Anil Kumar Gupta vs State Of U.P

and Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. The

learned Sessions Judge, Muzaffarnagar acquitted all of

them of the said charges. The State preferred appeal

against acquittal in the High Court of Judicature at

2

Allahabad. The High Court confirmed the order of

acquittal of all other accused except the appellant

herein. The High Court accordingly convicted the

appellant herein for the offences punishable under

Section 498A, IPC and sentenced him to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for two years with a fine of

Rs.5,000/- and in default of payment of fine, to further

undergo rigorous imprisonment for six months, and for

the offence punishable under Section 304B, IPC, he

was sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for

ten years. The High Court also convicted the appellant

for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 and sentenced him to

undergo rigorous imprisonment for five years and to

pay a fine of Rs.15,000/- and in default of payment of

fine, to further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one

year, whereas under Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition

Act, 1961, the appellant was sentenced to undergo

rigorous imprisonment for six months and to pay a fine

3

of Rs.1,000/- and in default of payment of fine, he

should further undergo rigorous imprisonment for one

month. The substantive sentences of imprisonment

were however directed to run concurrently. Hence this

appeal.

2. In order to consider as to whether the judgment of the

High Court convicting the appellant for the offences

punishable under the provisions referred to

hereinabove suffers from any infirmity requiring our

interference, it is just and necessary to notice the

relevant facts in brief.

3. The appellant is the husband of the deceased Poonam.

The incident is stated to have taken place in the

intervening night of 6th/7th June, 1988 in Mohalla

Kambalwala Bagh, Muzaffarnagar and a report was

lodged on 7.6.1988 at 8.50 a.m. by Dharmendra Kumar

Jain (PW 1), father of the victim. The parents of the

victim Poonam (deceased) are the residents of Khatauli,

4

a town nearby Muzafarnagar. The deceased Poonam

was married to the appellant Anil Kumar Gupta on 20th

April, 1987. Soon after the marriage, the appellant and

other accused (since acquitted) allegedly started

harassing and torturing the deceased to bring more

dowry. She was subjected to both mental and physical

cruelty repeatedly. The deceased gave birth to a male

child about four months before the occurrence and the

same constituted another occasion for the appellant

and other accused to demand cash and other valuable

articles. Dharmendra Kumar Jain (PW 1), the father of

the victim was not in a position to meet their demands.

Consequently, the victim was subjected to further

harassment. On 6th June, 1988 at about 11 a.m., the

victim telephoned to her near relation, namely, Ram

Kumar Vaish (PW 2) at Muzaffarnagar complaining

about her torture and requested him to see her. Ram

Kumar Vaish (PW 2) reached her house in the evening.

He heard shrieks of the deceased Poonam coming out

5

of the house. The appellant and his brother Ajay Kumar

and sister were shouting inside the house loudly. PW 2

then rang the bell evoking Anil Kumar Gupta, the

appellant to come out, but he did not allow him to meet

the victim Poonam. PW 2, in turn, informed the

complainant (PW 1) about all this at Khatauli at about

10 p.m. On 7.6.1988, the complainant (PW 1) along

with his sons and PW 2 reached the house of the

accused and found that none of them were present at

home. He was informed by the neighbours that in the

preceding night, the appellant, his brother and sister

had taken Poonam to the hospital when her condition

was serious and she was crying "MUJHE JAHAR DEKAR

MAAR DIYA". On reaching the District Hospital, PWs 1

and 2 came to know that Poonam had breathed her last

and her dead body was lying there. No accused was to

be found in the hospital. PW 1 then lodged the FIR

whereupon a case was registered and investigation was

undertaken by the S.H.O. Shyam Singh Tomar (PW 8).

6

4. There is no dispute whatsoever that the victim was

admitted in the hospital on 7.6.1988 at about 1 a.m.

under a case of suspected poisoning. Dr. N.C. Tyagi

(PW 7) had examined the victim. Her condition was

very critical and she was unconscious. She had

breathed her last at 1.40 a.m. Postmortem was

conducted by Dr. Suresh Chandra (PW 5) on the same

day at about 4 p.m. The following ante mortem injuries

were found on her person:

1. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with pin-pointed spots

in an area of 2 cm. x 1 cm. on the dorsum of right

big toe just behind the base of nail.

2. Multiple pin-point abrasions with pinpoint bleeding

(clotted) spots on the dorsum of 4th toe just behind

the base of nail.

3. Multiple pin-point abrasions with clotted blood on the

dorsum of left great toe just-behind the nail.

4. Multiple pin-point abrasions in an area of 1 cm. x 1

cm. on the front of left greater toe nail.

7

5. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in

front of nail of left 4th toe.

6. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in

front of left 4th toe.

7. Multiple pin-pointed abrasions with clotted blood in

front of left 3rd toe.

According to the medical opinion, the cause of death

could not be ascertained, hence viscera was preserved.

As per the report of the serologist, viscera contained

insecticide poison.

5. The prosecution, in order to establish its case,

altogether examined ten witnesses and the accused

produced two witnesses in their defence. There is no

direct evidence whatsoever and the entire case rests

upon the circumstantial evidence. The trial Court,

meticulously analyzed the evidence available on record

and recorded the following findings:

(i) The prosecution miserably failed to establish that

while victim was being taken to hospital, she

8

shouted that she had been administered poison.

Ram Kumar Vaish (PW 2) did not make any

statement to that effect before the police.

However, in his evidence, he stated that the

neighbours stated about the same. The fact

remains that no neighbour has been examined to

establish this fact.

(ii) The trial Court also found that there is no

evidence that one day prior to her death, the

victim spoke to PW 2.

(iii) The trial Court did not accept the evidence of

Dharmendra Kumar Jain (PW 1), father of the

victim on the ground that the evidence given by

him is full of contradictions. As per the evidence of

PW 1 and as well as in FIR, there is no mention of

any demand for dowry before or after the

marriage. The alleged demand was made only

after the birth of a male child. The letters

9

produced by the prosecution do not prove any

demand for dowry. The letters (Exts. Ka-2 and

Ka-3) do not mention that the accused have

demanded any dowry either in the form of

Camera or Scooter. On the other hand, letter

(Ext. Ka-13) written by Smt. Poonam (deceased)

from her father's house to the appellant only

showed family matters, about the love and

affection between the husband and wife and how

painful it was to stay away from her husband.

6. The trial Court further found that the suicide note (Ext.

Ka-78) stands proved to have been written by the

deceased, as established by the Handwriting and Finger

Print Expert.

7. The High Court, while reappreciating the evidence

available on record, did not discuss that portion of the

evidence which was taken into consideration by the

trial Court. However, the High Court concluded that the

10

deceased died an unnatural death by poisoning within

about 14 months of her marriage with the appellant

and there was consistent demand of dowry by him

after the marriage. The High Court also observed that

the victim was treated with cruelty by the appellant

over the demand for dowry. The appellant was never

satisfied even though some of the demands were met

by the parents of the deceased. That after the birth of

the child, the appellant further demanded VCR and

Rs.20,000/- in cash and on non-fulfillment of the

demand, the appellant continued to subject the

deceased to cruelty and harassment. Adverting to the

circumstances, the High Court noted that the appellant

prevented Ram Kumar Vaish (PW 2) to meet the

deceased in the preceding evening when he reached

their house on receipt of a telephone call from the

deceased. One of the most important circumstance that

was taken into consideration by the High Court is that

the appellant was nearest to the lady and was

11

undoubtedly with her on that fateful night and

therefore, the inference is inescapable that it is the

appellant who administered poison on her. The High

Court further found that the appellant was engaged in

manufacturing medicines and well acquainted with the

property, composition, potentiality and effectiveness of

the deadly poison responsible for the death of the lady.

In order to show his innocence, he took her to the

hospital on scooter where she collapsed within 40

minutes. Another circumstance that was taken into

consideration by the High Court was that the appellant

did not inform the police nor he informed the parents

of the deceased about her death. Instead, he was not

to be found in the hospital near the dead body of the

deceased in the next morning when deceased's father

and others reached there.

8. Shri R.K. Shukla, learned senior counsel appearing for

the appellant mainly contended that the High Court in

the process of reappreciating the evidence, ignored the

12

vital evidence on record which proves the innocence of

the appellant. It was submitted that the approach of

the High Court is completely contrary to the decision of

this Court in Ramesh Babulal Doshi Vs. State of

Gujarat1 which was followed by this Court in Dwarka

Das & Ors. Vs. State of Haryana2. The submission

was that the High Court miserably failed to examine

the reasons given by the trial Court for recording the

order of acquittal.

9. Learned counsel for the State of U.P. supported the

impugned judgment mainly relying on the

circumstances that on that fateful night, the appellant

alone was in the company of the deceased and it is one

of the strong circumstances to hold that it is the

appellant who administered poison to the deceased.

10. In Ramesh Babulal Doshi, this Court held that "the

mere fact that a view other than the one taken by the

trial Court can be legitimately arrived at by the

1 (1996) 9 SCC 225

2 (2003) 1 SCC 204

13

appellate Court on reappraisal of the evidence, cannot

constitute a valid and sufficient ground to interfere an

order of acquittal unless it comes to the conclusion that

the entire approach of the trial Court in dealing with

the evidence was patently illegal or the conclusions

arrived at by it were wholly untenable. While sitting in

judgment over an acquittal, the appellate Court is first

required to seek an answer to the question whether the

findings of the trial Court are palpably wrong,

manifestly erroneous or demonstrably unsustainable. If

the appellate Court answers the above question in the

negative, the order of acquittal is not to be disturbed.

Conversely, if the appellate Court holds, for reasons to

be recorded, that the order of acquittal cannot at all be

sustained in view of any of the above infirmities it can

then--and then only--reappraise the evidence to

arrive at its own conclusions". (emphasis supplied)

11. In Dwarka Das, this Court following the decision in

Ramesh Babulal Doshi, further observed that "there

14

cannot be any denial of the factum that the power and

authority to appraise the evidence in an appeal, either

against acquittal or conviction stands out to be very

comprehensive and wide, but if two views are

reasonably possible, on the state of evidence: one

supporting the acquittal and the other indicating

conviction, then and in that event, the High Court

would not be justified in interfering with an order of

acquittal, merely because it feels that it, sitting as a

trial court, would have taken the other view. While

reappreciating the evidence, the rule of prudence

requires that the High Court should give proper weight

and consideration to the views of the trial Judge. But if

the judgment of the Sessions Judge was absolutely

perverse, legally erroneous and based on a wrong

appreciation of the evidence, then it would be just and

proper for the High Court to reverse the judgment of

acquittal, recorded by the Sessions Judge, as

otherwise, there would be gross miscarriage of justice".

15

12. In Chandrappa & Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka3, this

Court reappreciating the aforesaid principles, further

observed that "in case of acquittal, there is a double

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the

presumption of innocence available to him under the

fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that

every person should be presumed to be innocent

unless he is proved to be guilty by a competent court

of law. Secondly, the accused having secured an

acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is certainly

not weakened but reinforced, reaffirmed and

strengthened by the trial Court. Though the above

principles are well established, a different note was

struck in several decisions by various High Courts and

even by this Court. It is, therefore, appropriate if we

consider some of the leading decisions on the point".

Having stated so, this Court also held that an appellate

Court has full power to reappreciate, review and

reconsider the evidence upon which the order of

3 (2007) 4 SCC 415

16

acquittal is founded. But it is well established that if

two views are possible on the basis of evidence on

record and one favourable view to the accused has

been taken by the trial Court, it ought not to be

disturbed by the appellate Court.

13. Therefore, keeping the above principles in mind, we

have to first ascertain whether there are any reasons

recorded by the High Court in order to observe that the

findings of the trial Court are unsustainable. The High

Court in its judgment expressed that "the acquittal is

wholly unjustified" and that the learned trial Judge

failed to make proper analysis of the evidence adduced

by the prosecution and other surrounding

circumstances. There is no finding recorded as such by

the High Court to the effect that the trial Court misread

the evidence and its findings therefore were perverse

in their entirety. The High Court was mainly impressed

by its finding that the suicide note produced on behalf

of the defence was found to be fabricated.

17

14. The defence, in its anxiety might have pressed some

suicidal note into service which was ultimately found to

be not acceptable by the High Court, but the High

Court did not consider the rest of the circumstantial

evidence that was taken into consideration by the trial

Court for acquitting the accused. The High Court has

mainly taken one singular circumstance into account,

namely, that on the fateful night, the appellant alone

was nearest to the victim and therefore, the inference

is inescapable that it is he who administered poison to

her. In the entire judgment, there is not even a

whisper as to how the reasons recorded by the trial

Court were perverse or erroneous.

15. It appears to us that the High Court very conveniently

ignored the exchange of letters between the deceased

Poonam and her mother which disclosed cordial

relations between the two families. The prosecution did

not find any letter by the deceased Poonam in response

to her mother's letter when her mother's letters

18

indicated receipt of Poonam's letters. There is no

explanation forthcoming as to why the prosecution

withheld that evidence. The benefit of doubt in this

regard may have to go in favour of the appellant.

16. The High Court while ignoring the vital evidence

available on record regarding the purchase of scooter

by appellant himself with his own funds relied upon

oral assertion made by PW-1 that parents of the victim

paid a sum of Rs. 2,000/- for replacing the Camera and

a further sum of Rs. 5,000/- for purchase of the

scooter. The Trial Court, on appreciation of evidence

available on record found that the scooter was actually

purchased by the appellant himself, through raising a

bank loan and in fact it was purchased much prior to

the letter alleged to have been written by the victim to

her parents. The appellant even got the scooter

insured. This vital evidence regarding the ownership of

the scooter has been completely ignored by the High

Court and arrived at the conclusion as if the appellant

19

demanded scooter from the parents of the victim as a

dowry. The evidence available on record does not

justify such a conclusion reached by the High Court.

The High Court in this regard did not assign any reason

as to how and why the conclusion arrived at by the trial

court in this regard was not sound and perverse.

17. Similarly the High Court, on a very peculiar reasoning

ignores the relevant piece of evidence that it is the

appellant who took the victim to the hospital on his

scooter to save her life. The High Court for no reason

characterized the act of appellant taking the victim to

the hospital as one of showmanship in order to avoid

any suspicion of his involvement in the crime.

According to the High Court the move was an

anticipatory self-defence. It is difficult to discern as to

on what basis the High Court arrived at such a

conclusion. The High Court without any reason

whatsoever concludes that the appellant took the

victim on his scooter to the hospital only in order to

20

show that as if he was innocent. The evidence of the

duty doctor and entries in the hospital register in

unmistakable terms reveals that it is the appellant who

got admitted the victim into the hospital. If it is the

appellant who removed the victim to the hospital on his

scooter, then the version given by the prosecution

(PW-2) that neighbours informed him to the effect that

the victim Poonam came out of her house crying and

shouting that she has been administered poison by the

accused person becomes totally unacceptable. This

vital portion of the evidence upon which the High Court

relied comes from the statement of PW-2 which is

undoubtedly an improvement since he did not state

anything to that effect in his statement to the police.

The fact remains that no neighbour was examined to

justify that the victim Poonam came out of her house

running and shouting that accused administered poison

to her. The trial court meticulously examined the

evidence available on record in this regard and

21

accordingly found that the prosecution story of the

victim revealing that she was administered poison was

totally unacceptable. There is no reason given by the

High Court as to why it did not agree with the findings

of the trial court.

18. Be it noted that on the same evidence, the High Court

did not find any case whatsoever against the other

accused but found only the appellant guilty on the sole

ground that on that fateful night, it was the appellant

who was proximate to the deceased and therefore, it is

the appellant who administered poison to the

deceased. The factum itself that the deceased and the

appellant were together cannot be a ground to

conclude that it was the appellant who administered

poison to the deceased. The cause of death of the

victim undoubtedly is on account of consumption of

poison but there are no circumstances available on

record based on which one could conclude that it was a

case that someone forcibly administered poison.

22

19. In the same manner, the High Court recorded the

finding that the appellant is very well versed in

manufacturing medicines and knew their property,

composition etc. The appellant looks after the accounts

of a manufacturing concern. He has no acquaintance

with any medical or chemical technology. We fail to

appreciate as to the relevance of appellant's

employment with a manufacturer of medicine has any

bearing on his knowledge in manufacture of poison. It

sounds very strange that High Court not only presumes

that the appellant has not only special knowledge

about preparation of poison but it is the appellant who

administered poison to the victim

20. In our considered opinion, the High Court committed a

serious error in arriving at its own conclusions without

properly appreciating the findings and conclusions

arrived at by the trial Court and the reasons assigned

in support of those conclusions and findings. In the

absence of any conclusion by the High Court to the

23

effect that "the trial Court misread the evidence and

the findings were therefore perverse", no interference

was called for. The High Court virtually substituted all

the findings and conclusions of the trial court but

without assigning any reason whatsoever as to why

and how those conclusions of the trial court were not

sound or perverse in their nature. The High Court

normally does not interfere with the findings of the trial

court merely because there is a possibility of taking a

different view on the available evidence on record. That

is no reason to interfere with the judgment of the trial

court.

21. We are satisfied that the trial court, for good and

cogent reasons, acquitted all the accused including the

appellant and it is the High Court which committed

error in reversing the well considered judgment of the

trial court so far as the appellant is concerned. Be it

noted, that on the same evidence the High Court

agreed with the trial court to acquit the other accused

24

by refusing to rely on the prosecution story but a

different yardstick has been applied so far as the

appellant is concerned solely on the ground of his

proximity with the victim on that fateful night. That

singular circumstance in our considered opinion is not

enough to conclude that the appellant forcibly

administered the poison to the victim. Even the

medical evidence available on record does not support

the conclusion. The view taken by the High Court to

reverse the order of acquittal is unsustainable both in

law and on facts.

22. The impugned judgment is accordingly set aside. The

appellant is acquitted of all the charges. The judgment

of the trial Court acquitting the appellant shall stand

restored. The bail bond executed by the appellant shall

stand cancelled.

23.The appeal is allowed.

25

..........................................J.

(B. SUDERSHAN REDDY)

..........................................J.

(SURINDER SINGH NIJJAR)

New Delhi,

March 9, 2011