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Ankit Tomar vs State Of Haryana

Supreme Court26 February 2026

Ratio decidendi

The rule this decision rests on

Where a woman who is already married and has children engages in a consensual physical relationship with a man, the subsequent claim that the relationship was entered into on a false promise of marriage cannot sustain a charge of rape under Section 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, as the absence of any reasonable possibility of deception negates the essential ingredient of inducement by promise of marriage.

Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.

Judgment

As delivered

2026 INSC 262

Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No…………. of 2026 (@Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025)

Ankit Tomar …Appellant Versus State of Haryana …Respondent

ORDER

Leave granted.

2. The appellant, accused under Section 376 (2)(n) and

Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code1, was arrested and

then released on bail by order of the Punjab & Haryana

High Court (Annexure P3). Later, he filed an application to

quash the FIR under Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik

Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 relying on the decision in Amol

Bhagwan Nehul v. State of Maharashtra and Anr2. By the

impugned order, the High Court rejected the same finding Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by SACHIN KUMAR 1 SRIVASTAVA Date: 2026.03.18 17:38:42 IST For brevity ‘the IPC’ 2 Reason:

2025 SCC Online SC 1230

Page 1 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025 distinction on facts insofar as in the present case there was

allegation of physical relationship on false pretext of

marriage and impregnation.

3. We heard Sh. Romil Pathak, learned counsel

appearing for the appellant and Sh. Alok Sangwan, Senior

AAG appearing for the respondent.

4. Learned counsel for the respondent-State would

contend that the trial has not commenced and the Forensic

Science Laboratory report of the DNA profile test

conducted of the child, born out of the relationship, is

pending. It is also pointed out that the child is no more, and

the complainant is now separated from her husband.

5. We have gone through the FIR in the above case,

wherein the complainant was working in a Massage

Parlour and was also in-charge of the same; having been

so entrusted by the owner. The appellant is alleged to have

come to the Parlour as a customer and then had a physical

relationship with her. It is stated that the relationship

continued for some time and the complainant permitted

Page 2 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025 the relationship only because the appellant had promised

to marry her. It is also alleged that despite the promise

made to the complainant, the appellant married another

girl and hence the said complaint is filed.

6. The contention of the appellant is that the appellant

had consensual relationship with the complainant and later

married another on 12.03.2024 when the complaint was

raised. It is the specific defence that the complainant was

married and had two children and there was no reason for

the appellant to extend a promise of marriage, which in any

event would not have been possible.

7. We are unable to find any distinction insofar as the

application of the principles declared in Amol Bhagwan

Nehul. Looking at the facts of the said case, this Court was

persuaded to quash the complaint on four grounds. Firstly,

the Court noticed that even if the allegations in the FIR are

true and correct, there appears to be consent on the part

of the complainant. Especially when she admits that they

fell in love and interacted frequently and engaged in a

Page 3 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025 physical relationship. Then, it was noticed that the consent

as coming out from the facts and circumstances cannot be

said to be either on ‘inducement or misrepresentation’ or

on the basis of a ‘coercion or threat of injury’. Lastly, it was

found that the complainant being married and having a

child of four years, there is no possibility of a deception

having been employed in the form of a promise to marry,

for engaging in physical relationship.

8. The reading of the FIR indicates that the dictum is

squarely applicable. The complainant was employed in a

massage parlour and was also entrusted with the running

of the same. The appellant had visited the parlour as a

customer and it was within the premises of the parlour,

where the complainant was in charge, the couple had

physical relationship, even as per the allegation in the FIS.

The relationship is said to have commenced in August 2023

and is said to have continued till March 2024; obviously and

admittedly consensual. It is also the case of the prosecutrix

that on 15.03.2024, she informed the appellant about her

Page 4 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025 pregnancy and then he quarrelled with her. Admittedly the

marriage of the appellant took place on 12.03.2024 after

which the FIR was registered alleging a quarrel on

15.03.2024, three days after the marriage. The complainant

is married and a mother of two children, as the FIS itself

indicates. There is no allegation that she was divorced from

her husband or even separated from him. We are

convinced that as in the cited decision, there was a

consensual relationship, neither inducement nor threat

and no possibility of a deception luring the complainant

into a physical relationship on the pretext of marriage.

9. We are of the opinion that there is no reason to wait

for the FSL report since even if the child, who passed away,

is found to be of the appellant, the consent demolishes the

case of the complainant that there was rape on the promise

of marriage. We hence find absolutely no reason to sustain

the order of the High Court. We set aside the order of the

High Court and quash the criminal proceedings in FIR

No.127 dated 28.03.2024 of the Police Station Kheripul,

Page 5 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025 District – Faridabad and there shall be no further

proceedings on the said FIR. The bail bonds executed by

the appellant shall stand cancelled.

10. The appeal is allowed in the aforestated terms.

11. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

……….…..…….…………. J.

(SANJAY KUMAR)

.……….…….……….……. J.

(K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI FEBRUARY 26, 2026.

Page 6 of 6 Crl. A @ SLP (Crl.) No.18044 of 2025

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