Arun Dev Upadhyaya vs Integrated Sales Service Ltd.

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA INHERENT JURISDICTION

R.P. (C) NOS. 1273-1274/2021 IN CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 8345-8346 OF 2018

ARUN DEV UPADHYAYA …PETITIONER(S)

VERSUS

INTEGRATED SALES SERVICE LTD. & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

JUDGMENT

VIKRAM NATH,J.

1. These are Review Petitions preferred by Arun

Dev Upadhyaya (Review Petitioner) praying for review

of the judgment dated 10.08.2021 passed in Civil

Appeal Nos. 8345-8346 of 2018 titled Gemini Bay

Transcription Pvt. Ltd. vs. Integrated Sales Service

Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SONIA BHASIN Date: 2023.07.06 16:43:09 IST Reason: 1 Ltd. & Anr.1 whereby the said Civil Appeals filed by

the Review Petitioner were dismissed.

2. We have heard Shri Harish N. Salve, Sr.

Advocate for the Review Petitioner and Shri Shekhar

Naphade, learned Senior Counsel for the Respondent

No. 1 and also perused the material on record.

3. Relevant facts of the present litigation giving rise

to the present review petitions are briefly summarized

hereunder:

3.1. D.M.C. Management Consultants Limited2

was incorporated as a public limited company

under the Companies Act, 1956 in July 1995. A

Representation Agreement was executed on

18.09.2000 to be effective from 03.10.2000

between DMC and Integrated Sales Service Ltd.

(Respondent No.1). The said agreement was

signed by Rattan Pathak (Managing Director) on

1 In short, “GBTL” 2 In short ‘DMC’

2 behalf of DMC and Terry L. Peteete, Director on

behalf of Respondent No.1.

3.2. Under the said agreement, Respondent No.

1 was to find customers for DMC on commission

basis. Under the terms of the agreement,

Respondent No. 1 as the representative was to

assist DMC in selling its goods and services to

prospective customers and to receive commission

in consideration thereof. Further, as per Clause

8(d), any dispute between the two companies was

agreed to be subjected to the laws of the State of

Missouri, USA and the same were to be referred

to a sole Arbitrator appointed by agreement

between the parties. Upon failure to agree to

Arbitrator, the appointment was to be made

according to the rules of the American Arbitration

Association.

3 3.3. There were two amendments with respect

to the Representation Agreement dated

18.09.2000. The first amendment executed in

2005 related to the changes in the rate of

commission. This amendment was signed by the

review petitioner Arun Dev Upadhyaya in his

capacity as Director of DMC and Terry L. Peteete

(Director) on behalf of the Respondent No.1.

3.4. The second amendment to the

Representation Agreement came to be executed

on 01.01.2008. It rendered the First Amendment

of 2005 as null and void. This amendment also

made some changes to the rate of commission and

further it made the laws of Delaware applicable to

the Representation Agreement. This Amendment

was signed by Rattan Pathak (Managing Director)

on behalf of DMC and Terry L. Peteete (Director)

on behalf of Respondent No.1.

4 3.5. The Review Petitioner who was holding the

office of Director in DMC tendered his resignation

on 31.03.2009. On 22.06.2009, Respondent No.

1 issued a demand for Arbitration to the Review

Petitioner under the Commercial Arbitration

Rules of the AAA. The statement of claim was also

against DMC and GBTL seeking damages to the

tune of US $ 4.8 million.

3.6. GBTL filed its objections on 21.07.2009 to

the effect that the Arbitral Tribunal has no

jurisdiction to include it as a party in the

arbitration as it was not a party to the agreement.

On the same day, the Review Petitioner also filed

a ‘without prejudice response’ to the Statement of

Claim stating, inter alia that he was not signatory

in the agreement between DMC and Respondent

No. 1; secondly, that he never consented to or

agreed to be bound by any arbitration agreement;

and thirdly, any demand for arbitration against

5 him in his individual capacity was not acceptable

and was denied.

3.7. The signatory to the Representation

Agreement i.e. DMC filed its reply on 21.07.2009

to the Statement of Claim made by Respondent

No.1.

3.8. In October, 2009, GBTL filed Special Civil

Suit No. 1035 of 2009 before the Civil Judge,

Senior Division, Nagpur, against Respondent No.

1 seeking declaration and perpetual injunction

and also for recovery of damages of Rs.

10,00,000/-. This suit is still pending. An

application under Order 39 Rules 1&2 CPC was

also filed in the said suit praying to restrain

Respondent No. 1 to proceed with the arbitration

on the ground that it could not be compelled to

participate in the arbitration as it was not a

signatory to the agreement.

6 3.9. The Tribunal on 23.12.2009 passed an

interlocutory order holding that the Tribunal had

jurisdiction to decide whether the non-signatory

to the Representation Agreement were

appropriately named in the arbitration or not; the

issue of piercing of the corporate veil and joinder

of non-signatory parties could be decided after

evidence is received and is not a preliminary

issue; the claims of the Review Petitioner and

GBTL would not be jeopardized and would not

constitute a waiver of their rights of claims as

non-signatory parties; that they must contest the

arguments and factual claims made by

Respondent No.1; their non-participation in the

arbitration would potentially expose them to an

adverse award or an award by default. According

to the Review Petitioner, the above order was

passed in his absence and GBTL.

7 3.10. The application under Order 39 Rules 1 &

2 CPC filed in the Special Civil Suit No. 1035 of

2009 was rejected by Civil Judge, Nagpur vide

order dated 25.01.2010.

3.11. The Arbitrator gave an award on

28.03.2010 in favour of Respondent No.1 with the

finding that DMC was in breach of their

Representation Agreement and further holding

that since DMC, Review Petitioner and GBTL

colluded together, they were jointly and severally

liable to pay the amount along with interest. The

award was for an amount of US $ 6,948,100.

3.12. The Respondent No. 1 before approaching

the High Court moved an application under

Section 47 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

19963 seeking execution of the Arbitral Award

before the Principal District Judge at Nagpur.

3 In short ‘the Act’

8 However, the said Application was found to be not

maintainable as it was the High Court which

would have jurisdiction. The application before

the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court,

seeking enforcement of the Award was registered

as M.C.A. No. 1319 of 2015. Review Petitioner on

27.01.2016 filed objections under Section 47 of

the Act to which Respondent No. 1 filed its reply

on 06.02.2016. A second set of objections were

filed by the Review Petitioner on 03.03.2016

under Sections 44 to 49 of the Act challenging the

recognition of the award as a foreign award as it

did not satisfy the requirements both under the

Act and also under the provisions of the New York

Convention. DMC and GBTL filed separate

objections under Section 49 of the Act to which

replies were filed by Respondent No.1.

3.13. The learned Single Judge vide judgment

dated 18.04.2016 held that the award was a

9 foreign award and enforceable against DMC only.

It accepted the objections raised by Review

Petitioner and GBTL that the award was not

enforceable against them. The Letters Patent

Appeal preferred by Respondent No.1 was

registered as Arbitration Appeal No.3 of 2016. In

the meantime, objections were raised regarding

maintainability of the appeal and also Review

Petitions were filed before the Single Judge.

3.14. The Division Bench rejected the objection

regarding the maintainability against which the

matter was carried to this Court by the Review

Petitioner but the same was dismissed on

30.09.2016. The Division Bench finally vide

judgment dated 04.01.2017 allowed the

Arbitration Appeal No. 3 of 2016 and held the

award to be enforceable against Review Petitioner

and GBTL also as the award was a foreign award

as against Review Petitioner and GBTL. Review

10 Petitions were filed before the Division Bench

which were dismissed on 24.02.2017.

3.15. The orders dated 04.01.2017 and

24.02.2017 were challenged before this Court by

the Review Petitioner by way of SLP (Civil) Nos.

8899-8900 of 2017 (Civil Appeal Nos.8345-8346

of 2018). GBTL as also DMC filed separate SLPs

before this Court. In the SLP filed by DMC, this

Court granted leave subject to condition that it

deposits US $ 2.5 million. This Court vide

judgment dated 10.08.2021 dismissed all the

appeals. The present Review Petitions have been

preferred only by Arun Dev Upadhyaya (Review

Petitioner) to review the judgement dated

10.08.2021.

4. In the impugned judgement, it has been held

that it would not be permissible to review the award

on merits even on the ground of existence and validity

11 of the arbitration and the only ground on which the

enforcement of foreign awards could be resisted or

refused are contained in Section 48 of the Act. It also

held that the canvas of Section 46 of the Act is wider

than that of Section 35 of the Act and as such would

apply to all the persons who are not even parties to

the Arbitration Agreement. It also held that the

tortious dispute can also be referred to arbitration

because it is in connection with the agreement.

5. Mr. Salve submitted that essential points in the

submissions made on behalf of the Review Petitioner

before this Court have not been considered nor any

finding returned by this Court as such the impugned

order suffers from an error apparent on the face of

record.

6. The submissions of Mr. Salve briefly summarized

are as under:

12

A) The impugned judgment overlooked the

fundamental point made on behalf of the Review

Petitioner that Section 44 read with Section 46

of Act makes only a foreign award enforceable

and in order to ascertain whether the award is

foreign award the Court is not constrained by

Section 48 of the Act.

B) Undisputedly, the Review Petitioner was not a

party to the Representation Agreement however,

the Arbitrator applying Delaware law and its

principles made the review petitioner a party to

the arbitration proceedings initiated by

Respondent No.1 against DMC. The said award

was sought to be enforced in India and in the

said enforcement proceedings, objections were

raised by Review Petitioner which have not been

dealt with in the impugned order.

C) The contention specifically raised at the time of

argument before this Court were not considered

13 and in fact misconstrued or misunderstood

resulting into an error apparent on the face of

record. Reference has been made to the written

submissions submitted on behalf of the Review

Petitioner at the time of arguments before this

Court which specifically included the following

points:

(i) Though under the Delaware law, a non-

party to the agreement could have been

included in the arbitration proceedings but

when the same is being enforced in India,

then, the award will have to be tested as to

whether it could be enforced against the

non-party to the agreement as per the

Indian law. The submission is that there

was no foreign award as against the Review

Petitioner which could be enforced in India.

The language of Section 35 and Section 46

of the Act are not pari materia. Under

14 Section 35, an arbitral award shall be final

and binding on parties and persons

claiming under them respectively meaning

that, to a non-party claiming under the

party to the agreement, the arbitral award

would be binding, whereas under Section

46 of the Act a foreign award would be

binding for all purposes on the persons as

between whom it was made and not against

non-party even though claiming under the

party to the agreement. Sections 35 and 46

of the Act are reproduced below:

“35. Finality of arbitral awards.- Subject to this Part an arbitral award shall be final and binding on the parties and persons claiming under them respectively.

46. When foreign award binding.- Any foreign award which would be enforceable under this Chapter shall be treated as binding for all purposes on the persons as between whom it was made, and may accordingly be relied on by

15 any of those persons by way of defence, set off or otherwise in any legal proceedings in India and any references in this Chapter to enforcing a foreign award shall be construed as including references to relying on an award.”

(ii) In the impugned judgment this aspect of

the matter has not been considered

although it was a vital issue and goes to the

root of the matter as to whether a foreign

award could be treated as binding and

enforceable against the non-party to the

agreement.

(D) Lastly, according to the Review Petitioner,

damages were calculated not in any quantified

manner but only on basis of Mr. Peteete’s intimate

understanding of the business, not supported by

any documentary material.

7. On the other hand, Sri Naphade, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for respondent No.1 sought to

justify the impugned judgment referring to various

16 findings therein. He also submitted that this being a

review petition, there was limited scope for this Court

to examine the arguments of the petitioner as they

would tantamount to a fresh hearing of the appeal.

Further, according to him, all the points now sought

to be argued have already been considered by this

Court, no case for review is made out and the review

petitions deserve to be dismissed.

8. Before proceeding to deal with the arguments on

merits of the review petitions, it would be appropriate

to briefly comment on the scope of review.

8.1. The review petitions have been filed under

Article 137 of the Constitution of India read with

Rule 1 of Order XLVII of the Supreme Court Rules,

2013. Article 137 of the Constitution of India

provides for review of judgments or orders by the

Supreme Court. The same is reproduced

hereunder:

17

“137. Review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court.-- Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or any rules made under article 145, the Supreme Court shall have power to review any judgment pronounced or order made by it.”

8.2. According to the said provision, the

Supreme Court would have power to review any

judgment or order made by it subject to the

provisions of any law made by the Parliament or

any Rules made under Article 145. The Supreme

Court Rules 2013 have been framed under Article

145 by this Court and duly approved by the

President. It may be stated that no law has been

made by the Parliament in that respect and, as

such, the power of review vested in this Court

would be governed by the Rules.

8.3. Order XLVII of Part-IV of the Supreme

Court Rules, 2013 provides for the powers of

review and the procedure for hearing such review.

The said provision is reproduced hereunder:

18

“PART-IV ORDER XLVII REVIEW

1. The Court may review its judgment or order, but no application for review will be entertained in a civil proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order XLVII, rule I of the Code, and in a criminal proceeding except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of the record.

The application for review shall be accompanied by a certificate of the Advocate on Record certifying that it is the first application for review and is based on the grounds admissible under the Rules.

2. An application for review shall be by a petition, and shall be filed within thirty days from the date of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed. It shall set out clearly the grounds for review.

3. Unless otherwise ordered by the Court an application for review shall be disposed of by circulation without any oral arguments, but the petitioner may supplement his petition by additional written arguments. The Court may either dismiss the petition or direct notice to the opposite party. An application for review shall as far as practicable be circulated to the same Judge

19 or Bench of Judges that delivered the judgment or order sought to be reviewed.

4. Where on an application for review the Court reverses or modifies its former decision in the case on the ground of mistake of law or fact, the Court, may, if it thinks fit in the interests of justice to do so, direct the refund to the petitioner of the court- fee paid on the application in whole or in part, as it may think fit.

5. Where an application for review of any judgment and order has been made and disposed of, no further application for review shall be entertained in the same matter.”

A perusal of the above provision makes it amply

clear that in a civil proceeding review could not be

entertained except on the grounds mentioned in

Order XLVII Rule 1 of C.P.C.

8.4. Section 114 of CPC vests power of review in

Courts and Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC provides for

the scope and procedure for filing a review

petition. The same is reproduced hereunder:

“Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC:

20 “1. Application for review of judgment- Any person considering himself aggrieved-

(a) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but from which no appeal has been preferred.

(b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or

(c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,

and who, from the discovery of new and important' matter or evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence was not within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the time when the decree was passed or order made, or on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the record or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a review of the decree passed or order made against him, may apply for a review of judgment to the Court which passed the decree or made the order. (emphasis supplied)

(2) A party who is not appealing from a decree or order may apply for a review of judgment notwithstanding the pendency of an appeal by some other party except where the ground of such appeal is common to the applicant and the appellant, or when, being respondent, he can

21 present to the Appellate Court the case on which he applied for the review.

Explanation. The fact that the decision on a question of law on which the judgment of the Court is based has been reversed or modified by the subsequent decision of a superior Court in any other case, shall not be a ground for the review of such judgment.”

9. A plain reading of the above provisions in

uncertain terms states that the power to review can

be exercised only upon existence of any of the three

conditions expressed therein. 'A mistake or an error

apparent on the face of the record' is one of the

conditions. It is only on this ground that review has

been preferred. The above phrase has been

consistently interpreted by authoritative

pronouncement of this Court for decades. A three

Judge Bench of this Court comprising of Hon’ble Sri

S.R. Das, C.J., M. Hidayatullah and Sri K.C. Das

Gupta, J.J. in the case of Satyanarayan

Laxminarayan Hegde and others Vs. Millikarjun

22 Bhavanappa Tirumale4, discussed the scope of the

phrase 'error apparent on the face of record'. The

challenge before this Court in the said case was the

judgment of the High Court on the ground whether it

suffers from an error apparent on the face of the

record. The High Court had issued a writ of certiorari

and had quashed order of the Tribunal and restored

that of the Mamlatdar. In paragraph 8 of the report,

the issue which was to be considered is reflected. The

same is reproduced hereunder:

“8. The main question that arises for our consideration in this appeal by special leave granted by this Court is whether there is any error apparent on the face of the record so as to enable the superior court to call for the records and quash the order by a writ of certiorari or whether the error, if any, was “a mere error not so apparent on the face of the record”, which

4 AIR 1960 SC 137

23 can only be corrected by an appeal if an appeal lies at all.”

10. After discussing the relevant material on record,

the conclusion is stated in paragraph 17 of the report.

The view was that where an error which has to be

established by a long-drawn process of reasoning on

points where there may conceivably be two opinions,

can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face

of the record. The view that long-drawn process of

arguments to canvass a point attacking the order in a

review jurisdiction, cannot be said to be an error

apparent on the face of record. Relevant extract from

paragraph 17 of the report is reproduced hereunder:

“17....................Is the conclusion wrong and if so, is such error apparent on the face of the record ? If it is clear that the error if any is not apparent on the face of the record, it is not necessary for us to decide whether the conclusion of the Bombay High Court on the question of notice is correct or not. An error which has to be established by a long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinions can

24 hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the record. As the above discussion of the rival contentions show the alleged error in the present case is far from self evident and if it can be established, it has to be established by lengthy and complicated arguments. We do not think such an error can be cured by a writ of certiorari according to the rule governing the powers of the superior court to issue such a writ. In our opinion the High Court was wrong in thinking that the alleged error in the judgment of the Bombay Revenue Tribunal, viz., that an order for possession should not be made unless a previous notice had been given was an error apparent on the face of the record so as to be capable of being corrected by a writ of certiorari.”

11. Another case which may be briefly dealt with is

the case of Parison Devi Vs. Sumitri Devi5, where,

this Court ruled that under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC,

a judgment may be open to review inter alia if there is

a mistake or an error apparent on the face of the

record. An error which is not self-evident and has to

be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be

5 (1997) 8 SCC 715

25 said to be an error apparent on the face of the record

justifying the Court to exercise its power of review. It

also observed that a review petition cannot be allowed

to be treated as an appeal in disguise.

12. A series of decisions may also be referred to

wherein, it has been held that power to review may

not be exercised on the ground that decision was

erroneous on merits as the same would be the domain

of the Court of appeal. Power of review should not be

confused with appellate powers as the appellate power

can correct all manners of errors committed by the

subordinate courts. The following judgments may be

referred:

(1) Shivdeo Singh Vs. State of Punjab; AIR

1963 SC 1909

(2) Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma Vs. Aribam

Pishak Sharma; AIR 1979 SC 1047

26 (3) Meera Bhanja (Smt.) Vs. Nirmala

Kumari Choudhary (Smt.); (1995) 1 SCC

170.

(4) Uma Nath Pandey Vs. State of U.P.;

(2009) 12 SCC 40

13. Recently, this Court in a judgment dated 24th

February, 2023 passed in Civil Appeal No.1167-

1170 of 2023 between S. Murali Sundaram Vs.

Jothibai Kannan and Others, observed that even

though a judgment sought to be reviewed is

erroneous, the same cannot be a ground to review in

exercise of powers under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. Futher, in the case of Perry Kansagra Vs. Smriti

Madan Kansagra6, this Court observed that while

exercising the review jurisdiction in an application

under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section 114 CPC,

6 (2019) 20 SCC 753

27 the Review Court does not sit in appeal over its own

order.

14. In another case between Shanti Conductors (P)

Ltd. Vs. Assam SEB,7 this Court observed that scope

of review under Order XLVII Rule 1 read with Section

114 CPC is limited and under the guise of review, the

petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and

reargue questions which have already been addressed

and decided. It was further observed that an error

which is not self-evident and has to be detected by a

process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error

apparent on the face of record.

15. From the above, it is evident that a power to

review cannot be exercised as an appellate power and

has to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of

Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. An error on the face of record

must be such an error which, mere looking at the

7 (2020) 2 SCC 677

28 record should strike and it should not require any

long-drawn process of reasoning on the points where

there may conceivably be two opinions.

16. In the above backdrop of the scope of review to

which these petitions are confined, we proceed to

consider whether a case for review is made out or not.

17. As many as 18 grounds have been raised in the

review petitions, we have considered not only the oral

submissions advanced by Mr. Salve, learned Sr.

Counsel, but have also perused all the grounds raised

in the review petition. A close perusal of the judgment

dated 10.08.2021 reflects that all the grounds taken

in the review have been discussed in detail and

findings returned not accepting the claim of the

Review Petitioner. What is sought to be argued is

basically that the view taken is erroneous and

therefore, impugned judgment deserves to be

reviewed.

29

18. We may briefly refer to the relevant argument and

the findings returned by this Court in the impugned

judgment dated 10.08.2021. In paragraph 26 of the

impugned judgment, this Court summarized the four

points argued by Mr. Salve. The said paragraph is

reproduced hereunder:

“26. Shri Harish Salve, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of Arun Dev Upadhyaya, argued that the commission of a tort would be outside contractual disputes that arise under the Arbitration Agreement and that since the cause of action really arose in tort, the Award was vitiated on this ground. He also argued relying heavily upon Dallah Real Estate and Tourism Co v Ministry of Religious Affairs of the Government of Pakistan [2010] 3 WLR 1472 [“Dallah”] that a full review based on oral and/or documentary evidence ought to have been undertaken which was not done on the facts of this case, the Division Bench merely echoing the Arbitrator’s findings. He then made a distinction between Section 46 and Section 35 of the Arbitration Act, and argued that under Section 46, a foreign award is to be treated as binding only on persons as between whom it was made and

30 not on persons who 25 may claim under the parties. He also argued that insofar as his client was concerned, there was no evidence to show his involvement in any manner and that the findings against his client are unreasoned and perfunctory, and on this ground also the Award stands vitiated.” (emphasis supplied)

19. Paragraph 298 of the judgment deals with the

analysis and interpretation of Section 44 of the Act.

This Court noticed that there would be six ingredients

to qualify an arbitral award to be a foreign award.

Paragraph 29 is reproduced hereunder:

“29. A reading of Section 44 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 would show that there are six ingredients to an award being a foreign award under the said Section. First, it must be an arbitral award on differences between persons arising out of legal relationships. Second, these differences may be in contract or outside of contract, for example, in tort. Third, the legal relationship so spoken of ought to be considered “commercial” under the law in India. Fourth, the award must be made on or after the 11th day of October, 1960.

8 The paragraph nos. are from the original impugned judgment annexed in the paper book.

31 Fifth, the award must be a New York Convention award – in short it must be in pursuance of an agreement in writing to which the New York Convention applies and be in one of such territories. And Sixth, it must be made in one of such territories which the Central Government by notification declares to be territories to which the New York Convention applies.”

20. In Paragraph Nos.30 to 33, this Court discussed

the ingredients. Further, in paragraphs 34 to 37, the

Court dealt with the scope of Section 47 of the Act and

the argument of the counsel for the Review Petitioner

that evidence should be adduced and it should be a

full trial to prove that the non-signatory would also be

bound by a foreign award, was rejected.

21. In Paragraph Nos.38 to 57, this Court dealt with

in detail the argument that review on merits of the

award would be permissible under Section 48(1) of the

Act and held against the Review Petitioner as none of

the grounds therein were available to the Review

Petitioner.

32

22. In paragraph Nos.66 to 70 of the report, this

Court dealt with the argument that damages awarded

in tort would be outside the scope of the arbitration

agreement and rejected the said argument.

23. In paragraph 71 of the report of the judgment,

this Court compared the scope of Section 35 and 46

of the Act and further observed that once the award

was not challenged in the State where it was made it

could not be said that the arbitral award had infracted

the substantive law of the agreement.

24. Paragraphs 72 and 73 of the report dealt with

the issue of violation of any public policy and this

Court found that there was no such violation.

25. In paragraphs 74 to 76, this Court justified the

quantification of the damages and the basis for

determining the same even if it was based on best

judgment assessment.

33

26. Each and every argument having been

considered by this Court in its judgment dated

10.08.2021, the arguments advanced if accepted

would result in expressing a different opinion on the

points raised and decided, which we are afraid do not

fall within the settled contours of Order XLVII Rule 1

CPC relating to error apparent on the face of record.

The other grounds of invoking the review power are

neither existing nor have been raised in the present

petitions.

27. Accordingly, we do not find any good ground to

allow the review petitions. They are, accordingly,

dismissed.

…………..........................J. [B.R. GAVAI]

………….........................J. [VIKRAM NATH] NEW DELHI JULY 5, 2023.

34