Anil Kumar vs Praveen
- Neutral2026 INSC 452
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
Where a High Court exercises criminal revisional jurisdiction over a conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and modifies the sentence by removing the imprisonment term and reducing the fine to the cheque amount alone without awarding interest, such modification constitutes a perverse and erroneous exercise of discretion that is indefensible, particularly where the offence has been concurrently proved by both the trial court and appellate court, and the respondent suffers no penalty whatsoever for the proved offence.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
2026 INSC 452 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2026 [Arising out of SLP (CRL.) 2786-87 OF 2025]
ANILKUMAR S/o MANOHAR DEVADHAR …PETITIONER
VS.
PRAVEEN S/o ADIVAYYA HIREMATH …RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
DIPANKAR DATTA, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The challenge in these appeals is to the common judgment and order dated
27th January 2025 passed by the High Court of Karnataka, Dharwad Bench1
disposing of two criminal revisional applications2 of the respondent by granting
him complete relief.
3. Appellant was the original complainant in separate complaints lodged
before the trial court3 arising out of Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act, 18814, wherein the respondent was the common accused.
4. By the impugned judgment and order, the High Court modified the
judgment of the appellate court5 impugned before it in its revisional jurisdiction
in the following terms:
Signature Not Verified
“7. Since the petitioner has already deposited 50% of the fine amount before this Court, it would suffice to modify the sentence by restricting the Digitally signed by rashmi dhyani pant Date: 2026.05.06 17:00:09 IST Reason: 1 High Court 2 Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 100041 and 100040 of 2017 3 IIIrd Additional Civil Judge & JMFC Court, Dharwad 4 Act 5 IVth Additional District & Session Judge, Dharwad fine amount to the cheque amount. Accordingly, to this extent, the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence requires modification. Accordingly, I pass the following:
ORDER
a) The appeals are allowed.
b) The impugned judgement and order dated 25.01.2017 passed by the IV Additional District and Session Judge Dharwad in Crl.P.Nos. 128/2016 and 129/2016 and the judgement and order dated 26.10.2016 passed by the III Additional Civil Judge (Jr.Dn) and JMFC, Dharwad in C.C. 284/2014 and 287/2014 are hereby modified as follows.
c) The appellant/accused is convicted for the offence punishable under section 138 of the N.I. Act and sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.2,00,000/-
and Rs.50,00,000/- respectively and in default to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of 2 years.
d) The complainant has withdrawn the cheque amount deposited by the accused before this Court.
e) The appellant/accused having deposited the entire cheques amount, the order of sentence passed against the accused to undergo imprisonment for a period of two years is set aside in case of default is set aside (sic.).”
5. Respondent had issued two cheques to the appellant, one for Rs.2,00,000/-
and the other for Rs.50,00,000/-. Both the cheques were dishonoured. The trial
magistrate recorded findings that dishonour of the cheques and the appellant
having followed the procedure statutorily laid down while issuing notices to the
respondent which he did not comply were proved; also that, the appellant proved
a legally enforceable claim. Consequently, upon recording conviction, the
magistrate sentenced the respondent to imprisonment for 2 (two) years with fine
of Rs.4,00,000/- and Rs.1,00,00,000/-, i.e., double the cheque amount. In
appeal by the respondent, the conviction and sentence were upheld.
6. Appellant, being the complainant is aggrieved, because despite concurrent
conviction under Section 138 of the Act by the trial court and the appellate court,
as well as by the High Court in revision, the respondent has been simply let off
by the High Court without any punishment and is required, in terms of the High
Court’s impugned order, to only pay the cheque amount sans even any interest.
According to the appellant, the cheque amount is being returned after 10 (ten)
years of dishonour of the cheques. This, he claims in unfair and unjust.
7. The High Court, mistakenly assuming that it was exercising appellate power
and not revisional power, proceeded to interfere by observing that the Trial Court
has not given any reason for imposing a fine that is twice the cheque amount;
however, while so interfering with that part of the sentence and modifying the
same, the High Court did neither impose any prison term nor award interest with
the result that the respondent does not stand to suffer any penalty for committing
the proved offence.
8. Interfering with the exercise of discretion as to what would constitute
appropriate sentence and ultimately letting off the respondent by merely asking
him to pay the cheque amount without any prison term and without awarding
any interest, prima facie, appeared to us perverse and erroneous, hence,
indefensible. Opportunity was given to learned counsel for the respondent to
advance submissions for sustaining it. He fairly expressed his inability to defend
the indefensible, so to say.
9. In course of hearing on several subsequent occasions, we had impressed
upon learned counsel for the respondent to propose terms for an ‘out of the court’
settlement. Since no such settlement was forthcoming, we indicated that
appropriate sentence ought to be imposed on the respondent and, by our last
order, required his presence today for appearance before us to hear him on the
question of sentence. Respondent has participated in the proceedings, through
the virtual mode.
10. Through his learned counsel, the respondent has proposed to pay a sum of
Rs. 45,00,000/- (Rupees forty-five lakh) towards full and final settlement of the
dues to the appellant by 31st August, 2026. With a bit of reluctance, but on
instructions, learned counsel for the appellant agrees to receive Rs. 45,00,000/-
(Rupees forty-five lakh) towards full and final settlement of the dues.
11. Having recorded the specific undertaking given by the respondent through
his learned counsel, we do not propose to enter into the merits of the matter
further and discuss how grossly wrong the High Court was in granting relief to
the respondent. Suffice to record, we grant time till 31st August, 2026 to the
respondent to make payment of Rs. 45,00,000/- (Rupees forty-five lakh) to the
appellant. We hope and trust that the respondent will endeavour to honour the
proposal and will not give any further occasion for the appellant to approach this
Court once again.
12. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court, being wholly perverse
and manifestly erroneous, stands set aside. The appeals are, thus, allowed.
13. Should the respondent fail to make the payment to the appellant, as
proposed and recorded supra, the appellant shall be at liberty to apply for revival
of these appeals whereupon they may be revived for considering the desirability
to send the respondent to prison straight away.
14. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
…………….............................J.
[DIPANKAR DATTA]
……………..............................J.
[SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA]
New Delhi;
April 13, 2026.
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