SCC 1: 1983

SCC (Cri) 115, that the proceedings can be quashed if on the face of

the complaint and the papers accompanying the same no offence is

constituted. It is not permissible to add or subtract anything. It was

observed:

"10. It is, therefore, manifestly clear that proceedings against an accused in the initial stages can be quashed only if on the face of the complaint or the papers accompanying the same, no offence is constituted. In other words, the test is that taking the allegations and the complaint as they are, without adding or subtracting anything, if no offence is made out then the High Court will be justified in quashing the

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proceedings in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of the present Code."

15. Madras High Court also held in Ganga Bai v. Shriram,

1990 SCC OnLine MP 213: ILR 1992 MP 964: 1991 Cri LJ 2018, that the

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fresh evidence is not permissible or desirable in the proceeding

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

"Proceedings under Section 482, Cr.P.C. cannot be allowed to be converted into a full-dressed trial. Shri Maheshwari filed a photostat copy of an order dated 28.7.1983, passed in

Criminal Case No. 1005 of 1977, to which the present petitioner was not a party. Fresh evidence at this stage is neither permissible nor desirable. The respondent by filing this

document is virtually introducing additional evidence, which is

not the object of Section 482, Cr.P.C."

16. Andhra Pradesh High Court also took a similar view in

Bharat Metal Box Company Limited, Hyderabad and Others vs. G. K.

Strips Private Limited and another, 2004 STPL 43 AP, and held:

"9. This Court can only look into the complaint and the documents filed along with it and the sworn statements of

the witnesses if any recorded. While judging the correctness of the proceedings, it cannot look into the documents, which are not filed before the lower Court. Section 482 Cr.PC debars

the Court to look into fresh documents, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in State of Karnataka v. M. Devendrappa and another, 2002 (1) Supreme

192. The relevant portion of the said judgment reads as follows:

"The complaint has to be read as a whole. If it appears that on consideration of the allegations, in the light of the statement made on oath of the complainant that the ingredients of the offence or offences are disclosed and there is no material to show that the

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complaint is mala fide, frivolous or vexatious, in that event there would be no justification for interference by the High Court. When information is lodged at the Police Station and an offence is registered, then the mala fides of the informant would be of secondary

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importance. It is the material collected during the

investigation and evidence led in Court, which decides the fate of the accused person. The allegations of mala fides against the informant are of no consequence and

cannot by itself be the basis for quashing the proceedings".

17. A similar view was taken in Mahendra K.C. v. State of

Karnataka, (2022) 2 SCC 129: (2022) 1 SCC (Cri) 401 wherein it was

observed on page 142:

"16. ... the test to be applied is whether the allegations in the complaint as they stand, without adding or detracting from the complaint, prima facie establish the ingredients of the offence alleged. At this stage, the High Court cannot test the

veracity of the allegations nor for that matter can it proceed in the manner that a judge conducting a trial would, on the basis of the evidence collected during the course of the trial."

18. This position was reiterated in Supriya Jain v. State of

Haryana, (2023) 7 SCC 711: 2023 SCC OnLine SC 765 wherein it was

held:

13. All these documents which the petitioner seeks to rely on, if genuine, could be helpful for her defence at the trial but the same are not material at the stage of deciding whether quashing as prayed for by her before the High Court was warranted or not. We, therefore, see no reason to place any reliance on these three documents.

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19. A similar view was taken in Iveco Magirus

Brandschutztechnik GMBH v. Nirmal Kishore Bhartiya, 2023 SCC

OnLine SC 1258 wherein it was observed:

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55. Adverting to the aspect of the exercise of jurisdiction by the High Courts under section 482, Cr. P.C., in a case where the offence of defamation is claimed by the accused to have

not been committed based on any of the Exceptions and a prayer for quashing, is made, the law seems to be well settled that the High Courts can go no further and enlarge the scope of inquiry if the accused seeks to rely on materials which were not

there before the Magistrate. This is based on the simple proposition that what the Magistrate could not do, the High Courts may not do. We may not be understood to undermine the High Courts' powers saved by section 482, Cr. P.C.; such

powers are always available to be exercised ex debito justitiae,

i.e., to do real and substantial justice for the administration of which alone the High Courts exist. However, the tests laid down for quashing an F.I.R. or criminal proceedings arising

from a police report by the High Courts in the exercise of jurisdiction under section 482, Cr. P.C. not being substantially different from the tests laid down for quashing of a process issued under section 204 read with section 200,

the High Courts on recording due satisfaction are empowered

to interfere if on a reading of the complaint, the substance of statements on oath of the complainant and the witness, if any, and documentary evidence as produced, no offence is

made out and that proceedings, if allowed to continue, would amount to an abuse of the legal process. This too, would be impermissible if the justice of a given case does not overwhelmingly so demand." (Emphasis supplied)

20. Thus, the documents relied upon by the petitioner

cannot be taken into consideration in the present proceedings.

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21. It was laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Rathish Babu Unnikrishnan (supra), that the burden of proving that

there is no existing debt of liability is to be discharged in the trial

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and the Court has to consider the presumption under Section 139 of

NI Act in favour of the holder while deciding the petition under

Section 482 of Cr.P.C. It was observed:

"10. It is also relevant to bear in mind that the burden of

proving that there is no existing debt or liability, is to be discharged in the trial. For a two judges Bench in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234, Justice S.N. Variava made the following pertinent observation

on this aspect: --

"17. There is therefore no requirement that the complainant must specifically allege in the complaint that there was a subsisting liability. The burden of

proving that there was no existing debt or liability was on the respondents. This they have to discharge in the trial. At this stage, merely on the basis of averments in

the petitions filed by them the High Court could not have concluded that there was no existing debt or

liability."

11. The legal presumption of the cheque having been issued

in the discharge of liability must also receive due weightage. In a situation where the accused moves the Court for quashing even before the trial has commenced, the Court's approach should be careful enough not to prematurely extinguish the case by disregarding the legal presumption which supports the complaint. The opinion of Justice K.G. Balakrishnan for a three-judge Bench in Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441 would at this stage, deserve our attention:--

"26. ... we are in agreement with the respondent claimant that the presumption mandated by Section

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139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. As noted in the citations, this is of course in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable

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debt or liability can be contested. However, there can

be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant."

12. At any rate, whenever facts are disputed the truth should be allowed to emerge by weighing the evidence. On this aspect, we may benefit by referring to the ratio in Rajeshbhai Muljibhai Patel v. State of Gujarat(2020) 3 SCC 794 where the

following pertinent opinion was given by Justice R. Banumathi:--

"22. .............. When disputed questions of facts are

involved which need to be adjudicated after the parties adduce evidence, the complaint under Section 138 of

the NI Act ought not to have been quashed by the High Court by taking recourse to Section 482 CrPC. Though, the Court has the power to quash the criminal

complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act on legal issues like limitation, etc. criminal complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act against Yogeshbhai

ought not to have been quashed merely on the ground that there are inter se disputes between Appellant 3

and Respondent 2. Without keeping in view the statutory presumption raised under Section 139 of the NI Act, the High Court, in our view, committed a

serious error in quashing the criminal complaint in CC No. 367 of 2016 filed under Section 138 of the NI Act."

13. Bearing in mind the principles for the exercise of jurisdiction in a proceeding for quashing, let us now turn to the materials in this case. On careful reading of the complaint and the order passed by the Magistrate, what is discernible is that a possible view is taken that the cheques drawn were, in the discharge of a debt for the purchase of shares. In any case, when there is a legal presumption, it would not be judicious for the quashing Court to carry out a

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detailed enquiry on the facts alleged, without first permitting the trial Court to evaluate the evidence of the parties. The quashing Court should not take upon itself, the burden of separating the wheat from the chaff where facts are contested. To say it differently, the quashing proceedings

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must not become an expedition into the merits of factual

dispute, so as to conclusively vindicate either the complainant or the defence.

14. The parameters for invoking the inherent jurisdiction of the Court to quash the criminal proceedings under S.482 CrPC, have been spelt out by Justice S. Ratnavel Pandian for the two judges' bench in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal 1992

Supp (1) SCC 335: AIR 1992 SC 604, and the suggested precautionary principles serve as good law even today, for invocation of power under Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.

"103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be

exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases; that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the

reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an

arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

15. In the impugned judgment, the learned Judge had rightly relied upon the opinion of Justice J.S. Khehar for a Division

Bench in Rajiv Thapar (supra), which succinctly expresses the following relevant parameters to be considered by the quashing Court, at the stage of issuing process, committal, or framing of charges, "28. The High Court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if

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the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations

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levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without

allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same."

16. The proposition of law as set out above makes it abundantly clear that the Court should be slow to grant the relief of quashing a complaint at a pre-trial stage, when the factual controversy is in the realm of possibility particularly

because of the legal presumption, as in this matter. What is also of note is that the factual defence without having to adduce any evidence needs to be of an unimpeachable quality, so as to altogether disprove the allegations made in

the complaint.

17. The consequences of scuttling the criminal process at a pre-trial stage can be grave and irreparable. Quashing proceedings at preliminary stages will result in finality

without the parties having had an opportunity to adduce evidence and the consequence then is that the proper forum i.e., the trial Court is ousted from weighing the material

evidence. If this is allowed, the accused may be given an un- merited advantage in the criminal process. Also because of

the legal presumption, when the cheque and the signature are not disputed by the appellant, the balance of convenience at this stage is in favour of the complainant/prosecution, as

the accused will have due opportunity to adduce defence evidence during the trial, to rebut the presumption.

18. Situated thus, to non-suit the complainant, at the stage of the summoning order, when the factual controversy is yet to be canvassed and considered by the trial court will not in our opinion be judicious. Based upon a prima facie impression, an element of criminality cannot entirely be ruled out here subject to the determination by the trial Court. Therefore, when the proceedings are at a nascent stage, the scuttling of the criminal process is not merited."

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22. Therefore, it is not permissible to adjudicate the plea

that the cheque was not issued in the discharge of the legal liability

of the petitioner in these proceedings.

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23. The complaint has been filed before the Competent

Court and it is seized of the matter. Learned Trial Court will

determine the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in

the complaint and it is not permissible for this Court to adjudicate

this fact during this proceedings. It was laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Priyanka Jaiswal vs. State of Jharkhand, 2024 SCC

OnLine SC 685 that the Court exercises extra-ordinary jurisdiction

under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. and cannot conduct a mini-trial or

enter into an appreciation of an evidence of a particular case. It was

observed:-

"13. We say so for reasons more than one. This Court in

catena of Judgments has consistently held that at the time of examining the prayer for quashing of the criminal proceedings, the court exercising extra-ordinary jurisdiction

can neither undertake to conduct a mini-trial nor enter into appreciation of evidence of a particular case. The correctness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint cannot be examined on the touchstone of the probable defence that the accused may raise to stave off the prosecution and any such misadventure by the Courts resulting in proceedings being quashed would be set aside. This Court in the case of Akhil Sharda 2022 SCC OnLine SC 820 held to the following effect:

"28. Having gone through the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court by which the High Court

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has set aside the criminal proceedings in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C., it appears that the High Court has virtually conducted a mini-trial, which as such is not permissible at this stage and while deciding the application under Section 482 Cr. P.C. As

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observed and held by this Court in a catena of decisions

no mini-trial can be conducted by the High Court in the exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr. P.C. jurisdiction and at the stage of deciding the application under

Section 482 Cr. P.C., the High Court cannot get into appreciation of evidence of the particular case being considered."

24. A similar view was taken in Maneesha Yadav v. State of

U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 643, wherein it was held that: -

"13. As has already been observed hereinabove, the Court

would not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint at the stage of quashing of the proceedings under Section 482 Cr. P.C. However, the

allegations made in the FIR/complaint, if taken at its face value, must disclose the commission of an offence and make out a case against the accused. At the cost of repetition, in the

present case, the allegations made in the FIR/complaint even if taken at its face value, do not disclose the commission of an

offence or make out a case against the accused. We are of the considered view that the present case would fall under

Category-3 of the categories enumerated by this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal (supra).

14. We may gainfully refer to the observations of this Court in the case of Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), Department of Home (2019) 11 SCC 706: 2018 INSC 1060:

"14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge sheet is filed, the petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind

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the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23]. In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23], this Court while deciding

.

the question of whether the High Court could

entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition,

observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16) "16. Thus, the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is

being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant's FIR. Even if the charge sheet had been filed, the learned r Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of

Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant's

FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not."

25. Hence, it is not permissible for the Court to go into the

truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations made in the complaint.

26. Consequently, the present petition fails and the same is

dismissed, so also the pending miscellaneous applications, if any.

(Rakesh Kainthla) Judge 8th July, 2024 (Saurav pathania)

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