Anusuchit Jati Jamati Shikshan Sanstha ... vs State Of Maharashtra Through Its Chief ...
- Citation2024 SCC OnLine Bom 986
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
The doctrine of promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation cannot be invoked to challenge a Government policy decision where: (a) the promise or representation relied upon is not clear and unequivocal; (b) the promise falls short of creating a vested right binding the State for the stated duration; and (c) the State's altered policy serves a legitimate public purpose that satisfies the test of Wednesbury reasonableness. An agreement entered into between training centres and a State autonomous institution for a one-year term, notwithstanding references in an antecedent Government Resolution to a five-year programme duration, does not establish that the parties acquired a contractual or quasi-contractual right to continue beyond one year. A State Government is entitled to rescind a prior policy to implement a unified scheme for scholarships and training across multiple Government departments and autonomous institutions, and the introduction of competitive bidding mechanisms for selection of training providers—absent from the earlier policy—constitutes a legitimate policy shift in public interest. The doctrine of legitimate expectation has no role where the impugned State action is taken in pursuance of a public policy decision that is rational and not arbitrary, unless the decision amounts to an abuse of power. A formal Government Resolution, which explicitly revokes an earlier Resolution, validly supersedes the prior policy even if the Appendix attached to the new Resolution reflects substantive changes, provided the Government Resolution is the formal expression of a Cabinet decision and no material suggests the Appendix was added mischievously or outside the scope of the Cabinet's decision.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
30945.23-wpl.docx
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 30945 OF 2023
Anusuchit Jati Jamati Shikshan Sanstha, through its President Mr. Bhushan Govind Ramteke & Ors. .. Petitioners
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Anr. .. Respondents
WITH WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33274 OF 2023
Seva Samajik Vikas Sanstha, through Its authorized representative Mr. Bhushan Govind Ramteke .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33281 OF 2023
Yukti Multipurpose Society, through Its Chairman Mrs. Anupama Maroti Nagarkar .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
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WITH WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33310 OF 2023
Prasang Magaswargiy Samajkalyan Sanstha, through its President Mr. Gajapal Payaruji Ingole .. Petitioner Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
WITH WRIT PETITION (L) NO. 33311 OF 2023
Bharatiya Samajik Bahuuddeshiy Vikas Sanstha, through its President Mr. Mangal Kawdu Telang .. Petitioner
Versus
State of Maharashtra & Ors. .. Respondents
Mr. Nitin Thakkar, Senior Advocate a/w Mr. Sanjiv Sawant, Mr. Sandeep Barve, Mr. Santosh Wagh and Ms. Sonali Patil i/by B. K. Barve & Co. for petitioners in WPL/30945/2023.
Mr. Bhushan Ramteke, petitioner-in-person in WPL/33274/2023.
Dr. Uday Warunjikar a/w Mr. Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil i/by B. K. Barve and Co. for petitioner in WP/33281/2023.
Mr. Abhijeet Desai a/w Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil, Mr. Karan Gajra, Mr. Digvijay Kachare, Ms. Daksha Punghera and Mr. Vijay Singh i/by B. K. Barve & Co. for petitioner in WPL/33310/2023.
Mr. Sanjiv Sawant a/w Mr.Sandeep Barve and Ms. Sonali Patil i/by B. K. Barve & Co. for petitioners in WPL/33311/2023.
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Mr. Milind V. More, Addl. Govt. Pleader with Mr. Kushal Amin for State in WPL/30945/2023 and WPL/33281/2023.
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Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Smt. P. H. Kantharia, Govt. Pleader with Mr. Abhay L. Patki, Addl. Govt. Pleader with Mr. Kushal Amin for State in WPL/33274/2023 and WPL/33310/2023.
Dr. Birendra Saraf, Advocate General with Smt. P. H. Kantharia, Govt. Pleader, Smt. Jyoti Chavan, Addl. Govt. Pleader with Mr. Kushal Amin for State in WPL/33311/2023.
CORAM: DEVENDRA KUMAR UPADHYAYA, CJ. & ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.
RESERVED ON : MARCH 1, 2024 PRONOUNCED ON : APRIL 3, 2024
JUDGMENT (PER : CHIEF JUSTICE)
1. Heard learned counsel representing the respective parties.
BACKGROUND FACTS:
2. Challenge in this batch of Writ Petitions filed under Article
226 of the Constitution of India, is to a Government decision /
resolution dated 30th October 2023 whereby the earlier
Government decision dated 28 th October 2021 has been revoked
and it has been resolved to establish uniform guidelines for
various scholarships, fellowships, autonomous institutions, hostel
accommodations and stipends to candidates / students who opt
for being imparted training to take various competitive
examinations in certain autonomous institutions established by
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the State Government such as Tribal Research and Training
Institute (TRTI), Pune, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar Research and
Training Institute (BARTI), Pune, Chhatrapati Shahu Maharaj
Research and Training Institute (SARTHI), Pune, Mahatma
Jyotiba Phule Research and Training Institute (MAHAJYOTI),
Nagpur and Maharashtra Research and Training Prabodhini
(AMRIT), Mumbai. As per the impugned decision of the
Government, dated 30th October 2023, a Committee headed by
Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department has been
constituted which comprises of the Additional Chief Secretary
(Planning), Additional Chief Secretary (IMBK), Additional Chief
Secretary, (TDD), Principal Secretary, Higher and Technical
Education Department, Principal Secretary, Minority Affairs
Department, Secretaries of other concerned Departments and
Secretary, Social Justice and Special Assistance, who are its
members. The impugned Government decision further requires
that proposals for various such programmes to be implemented
and proposed under the aforesaid autonomous institutions and
all other similar autonomous institutions shall be submitted to
the respective Departments and shall be presented before the
Committee which shall be considered as per the
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recommendations made by a Committee in its meetings held on
4th May 2023, 1st June 2023 and 12th October 2023 as mentioned
in Appendix-A appended to the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023.
3. Appendix-A attached to the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 provides, inter alia; that the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 shall
stand rescinded/revoked.
4. At this juncture itself, we find it relevant to mention as to
what was provided for by the earlier Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021. The said Government Resolution was
issued taking into consideration that BARTI, Pune has since 2012
been conducting a preparatory training for written examinations
and interview for various competitive examinations and such
training was aimed at supporting students from scheduled caste
category to secure employment opportunities in Government,
semi-Government and in private/corporate sector. BARTI, thus,
under the earlier scheme i.e. the Schemes prevalent prior to
impugned decision dated 30th October 2023 imparted training to
prepare candidates/students for taking aptitude tests, written
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examination and interviews etc. and thus, the purpose of the
scheme was to empower the students with necessary expertise
to succeed in competitive examination for employment in Banks,
Railways, LIC etc. and other equivalent examinations. Thus, the
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 was issued to
grant approval to the BARTI, Pune for conducting training for
Banks, Railways and LIC and other equivalent examinations and
police and military recruitment examinations through 30 training
centres working under the BARTI. The training duration under
the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 was
minimum of 6 months. The students who were selected through
screening examination and eligibility for the students to be
admitted to such training courses were to be determined by the
BARTI on the basis of educational qualification and age and other
criteria. The BARTI was to pay training fee of Rs.50,000/- plus
taxes per student and trainees were also receiving monthly
stipend of Rs.6000/-. As per Clauses 9 and 12 of the scheme
embodied in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th
October 2021, the training programme was to be conducted for a
minimum duration of 5 years.
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5. We may also notice that prior to introduction of the scheme
enunciated in the Government Resolution dated 28 th October
2021, BARTI was imparting training to the candidates belonging
to the category of scheduled castes for competitive examinations
and that for selecting the training centres a tender was floated
on 15th September 2017 in which 47 entities were held eligible
and accordingly, training was being provided by these 47 training
centres through the selected entities under BARTI till June 2019.
BARTI conducted evaluation of these training centres on 12 th
June 2019 and out of 47 training centres, it was decided to close
down 17 centres on account of non fulfillment of prescribed
parameters. These 30 centres, thus, continued to impart
training the candidates preparing them for competitive
examinations.
6. As already observed above, the training under BARTI was
being imparted at 30 training centres preparing the scheduled
caste candidates for taking up competitive examinations leading
to employment in Railways, Banks and LIC etc. Parallel to this
training programme, the Home Department also floated a
scheme to impart training for preparing the candidates for
recruitment of police personnel, for which purpose a tender was
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floated on 29th January 2018 based on which 9 institutions were
held eligible and accordingly, work orders were issued to these 9
institutions on 9th March 2018 for imparting training for police
and military recruitment. This training programme for police and
military recruitment was completed in the year 2019.
7. On account of pandemic caused by COVID-19, the training
programmes under both the aforesaid schemes, viz. the one run
for scheduled caste candidates under BARTI and the other run by
the State Government through Home Department for preparing
the candidates for police and military recruitment, came to a halt
and thereafter the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th
October 2021 was issued post lock-down whereby it was decided
to continue training programme for Banks, LIC, Railways and
equivalent examinations. The Government Resolution dated 28 th
October 2021 provides that the programme under the said
Government Resolution shall be conducted by the approved 30
centres and these training centres were those which were earlier
selected in the tender process initiated vide tender notice dated
15th September 2017. It is worthwhile to notice that after
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021, no tender
process to select the centres/ institutes for imparting training
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was undertaken by the State Government and there are 30
training centres which were imparting training, were allowed to
continue conducting the training by the Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021. Pursuant to the said Government
Resolution, an agreement was entered into between BARTI and
30 respective training centres/institutions. One such agreement
entered into between BARTI and the Petitioner of Writ Petition
(L) No.30945 of 2023 on 10th December 2021 may be referred
to. Similar agreements were entered into between BARTI and
other training centres. The agreement was executed as per
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 for conducting
preparatory programme for a period of one year. The agreement
also provided that the training centre shall provide required
infrastructure and other facilities and conduct the examinations
under the supervision of BARTI representative. It also provided
that in the event of any irregularity/unsatisfactory performance
during the training programme, BARTI will have full right to
recover the training fee and to cancel the continuation of such
training centre and also to black-list such training centre
/institute. The agreement also provided that the terms may be
changed from time to time by BARTI, which shall be binding on
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the training centre/institute concerned. As regards duration of
agreement, it clearly provided that the validity of agreement
would be for a period starting from the date of agreement till the
completion of scheduled training for the next one year with a
further stipulation in the agreement that this period can be
increased as per the provisions of the Government Resolution.
The agreement also provided that right to reduce or extend the
duration of the agreement shall be with the BARTI and also that
the right to amend the terms and conditions of the agreement
and right to cancel the agreement at any time shall also be with
BARTI.
8. Thus, the Petitioners-training centres/institutions were
imparting training in terms of the agreement entered into
between the Petitioners and the BARTI as per the prescription
available in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th
October 2021. We may also note that since by the impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 has been
rescinded/revoked, the arrangement between the Petitioners -
training centres/institutions and BARTI has come to an end
which has led the Petitioners to challenge the impugned
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Government decision contained in the Government Resolution
dated 30th October 2023.
9. Besides the above facts, we may also notice certain
litigation which took place between the Petitioners - training
centres/institutions and the State Government prior to filing of
the instant Writ Petitions wherein challenge has been made to
the Government decision dated 30th October 2023. In this
regard, it is noticed that under a note dated 19 th January 2022,
the Hon'ble Minister, Department of Social Justice and Special
Assistance directed to initiate selection of new entities/training
centres/institutions through e-tender process and accordingly,
the State Government directed BARTI to initiate fresh tender
process, pursuant to which the tender notices were issued which
became subject matter of challenge by the Petitioners before this
Court at Bombay and at Aurangabad and Nagpur as well. In
these Writ Petitions, challenge to the e-tender process was made
primarily on the ground that the Government Resolution dated
28th October 2021 created a right in favour of the Petitioners-
training centres/institutions to continue to impart training for a
period of five years. This Court and Benches at Aurangabad and
Nagpur passed certain interim orders providing therein that the
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e-tender process may go-on but the same shall not be finalized.
All such Petitions were clubbed and by the order dated 9 th
November 2023 were dismissed by this Court as having been
rendered infructuous on issuance of impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023. The Court, while dismissing
the said Writ Petitions as infructuous, further made an
observation that it will be open for the Petitioners to challenge
the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 by taking
out appropriate proceedings with all permissible pleas and
ancillary prayers. The said order was, however, challenged
before Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP(C) No.2778 of 2023
which was dismissed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court by means of
an order dated 3rd January 2024 with the following observations:
"1. In pursuance of the liberty which has been granted by the impugned order of the High Court, Mr. Vijay Hansaria, senior counsel appearing for the Petitioner states that the Petitioner has already filed a substantive petition before the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution. All that needs to be clarified is that the petitioner is at liberty to raise all appropriate contentions before the High Court including on the grounds which were raised in the earlier petition."
10. Thus, in the above said background facts these petitions
came to be filed assailing the validity of the Government decision
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contained in the Government Resolution dated 30 th October
2023.
CONTENTIONS ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONERS:
11. As already observed above, the Petitioners - training
centres / institutions are the entities which were appointed to
impart training under BARTI through tender process initiated by
issuing the tender notice on 15 th September 2017. Thus, the
Petitioners were never subjected to any tender process for being
selected to impart training under BARTI; rather were assigned to
work of imparting training under the Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021 itself. The main plank of argument on
behalf of the Petitioners is that in terms of earlier Government
Resolution dated 28th October 2021 since the term of the scheme
was five years and the Petitioners were engaged for imparting
training by BARTI by entering into an agreement in pursuance of
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 itself, hence,
before completion of period of five years of their engagement, no
action was permissible to be taken by the Government
Resolution which would result in their disengagement from the
work relating to imparting training. It is, thus, contended by
learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners that since the
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impugned decision of the State Government contained in the
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 rescinds the
Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, as such they
have been disengaged from the work of imparting training which
is contrary to the terms contained in the Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021 based on which the Petitioners had
accepted the work relating to imparting training by entering into
an agreement with BARTI and as such once the Petitioners
altered their position by accepting the work of imparting training
under the representation/promise made to them vide
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021, it was not open
to the State Government to resile from the representation/
promise made to the Petitioners. Essentially, thus, the
Petitioners have invoked the principle of promissory estoppel
and legitimate expectation to assail the validity of impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023. It has also
been argued on behalf of the Petitioners that the impugned
Government Resolution is infested with mala fide for the reason
that it has been issued only to defeat the interim orders passed
by this Court in earlier batch of Writ Petitions.
12. Further submission is that the impugned Government
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Resolution dated 30th October 2023 takes away vested right of
the Petitioners available to them as per the agreement entered
into between the Petitioners and the BARTI pursuant to the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and that
the impugned decision is absolutely arbitrary as there is no
supervening public interest which the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to serve or achieve.
Learned Counsel representing the Petitioners have also argued
that pursuant to the Government Resolution dated 28 th October
2021, the Petitioners - training centres / institutions have
invested heavy amounts in developing the infrastructure relying
on the promise made by the Government by issuing Government
Resolution dated 28th October 2021 that the scheme shall be
available for a period of five years and now by issuing the
impugned Government decision dated 30th October 2023 they
have been discontinued from the work of imparting training,
which is legally unsustainable.
13. It is also the submission on behalf of the Petitioners that
the Cabinet, in its meeting dated 19 th October 2021 based on
which the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th October
2023 has been issued, only decided to form a Committee to
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bring uniformity in training programmes and schemes of BARTI,
SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT and other such autonomous
institutions but no decision as is reflected from Clause 6 of the
Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 superseding the earlier Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021 was taken by the Cabinet and in fact,
insertion of points 5, 6 and 7 in the Appendix-A has
mischievously been done.
14. Urging the aforesaid grounds, the Petitioners have thus
impeached the Government decision contained in the
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 and have
prayed that the same may be quashed and the Petitioners may
be allowed to continue to impart training in terms of the
provisions contained in the earlier Government Resolution dated
28th October 2021.
15. To buttress the submissions based on the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, the Petitioners have relied upon the
judgments in the case of State of Jharkhand and Ors. Vs.
Brahmputra Metallics Ltd., Ranchi & Anr. 1, State of UP Vs.
1 2020 SCC OnLine SC 968
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Birla Corporation Ltd.2, Devi Multiplex Vs. State of
Gujarat3, Motilal Padampat Sugar Mills Co. Ltd. Vs. State
of U.P.4 In support of the submission that the impugned
Government decision suffers from the vice of mala fide, reliance
has been placed by the Petitioners on the judgment in the case
of Swaran Singh Chand v. Punjab State Electricity Board &
Ors.5
16. Per Contra, Shri Birendra Saraf, learned Advocate General
has opposed the Writ Petitions, firstly by submitting that
doctrine of estoppel, in the facts of the present case, cannot be
invoked to challenge the impugned Government Resolution dated
30th October 2023. He has argued that for invoking the principle
of promissory estoppel, the promise made by one party should
be clear and unequivocal and it should be intended to create a
legal relationship. It has also been argued that for putting the
doctrine of promissory estoppel into service to challenge a
Government action, it needs to be established that acting on an
unequivocal promise, the Petitioners altered their position and
that there is no overwhelming public interest which the 2 (2020) 20 SCC 320 3 (2015) 9 SCC 132 4 (1979) 2 SCC 409 5 (2009) 13 SCC 758
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Government by taking the impugned decision intends to achieve
or serve. It is also the submission of Shri Saraf, learned
Advocate General that the doctrine of promissory estoppel is a
principle of equity which is invoked to ensure justice and fairness
and to prevent manifest injustice and thus, all relevant factors
including the result sought to be achieved by subsequent
decision and the public good sought to be served have to be
taken into account by the Court while invoking the said principle.
17. It is the submission of learned Advocate General that the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 did not
create any vested right in the Petitioners and that whatever
rights were available to the Petitioners though flowed only from
the agreement entered into between BARTI and the Petitioners
training centres/institutions pursuant to the Government
Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and since the term of
agreement entered into between BARTI and the Petitioners,
admittedly, was one year, hence any such right, much less any
vested right is not available to the Petitioners to continue to
impart training beyond one year. Learned Advocate General has
also argued that the Government Resolution dated 28 th October
2021 or the agreement entered into between the Petitioners
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training centres and the BARTI did not contain any promise in
any unequivocal or clear terms to allow the Petitioners to
continue to impart training for five years and hence in absence
of any such clear promise, invocation of the doctrine of
promissory estoppel, in the facts of the present case, is not
permissible.
18. Laying much emphasis on the fact that the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 did not require
the Petitioners to undergo any tender process or public
competition for their selection as training centres, Shri Saraf,
learned Advocate General has argued that considering the huge
expenditure involved in the training scheme which is to be borne
by the State exchequer, the State Government found it
appropriate to rescind the policy contained in the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021. It is also
submitted by Shri Saraf that cancellation/supersession of the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 for the
reason that it did not provide for any competitive bidding for
selection of the entities to impart training, in itself achieves
public good and public purpose for the reason that such large
expenditure cannot be permitted to be made by the State
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Government involving private entities without subjecting them to
a competitive bid process.
19. Emphasizing further that the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 has been issued to achieve
larger and overriding public interest, it has been argued by Shri
Saraf, that the Petitioners were engaged in imparting training
only by one autonomous institution viz. BARTI, whereas, the
impugned Government decision contained in the Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to formulate a unified
policy for imparting training to candidates belonging not only to
scheduled caste category under BARTI but also all other
disadvantaged sections of the society under other autonomous
institutions of the State Government which are SARTHI,
MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT and TRITI. It is his contention that it is well
within the authority and powers of the State Government to
come-forth with a uniform policy for providing scholarship and
coaching for competitive examinations and also for providing
other facilities such as hostel facilities and stipends to the eligible
candidates under all schemes to be run by various Departments
other than the Department of Social Justice and Special
Assistance. He has stated that the earlier Government
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Resolution dated 28th October 2021 aimed at the scheme run by
only one Government department viz. Department of Social
Justice and Special Assistance under supervision of only one
autonomous institution viz. BARTI, however, by the impugned
Government decision, the State Government has decided to
promulgate a unified policy for all such schemes run by different
Government departments under other autonomous institutions
as well. He, thus, submits that promulgating such a unified
policy in itself seeks to achieve public purpose and such policy
decisions being primarily in the realm of State Government need
not be interfered with by this Court unless it is found to be
manifestly arbitrary or suffering from any other vice of illegality
or unconstitutionality.
20. Thus, to support the argument on behalf of the State -
Respondents in opposition of the prayers made in the Writ
Petition, it has been argued by the learned Advocate General
that principle of promissory estoppel in the facts of the present
case cannot be invoked for three reasons, viz; (i) the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 did not create
any right, much less any vested right in the Petitioners to
continue to impart training for five years, (ii) the earlier
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Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 does not
contain any unequivocal promise based on which the Petitioners
can be said to have altered their position and, (iii) the impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 seeks to
achieve public purpose (a) by unifying all the schemes of the
State Government being run by different Departments under
different autonomous institutions and (b) by rescinding the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 which
did not provide for any competitive mechanism for selection of
the training centres/institutions through imparting training
involves huge expenditure, burden of which is borne by the State
exchequer, as such, in absence of any competitive process of
selection in the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th
October 2021, its continuance would not have been in public
interest.
21. Shri Saraf, learned Advocate General has also argued that
the Petitioners' submission that the impugned Government
decision dated 30th October 2023 is mala fide for the reason that
it seeks to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in
earlier batch of Writ Petitions, is also not tenable. In support of
this submission, it has been stated by Shri Saraf that the
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purpose for which the impugned decision dated 30 th October
2023 has been taken, is legitimate in its character as it seeks to
achieve larger public interest. In this regard, he has taken us
through the Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023
which clearly mentions that there is no consistent approach in
maintaining equality in the decisions relating to providing
scholarships and coaching for competitive examinations across
autonomous institutions like BARTI, SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT
and TRITI and different departments and autonomous
institutions are free to take independent decisions and hence, it
was found appropriate to have some scheme for all the
Government departments and all autonomous institutions. His
submission is that it is with this object and aim that the
impugned decision has been taken and hence, attributing the
impugned decision of the Government Department contained in
the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 to any mala
fide against the Petitioners training centres/institutions, is wholly
incorrect. He has also submitted that by the impugned
resolution a Committee has been formed which shall take final
decision in the matter based on the proposals to be submitted by
different Government Departments in tune with the prescriptions
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set out in the Appendix-A appended to the Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023. His submission is that thus,
all the Government departments are bound by the prescriptions
available in Appendix-A and therefore by adhering to the said
prescriptions, the object of having a unified scheme to impart
training by different departments and autonomous institutions
shall be achieved.
22. Regarding the submission made on behalf of the Petitioners
that Clauses 5, 6 and 7 as available in Appendix-A appended to
the Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 were not
part of the accompanying decision by the Cabinet and the same
have been inserted mischievously by the State Respondent, it
has been stated by learned Advocate General that the said
contention raised on behalf of the Petitioners training centres is
absolutely incorrect and as a matter of fact, the clauses
contained in Appendix-A form integral part of the accompanying
decision which have been mentioned in the Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023, which, in fact, is formal
expression of the decisions taken by the Cabinet.
23. On behalf of the Respondents - State, it has also been
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argued that in pursuance of the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023, the proposals by different
Departments are to be considered by the committee headed by
the Additional Chief Secretary, Finance Department and once the
schemes are finalized, the selection of training
centres/institutions shall be made through the process of
competitive bidding in which the Petitioners may also participate.
Learned Advocate General, in support of his submissions has
thus prayed that Writ Petitions be dismissed.
ISSUES:
24. Considering the pleadings available on record and the
submissions made by the learned Counsel for the respective
parties, the issues which have emerged for our consideration
are; (a) as to whether in the facts of the case, doctrine of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation can be invoked
to impeach the Government Resolution dated 30 th October
2023 ? (b) as to whether on the basis of the earlier Government
Resolution dated 28th October 2021, any vested rights can be
said to be available to the Petitioners which have been taken
away by issuing subsequent Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 ? (c) as to whether impugned Government
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Resolution dated 30th October 2023 has been issued with mala
fide intent to defeat the interim orders passed by this Court in
the earlier bunch of Writ Petitions which has resulted in unlawful
removal of Petitioners from the work of imparting training ? and
(d) as to whether Appendix-A appended to impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 does not form
part of the Cabinet decision dated 19th October 2023 ?
DISCUSSION:
25. We will, first examine the ground urged on behalf of the
Petitioners based on doctrine of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation. In Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd. Vs.
Union of India & Ors6, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
observed that doctrine of promissory estoppel is now firmly
established and is well accepted in our jurisprudence. Reviewing
all earlier judgments on the principle of promissory estoppel,
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd.
(supra) has observed, inter alia; that plea of principle of
promissory estoppel is available where one party has, by his
word or conduct, made to the other a clear and unequivocal
promise or representation which is intended to create a legal 6 (2012) 11 SCC 1
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relationship to arise in future, knowing and intending that it
would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise or
representation is made and that such promise/representation
would be binding on the party making it and such a party will not
be entitled to go back upon it. The principle of promissory
estoppel is not limited in its application only as a defense but it
can also be made basis of a cause of action. In paragraph 182
of the report in the case of Monnet Ispat and Energy Ltd.
(supra), Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up principles
which guide the Court where issue of applicability of promissory
estoppel arise. Paragraph 182 is quoted hereunder:
"182. In my view, the following principles must guide a court where an issue of applicability of promissory estoppel arises:
182.1. Where one party has by his words or conduct made to the other a clear and unequivocal promise which is intended to create legal relations or affect a legal relationship to arise in the future, knowing or intending that it would be acted upon by the other party to whom the promise is made and it is, in fact, so acted upon by the other party, the promise would be binding on the party making it and he would not be entitled to go back upon it, if it would be inequitable to allow him to do so having regard to the dealings which have taken place between the par-
ties, and this would be so irrespective of whether there is any pre-existing relationship between the parties or not.
182.2. The doctrine of promissory estoppel may be applied against the Government where the interest of justice, morality and common fairness dictate such a course. The doctrine is ap- plicable against the State even in its governmental, public or sovereign capacity where it is necessary to prevent fraud or manifest injustice. However, the Government or even a private
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party under the doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be asked to do an act prohibited in law. The nature and function which the Government discharges is not very relevant. The Gov- ernment is subject to the rule of promissory estoppel and if the essential ingredients of this doctrine are satisfied, the Govern- ment can be compelled to carry out the promise made by it.
182.3. The doctrine of promissory estoppel is not limited in its application only to defence but it can also furnish a cause of ac- tion. In other words, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can by itself be the basis of action.
182.4. For invocation of the doctrine of promissory estoppel, it is necessary for the promisee to show that by acting on promise made by the other party, he altered his position. The alteration of position by the promisee is a sine qua non for the applicability of the doctrine. However, it is not necessary for him to prove any damage, detriment or prejudice because of alteration of such promise.
182.5. In no case, the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be pressed into aid to compel the Government or a public authority to carry out a representation or promise which is contrary to law or which was outside the authority or power of the officer of the Government or of the public authority to make. No promise can be enforced which is statutorily prohibited or is against public policy.
182.6. It is necessary for invocation of the doctrine of promis- sory estoppel that a clear, sound and positive foundation is laid in the petition. Bald assertions, averments or allegations without any supporting material are not sufficient to press into aid the doctrine of promissory estoppel.
182.7. The doctrine of promissory estoppel cannot be invoked in abstract. When it is sought to be invoked, the court must con- sider all aspects including the result sought to be achieved and the public good at large. The fundamental principle of equity must forever be present to the mind of the court. Absence of it must not hold the Government or the public authority to its promise, assurance or representation."
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26. The Petitioners have also argued the protection under
principle of legitimate expectation. In this regard a judgment of
the Hon'ble Supreme court in the case of State of Rajasthan
and Ors. Sharwan Kumar Kumawat7 may be referred to,
wherein it has been observed that legitimate expectation is
different from mere anticipation and any kind of anticipation
cannot amount to an assertable legitimate expectation and every
such expectation should be distinguishable, legitimate and
protective. It is also equally well settled that protection of
legitimate expectation is not available to a party seeking its
umbrella, wherein every right itself requires otherwise. Referring
to an earlier judgment in the case of State of Tamilnadu Vs.
Hind Stone, (1981) 2 SCC 205, Hon'ble Supreme Court in the
Sharwan Kumar Kumawat (supra) has laid down that
decision makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest
cannot be fettered by applying the principle of legitimate
expectation. Paragraphs 19 and 20 of the judgment in the case
of Sharwan Kumar Kumawat (supra) are relevant to be
extracted herein, which run as under:
7 (2023) SCC OnLine SC 898
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"20. Kerala State Beverages (M AND M) Corporation Limited v. P.P. Suresh, (2019) 9 SCC 710:--
"B. Legitimate expectation
14. The main argument on behalf of the respondents was that the Government was bound by its promise and could not have resiled from it. They had an indefeasible legitimate expectation of continued employment, stemming from the Government Order dated 20-2-2002 which could not have been withdrawn. It was further submitted on behalf of the respondents that they were not given an opportunity before the benefit that was promised, was taken away. To appreciate this contention of the respondents, it is necessary to understand the concept of legitimate expectation.
15. The principle of legitimate expectation has been recognised by this Court in Union of India v. Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499] If the promise made by an authority is clear, unequivocal and unambiguous, a person can claim that the authority in all fairness should not act contrary to the promise.
16. M. Jagannadha Rao, J. elaborately elucidated on legitimate expectation in Punjab Communications Ltd. v. Union of India [(1999) 4 SCC 727]. He referred (at SCC pp. 741-42, para 27) to the judgment in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [[1985] A.C. 374 : [1984] 3 WLR 1174 : [1984] 3 All ER 935 (HL)] in which Lord Diplock had observed that for a legitimate expectation to arise, the decisions of the administrative authority must affect the person by depriving him of some benefit or advantage which,
"27. ... (i) he had in the past been permitted by the decision-maker to enjoy and which he can legitimately expect to be permitted to continue to do until there have been communicated to him some rational grounds for withdrawing it on which he has been given an opportunity to comment; or (ii) he has received assurance from the decision-maker that they will not be
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withdrawn without giving him first an opportunity of advancing reasons for contending that they should not be withdrawn." (AC p. 408)"
17. Rao, J. observed in this case, that the procedural part of legitimate expectation relates to a representation that a hearing or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made. The substantive part of the principle is that if a representation is made that a benefit of a substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit, that it will be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced.
18. It has been held by R.V. Raveendran, J. in Ram Pravesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2006) 8 SCC 381 :
2006 SCC (L&S) 1986] that legitimate expectation is not a legal right. Not being a right, it is not enforceable as such. It may entitle an expectant : (SCC p. 391, para 15) "(a) to an opportunity to show cause before the expectation is dashed; or
(b) to an explanation as to the cause for denial. In appropriate cases, the courts may grant a direction requiring the authority to follow the promised procedure or established practice."
Substantive Legitimate Expectation
19. An expectation entertained by a person may not be found to be legitimate due to the existence of some coun- tervailing consideration of policy or law. [ H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (Eleventh Edn., Oxford University Press, 2014).] Administrative policies may change with changing circumstances, including changes in the political complexion of Governments. The liberty to make such changes is something that is inherent in our constitutional form of Government. [Hughes v. Department of Health and Social Security, [1985] A.C. 776 : [1985] 2 WLR 866 (HL)]
20. The decision-makers' freedom to change the policy in public interest cannot be fettered by applying the princi- ple of substantive legitimate expectation. [ Findlay, In re,
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[1985] A.C. 318 : [1984] 3 WLR 1159 : [1984] 3 All ER 801 (HL)] So long as the Government does not act in an arbitrary or in an unreasonable manner, the change in policy does not call for interference by judicial review on the ground of a legitimate expectation of an individual or a group of individuals being defeated."
(emphasis supplied)
27. Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Punjab
Communications Ltd. Vs. Union of India & Ors. 8 has also
observed that though a policy decision, which makes a
representation that some benefit shall be granted, though
creates legitimate expectation which is normally binding on the
decision-maker, however, such policy can be changed by the
decision-maker in overriding public interest since choice of policy
is for the decision-maker, however, change in policy defeating
the legitimate expectation must satisfy the test of Wednesbury
reasonableness. The relevant portion of the judgment in the
case of Punjab Communications Ltd. (supra) is extracted
below:
"38. The more important aspect, in our opinion, is whether the decision-maker can sustain the change in policy by resort to Wednesbury principles of rationality or whether the court can go into the question whether the decision-maker has properly balanced the legitimate expectation as against the need for a change. In the latter case the court would obviously be able to go into the proportionality of the change in the policy.
8 (1999) 4 SCC 727
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39. This aspect has come up for consideration recently in the English courts. The debate was started by Laws, J. in R. v. Secy. of State for Transport, ex p Richmond upon Thames London BC [(1994) 1 WLR 74 : (1994) 1 All ER 577] where the learned Judge laid down that the Wednesbury reasonableness test alone applied for finding out if the change from one policy to another was justified. That was a case in which in relation to airports a new system of night-flying restrictions were imposed. The new policy related to the fixation of the maximum number of take-off and landing movements variable according to the type of air- craft involved and the noise the aircraft generated during the night-time. The Wednesbury test was held applicable. Laws, J. stated:
"The court is not the Judge of the merits of the decision- maker's policy. ... the public authority in question is the Judge of the issue whether 'overriding public interest' justifies such a change in policy.... But that is no more than saying that a change in policy, like any discretionary decision by a public au- thority, must not transgress Wednesbury principles."
But this view of Laws, J. was dissented by Sedley, J. in R. v. Ministry of Agriculture Fisheries & Food, ex p Hamble (Off- shore) Fisheries Ltd. [(1995) 2 All ER 714] The learned Judge observed that if the outcome is challenged by way of judicial re- view, he did not consider that the courts' criterion was restricted to consider the rationality of the policy-maker's conclusions. He held that while the policy was for the policy-maker alone, the fairness of his or her decision remained the courts' concern. He said that to say so did not amount to placing the Judge in the seat of the Minister.
40. The judgment of Sedley, J. has since been overruled in R. v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt., ex p Hargreaves [(1997) 1 WLR 906] . In that case, the facts were that the eligibility for "home leave" of prisoners was initially one-third of the term of sentence as per the earlier decision of the Government of 1994 (accepting Lord Woolf's Report, 1990) and Hargreaves would at- tain that eligibility by 12-4-1995 to put in his application. But the Home Secretary felt that the scheme was being abused and therefore he modified the eligibility to one-half of the period of sentence by notice dated 20-4-1995. This postponed Harg- reaves' eligibility to 12-4-1996. Though the applicant had "be- come eligible" by 20-4-1995, the courts rejected his plea of le- gitimate expectation because eligibility merely enabled consid-
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eration of the application for home leave. The case was similar to Findlay [1985 AC 318 : (1984) 3 All ER 801 HL, sub nom Findlay v. Secy. of State for the Home Deptt.] which related to a change in parole policy and which was held valid. It was held that the change in home-leave policy did not violate the earlier policy. In the Court of Appeal, Hirst, L.J. described the principle laid down by Sedley, J. as based on "heresy" and stated:
"On matters of substance (as contrasted to procedure) Wednesbury provides the correct test. It follows that ... his (Sedley, J.'s) ratio insofar as he propounds a balancing exercise to be undertaken by the court should, in my opinion, be over- ruled."
The result is that a change in policy can defeat a substan- tive legitimate expectation if it can be justified on Wednesbury reasonableness. We have noticed that in Hindustan Develop- ment Corpn. case [(1993) 3 SCC 499] also it was laid down that the decision-maker has the choice in the balancing of the pros and cons relevant to the change in policy. It is, therefore, clear that the choice of the policy is for the decision-maker and not for the court. The legitimate substantive expectation merely permits the court to find out if the change in policy which is the cause for defeating the legitimate expectation is irrational or perverse or one which no reasonable person could have made."
28. In Sethi Auto Service Station and Anr. Vs. Delhi De-
velopment Authority & Ors.9 Hon'ble Supreme Court has
clearly laid down that though doctrine of legitimate expectation
is not accepted as a part our legal jurisprudence, however, a per-
son who bases his claim on the said doctrine, has to first satisfy
that he had relied upon such representation and denial of that
expectation is detrimental. It has further been held in this judg-
ment that Court will interfere only if the decision taken by the
authority is found to be arbitrary, unreasonable and in gross 9 (2009) 1 SCC 180
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abuse of power or has not been taken in public interest. Hon'ble
Supreme Court has also held that a claim based on mere legiti-
mate expectation without anything more cannot ipso facto gives
rise to a right to invoke this principle. Hon'ble Supreme Court
further observes that concept of legitimate expectation does not
have any role where the State action is as a public policy or in
public interest unless such action amounts to abuse of power. Paragraph 32 and 33 of the judgment in the case of Sethi Auto
Service Station and Anr. (Supra) are relevant which are ex-
tracted hereinbelow:
"32. An examination of the aforenoted few decisions shows that the golden thread running through all these decisions is that a case for applicability of the doctrine of legitimate expectation, now accepted in the subjective sense as part of our legal jurisprudence, arises when an administrative body by reason of a representation or by past practice or conduct aroused an expectation which it would be within its powers to fulfil unless some overriding public interest comes in the way. However, a person who bases his claim on the doctrine of legitimate expectation, in the first instance, has to satisfy that he has relied on the said representation and the denial of that expectation has worked to his detriment. The Court could interfere only if the decision taken by the authority was found to be arbitrary, unreasonable or in gross abuse of power or in violation of principles of natural justice and not taken in public interest. But a claim based on mere legitimate ex- pectation without anything more cannot ipso facto give a right to invoke these principles.
33. It is well settled that the concept of legitimate expectation has no role to play where the State action is as a public policy or in the public interest unless the action taken amounts to an
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abuse of power. The court must not usurp the discretion of the public authority which is empowered to take the decisions under law and the court is expected to apply an objective standard which leaves to the deciding authority the full range of choice which the legislature is presumed to have intended. Even in a case where the decision is left entirely to the discretion of the deciding authority without any such legal bounds and if the de- cision is taken fairly and objectively, the court will not interfere on the ground of procedural fairness to a person whose interest based on legitimate expectation might be affected. Therefore, a legitimate expectation can at the most be one of the grounds which may give rise to judicial review but the granting of relief is very much limited. (Vide Hindustan Development Corpn. [(1993) 3 SCC 499])"
29. For examining the grounds based on the principle of
promissory estoppel and legitimate expectation as urged by the
Petitioners in this case, we may state that Court has its own
limitation when called upon to interfere in the policy decision of
the State. In Dhampur Sugar (Kshipur) Ltd. Vs. State of
Uttaranchal & Ors.10, Hon'ble Supreme Court has laid down
that the public authorities must have liberty and freedom in
framing policies and that though such discretion is not absolute
and Courts, in exercise of their powers of judicial review, can
interfere in such executive actions, however, it is also well
established that Courts are ill-equipped to deal with such
matters and that in complex social, economic and commercial
matters, decisions are to be taken by the Government
10 (2007) 8 SCC 418
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authorities keeping in view several factors and it will not be
possible for Courts to consider competing claims and conflicting
interests. Said observations find expression in paragraph 63 of
the report in the case of Dhampur Sugar (Kashipur) Ltd.
(supra), which is extracted hereunder:
"63. In our judgment, it is well settled that public authorities must have liberty and freedom in framing policies. No doubt, the discretion is not absolute, unqualified, unfettered or uncanalised and judiciary has control over all executive actions. At the same time, however, it is well established that courts are ill-equipped to deal with these matters. In complex social, economic and commercial matters, decisions have to be taken by governmental authorities keeping in view several factors, and it is not possible for courts to consider competing claims and conflicting interests and to conclude which way the balance tilts. There are no objective, justiciable or manageable standards to judge the issues nor such questions can be decided on a priori considerations."
30. If we examine the facts of the present case as pleaded by
the Petitioners invoking the doctrine of promissory estoppel and
legitimate expectation, in the light of the law relating to these
doctrines as discussed above, what we find is that to invoke such
a ground the Petitioners have to first establish that they had,
upon some promise/representation made by the Government
allowing the Petitioners to continue to impart the training for five
years, altered their position. For asserting that the Government
had made such promise/representation, learned Counsel for the
Petitioners have more than once referred to clauses 9 and 12 of
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the Government policy embodied in the earlier Government
Resolution dated 28th October 2021 which states that (1) training
programme shall be conducted by the 30 centers for a minimum
duration of five years and (2) this programme shall be conducted
for a duration of five years. However, Government Resolution
dated 28th October 2021 was followed by separate agreements
entered into between the Petitioners and BARTI where the term
of conducting preparatory training programme is clearly
mentioned as one year. The relationship, thus, between the
Petitioners and BARTI which is an autonomous institution
functioning under the State Government, is to be governed by
the terms of the agreement which clearly provided that the
Petitioners were engaged for a period of one year. Thus, having
regard to the terms of agreement entered into between the
Petitioners and BARTI, what we find is that it cannot be said that
there was any categorical and unequivocal promise made by the
State Government allowing the Petitioners to run the training
programme for five years.
31. It is also to be noticed that the principle of promissory
estoppel and legitimate expectation have to give away to change
of policy by the State Government in case by the changed or
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altered policy, some larger public good or overriding public
interest is sought to be achieved. We have already noticed the
reasons available in the Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 for issuance of the same according to which the
policy promulgated by Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 aimed at evolving a unified policy of preparatory
training to the candidates seeking employment in Government,
semi-Government and private/corporate sector, which was also
being provided by different Government departments other than
the department of social justice and assistance, through different
autonomous institutions such as SARTHI, MAHAJYOTI, AMRIT,
TRITI etc. One of the reasons as argued by the learned Advocate
General for promulgating the new policy is that pursuant to the
earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, no
competitive bidding was resorted to for selecting the training
centres/institutions for imparting preparatory training involving
huge expenditure to be borne by the State exchequer. If to
provide for competitive bidding for selection of training
centres/institutions, the earlier Government policy contained in
the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 has been
done away with, in our opinion, such a policy shift is in public
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interest.
32. We are also of the opinion that it is well within the
authority and power of the State Government to formulate a
policy which envisages a unified mechanism for imparting
training to the candidates by different Government departments.
It is difficult for the Court to accept any objection as urged by
the Petitioners against the decision of the State Government to
have a unified policy of scholarship for imparting training. It is
also, in our opinion, beyond the scope of judicial review of this
Court to opine as to which of the policies can be said to be better
and even if this Court finds that a particular policy is better, that
in itself cannot be a ground for striking down the policy adopted
by the State Government.
33. Even if it is presumed that there was some kind of
promise/ representation made by the State Government by
issuing the Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021, in
view of the law as discussed above, it is always open to the
State Government to bring a change in the policy which may
result in defeating such an expectation aroused in the Petitioners
on account of promise allegedly made, provided change in policy
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passes the test of Wednesbury reasonableness. We do not see
any unreasonableness in the Government policy promulgated by
the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th October 2023.
Since it is the prerogative and within the ambit of the State
Government to adopt a particular policy and unless such a policy
is arbitrary and infringes any right - constitutional, statutory,
vested or otherwise, such policy is not susceptible to challenge.
34. The submission of the Petitioners that the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28 th October 2021 vested any right
in the Petitioners, is not acceptable. Right, if any, which was
created with the Petitioners arose from the agreement entered
into between the Petitioners and BARTI and as observed above,
the term of the said agreement was one year and accordingly, it
is not open for the Petitioners to plead that they have any vested
right available to them to continue to impart training for five
years. The earlier Government Resolution does not create any
vested right. There is nothing on record from where it can be
inferred that by issuing impugned Government Resolution dated
30th October 2023 any of the constitutional or statutory rights of
the Petitioners have been infringed. To the contrary, what we
have found is that the impugned Government Resolution dated
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30th October 2023 aims at evolving a unified policy of scholarship
and preparatory training for employment being imparted by
different Government departments and different autonomous
Government institutions. One of the reasons which appears to
have impelled to issue Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 is absence of any mechanism for competitive
bidding process in selection of the training centres/institutions in
the earlier Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021.
35. For the reasons aforesaid, we have no hesitation to hold
that the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th November
2023 cannot be said to unsustainable and consequently, cannot
be struck down on the grounds as urged by the Petitioners based
on the doctrine of legitimate expectation and promissory
estoppel. We have also no hesitation to hold that the impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023 does not take
away any right of the Petitioners, much less any vested right.
36. The next submission made on behalf of the Petitioners that
the impugned Government Resolution dated 30th November 2023
issued with mala fide intent to defeat the interim orders passed
by this Court in earlier bunch of Writ Petitions as a result of
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which the Petitioners have been removed from the work of
imparting training, is also not made out for the reasons that we
have already discussed. The objects which are sought to be
achieved by the impugned Government Resolution are clearly set
out therein. The primary aim of the impugned Government
Resolution is to evolve a unified mechanism for scholarship and
preparatory training programmes being conducted by different
departments under different autonomous institutions. In our
opinion, there does not exist any material before us to conclude
that the impugned Government Resolution has been issued with
any mala fide intent.
37. As regards the submission made on behalf of the
Petitioners that clauses 5, 6 and 7 of the Appendix-A appended
to the impugned Government Resolution were not part of the
decision of the Cabinet taken on 19 th October 2023, it is to be
observed that the Government Resolution dated 30 th October
2023 is a formal expression of decision of the Cabinet. We do
not find any reason or material to conclude that such clauses in
Appendix-A have been added mischievously to the Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 though no such decision was
taken by the Cabinet. Government Resolution dated 30 th
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October 2023 explicitly mentions the chronology relating to the
scheme of scholarship and preparatory training and also
mentions the earlier Government Resolution dated 28 th October
2021. The policy as embodied in the impugned Government
Resolution dated 30th October 2023 is at complete variance with
the earlier policy contained in the Government Resolution dated
28th October 2021 and hence, both the mechanisms of imparting
preparatory training, the one contained in the earlier
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021 and the other
contained in the impugned Government Resolution dated 30 th
October 2023 cannot run parallel to each other. Thus, the very
issuance of the Government policy as contained in the impugned
Government Resolution dated 30th October 2023, in effect,
overrides the earlier Government policy available in the
Government Resolution dated 28th October 2021.
38. Accordingly, unhesitatingly, we hold that the assertion of
the Petitioners that there has been any mischievous attempt on
the part of the State Government to include clauses 5, 6 and 7
available in Appendix-A appended to the Government Resolution
dated 30th October 2023 though no such decision by the Cabinet
was taken, is not tenable.
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39. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, we do not find any
good ground to interfere with the Government
decision/Resolution dated 30th October 2023. The Writ Petitions
are, thus, devoid of merit.
40. Resultantly, the Writ Petitions fail, which are hereby
dismissed.
41. There will be, however, no order as to costs.
(ARIF S. DOCTOR, J.) (CHIEF JUSTICE)
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