Amrika Bai vs The State Of Chhattisgarh

NON­REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1036 OF 2011

AMRIKA BAI … APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE STATE OF CHHATTISGARH … RESPONDENT

JUDGMENT

N.V. RAMANA, J.

1. This appeal is directed against judgment dated

26.04.2010, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court

of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in Criminal Appeal No. 604 of

1993, whereby the appeal preferred by the appellant was

dismissed, and the judgment and order dated 11.06.1993

passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Bilaspur, convicting Signature Not Verified Digitally signed by

the appellant was confirmed. The appellant was convicted VISHAL ANAND Date: 2019.03.30 10:44:20 IST Reason:

under Section 302 read with Section 149; and Section 147 of

1 the IPC, and sentenced to imprisonment for life and one­year

rigorous imprisonment respectively.

2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on the morning

of 12.08.1989, the deceased, Kapil, was taking his cattle for

grazing, at which time his cattle jumped on the door of the

appellant’s house, which led to the appellant abusing the

deceased. Thereafter, on his way back, the deceased

questioned the appellant as to why she abused him earlier in

the morning. At this, the appellant, on the pretext of touching

the feet of the deceased, caught hold of him. Then, the other

accused, armed with deadly weapons, came to the spot and

beat the deceased to death. Pursuant to this an FIR was

registered against the accused on 12.08.1989 and charge­

sheet was filed.

3. Originally, 14 individuals were made accused in the

present case and out of them 10 were convicted by the trial

court. During the pendency of their appeal before the High

Court, accused no.3 Jhangul died, abating his appeal, and

accused nos. 1, 5, 6, 7 and 10 were released on special

reprieve granted to them. With respect to the remaining

2 accused including the present appellant, the appeal was

dismissed by the High Court. The present appeal before us

concerns only accused no. 13, Amrika Bai, who has

sustained conviction as aforementioned.

4. Heard learned counsel for both the parties.

5. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the

impugned judgment convicts the appellant without any

credible and clinching evidence, and is thereby illegal. The

counsel further submitted that Section 157 Cr.P.C. was not

complied with and the counterfoil of the FIR was forwarded to

the Magistrate after a delay of 4 days from its registration. He

also submitted that the statements of prosecution witnesses

are unnatural and contradictory, made with the intention to

falsely implicate the appellant.

6. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the

respondent­State submitted that the impugned judgment is

well reasoned and does not suffer from any infirmity which

merits interference.

7. The prosecution has relied on the testimonies of Dharmu

(P.W. 7, father of the deceased), Bhagwat Bai (P.W. 8, sister of

3 the deceased) and Babulal (P.W. 9, brother­in­law of the

deceased) to secure the conviction of the appellant. It is to be

noted that these prosecution witnesses are close relatives of

the deceased and in view of the same, this Court has to

scrutinize their testimony with great care and caution.

8. In the facts of the present case, the appellant who was

unarmed is implicated in the incident by virtue of the

testimonies of the aforementioned witnesses stating her role

in allegedly catching hold of the deceased to facilitate his

murder. On a close scrutiny of the testimonies of the

aforesaid witnesses, the role of the appellant in the incident is

extremely doubtful.

9. The testimonies of Dharmu (P.W. 7), Bhagwat Bai (P.W. 8)

and Babulal (P.W. 9), on the basis of which the appellant was

implicated in the offence, are highly inconsistent with respect

to the role of the appellant. While P.W. 8 deposed in line with

the prosecution version that the appellant merely held the

deceased as he was being assaulted, P.W. 9, went on to

depose in his cross­examination that the appellant in fact

assaulted the deceased with a lathi. Further, P.W. 7, in his

4 cross­examination, deposed that the appellant brought the

tangia from inside the house and handed it over to Chandra

(accused no. 11, husband of the appellant) while admitting

that his earlier statement, wherein he stated that Chandra

had brought a tangia from inside the house, was incorrect.

He further stated that the appellant did not leave the

deceased till he fell on the ground as a result of the assault.

10. The abovementioned inconsistencies found in the

testimonies of the prosecution witnesses create a doubt

regarding the credibility of their testimonies vis­à­vis the role

of the appellant.

11. Further, this Court fails to fathom a scenario wherein the

appellant single handedly caught hold of the deceased

facilitating his assault, particularly when P.W.8 has

categorically stated in her cross­examination that the

deceased was well built, such that he could have taken down

two to three persons himself.

12. The above observations cast a serious doubt on the

involvement of the appellant in the incident in which the

deceased was beaten to death and she suffered unexplained

5 injuries. Thus, she cannot be termed to be a member of the

unlawful assembly, much less one which was alleged to have

been constituted with the common object of murdering the

deceased. The law is well­settled on the aspect that mere

presence in an unlawful assembly cannot render a person

liable unless there was a common object, being one of those

set out in Section 141 I.P.C. and she was actuated by that

common object. [See: Dani Singh v. State of Bihar, (2004)

13 SCC 203]

13. Moreover, the fact that the FIR was registered on

12.08.1989 but was forwarded to the Magistrate only on

16.08.1989, after a delay of 4 days, becomes significant in

light of the abovementioned inconsistencies in the story of the

prosecution with respect to the appellant. It appears that the

appellant was roped in as an accused, due to the inimical

relationship between the parties which clearly emanates from

the record.

14. In conclusion, since the involvement of the appellant as

a member of the unlawful assembly has itself been put to

doubt, the question of her having common object for 6 murdering the deceased under Section 302 read with Section

149 and her using force or violence under Section 147 IPC

does not arise.

15. Taking into consideration the overall evidence, we feel that

it is not safe to convict the appellant in the present case.

16. Thus, in light of the observations hereinabove, the appeal

is allowed and the appellant is acquitted of offences under

Section 302 read with Section 149 and Section 147 IPC.

..............................................J. (N.V. RAMANA)

..............................................J. (MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR)

..............................................J. (INDIRA BANERJEE)

NEW DELHI;

MARCH 29, 2019.

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