Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association (REGD.) vs M/S Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. & Ors.

2026 INSC 51 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8465-8466 OF 2024

ANSAL CROWN HEIGHTS FLAT BUYERS ASSOCIATION (REGD.) … APPELLANT

VS.

M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8539 OF 2024

KAMAL GIROTRA & ANR. … APPELLANTS

VS.

M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 10874-10877 OF 2024

SANGEETA DEWAN ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS

VS.

M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD PVT. LTD. & ORS. Signature Not Verified … RESPONDENTS Digitally signed by JATINDER KAUR AND Date: 2026.01.12 19:13:19 IST Reason:

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 10878 OF 2024

1 NIDHI CHAWLA … APPELLANT

VS.

M/S ANSAL CROWN INFRABUILD PVT. LTD. & ORS. … RESPONDENTS

JUDGMENT

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8465-8466 OF 2024

1. The lead appeals call in question the judgment and order dated 20th

June, 20241 of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal

Commission2 dismissing Execution Application Nos. 27/2023 and

28/2023 filed by the appellant against the respondents 2 to 9

(directors/promoters of M/s. Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd.3). Such

applications arose from two final orders rendered by the NCDRC while

deciding complaints lodged by the appellant bearing nos.

CC/2600/2018 and CC/86/2018 respectively.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2. Appellant is an association of flat buyers which entered into Flat Buyer

Agreements with ACIPL for units in Ansal Crown Heights. Vide

1 impugned order 2 NCDRC 3 ACIPL

2 individual builder buyer agreements, ACIPL promised to handover

possession of the apartments within a period of 36 months from the

date of execution of the agreements, which expired for all the buyers

in the time period from December, 2013 - December, 2015. Possession

of the flats not having been delivered, the appellant instituted two

consumer complaints – the first on 10th, January 2018 (on behalf of

45 flat buyers), and the second on 26th November, 2018 (on behalf of

20 flat buyers). The respondents were ACIPL and its

directors/promoters being the respondents 2 to 9.

3. While admitting CC/86/2018, the NCDRC vide order dated 25th

January, 2018 directed that the proceedings would continue only

against ACIPL and not the respondents 2 to 9. Accordingly, the

appellant was directed to file amended memo of party impleading

ACIPL as the sole respondent.

4. Subsequently, CC/2600/2018 came to be lodged wherein ACIPL was

arrayed as the sole respondent, in conformity with the earlier

admission order.

5. On 28th February, 2022, the complaints were allowed and directions

were issued to ACIPL to complete the project; obtain the occupancy

certificate; and hand over possession of the flats to the buyers, i.e.,

the allottees, with interest @ 9% per annum on the amounts deposited

by them from the committed date of possession until the offer of

possession or, alternatively, if the allottees were unwilling to wait for

possession, ACIPL was directed to refund the entire amount deposited

3 with interest @ 9% per annum, to be paid within six weeks, failing

which interest @ 12% per annum would apply for the period of default.

6. Owing to ACIPL not complying with the said order, the appellant

initiated proceedings for execution. During this time, corporate

insolvency resolution process having been initiated under

the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20164 against ACPIL, a

moratorium had come into force. NCDRC, accordingly, vide order dated

18th May, 2023, adjourned proceedings sine die, including against the

directors of ACPIL with the following observations:

" ... So far opposite party Nos.2 to 9 are concerned, they were not party in the main complaint. If the decree cannot be executed against opposite party No.1 due to moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC, it would not be appropriate to proceed in same execution against opposite party Nos.2 to 9. In the light of order of National Company Law Tribunal, this Matter is adjourned sine die with liberty to the Parties to file an Application for listing of the Case in the event the National Company Law Tribunal alter, modify or vacates of the Order or decides the proceedings finally."

7. Appellant then challenged the sine die adjournment granted by the

NCDRC by filing Civil Appeal Nos. 4247, 4480 and 4481 of 2023 before

this Court. The said appeals were allowed vide order dated 17th

January 2024, whereby the abovementioned order of the NCDRC was

set aside. This Court directed that the execution proceedings may

continue against the respondents 2 to 9, while granting them liberty

to raise all available objections, including the plea that they were not

liable to satisfy or implement the order sought to be executed. This

4 IBC

4 Court held that the moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC shields

only the corporate debtor and does not extend to directors/promoters.

8. Upon revival, the appellant pressed the execution applications against

the respondents 2 to 9. As noted, the NCDRC dismissed the execution

applications insofar as they sought to proceed against the respondents

2 to 9, holding that the order is executable only against ACIPL, the

sole respondent in the original complaints.

ISSUE

9. The core controversy lies within a narrow compass. Question that

arises is, can persons who were arrayed as respondents in the

consumer complaints but ultimately against whom no notice was

issued and the complaints did not proceed, could be brought within the

net of execution, on the premise that they were directors/promoters

of the judgment-debtor company. NCDRC has answered this question

in the negative. We are called upon to decide whether such view

warrants interference.

ANALYSIS AND OBSERVATIONS

10. It is not in dispute that at the stage of admitting CC/86/2018, the

NCDRC consciously admitted the complaint on 25th January, 2018 only

qua the respondent no. 1, namely ACIPL, while declining to issue

notice to the directors and promoters. A specific direction was issued

to amend the memo of parties accordingly, whereafter notice was

issued only to ACIPL. The said order was never assailed and, therefore,

attained finality.

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11. Proceedings in the complaints thereafter continued on that basis

alone. No pleadings were directed to be filed against, nor issues

framed in relation to the directors or promoters, and no findings came

to be recorded against them at any stage of the adjudicatory process.

Once the lis stood consciously and finally confined to ACIPL, the

adjudication culminated in an order binding exclusively ACIPL and

none else. The order neither records any determination of liability

against the respondents 2 to 9 nor contains any direction requiring

them to perform or refrain from performing any act. In the absence of

pleadings, adjudication, or findings against them, the essential

foundation for fastening liability upon the respondents 2 to 9 is plainly

lacking.

12. Since, the judgment and order in CC/86/2018 and CC/2600/2018 had

not been passed against the respondents 2 to 9, at the stage of

execution, the order passed against ACIPL could not be enforced

against them. It is settled law that execution must strictly conform to

the decree. This principle has been reiterated in a catena of

precedents. For the purpose of this discussion, we may profitably refer

to Rajbir v. Suraj Bhan5 where this Court held that:

“14. It is well settled that the executing court cannot go beyond the decree. The decree must be executed as it is. Though, it is indeed open to the executing court to construe the decree; it cannot go beyond the decree …”

5 (2022) 14 SCC 609

6

13. It is trite that a decree cannot, by process of execution, be employed

to shift or enlarge liability so as to bind persons who were neither

parties to the decree nor otherwise legally liable thereunder. Where

the judgment debtor is a company, the liability of its shareholders or

joint venture partners remains confined to the extent of their

shareholding or to such guarantees or undertakings as may have been

expressly furnished by them.

14. In the present case, the appellant has neither pleaded nor established

that the respondents 2 to 9 had furnished any guarantee or surety in

respect of the investment made in the project, nor has any material

been placed on record to attract the application of Section 14(3) of the

IBC.

15. Once a moratorium has been declared against the judgment debtor

company, i.e., ACIPL, the modes of execution contemplated under

Section 71 of the Consumer Protection Act, 20196 including

attachment and sale of movable or immovable property, attachment

of bank accounts, or withdrawal of decretal amounts from the accounts

of the judgment debtor, stand interdicted. Execution proceedings

cannot, therefore, be permitted to continue indirectly against the

respondents 2 to 9, who are neither judgment debtors nor guarantors,

and against whom no independent liability under the order allowing

the complaints has been established.

6 CP Act

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16. This Court in Electronics Corpn. of India Ltd. v. Secy., Revenue

Deptt., Govt. of A.P.7 underscored that a clear distinction must be

maintained between a company and its shareholders by observing as

follows:

“15. A clear distinction must be drawn between a company and its shareholder, even though that shareholder may be only one and that the Central or a State Government. In the eye of the law, a company registered under the Companies Act is a distinct legal entity other than the legal entity or entities that hold its shares.”

17. We are in complete agreement with the approach adopted by the

NCDRC that the CP Act envisages a complete adjudicatory process

founded on service of notice, pleadings, opportunity to contest, leading

of evidence, and recorded findings of fact and law. These are not mere

procedural formalities but substantive safeguards that precede the

fastening of liability. In the present case, no such adjudicatory exercise

was undertaken qua the respondents 2 to 9. There are no pleadings

attributing any personal role to them, no evidence led to establish

individual culpability, and no findings returned fixing personal liability.

In the absence of these foundational elements, execution proceedings

cannot be utilised as a surrogate forum to impose liability where none

has been adjudicated.

18. It is apposite to note that the invocation of the doctrine of piercing the

corporate veil is wholly unwarranted in the present factual matrix. The

lifting of the corporate veil is an exceptional measure, to be resorted

7 (1999) 4 SCC 458

8 to only upon a clear finding that the corporate personality was abused

for fraudulent or dishonest purposes. Such a finding must be preceded

by specific pleadings and a determination on merits. No such allegation

of fraud or misuse of the corporate form was either pleaded or

established before the adjudicatory forum. In the absence of a prior

and reasoned determination justifying disregard of the corporate

personality, the directors/promoters cannot be exposed to personal

liability through execution.

19. Appellant placed reliance on the order of this Court dated 17th January,

2024. The order reads as follows:

“11. Therefore, we are of the view that only because there is a moratorium under Section 14 of the IBC against the company, it cannot be said that no proceedings can be initiated against the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the respondent Nos. 2 .to 9) for execution, provided that they ·are otherwise liable to abide by and comply with the order, which is passed against the company. The protection of the moratorium will not be available to the directors/officers of the company.

12. Therefore, we set aside the impugned judgments and orders and remit the execution application to the National Commission. The execution will continue against the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9(the respondent Nos. 2 to 9) in the execution application.

13. It is open for the opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the respondent Nos. 2 to 9) to raise a contention that they are not bound to implement the order sought to be executed. They are entitled to file additional objections along with documents raising the issue of executability as against them.

14. We clarify that the issue whether opposite party Nos. 2 to 9 (the respondent Nos. 2 to 9) to the execution are otherwise liable, will have to be decided by the National Commission in accordance with law."

(emphasis ours)

20. A plain reading of the said order shows that it addressed a limited

issue, namely, whether the existence of a moratorium under Section

9 14 of the IBC, against ACIPL, operated as a bar to the continuation of

execution proceedings against its directors/promoters. This Court held

that the moratorium, by itself, does not preclude execution

proceedings against directors or officers, provided they are otherwise

liable.

21. Importantly, the order did not determine or declare any personal

liability of the respondents 2 to 9. On the contrary, this Court expressly

left it open to them to raise all objections as to executability and

clarified that the question whether they are otherwise liable to comply

with the order was required to be decided by the NCDRC in accordance

with law. The order dated 17th January, 2024, therefore, merely

removed the moratorium-related impediment and did not expand the

scope of the order or fasten liability upon the directors.

22. Viewed in this light, the impugned order of the NCDRC, which

examines the issue of executability against the respondents 2 to 9 on

its own merits and declines to proceed against them in the absence of

any legal or factual basis for personal liability, cannot be said to be

inconsistent with the order of this Court.

23. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the

record, we are of the considered view that the NCDRC committed no

error of law or jurisdiction in declining to execute the order against

persons who were admittedly not parties to the complaints. The order

binds only ACIPL. Appellant did not challenge the order dated 25th

January, 2018 of the NCDRC declining to issue notice to the

10 respondents 2 to 9 and directing it to file amended memo of party with

ACIPL as the sole respondent, and cannot now enlarge the order

through execution. Hence, in our opinion, the appeals must fail.

24. Consequently, the appeals are dismissed.

25. However, this dismissal will not preclude the appellant from pursuing

any remedy available in law against the promoters/directors, including

proceedings under the Companies Act, IBC, or civil law, should the

statutory requirements therefor be satisfied.

26. There shall be no order as to costs.

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.8539, 10874-10877 & 10878 OF 2024

27. These appeals involve similar questions of fact and law as raised in the

lead appeals and for the reasons aforementioned, the same too stand

dismissed.

……………..…………………………J. (DIPANKAR DATTA)

……………..…………………………J. (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH) New Delhi;

January 12, 2026.

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