Aradadi Ramudu vs State

ARADADI RAMUDU @ AGGIRAMUDU ... APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE, THROUGH

INSPECTOR OF POLICE, YANAM ... RESPONDENT

O R D E R

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the

judgment and order passed by the High Court of

Judicature at Madras in Criminal Appeal

No.1083/2007 dated 05.11.2009. By the impugned

judgment and order, the High Court, after re-

appreciating the entire evidence on record, has

confirmed the Order of the Additional Sessions

Judge, Pondicherry in S.C.No.99 of 1997 dated

29.04.1999, by which the appellant-accused was

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convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal

Code (for short "the IPC") and sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for life.

3. The deceased (Gangammal) was the wife of

appellant-accused. It is the case of the

prosecution that the accused was an alcoholic, and

habitually beating his wife after picking up a

quarrel with her for silly reasons. He also didn't

reside under the same roof with her, and only

occasionally visited her. Gangammal was eking her

livelihood by working as a domestic servant. At the

time of the incident, Gangammal and the accused had

a son and a daughter.

4. It appears that on the previous night of

the incident, the accused severely beat Gangammal

as he doubted her fidelity. On 13.08.1997, around

6.45 a.m., the accused attacked her neck with a

kitchen knife, causing her to bleed profusely,

which ultimately led to her death.

5. It has come in the evidence of P.W.2 (the

neighbour) that she barged into the Gangammal's

house on hearing her shriek in pain, and found

Gangammal in a severely injured condition. In her

evidence, she has also stated that Gangammal told

her that the accused had caused the knife injury on

her neck. Thereafter, P.W.2 has deposed that she

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asked Gangammal to change her blood soaked saree

and arranged for a rickshaw puller to shift

Gangammal from the house to the Government Hospital

at Yanam.

6. In the hospital, P.W.1 (the doctor)

treated the deceased. In the Examination-in-Chief,

he has elaborated the nature of the injuries that

Gangammal had suffered and the treatment that was

given to her. He has further stated that, for

better treatment, he had advised P.W.2 to take her

to the Government Hospital, Kakinada. He has

further stated that Gangammal had told him that the

accused had first tried to throttle her neck and

later on stabbed her on the neck with a knife.

7. We have the evidence of P.W.3 (son of the

accused and deceased) and P.W.4 (daughter of the

accused and deceased), who, at that time, were 16

years and 14 years respectively. Both of them, in

one voice, have stated that there used to be

quarrel between their mother and father and their

father used to beat their mother. They have also

stated that after they came back to the house, they

were informed that the accused had caused the knife

injury on the neck of their mother.

8. P.W.5 (the rickshaw puller who transported

the deceased to Government Hospital, Yanam) has

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testified that the deceased had stated to him that

the accused had stabbed her on the neck. P.W.12

(the doctor who treated the deceased at Government

Hospital, Kakinada) has explained the treatment she

gave to the deceased in her evidence, and has

confirmed that the death of the deceased was caused

by the stab injury inflicted on her neck. In the

evidence of P.W.13 (the medical examiner who

conducted the post mortem) and the post mortem

report, the nature of the injury on the body of the

deceased and the seriousness of the same has come

on record.

9. The Trial Court, after appreciating and

analysing the entire evidence on record, has came

to the conclusion that the knife injury caused by

the accused on the neck of the deceased was

sufficient to cause her death. Accordingly, it has

convicted and sentenced the accused under Section

302 of the IPC, awarding rigorous imprisonment for

life. The same is confirmed by the High Court,

which decision is impugned before us.

10. We have heard Shri. Shekhar Prit Jha,

learned amicus curiae appearing for the appellant

and Shri. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel

appearing for the respondent. We have also perused

the evidence on record and the testimonies of the

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various witnesses.

11. After a careful analysis of the evidence

on record, we are of the firm opinion that the

conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial Court

and confirmed by the High Court, does not suffer

from any legal infirmity which would call for our

interference under Article 136 of the Constitution.

12. However, Shri Jha, learned amicus curiae

would contend before us that in the instant case,

the sentence requires to be modified from Section

302 IPC to Section 304 Part-II of IPC. According to

the learned amicus curiae that the accused had no

intention to kill the deceased and the injury which

was inflicted on the deceased was not sufficient to

convict and sentence the accused under Section 302

of the IPC.

13. Shri. V. Kanagaraj, learned senior counsel

appearing for the respondent has stated that the

factum of the accused causing the knife injury on

the neck of the deceased has come in the

testimonies of P.W.1, P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.4, P.W.5

and P.W.6 (a village elder). He would also state

that the injury sustained by the deceased was of a

serious nature and ultimately led to her death. The

learned senior counsel would submit that in light

of the evidence on record, our interference, in

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respect of the sentence, was not called for.

14. Though the submission of the learned

amicus curiae looks attractive at the first blush,

weighing the same with the facts of the present

case and evidence on record, in our opinion, the

same has no merit.

15. In State of UP v. Indrajeet, (2000) 7 SCC

249, this Court held:

"7......Absence of intention to cause death

coupled with the lack of knowledge that

death would be inevitably caused on

account of the injury would make the

offence fall only under Section 304 Part

II IPC, and not under Section 302 IPC......"

In Satish Narayan Sawant v. State of Goa, (2009) 17

SCC 724, this Court held:

"41......It is trite law that Section 304 Part

II comes into play when the death is

caused by doing an act with knowledge that

it is likely to cause death but there is

no intention on the part of the accused

either to cause death or to cause such

bodily injury as is likely to cause

death."

16. In other words, this Court has held that

for modification of sentence from Section 302 to

Section 304 Part II, not only should there be an

absence of the intention to cause death, but also

an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury

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that in the ordinary course of things was likely to

cause death.

17. There is concurrent affirmative finding of

fact by both the Courts below regarding the

intention of the accused to kill the deceased.

Having perused the evidence on record, and on

account of the concurrent findings, we are unable

to accept the submission of Shri. Jha that there

was an absence of intention to kill on the part of

the accused, meriting our interference in sentence.

Further, this Court, in Chahat Khan v. State of

Haryana, (1972) 3 SCC 408, held:

"9......When a person is causing an injury on

such a vital part the intention to kill

can certainly attributed to him..."

18. Assuming for a moment that the accused had

no intention to kill the deceased, it can still be

said that he had the intention to cause an injury

which would in the ordinary course of things would

cause her death. In Virsa Singh v. The State of

Punjab, 1958 SCR 1495, this Court, speaking through

Vivian Bose, J., held (at pg. 1501):

"...It does not matter that there was no

intention to cause death. It does not

matter that there was no intention even to

cause an injury of a kind that is

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sufficient to cause death in the ordinary

course of nature (not that there is any

real distinction between the two). It does

not even matter that there is no knowledge

that an act of that kind will be likely to

cause death. Once the intention to cause

the bodily injury actually found to be

present is proved, the rest of the enquiry

is purely objective and the only question

is whether, as a matter of purely

objective inference, the injury is

sufficient in the ordinary course of

nature to cause death. No one has a

license to run around inflicting injuries

that are sufficient to cause death in the

ordinary course of nature and claim that

they are not guilty of murder. If they

inflict injuries of that kind, they must

face the consequences; and they can only

escape if it can be shown, or reasonably

deduced that the injury was accidental or

otherwise unintentional."

19. In Arun Raj v. Union of India, (2010) 6

SCC 457, held:

"22...... The appellant in this instance has

used a kitchen knife. A kitchen knife with

sharp edges is a dangerous weapon and it

is very obvious that the appellant was

aware that the use of such a weapon can

cause death......"

20. In the instant case, it has come on record

that the accused was an alcoholic and he was in the

habit of beating his wife regularly after consuming

enough and more liquor. It is also a matter of fact

confirmed by the two Courts below that on the date

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of the incident, there was a quarrel between the

accused and the deceased, and the accused caused

injury on the neck of the deceased with a kitchen

knife.

21. The doctor (P.W.1) in his medical report

has stated the nature of the injuries suffered by

the deceased due to the knife injury caused by the

accused. A perusal of the medical report would

definitely indicate that those injuries were

sufficient enough to cause the death of the

deceased. That apart, we should also notice that

before the deceased was shifted to the Government

Hospital at Yanam for treatment of the injuries,

the saree worn by the deceased was literally soaked

in blood. Therefore, her neighbour, who has come on

record as (P.W.2), has stated that she had to

advise the deceased to change her saree. This would

indicate that because of the injuries suffered,

there was profuse loss of blood which itself was

sufficient enough to cause the death of the

deceased.

22. In our view, the evidence on record is

more than sufficient to indicate that the accused

had the intention to cause such injury on the body

of the deceased that would be in all likelihood

cause her death in the natural course of things,

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fulfilling the conditions imposed by Section 300 of

IPC for punishment under Section 302.

23. Keeping in view all these aspects, the

submission of Shri. Jha, learned amicus curiae that

the conviction and sentence awarded by the Trial

Court and confirmed by the High Court requires to

be modified from Section 302 IPC to Section 304

Part-II IPC, cannot be accepted by us.

24. In view of the above, we do not see any

merit in this appeal. Accordingly, the appeal

stands dismissed.

Ordered accordingly.

...................J.

(H.L. DATTU)

...................J.

(ANIL R. DAVE)

NEW DELHI,

FEBRUARY 15, 2012

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