Amit Kumar Agarwal vs Directorate Of Enforcement
- Citation2025 SCC OnLine Jhar 986
Ratio decidendi
The rule this decision rests on
1. Once a litigant's counsel confines the prayer in a writ petition by way of a substantive order during proceedings, and that order remains unquestioned by review or recall petition and unappealed, the High Court exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution is bound by the principle of pleading and cannot consider issues beyond the scope of that confinement, notwithstanding that the court may have heard arguments on the broader issues prior to confinement. 2. The arrest and remand are distinct legal events: arrest is governed by the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 requiring the grounds of arrest to be informed to the person arrested; the remand that follows is a separate judicial act under Section 167 of the Criminal Procedure Code addressing the continued detention of the arrested person, and defects alleged to exist at the stage of arrest cannot be used to challenge a subsequent remand order when the prayer has been confined to the remand order alone. 3. A person arrested in connection with a money laundering investigation who receives written grounds of arrest at the time of arrest, reads and acknowledges those grounds by signature without expressing dissatisfaction, and who is subsequently produced before a court within 24 hours where counsel is present and no objection to the arrest is raised, cannot subsequently challenge the validity of the remand order passed on the basis of non-supply of grounds of arrest at the remand stage. 4. The statutory requirement to furnish grounds of arrest is mandatory at the stage of arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, and is not a requirement that attaches to the remand stage; accordingly, where the grounds of arrest have been properly communicated to the arrested person at the time of arrest, the subsequent remand order is not rendered illegal by the absence of those grounds from the remand application or remand order document itself. 5. The legality and propriety of a judicial remand order depends on whether the magistrate has applied his mind to the materials placed before him and whether reasonable grounds exist for the remand, and cannot be challenged on the basis of alleged defects in the arrest order where the prayer has been confined to challenge the remand order alone and no challenge has been made to the initial remand order passed immediately after arrest.
Written by Miss Lucy from the judgment below, not taken from a headnote.
Judgment
As delivered
226 of the Constitution of India for holding the
detention/arrest of the petitioner since 07.06.2023 and
remand since 09.06.2023 in ECIR Case No. 01 of 2023
(arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022) as void ab initio; and
further for quashing/setting aside the remand order dated
09.06.2023 passed by the learned Special Judge, PMLA,
Ranchi; and in consequence thereof direction for release of
the petitioner from custody in ECIR No. 01 of 2023 (arising
out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022).
-1- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Factual Matrix
2. Brief facts of the case, as per the prosecution version,
needs to refer herein, which reads as under:
3. An ECIR bearing No. 18/2022 was recorded, on the
basis of the FIR bearing No. 141 of 2022 [Bariyatu P.S.] dated
04.06.2022, lodged at Bariyatu police station, Ranchi
Jharkhand under Sections 420, 467 and 471 of the Indian
Penal Code, against one Pradeep Bagchi on the basis of
complaint made by one Sri Dilip Sharma, Tax Collector,
Ranchi Municipal Corporation, for submission of forged
papers i.e., Aadhar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession letter
for obtaining holding number 0210004194000A1 and
0210004031000A5. Investigation revealed that by submitting
the forged documents, a holding number was obtained in
name of Pradeep Bagchi for property at Morabadi Mouza,
Ward No. 21/19, Ranchi having an area of the plot measuring
455.00 decimals approx.
4. Investigation further revealed that the above property
belonged to Late B.M. Laxman Rao which was given to the
Army and had been in the possession of the Defence/Army
since independence. Investigation also reveals that by way of
creating a fake owner (Pradeep Bagchi) of the above said
property, it was sold to a company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea
Estate Pvt. Ltd for which the consideration amount was
-2- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 shown to be Rs. 7 crores which was highly under value and
out of this amount payment amounting to Rs. 25 lakhs only
were made to the account of said Pradeep Bagchi and rest of
the money was falsely shown to be paid through cheques in
the sale deed being deed no. 6888 of 2021.
5. It has come during investigation that records available
at the Circle Officer, Bargain, and Ranchi along with the
office of Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata have been altered
and records have been modified. The survey of Circle Office
Bargain as well as Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata
transpires that documents have been tempered to create
fictitious owner of the above properties.
6. The Enforcement Directorate, upon completion of
investigation, filed the prosecution complaint under Section
45 read with Section 44 of PML Act being ECIR Case no.
01/2023 against the present petitioner and consequently, the
trial court vide order dated 19.06.2023 has taken cognizance
of the aforesaid offence.
7. The present petitioner was arrested on 07.06.2023 in
exercise of power conferred under Section 19(1) of the
Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 [hereinafter
referred to as ‗PMLA, 2002']. Thereafter, he preferred Misc.
Cri. Application No. 1915 of 2023 for grant of bail, which was
dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2023 by learned Special
-3- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, Ranchi, against
which he moved before this Court by filing bail application
being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, which was also dismissed vide
order dated 01.03.2024. After dismissal of the bail
application, the petitioner moved before the Hon'ble Supreme
Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024, which was
dismissed as withdrawn.
8. Thereafter, again the petitioner has renewed his prayer
for bail by filing B.A. No. 8321 of 2024, which is pending
consideration before this Court.
9. However, after his prayer for bail having been rejected,
he moved before this Court by filing the instant writ petition
initially challenging the detention/arrest of the petitioner
since 07.06.2023 and remand since 09.06.2023 in ECIR Case
No. 01 of 2023.
10. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned senior counsel for the petitioner
has argued the matter on 4th October, 2024 through video
conferencing and in course of argument has confined the
prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by
learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.
For ready reference, the order dated 04.10.2024 is quoted as
under:
―The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the instant writ petition has been assigned to the D.B.-II by the administrative order of
-4- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, this matter has been listed today before this Court.
2. The writ petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:
(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-
(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA cannot be exercised without issuing summon under Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of persons under Section 18;
(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;
(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must record the reasons why the authorised person considers necessary the attendance of the person to whom Summons are issued.
(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;
(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022];
(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending learned Court of Sri Yogesh
-5- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Kumar, Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum-Special Judge, CBI-cumSpecial Judge under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
3. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel has appeared through Video Conferencing to represent the petitioner. He has referred page 53 of the pleadings, which is the arrest order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India at Ranchi, annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition by which petitioner has been arrested in exercise of power conferred under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Act, 2002.
4. Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vrs. Union of India and others [(2024) 7 SCC 576] and in the case of Prabir Purkayastha Vrs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC 254 and submitted that the arrest order is contrary to the provision of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, as has been settled by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.
5. However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.
6. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel representing the respondent Enforcement Directorate prays for 4 weeks' time to seek instruction and file affidavit in the matter since in the intervening period two consecutive holidays are falling.
7. As such, with consent of both the parties, list this case on 11th November 2024.‖ [Emphasis supplied]
11. However, on subsequent date, the argument has been
advanced by Ms. Meenakashi Arora, learned senior counsel
for the petitioner, questioning the order of arrest dated
-6- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 07.06.2023 as also the order dated 09.06.2023, which as per
learned senior counsel is the order of remand.
12. The ground has been taken on behalf of petitioner by
challenging the issue of remand that at the time of arrest the
condition stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002
has not been followed. Further, the ground of arrest has not
been provided, in writing, as required to be provided under
the provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 coupled
with the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court in the
case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors., [2023
SCC OnLine SC 1244 : (2024) 7 SCC 576]. Further reliance
has been placed upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State
Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. [(2024) 3 SCC 51;
Prabir Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC
OnLine 934; and recently in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement [2024 SCC OnLine SC 1703].
13. Further ground has been taken that the order of remand
is in utter violation of provision as contained under Section
19(1) of the PML Act, 2002, since, the reasons for ground of
remand has never been communicated to the petitioner as
per the statutory provision contained therein.
14. Further, submission has been made that the condition
precedent for arrest/remand under the PML Act, 2002 is that
-7- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 at the time of arrest the reason for arrest is to be
communicated to the concerned but herein no such reason
has been communicated and hence the very arrest of the
petitioner is per se illegal and in consequence thereof, the
order of remand is not sustainable in law and is fit to be
quashed and set aside and accordingly the writ petitioner
may be directed to be released from judicial custody.
15. Submission has been made that the statutory provision,
as contained under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, has been
clarified by the Hon'ble Apex Court while dealing with PML
Act, 2002 in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and
Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors., [(2022) SCC On Line SC
929]. Further submission has been made that subsequent to
the judgment passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India
and Ors. (supra) again on the issue consideration has been
given by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal
vs. Union of India and Ors., (supra) followed by judgment
rendered in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State
Represented by Deputy Director & Ors. (supra) regarding
the communication for reason of arrest at the time of arrest
itself in writing.
16. While on the other hand, the learned counsel appearing
for the respondent-ED has argued that it is incorrect on the
-8- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 part of the petitioner to take the ground that the reason for
arrest or remand has not been communicated rather the
reason for arrest has been communicated along with the
exhaustive grounds, the day when the petitioner was
arrested, which would be evident from Annexure R-3
appended with the counter affidavit, wherein the entire
details has been furnished regarding the culpability said to be
the reason to believe for arrest of the writ petitioner.
17. It has been submitted that in the said communication
the writ petitioner has put his signature in each page with
date and on the last page, he has noted that ‗read and
understand' ‗I have read my ground of arrest completely and
also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh.‖ and below therein has
put his signature with date i.e., 07.06.2023. In view thereof,
submission has been made that the petitioner has been
communicated with the reason of arrest, the day when he
was taken into custody i.e., on 07.06.2023. Hence, the
provision of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 has fully been
complied with.
18. The argument has been advanced that the arrest of the
writ petitioner, therefore, is in consonance with the
interpretation made by Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and Ors. Vs. Union of India
and Ors. (supra); Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and
-9- W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Ors. (supra); V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by
Deputy Director & Ors. (supra); Prabir Purkayastha Vs.
State (NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine SC 934] or in the
case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement
(supra), so far as the stipulation made under Section 19(1) of
the PML Act, 2002 pertaining to communication of reason for
ground of arrest is concerned.
19. Further submission has been made has the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary and
Ors. Vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) has laid down that
the arrest will be said to be illegal if the reason for arrest will
not be communicated. However, in the case of Pankaj
Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) it has been laid
down that written communication is required to be served to
the concerned but that has been held to be applicable from
the date of judgment since the word ‗henceforth' has been
used therein. Here, the judgment in the case of Pankaj
Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) has come on
03.10.2023 but the arrest of the present writ petitioner was
made on 07.06.2023, which is much prior to the
pronouncement of the judgment rendered in the case of
Pankaj Bansal vs. Union of India and Ors. (supra) but
even ignoring the same the facts and circumstances of the
case, the reason for arrest since has already been served the
- 10 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 day when the writ petitioner was arrested i.e., on 07.06.2023,
hence, it is incorrect on the part of the writ petitioner to take
the ground that the mandate of the Hon'ble Apex Court
clarifying the mandate of Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002
has not been followed.
20. This Court based upon the aforesaid arguments of the
learned counsel for the parties reserved the judgment on 5th
December, 2024.
21. But subsequently, after taking note of the order dated
4th October, 2024, whereby and whereunder the prayer of the
writ petitioner has been confined only to the issue of alleged
remand dated 09.06.2023, this Court has posted the matter
under the heading for orders on 28th January, 2025, for
clarifying the issue i.e., with respect to the issue that when
the prayer of the writ petitioner was confined only with
respect to the issue of remand order dated 09.06.2023, then
where is the question to argue on the issue of the impropriety
of order of arrest on the ground of non-fulfillment of the
condition stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002
and its appreciation by the Court.
22. The parties have appeared on the aforesaid date. The
aforesaid fact of confinement of the prayer has not been
disputed by learned counsel for the petitioner, rather, it has
- 11 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 fairly been submitted that argument has been advanced
without taking note of the order dated 4th October, 2024 by
which the writ petition has been confined only to the legality
of order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be the remand
order. Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, sought for
two weeks' time to file affidavit on the issue and argue the
matter further.
23. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED has also
submitted that in the counter affidavit the fact about order
dated 4th October, 2024 has not been taken care of and, as
such, he also wants to file affidavit as was required to be filed
in pursuance to order dated 4th October, 2024.
24. For ready reference, order dated 28.01.2025 is quoted
as under:
―The matter was heard by this Court on 5th December, 2024. After the hearing having been concluded, the order was reserved.
Subsequent thereto, while going through the records, this Court has found that the argument has been advanced on behalf of the parties based upon the pleadings.
The order-sheet shows that the prayer made by the petitioner has been confined only with respect to the issue of legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023, leaving the prayer of validity of order of arrest under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, which would be evident from the order dated 4th October, 2024, for ready reference, the same is being quoted hereunder as :-
- 12 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 "IN THE HIGH COURT OF JHARKHAND AT RANCHI W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Amit Kumar Agarwal, aged about 53 years, son of Sri Vijay Kumar Agarwal, resident of HB-165, Salt Lake, Sector-3, P.O. - Vidhan Nagar, P.S.-Vidhan Nagar South, District-24 Parganas North, (West Bengal)
--- --- Petitioner Versus Directorate of Enforcement, Government of India, Pee Pee Compound, Kaushalya Chambers-II, Ranchi Sub Zonal Office, P.O.- G.P.O., P.S.- Hindpidhi, District- Ranchi
--- --- Respondents .......
CORAM: HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUJIT NARAYAN PRASAD HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVNEET KUMAR
For the Petitioner: Mr. Kapil Sibbal, Sr. Advocate (through V.C) Mr. Rohit Ranjan Sinha, Advocate Ms. Amrita Sinha, Advocate Mr. Abhishek Agarwal, Advocate Md. Imran Beig, Advocate For the Respondents : Mr. Amit Kumar Das, Advocate (for ED) Order No.0 / Dated 4th October, 2024 The instant writ petition has been filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. It appears that the instant writ petition has been assigned to the D.B.-II by the administrative order of Hon'ble the Chief Justice, therefore, this matter has been listed today before this Court.
2. The writ petitioner has prayed for following reliefs:
(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of the Prevention of
- 13 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v.
Atma Ram Shridhar Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-
(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA cannot be exercised without issuing summon under Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of persons under Section 18;
(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;
(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must record the reasons why the authorised person considers necessary the attendance of the person to whom Summons are issued.
(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles 14, 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;
(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR
- 14 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022];
(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending learned Court of Sri Yogesh Kumar, Additional Judicial Commissioner-I-cum- Special Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002.
3. Mr. Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel has appeared through Video Conferencing to represent the petitioner. He has referred page 53 of the pleadings, which is the arrest order dated 07.06.2023 passed by the Assistant Director, Enforcement Directorate, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Government of India at Ranchi, annexed as Annexure-1 to the writ petition by which petitioner has been arrested in exercise of power conferred under Section 19(1) of the Prevention of Money Laundering (PMLA) Act, 2002.
4. Learned Senior Counsel has relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vrs. Union of India and others [(2024) 7 SCC 576] and in the case of Prabir Purkayastha Vrs. State (NCT of Delhi) [(2024) 8 SCC 254 and submitted that the arrest order is contrary to the provision of Section 19(1) of the Act of 2002, as has been settled by the Apex Court in the aforesaid cases.
5. However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is confining the prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed by
- 15 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.
6. Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel representing the respondent Enforcement Directorate prays for 4 weeks' time to seek instruction and file affidavit in the matter since in the intervening period two consecutive holidays are falling.
7. As such, with consent of both the parties, list this case on 11th November 2024.‖ The argument has been advanced on behalf of the petitioner in the entirety of issue which is based upon the pleading and without taking into consideration the order dated 04.10.2024 by which prayer has been confined with respect to the legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023 only.
The counter affidavit has been filed on behalf of the Enforcement Directorate wherein also the order dated 4th October, 2024 has not been taken care of.
Consequent thereto the argument on behalf of both the sides has been made raising the legality of order of arrest.
But, when the prayer of writ petitioner has only been confined to the issue of remand dated 09.06.2023 passed in ECIR 01/2023, as would appear from the order dated 4th October, 2024, then the question which requires consideration is that what will happen to the confinement of prayer as has been recorded in the order dated 4th October, 2024.
In the backdrop of the aforesaid, this Court is of the view that further hearing is required. As such, the case has been listed today under the heading ―Orders‖.
The aforesaid fact of confinement of prayer has not been disputed by the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, rather, learned counsel for the petitioner has fairly submitted that the argument has been advanced without taking care of the order dated 4th October, 2024 by which the prayer of the writ petition has been confined only to the legality of order of remand dated 09.06.2023.
- 16 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
Learned counsel for the petitioner, therefore, has sought for two weeks' time to file affidavit on the issue and to argue the matter further.
Mr. Amit Kumar Das, learned counsel appearing for the Enforcement Directorate, has also submitted that in the counter affidavit the fact about order dated 4 th October, 2024 has not been taken care of and, as such, he also wants to file affidavit as was required to be filed in pursuance to order dated 4 th October, 2025 wherein four weeks' time was sought for to file affidavit after confinement of prayer made on behalf of the petitioner, as referred in paragraph 5 of the said order.
However, he has submitted that better would be, if he may be allowed to file affidavit after the affidavit will be filed on behalf of the petitioner, as per the prayer made by the writ petitioner as above, for which he has sought for one more week time over and above the period of two weeks as has been sought for on behalf of the petitioner.
Considering the aforesaid and with the consent of the parties, the matter is being adjourned for three weeks.
List this matter after three weeks under the heading ―Admission‖.
25. In pursuant thereto, affidavits have been filed, wherein
fact about confinement of prayer has not been disputed by
the petitioner as also by the learned counsel for the
respondent-ED.
26. The matter was posted for hearing on 28th February,
2025.
27. Mrs. Minakshi Arora, learned senior counsel for the
petitioner, has appeared through virtual mode and has
informed this Court that the petitioner has challenged order
dated 28.01.2025 before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP,
- 17 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 which has been listed for clarification on the issue of
confinement of prayer vide order dated 04.10.2024, and as
such prayer for adjournment has been sought for. The S.L.P.
being SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 stands disposed of vide
order dated 3rd March, 2025. For ready reference, order dated
3rd March, 2025 passed in SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 is
quoted as under:
1. Leave granted.
2. The issue before us lies within a very narrow compass.
3. The appellant before us, had approached the High Court by means of a writ petition, challenging the validity of the order of arrest dated 07.06.2023 and the subsequent remand order dated 09.06.2023, passed in ECIR Case No. 1/2023.
4. The Hon'ble Division Bench of the High Court, after reserving the judgment on 05.12.2024, took note of its earlier order dated 04.10.2024, wherein, the learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant before the High Court had submitted that the challenge would, henceforth, be confined to the validity of the remand order alone. Despite the above-
mentioned submission made on behalf of the appellant, the hearing on subsequent dates proceeded, with the appellant's counsel addressing the Court on other issues as well, beyond the limited scope of the earlier submission. Therefore, the Hon'ble Division Bench, vide the impugned order dated 28.01.2025, held that the matter would be proceeded with afresh.
5. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant would submit that the arguments have been heard on all issues, notwithstanding the earlier submission made restricting the arguments to the order of remand alone. Therefore, there is no requirement for a fresh hearing. A request has also been made by the learned senior counsel appearing for the
- 18 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 appellant, that it would be appropriate that the same Bench of the High Court, may rehear the matter.
6. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent would submit that the findings in the impugned order, were necessitated on account of the submissions made on behalf of the appellant before the High Court and, therefore, it is the appellant who has brought about the said situation. In any case, it is for the High Court to take a further call on the matter.
7. Taking note of the aforesaid submissions, we request the Hon'ble Chief Justice of the High Court of Jharkhand at Ranchi to make a request to the very same Bench or any Bench, as per the roster, after ascertaining the convenience of the Bench that dealt with the matter earlier. The High Court is at liberty to pass orders forthwith, or hear the counsels appearing for the parties afresh.
8. The appeal stands disposed of accordingly.
9. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.‖
28. Accordingly, the present matter has been placed before
this Court by the administrative order passed by Hon'ble the
Chief Justice, High Court of Jharkhand, in pursuance to the
order passed by Hon'ble Apex Court in 3rd March, 2025 in
particular at paragraph 7 thereof and thereby the case has
been listed on 11.03.2025 and taken up for hearing afresh.
Argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner:
29. Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner, has again questioned the very validity of
the arrest said to be not in consonance with the provision of
Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 since the grounds of
- 19 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 arrest has not been supplied at the time of arrest of the
petitioner in writing, rather, the grounds of arrest were for the
first time supplied on 10.11.2024 along with the counter
affidavit filed on behalf of respondent. Submission has been
made that the stand of the respondent-ED that the ground of
arrest was filed along with remand application is completely
incorrect.
30. The learned senior counsel has submitted that the
requirement of informing the person arrested the grounds of
arrest is not a formality but a mandatory constitutional
requirement.
31. The order of remand said to be order dated 09.06.2024
has been challenged on the ground that the reason for arrest
has not been communicated, which was required to be
communicated in writing.
32. In support of her argument has relied upon the
judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal vs. Union
of India and Ors., [2023 SCC OnLine SC 1244 : (2024) 7
SCC 576]; V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented by
Deputy Director & Ors. [(2024) 3 SCC 51]; Prabir
Purkayastha Vs. State ((NCT of Delhi) [2024 SCC OnLine
934; Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate of Enforcement
[2024 SC OnLine 1703] and in addition thereto the
judgment rendered in the case of Vihaan Kumar v. State of
- 20 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Haryana, 2025 SCC OnLine SC 269 has also been relied
upon.
33. On the factual aspect, submission has been made that
there is no document/material available on record to
implicate the petitioner for forging and manipulating the title
deeds being Deed of Sale No. 4369 dated 11.10.1932 of the
property in question in the office of Registrar of Assurances at
Kolkata. Further, there is no material on record to show that
the petitioner was involved in obtaining holding numbers by
accused Pradeep Bagchi by submitting the forged documents.
Furthermore, there is no material available on record to
show, even remotely, that any proceeds of crime have been
generated by the petitioner. It has been submitted that even if
all the allegations leveled against the petitioner in the
prosecution complaint are accepted at its face value and in
their entirety and appreciated in their proper perspective in
accordance with law settled by Hon'ble Apex Court the same
do not make out any case defined under Section 3 punishable
under Section 4 of the PML Act.
34. It has been contended that since the ground of arrest
has not been provided and as such the very arrest is illegal.
However, learned senior counsel did not deny the fact that
the prayer of the writ petitioner has been confined only with
respect to the order dated 09.06.2023, said to be the remand
- 21 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 order as per the petitioner, but even accepting the same even
then at the time of remand the ground of arrest has not been
supplied since no document has been annexed with the order
of remand. Therefore, the argument has been advanced that
in absence of ground of arrest having not been available at
the time of remand even if the prayer has been only with
respect with respect to the issue of remand, there is no
material change in the argument by raising the issue of
impropriety committed by the investigating agency at the time
of arrest said to be in consonance with Section 19(1) of the
PML Act, 2002. It has been contended that since the ground
of arrest has not been provided and as such the very arrest is
illegal.
35. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner has also
taken the ground of custody and submitted that the writ
petitioner is in custody since 07.06.2023 i.e., for more than
22 months.
36. Learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner on the
aforesaid ground has submitted that it is a fit case where the
alleged order of remand dated 09.06.2023 is required to be
quashed and set aside.
Argument on behalf respondent-ED
37. At the outset, Mr. A.K. Das, learned counsel for the
respondent-ED has submitted that the prayer of the writ
- 22 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner having been confined only to the issue of remand, it
is not available for the writ petitioner to question the order of
arrest said to be not in consonance with the provision of
Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002. Therefore, even if
argument has been advanced on behalf the petitioner and, on
mis-conception, initially by the respondent-ED on the issue of
arrest then also it is not proper for the writ Court, under
power conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of
India, to delve upon this issue which has been chosen by the
petitioner not to press, as would be evident from order dated
4th October, 2024. Further, even the order of confinement
dated 04.10.2024 has not been challenged by filing
recall/review petition at any forum.
38. It has been submitted that the petitioner was arrested
on 07.06.2023 and the grounds of arrest were duly
communicated to the petitioner upon which he put his
signature on each and every page, acknowledging the
contents by endorsing that ‗I have read my ground of arrest
completely an also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh'. Further,
when the petitioner was produced before the Special Judge,
PMLA on 08.06.2024, he did not complain regarding non-
supply of grounds of arrest or about any ill-treatment against
the arrest.
- 23 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
39. The learned Special Judge has specifically recorded in
order dated 08.06.2023 that the information of arrest has
been given to their family members and even at the time of
passing of order learned counsel for the petitioner, namely,
Mr. Bidhyut Chourasia and Mr. Abhishek Agarwal were
present in the Court and thereafter, the petitioner was sent to
Birsa Munda Central Jail in judicial custody.
40. It has been contended that even the order of remand has
not been challenged by the writ petitioner since the order
dated 09.06.2023, stated to be the order of remand, cannot
be said to be order of remand rather it is the order by which
the police custody of the writ petitioner has been given for the
purpose of interrogation.
41. It has been submitted that the actual order of remand is
08.06.2023 which was on the basis of application filed by the
prosecuting agency, filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C, herein
ED and based upon the said application the writ petitioner
was remanded and send to the Birsa Munda Central Jail,
Ranchi in judicial custody. Therefore, the order dated
08.06.2023 is the actual order of remand and order dated
09.06.2023 is the order by which the police custody of the
present writ petitioner has been given to the investigating
agency for the purpose of custodial interrogation.
- 24 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
42. Further, it has been submitted that earlier the writ
petitioner had moved before this Court by filing Bail
Application being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, which was rejected
vide order dated 01.03.2024, against which, the petitioner
had moved before the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP (Cr.)
No. 6584 of 2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn vide
order dated 16.05.2024.
43. The argument has been advanced by the learned
counsel for the respondent-ED that admittedly the order of
remand dated 08.06.2023 has not been challenged by the
present petitioner at first instance which clarifies that the
writ petitioner is not at all aggrieved with the order of remand
reason being that when Bail Application of the writ petitioner
being B.A. No. 7343 of 2023 was rejected vide order dated
01.03.2024, against which, the petitioner had moved before
the Hon'ble Apex Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of 2024,
and the same was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated
16.05.2024, only thereafter the petitioner had moved before
this Court and assailed the order of arrest /remand.
44. It has been argued by him that although the prayer of
the present writ petition has been confined only to the issue
of remand order dated 09.06.2023 but argument has been
advanced showing the arrest of the writ petitioner to be
improper and as such for the purpose of meting out the
- 25 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 ground the argument has been advanced that at the time
when the writ petitioner was arrested i.e., on 07.06.2023 the
prosecuting agency was to follow the statutory command as
provided under Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 and on the
date of arrest only oral information of ground of arrest was to
be given to the accused persons as mandated under Section
19(1) of the PML Act, 2002.
45. Learned counsel referring the order dated 04.10.2024
has submitted that once the learned senior counsel appearing
for the petitioner has conceded by confining the prayer
questioning the order of remand dated 09.06.2023 only and
therefore, the question which requires consideration is only
the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, stated
to be order of remand by the writ petitioner.
46. Mr. Das, learned counsel for the respondent-ED has
further submitted that due to inadvertence order dated
04.10.2024 could not be pointed out at the relevant stage,
however, when the matter was heard on 28.01.2025, the
respondent-ED has filed supplementary affidavit and brought
to the notice of this Court regarding confinement of prayer in
order dated 4th October, 2024. Therefore, submission has
been made that the matter is to be adjudicated only on the
issue of propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023,
stated to be remand order by the writ petitioner.
- 26 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
47. Argument has been advanced that the learned counsel
for the petitioner has relied upon the judgment passed by
Hon'ble Apex Court that pertains to issue of arrest but herein
the question which requires consideration by this Court is the
propriety/impropriety of the order dated 09.06.2023.
48. So far as the fact of said Pankaj Bansal case, as relied
upon the petitioner, is concerned, it is quite different since it
would be evident from paragraph 21 of the judgment
rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal therein it has been
referred that even the procedure which was required to be
followed, as provided under the original text of Section 19(1)
of the Act, 2002, has not been followed. Therefore, the order
of remand has been quashed and set aside holding the arrest
to be illegal.
49. But, herein in the instant case, that is not the fact
rather the correct fact is that the grounds of arrest has been
supplied to the petitioner which has been read over by him
and not only that he has also endorsed therein that he has
gone through the entire content and has shown no
complain/objection regarding the same.
50. So far as the period of custody as agitated by learned
senior counsel for the petitioner is concerned, it has been
submitted that in the matter of challenge of arrest/remand
the ground of custody is of no aid to the petitioner.
- 27 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
51. Learned counsel for the respondent-ED based upon the
aforesaid ground has submitted that the petitioner has not
been able to make out a case for showing interference in
order dated 09.06.2023, which is stated to be order of
remand by the writ petitioner.
Analysis
52. This Court has heard learned counsel for the parties,
considered the argument advanced on behalf of parties and
the pleadings available on record as also the documents
appended therewith and the judgments relied upon by the
parties and other materials available on record.
53. This Court, after having heard learned counsel for the
parties, is of the view that for proper adjudication of the lis
following issues are required to be answered:
I.Whether after confinement order dated 04.10.2024, on
the basis of prayer made by the learned senior counsel
for the petitioner to the effect that ‗he is confining the
prayer with respect to order dated 09.06.2023 passed
by learned Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in ECIR
01/2023 only, the writ petitioner can be allowed to
agitate the issue of propriety/impropriety of order of
arrest and if it is agitated/argued/pleaded by the
petitioner later on, is it proper for this Court to delve into
that issue?
- 28 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 II.Whether in view of confinement of prayer the writ
petition is required to be considered only with respect to
the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023,
which as per the petitioner is said to be the order of
remand, on the ground that the grounds for arrest has
not been supplied to the petitioner?
III.Whether the petitioner has been able to make out a
case for showing interference in order dated
09.06.2023, which is stated to be order of remand by
the petitioner?
54. This Court is framing these issues since learned senior
counsel appearing for the writ petitioner has argued the
matter on the prayer which has once been confined by the
petitioner, and as such this Court has formulated these
issues as to whether this issue can be allowed to be agitated
when the prayer of the writ petition has been confined with
respect to order dated 09.06.2023 only, which would be
evident from order dated 4.10.2024 passed by this Court, and
it needs to refer herein that order dated 4.10.2024 is still
operative reason being that the same has not been
questioned by filing any review/recall petition or challenging
in higher forum rather the said order dated 04.10.2024 is
admitted one.
55. For the sake of convenience, this Court is taking up
issue no. I first and independently.
- 29 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
56. Originally, the writ petition was filed for the following
relief(s):
(a) to read down and/or read into, consider, determine and
expound the scope and ambit of Section 19 and Section 50 of
the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (PMLA) in
consonance with the law declared by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court inter alia, in State of Bombay v. Atma Ram Shridhar
Vaidya, reported in AIR 1951 SC 157, Harkishan Vs. State
of Maharashtra and Others, reported in 1962 SCC OnLine
SC 117 and Vijay Madanlal Chowdhury vs Union of India
reported in 2022 SCC OnLine 929 and declare that :-
(i) Power to arrest prescribed in Section 19 of the PMLA
cannot be exercised without issuing summon under
Section 50 PMLA save in case of arrest effected in course
of search and seizure under Section 17 and search of
persons under Section 18;
(ii) Summons issued under Section 50(2) PMLA must set out the brief particulars of the predicate offence and information which is required by the authorised person issuing the Summons;
(iii) Summons issued under Section 50 (2) PMLA must
record the reasons why the authorised person considers
necessary the attendance of the person to whom
Summons are issued.
(b) holding and declaring, with all consequences, the
detention/arrest of the petitioner since 7.6.2023 and remanded
since 9.6.2023 (vide Annexure-4) in ECIR Case No.01/2023
- 30 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022] as
void-ab-initio, illegal and unconstitutional as being in gross
violation of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Articles
14, 21 & 22 of the Constitution of India;
(c) quashing/setting aside of, with all consequences, the
remand order dated 9.6.2023 (Annexure-4) passed by the
learned Court of Sri Dinesh Rai, Special Judge, PMLA, Ranchi in
ECIR Case No.01/2023 [arising out of ECIR/RNZO/18/2022
dated 21.10.2022];
(d) directing for immediate release of the petitioner from custody
in ECIR Case No. 01/2023 [arising out of
ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022]; presently pending
learned Court of Sri Yogesh Kumar, Additional Judicial
Commissioner-I-cum-Special Judge, CBI-cumSpecial Judge
under PMLA at Ranchi for offence under section 3 read with
section 70 and punishable under section 4 of the Prevention of
Money Laundering Act, 2002.
57. In course of argument on 04.10.2024, Mr. Kapil Sibal,
learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner, who has
appeared through virtual mode, has confined the prayer of
the writ petition only with respect to the issue of
propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023, which is
stated to be remand order, as would which is evident from
order dated 04.10.2024, as quoted and referred hereinabove.
- 31 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 However, at the cost of repetition, the relevant portion of the
order dated 04.10.2024 is quoted hereunder as:
However, in course of argument, learned senior counsel
appearing for the petitioner, has submitted that he is
confining the prayer with respect to order dated
09.06.2023 passed by learned Special Judge, PMLA,
Ranchi in ECIR 01/2023 only.
58. Admittedly, the said order i.e., order dated 04.10.2024
has never been questioned by the writ petitioner and even no
application has been filed for recall/review of the said order.
It is further evident that the fact about confinement of prayer
has rather been admitted, as would be evident from order
dated 28.01.2025 whereby and whereunder the learned
counsel for the petitioner has admitted the issue of
confinement of prayer of the writ petition, and has sought for
time to file affidavit.
59. Even the writ petitioner has approached to the Hon'ble
Court by filing SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 challenging order
dated 28.01.2025 but in the said SLP, it is no issue having
been raised questioning order dated 04.10.2024. The said
SLP (Crl) No. 2912 of 2025 stands disposed of vide order
dated 3rd March, 2025 and as per observations made by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court at paragraph 7 of the said order, as
quoted hereinabove, the matter has been listed before this
Bench.
- 32 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
60. It requires to refer herein that the supplementary
affidavit has been filed on behalf of writ petitioner in
pursuance to order dated 28.01.2025 wherein about
confinement of prayer, as per order dated 04.10.2024, has
not been disputed but merely because the Court has heard
the matter and as such the plea is being taken that the
matter is to be heard on the basis of original prayer made in
the writ petition that the validity of Section 19(1), the issue of
arrest, and order dated 09.06.2023.
61. Further, when the prayer after having been confined by
the writ petitioner only to the order dated 09.06.2023, stated
to be the order of remand, then this Court has called upon
the ED to file affidavit only on the prayer of confinement i.e.,
the order dated 09.06.2023 but the counter affidavit has been
filed by the ED on the issue of arrest also and when this
Court has posted the matter on 28.01.2025, it has been
admitted by Mr. Das the learned counsel for the ED that it
was due to misconception and thereafter he has sought for
time to file affidavit in response to the affidavit which has
been sought to be filed on behalf of writ petitioner.
62. Accordingly, affidavit has been filed on behalf of
respondent-ED stating that in spite of the writ petitioner has
confined his prayer for quashing of order dated 09.06.2023
only but even then, the argument has been made by the writ
- 33 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner by assailing the order of arrest dated 07.06.2023.
The statement of the said affidavit has not been denied by
filing affidavit by the writ petitioner.
63. Thus, the question arises that when the litigant has
approached to the Court and the learned counsel
representing such litigant concerned has made submission at
Bar by confining the prayer and the same has been taken
note by the Court in judicial order, as would be evident from
order dated 04.10.2024, but without filing any recall/review
petition to that order can it be permissible for the writ
petitioner to deal with that prayer merely because the Court
has heard the issues, and the Court is duty bound to answer
all the issues ignoring the confinement of prayer made by the
writ petitioner.
64. In the aforesaid context this Court is of the view that it
is the learned counsel of litigant who is to place the case
considering the interest of the litigant based upon instruction
of the litigant concerned. The Court merely because has
heard the matter, the litigant concerned cannot be allowed to
dictate the Court to consider contrary to the pleadings and
moreover once prayer has been confined, limiting it to the
issue of alleged remand dated 09.06.2023 without having
order of recall/review of the order dated 04.10.2024 by which
- 34 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 prayer has been confined, it would not be proper to delve into
the confined prayer.
65. It is bounden duty of the litigant concerned in
approaching the Court of law particularly exercising the
extraordinary jurisdiction conferred to High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution of India, with clean hand and
to bring all the facts to the notice of the Court. It cannot be
acceptable that if anything has been recorded in the order
being part of the record and if the Court has heard the
litigant concerned even with respect to the other issues prior
to the confinement of prayer it will not be proper for the Court
to consider the entire issue contrary to the intention shown
by the litigant concerned by confining the prayer.
66. It is settled principle of law that the writ jurisdiction is
totally based upon the principle of pleading and once the
pleading has been made and subsequent thereto confined,
the Court will go on the premise of confinement limiting the
pleading to the aforesaid extent.
67. Further it needs to refer herein that the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the case of Ram Bali v. State of U.P., (2004) 10
SCC 598 at paragraph 9 of the said judgment, has held that
where the High Court has specifically recorded to the effect
that only two points were urged before it, in order to ascertain
as to what transpired in the Court, the record in the
- 35 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 judgment of the Court should be taken as a conclusive proof
and no one should be allowed to contradict such statement
on an affidavit or by other evidence. It was further held that if
a party wanted to take a stand that what was recorded was
erroneous, the party should approach the concerned Court
for making any rectification and it is not open to the party to
contend contrary to what has been recorded before the Court,
for ready reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as
under:
9. We notice that the High Court specifically records that only two points were urged before it. It has to be noted that the statement of as to what transpired at the hearing, the record in the judgment of the Court are conclusive of the facts so stated and no one can contradict such statement on affidavit or by other evidence. If a party thinks that the happenings in court have been erroneously recorded in a judgment, it is incumbent upon the party, while the matter is still fresh in the minds of the judges who have made the record, to make necessary rectification. That is the only way to have the record corrected. It is not open to the appellant to contend before this Court to the contrary. [See State of Maharashtra v. Ramdas Shrinivas Nayak [(1982) 2 SCC 463 : 1982 SCC (Cri) 478] , Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. [(2003) 2 SCC 111] and Roop Kumar v. Mohan Thedani [(2003) 6 SCC 595] .]
68. Further, the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Roop
Kumar v. Mohan Thedani, (2003) 6 SCC 595, again
reiterated at paragraph No.11 that it is not open to a party
- 36 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to turn around and take a plea that no concession was
given, which would amount to a case of sitting on the
fence, which should not be encouraged and if really there
was no concession, the only course open to the party was
to move the concerned Court and not by approaching the
appellate court.
69. Thus, in the backdrop of the aforesaid settled position of
law merely because the Court has heard the issue, which
has been once confined and judicial order to that effect has
been recorded in black and white vide order dated
04.10.2024 and even later on it is not being contradicted
by the litigant concerned also and further it has never been
challenged by filing review/recall petition before this Court,
in such circumstance, this Court is of the view that if the
Court has heard the litigant concerned on misconception
having not been pointed out about order dated 04.10.2024
it does not mean that the Court will ignore the order
already on record i.e., order dated 04.10.2024.
Furthermore, there is no statement that any endeavor has
been taken for recall/review of the said order.
70. It further needs to refer herein that it was the bounden
duty of the litigant concerned either it is writ petitioner or
the respondent-ED to point out about order dated
04.10.2024 and if that has not been pointed out and the
- 37 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Court has heard the matter it does not mean that ignoring
the said order which is already on record and still in
subsistence, the said issue is to be delve upon.
71. Further question is that if the contention of the writ
petitioner will be accepted then what would happen to
order dated 04.10.2024 which is still in operative and
hearing the entire prayer of the writ petition on cost of
ignoring the said order dated 4.10.2024, will it be improper
on the part of the Court.
72. It is evident that in pursuance to order dated
28.01.2025, due affidavits have been filed by the parties
and order dated 04.10.2024 having not been assailed or
recalled/reviewed, as such in course of such subsistence of
the said order it would not be appropriate for this Court to
open the issue to consider the argument advanced on
behalf of petitioner or pleading available on record, who
still insists upon the order of arrest due to non-compliance
of the statutory provision as contained under Section 19(1)
of the PML Act, 2002.
73. It further appears that the petitioner approached to the
Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing Special Leave Petition
being S.L.P. (Cr.) No. 2912 of 2025 to challenge order dated
28.01.2025 but therein also no such plea has been taken
questioning the order of confinement dated 04.10.2024
- 38 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 that is self-explanatory if the order passed by Hon'ble Apex
Court will be taken into consideration as quoted and
referred hereinabove.
74. This Court, therefore, is of the view that in such a
situation of confinement of prayer, this Court if will
consider the issue of arrest, then the question will be that
what will happen to the order dated 04.10.2024.
75. This Court, therefore, is of the view that since the prayer
has been confined only with respect to order 09.06.2023,
said to be order of remand by the petitioner, in view of
order dated 04.10.2024 confining the prayer leaving the
prayer of arrest by not challenging the same, the same
cannot be delve upon by this Court.
76. Learned senior counsel has relied upon the catena of
judgments rendered by Hon'ble Apex Court, as referred
above, mainly to strength her argument on the issue of
arrest order dated 07.06.2023, but that is not the issue
herein reason being that prayer of the writ petition has
been confined and extent limited to the order dated
09.06.2023 only.
77. This Court is of the view that the aforesaid judgments
are with respect to the issue of arrest and at that time the
requirement as stipulated under Section 19(1) of the PML
Act, 2002 has been held to be mandatorily complied with.
- 39 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 But since the issue of arrest has not been intended to be
challenged by confining the prayer only with respect to the
order of remand said to be passed as per the petitioner on
09.06.2023, hence, there is no requirement of delving upon
the said judgment with respect to its applicability in view
of subsistence of order dated 04.10.2024.
78. Therefore, this Court is of the view that the writ petition
since has been confined and as such it would not be
proper to delve upon the issue of arrest, therefore,
judgment upon which reliance has been placed is not
applicable. Therefore, issue of arrest is not being dealt with
herein.
79. In view of discussions made hereinabove, the issue no. I
is decided against the writ petitioner taking into
consideration that after confinement of prayer by the
learned senior counsel for the petitioner limited to the
order dated 09.06.2023, the writ petitioner cannot be
allowed to agitate the issue of propriety/impropriety of
order of arrest dated 07.06.2023 and in light of
confinement of prayer which would be evident from order
dated 04.10.2024 passed by this Court and the said order
still in existence as such it will not be proper for this
Court to delve into the validity of order of arrest dated
07.06.2023.
- 40 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
80. Since Issue No. II and Issue No. III are interlinked, as
such they are taken up together.
81. Admittedly, in course of argument, learned senior
counsel for the writ petitioner has confined the prayer only to
the issue of remand considering the remand order to be
passed on 09.06.2023, as would be evident from order dated
04.10.2024.
82. We have already referred herein clarifying the reason for
posting this matter again for hearing the matter under the
heading for Admission since the argument has been advanced
in entirety on all the prayers, without considering the
confinement of prayer only to the extent of order of remand
said to be passed on 09.06.2023.
83. The argument has been advanced by learned senior
counsel for the petitioner that even if the prayer made by the
writ petitioner has been confined only to the extent of order of
remand said to be passed on 09.06.2023, there will be no
material change since the issue of impropriety committed by
the investigating agency at the time of arrest is said to be not
in consonance with Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002 is still
existing.
84. This Court is not in agreement with such submission
reason being that the arrest is something different to that of
the remand and the remand is the consequence upon the
- 41 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 order of arrest of a person facing the accusation. Specific
provision has been made under the PML Act, 2002 to be
followed at the time of arrest i.e., the ground of arrest is to be
informed to the person facing the accusation as soon as
possible that is the original text of Section 19(1) of the Act,
2002. For ready reference, Section 19(1) of the PML Act, 2002
is quoted as under:
"19. Power to arrest.
(1)If the Director, Deputy Director, Assistant Director or any other
officer authorised in this behalf by the Central Government by
general or special order, has on the basis of material in his
possession, reason to believe (that reason for such belief to be
recorded in writing) that any person has been guilty of an offence
punishable under this Act, he may arrest such person and shall, as
soon as may be, inform him of the grounds for such arrest.‖
85. The issue of PML Act regarding its validity fell for
consideration before the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors. Vs. Union of India &
Ors. (supra) wherein also the validity of Section 19(1) has
been held to be intra-virus meaning thereby whatever has
been stipulated under the provisions of Section 19(1) of the
Act, 2002, the same has been held to be valid in the
judgment passed by the Hon'ble Apex Court [Larger Bench]
rendered in the case of Vijay Madanlal Choudhary & Ors.
Vs. Union of India & Ors. (supra).
- 42 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
86. Further it needs to refer herein the judgment which has
come in the case of V. Senthil Balaji Vs. State Represented
by Deputy Director & Ors. (supra) has been passed on
07.08.2023 wherein consideration has been given with
respect to the issue of Section 19(1) holding therein that after
firming a reason to believe that the person has been found
guilty of an offence punishable under PMLA, 2002 the officer
concerned is at liberty to arrest him, while performing his
mandatory duty of recording the reasons, and that the said
exercise has to be followed by way of an information being
served on the arrestee of the grounds of arrest.
87. However, subsequent thereto the issue crept up by
taking note of mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India as to whether the arrest can be well without being
giving any information in writing to the person facing the
accusation. That was the issue involved in the case of Pankaj
Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra). The fact leading
to the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors
(supra) in narrow compass is being referred herein, which
reads as under:
(i) A FIR No. 0006 dated 17-4-2023 was registered by the
Anti-Corruption Bureau, Panchkula, Haryana, under
Sections 7, 8, 11 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988, read with Section 120-BIPC for the offences of
- 43 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 corruption and bribery along with criminal conspiracy.
(ii) Significantly, prior to this FIR, between the years 2018
and 2020, 13 FIRs were gotten registered by allottees of
two residential projects of the IREO Group, alleging
illegalities on the part of its management. On the strength
of these FIRs, ED recorded Enforcement Case Information
Report No. GNZO/10/2021 dated 15-6-2021 (hereinafter
―the first ECIR‖) in connection with the money laundering
offences but neither in the FIRs nor in the first ECIR the
appellants arrayed as the accused. On 14-1-2022, ED
filed Prosecution Complaint No. 01/2022. The number of
FIRs had also increased from 13 to 30, as per this
complaint.
(iii) The appellant case was numbered as COMA/01/2022,
titled ―Enforcement Directorate v. Lalit Goyal and others‖,
and at that stage, the Anti-Corruption Bureau,
Panchkula, received information that the owner of IREO
Group, and also to Roop Bansal and his brother, Basant
Bansal, the owners of M3M Group has been helped by the
court concerned. This led to the registration of FIR No.
0006 dated 17-4-2023. On 12-5-2023, ED issued
summons to M3M India Pvt. Ltd., calling upon it to
provide information and documents pertaining to
transactions with certain companies. Thereafter, on 1-6-
2023, ED raided the properties of M3M Group and
effected seizures of assets and bank accounts. Roop
- 44 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Bansal was arrested by ED on 8-6-2023 apropos the first
ECIR.
(iv) Apprehending that action would be taken against them
also in the context of the first ECIR, Pankaj Bansal and
Basant Bansal secured interim protection from the Delhi
High Court in Bail Applications Nos. 2030 and 2031 of
2023 subject to conditions, till the next date of hearing
i.e. 5-7-2023. In the meanwhile, on the basis of FIR No.
0006 dated 17-4-2023, ED recorded another ECIR viz.
ECIR/GNZO/17/2023, on 13-6-2023 (hereinafter ―the
second ECIR‖) against accused persons.
(v) However, summons were issued by ED to Pankaj Bansal
and Basant Bansal on 13-6-2023 and required their
compliance with the summons on 14-6-2023 at 11 a.m.
While Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal were at the office
of ED at Rajokri, New Delhi, in compliance of these
summons, Pankaj Bansal was served with fresh summons
at 4.52 p.m. on 14-6-2023, requiring him to be present
before another investigating officer at 5.00 p.m. on the
same day. This summon was in connection with the
second ECIR. There is lack of clarity as to when summons
in relation to the second ECIR were served on Basant
Bansal. According to ED, he was served the summons on
13-6-2023 itself and refused to receive the same.
However, it is an admitted fact that Basant Bansal was
- 45 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 also present at ED's office at Rajokri, New Delhi, on 14-6-
2023 at 11.00 a.m. It is also not in dispute that, while he
was there, Basant Bansal was arrested at 6.00 p.m. on
14-6-2023 and Pankaj Bansal was arrested at 10.30 p.m.
on the same day.
(vi) These arrests, made in connection with the second ECIR,
were in exercise of power under Section 19(1) PMLA. The
arrested persons were then taken to Panchkula, Haryana,
and produced before the learned Vacation
Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula. There, they
were served with the remand application filed by ED.
(vii) The learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge,
Panchkula, initially passed order dated 15-6-2023 holding
that custodial interrogation of the arrested persons was
required and granted their custody to ED for 5 days with
a direction to produce them before the court on 20-6-
2023. By the later orders dated 20-6-2023 and 26-6-
2023, their remand to the custody of ED was extended by
5 more days and thereafter, they were sent to judicial
custody.
(viii) Assailing the first remand order dated 15-6-2023, Pankaj
Bansal and Basant Bansal approached the Delhi High
Court, vide WPs (Crl.) Nos. 1770 and 1771 of 2023.
However, by the order dated 16-6-2023 the Delhi High
Court opined that the appropriate remedy for them would
- 46 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 be to approach the Punjab and Haryana High Court and
challenge the said order of remand. Aggrieved by the Delhi
High Court's order, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal
filed SLPs (Crl.) Nos. 7443 and 7444 of 2023 before the
Hon'ble Apex Court. The SLPs were disposed of as
withdrawn on 4-7-2023 reserving liberty to approach the
Punjab and Haryana High Court against the remand
orders. Thereupon, Pankaj Bansal and Basant Bansal
filed the subject writ petitions before the Punjab and
Haryana High Court.
(ix) It was the specific case of the father and son in their writ
petitions before the High Court that their arrest under the
provisions of PMLA was a wanton abuse of
power/authority and an abuse of process by ED, apart
from being blatantly illegal and unconstitutional. They
also asserted that ED acted in violation of the safeguards
provided in Section 19 PMLA. They asserted that the
remand orders were passed in a patently routine and
mechanical manner without due compliance with the
mandate of Section 19 PMLA. In consequence, they
prayed for a direction to quash the remand orders as well
as the underlying arrest orders and arrest memos, but the
said writ petitions came to be dismissed, vide the
impugned orders of the Division Bench, thereafter SLP
has been preferred before the Hon'ble Apex Court.
- 47 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
88. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking note of the
aforesaid facts has observed as under:
21. In terms of Section 19(3) PMLA and the law laid down in the above decisions, Section 167CrPC would necessarily have to be complied with once an arrest is made under Section 19 PMLA.
The court seized of the exercise under Section 167CrPC of remanding the person arrested by ED under Section 19(1) PMLA has a duty to verify and ensure that the conditions in Section 19 are duly satisfied and that the arrest is valid and lawful. In the event the court fails to discharge this duty in right earnest and with the proper perspective, as pointed out hereinbefore, the order of remand would have to fail on that ground and the same cannot, by any stretch of imagination, validate an unlawful arrest made under Section 19 PMLA.
23. Viewed in this context, the remand order dated 15-6-2023 passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, reflects total failure on his part in discharging his duty as per the expected standard. The learned Judge did not even record a finding that he perused the grounds of arrest to ascertain whether ED had recorded reasons to believe that the appellants were guilty of an offence under the 2002 Act and that there was proper compliance with the mandate of Section 19 PMLA. He merely stated that, keeping in view the seriousness of the offences and the stage of the investigation, he was convinced that custodial interrogation of the accused persons was required in the present case and remanded them to the custody of ED! The sentence -- ―It is further (sic) that all the necessary mandates of law have been complied with‖ follows -- ―It is the case of the prosecution....‖ and appears to be a continuation thereof, as indicated by the word ―further‖, and is not a recording by the learned Judge of his own satisfaction to that effect.
89. Further this Court has gone through paragraph 42 and
39 of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal
Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) and from paragraph 42
- 48 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 of the said judgment that the ED however has claimed that
the witnesses were present and certified that the grounds
of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that
is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document.
Non-compliance in this regard would entail release of the
arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil
Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 :
(2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1]. For ready reference, paragraph 42 is
quoted as under:
"42. That being so, there is no valid reason as to why a copy of such written grounds of arrest should not be furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. There are two primary reasons as to why this would be the advisable course of action to be followed as a matter of principle. Firstly, in the event such grounds of arrest are orally read out to the arrested person or read by such person with nothing further and this fact is disputed in a given case, it may boil down to the word of the arrested person against the word of the authorised officer as to whether or not there is due and proper compliance in this regard. In the case on hand, that is the situation insofar as Basant Bansal is concerned. Though ED claims that witnesses were present and certified that the grounds of arrest were read out and explained to him in Hindi, that is neither here nor there as he did not sign the document. Non- compliance in this regard would entail release of the arrested person straightaway, as held in V. Senthil Balaji [V. Senthil Balaji v. State, (2024) 3 SCC 51 : (2024) 2 SCC (Cri) 1] . Such a precarious situation is easily avoided and the consequence thereof can be obviated very simply by furnishing the written grounds of arrest, as recorded by the authorised officer in terms of Section 19(1) PMLA, to the arrested person under
- 49 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 due acknowledgment, instead of leaving it to the debatable ipse dixit of the authorised officer.‖
90. Thereafter, paragraph 39 is also required to be seen
wherein it has been held by taking into consideration the
mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India and
Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 that too give true meaning and
purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of
Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of the
grounds of arrest, it has been held that it would be necessary,
henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is
furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and
without exception. The Hon'ble Apex Court while considering
the particular case of said Pankaj Bansal has considered the
admitted position that the investigating officer merely read
out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the
appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the
appellants and hence, it has been held that their arrest was
not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA,
2002. Accordingly, the appeals before the Hon'ble Apex Court
were allowed, setting aside the impugned orders passed by
High Court as well as the impugned arrest orders and arrest
memos along with the orders of remand passed by the
learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, and all
orders consequential thereto. Accordingly, the appellants
were directed to be released forthwith.
- 50 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 91. Further, for ready reference, relevant paragraphs of the
said Judgment i.e.45 to 47 are quoted as under:
45. On the above analysis, to give true meaning and purpose to the constitutional and the statutory mandate of Section 19(1) PMLA of informing the arrested person of the grounds of arrest, we hold that it would be necessary, henceforth, that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. The decisions of the Delhi High Court in Moin Akhtar Qureshi [Moin Akhtar Qureshi v. Union of India, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12108] and the Bombay High Court in Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal [Chhagan Chandrakant Bhujbal v. Union of India, 2016 SCC OnLine Bom 9938 : (2017) 1 AIR Bom R (Cri) 929] , which hold to the contrary, do not lay down the correct law. In the case on hand, the admitted position is that ED's investigating officer merely read out or permitted reading of the grounds of arrest of the appellants and left it at that, which is also disputed by the appellants. As this form of communication is not found to be adequate to fulfil compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution and Section 19(1) PMLA, we have no hesitation in holding that their arrest was not in keeping with the provisions of Section 19(1) PMLA. Further, as already noted supra, the clandestine conduct of ED in proceeding against the appellants, by recording the second ECIR immediately after they secured interim protection in relation to the first ECIR, does not commend acceptance as it reeks of arbitrary exercise of power. In effect, the arrest of the appellants and, in consequence, their remand to the custody of ED and, thereafter, to judicial custody, cannot be sustained.
46.The appeals are accordingly allowed, setting aside the impugned orders [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 2045] , [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, 2023 SCC OnLine P&H 2028] passed by the Division Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court as well as the impugned
- 51 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 arrest orders and arrest memos along with the orders of remand passed by the learned Vacation Judge/Additional Sessions Judge, Panchkula, and all orders consequential thereto.
47. The appellants shall be released forthwith unless their incarceration is validly required in connection with any other case.‖
92. We are referring these judgments in order to appreciate
the argument of learned counsel for the petitioner, who has
relied upon these judgments in order to consider the
requirement which is to be fulfilled at the stage of Section
19(1) of PMLA, 2002 and the remand can be said to be equal
that too when the issue of arrest has been declined to be
challenged by confining the prayer to challenge only the issue
of remand, as would be evident from order dated 04.10.2024
as also the applicability of these judgments on the available
facts of the present petition.
93. Subsequent thereto the judgment has come in the case
of Ram Kishor Arora Vs. Directorate of Enforcement
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1682 wherein while considering the
judgment passed in the case of Pankaj Bansal, (supra) the
argument has been advanced on behalf of litigant concerned
to apply the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal
retrospectively has been disagreed to on the ground of
reference of specific word in the case of Pankaj Bansal
‗henceforth'. For ready reference, paragraph 21 to 23 of the
said judgment is quoted as under:
- 52 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 21. In view of the above, the expression ―as soon as may be‖ contained in Section 19 PMLA is required to be construed as
-- ―as early as possible without avoidable delay‖ or ―within reasonably convenient‖ or ―reasonably requisite‖ period of time. Since by way of safeguard a duty is cast upon the officer concerned to forward a copy of the order along with the material in his possession to the adjudicating authority immediately after the arrest of the person, and to take the person arrested to the court concerned within 24 hours of the arrest, in our opinion, the reasonably convenient or reasonably requisite time to inform the arrestee about the grounds of his arrest would be twenty-four hours of the arrest.
22. In Vijay Madanlal Choudhary [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] , it has been categorically held that so long as the person has been informed about the grounds of his arrest, that is sufficient compliance with mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. It is also observed that the arrested person before being produced before the Special Court within twenty-four hours or for that purposes of remand on each occasion, the Court is free to look into the relevant records made available by the authority about the involvement of the arrested person in the offence of money-laundering.
Therefore, in our opinion the person arrested, if he is informed or made aware orally about the grounds of arrest at the time of his arrest and is furnished a written communication about the grounds of arrest as soon as may be i.e. as early as possible and within reasonably convenient and requisite time of twenty-four hours of his arrest, that would be sufficient compliance of not only Section 19 PMLA but also of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
23. As discernible from the judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] also noticing the inconsistent practice being followed by the officers arresting the persons under Section 19 PMLA, directed to furnish the grounds of arrest in writing as a
- 53 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 matter of course, ―henceforth‖, meaning thereby from the date of the pronouncement of the judgment. The very use of the word ―henceforth‖ implied that the said requirement of furnishing grounds of arrest in writing to the arrested person as soon as after his arrest was not mandatory or obligatory till the date of the said judgment. The submission of the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi for the appellant that the said judgment was required to be given effect retrospectively cannot be accepted when the judgment itself states that it would be necessary ―henceforth‖ that a copy of such written grounds of arrest is furnished to the arrested person as a matter of course and without exception. Hence, non- furnishing of grounds of arrest in writing till the date of pronouncement of judgment in Pankaj Bansal case [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] could neither be held to be illegal nor the action of the officer concerned in not furnishing the same in writing could be faulted with. As such, the action of informing the person arrested about the grounds of his arrest is a sufficient compliance of Section 19 PMLA as also Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India, as held in Vijay Madanlal [Vijay Madanlal Choudhary v. Union of India, (2023) 12 SCC 1 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 929] .
24. Insofar as the facts of the present case are concerned, it is not disputed that the appellant was handed over the document containing grounds of arrest when he was arrested, and he also put his signature below the said grounds of arrest, after making an endorsement that ―I have been informed and have also read the abovementioned grounds of arrest.‖ The appellant in the rejoinder filed by him has neither disputed the said endorsement nor his signature below the said endorsement. The only contention raised by the learned Senior Counsel Mr Singhvi is that he was not furnished a copy of the document containing the grounds of arrest at the time of arrest. Since the appellant was indisputably informed about the grounds of arrest and he having also put his signature and the endorsement on the said document of having been informed, we hold that there
- 54 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 was due compliance of the provisions contained in Section 19 PMLA and his arrest could neither be said to be violative of the said provision nor of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
94. So far as the factual aspect of Ram Kishor Arora Vs.
Directorate of Enforcement (supra) is concerned, it has
been held therein that the arrest was made pre-Pankaj
Bansal Judgment and as such the arrest of said Ram Kishor
Arora has been declined to be interfered with.
95. Thereafter the judgment has come in the case of Prabir
Purkayastha Vs. State (NCT of Delhi) (supra). So far as the
fact of the said case is concerned the officers of PS Special
Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi carried out extensive raids at
the residential and official premises of the appellant and the
company, of which the appellant is the Director in connection
with FIR No. 224 of 2023 dated 17-8-2023 registered at PS
Special Cell, Lodhi Colony, New Delhi for the offences
punishable under Sections 13, 16, 17, 18, 22-C of the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 read with Sections
153-A, 120-B of the Penal Code.
96. The appellant was arrested in connection with the said
FIR on 3-10-2023 vide arrest memo. Thereafter, the appellant
was presented in the court of the learned Additional Sessions
Judge-02, Patiala House Courts, New Delhi on 4-10-2023,
sometime before 6.00 a.m. which fact is manifested from the
- 55 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 remand order and the appellant was remanded to seven days'
police custody vide order dated 4-10-2023. The proceedings
of remand have been seriously criticised as being
manipulated by Shri Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel for
the appellant and aspersions of subsequent insertions in the
remand order have been made.
97. The appellant promptly questioned his arrest and the
police custody remand granted by the learned Remand Judge
vide order dated 4-10-2023 by preferring Criminal
Miscellaneous Case No. 7278 of 2023 in the High Court of
Delhi which stands rejected by the learned Single Judge of
the High Court of Delhi vide judgment dated 13-10-2023. The
said order is subjected to challenge by special leave before the
Hon'ble Apex Court.
98. The Hon'ble Apex Court has taken into consideration the
ratio of the judgment rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal
Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra). The arrest of the said
appellant was on 03.10.2023 but the judgment rendered in
the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors
(supra) has been uploaded on 04.10.2023 and as such the
ground was taken not to give any aid of judgment passed in
the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors
(supra) even though the written communication regarding the
ground of arrest of the appellant has not been furnished but
- 56 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 the Hon'ble Apex Court has passed the order that merely
because the judgment in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs.
Union of India & Ors (supra) has been uploaded on
04.10.2023 but the said Prabir Purkayastha was arrested
on 04.10.2023 while the judgment passed in the case of
Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India & Ors (supra) was
delivered on 03.10.2023 and as such the case of Prabir
Purkayastha has come within the ratio of judgment
rendered in the case of Pankaj Bansal Vs. Union of India &
Ors (supra) and since the written communication was not
there, hence, he was directed to be released on bail. For ready
reference the relevant paragraph is being quoted as under:
29. Hence, we have no hesitation in reiterating that the requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest or the grounds of detention in writing to a person arrested in connection with an offence or a person placed under preventive detention as provided under Articles 22(1) and 22(5) of the Constitution of India is sacrosanct and cannot be breached under any situation. Non-compliance of this constitutional requirement and statutory mandate would lead to the custody or the detention being rendered illegal, as the case may be.
30. Furthermore, the provisions of Article 22(1) have already been interpreted by this Court in Pankaj Bansal [Pankaj Bansal v. Union of India, (2024) 7 SCC 576] laying down beyond the pale of doubt that the grounds of arrest must be communicated in writing to the person arrested of an offence at the earliest. Hence, the fervent plea of the learned ASG that there was no requirement under law to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing to the appellant-accused is noted
- 57 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to be rejected.
99. Again, in the case of Arvind Kejriwal Vs. Directorate
of Enforcement (supra) the view has been taken for
communication of reason of arrest and it has been observed
by the Hon'ble Apex Court that the written ―grounds of
arrest‖, though a must, does not in itself satisfy the
compliance requirement. The authorized officer's genuine
belief and reasoning based on the evidence that establishes
the arrestee's guilt is also the legal necessity. As the ―reasons
to believe‖ are accorded by the authorised officer, the onus to
establish satisfaction of the said condition will be on the DoE
and not on the arrestee. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking
into consideration the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble
Vijay Madanlal Choudhary (supra) which is a decision
rendered by a three Judge Bench, after formulating the
questions of law, has referred the matter for consideration by
a larger Bench. For ready reference the relevant paragraphs
are being quoted as under:
11. Arrest under Section 19(1) of the PML Act may occur prior to the filing of the prosecution complaint and before the Special Judge takes cognizance. Till the prosecution complaint is filed, there is no requirement to provide the accused with a copy of the ECIR. The ECIR is not a public document. Thus, to introduce checks and balances, Section 19(1) imposes safeguards to protect the rights and liberty of the arrestee. This is in compliance with the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of India.
- 58 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 12. V. Senthil Balaji v. State similarly states that the designated officer can only arrest once they record ―reasons to believe‖ in writing, that the person being arrested is guilty of the offence punishable under the PML Act. It is mandatory to record the ―reasons to believe‖ to arrive at the opinion that the arrestee is guilty of the offence, and to furnish the reasons to the arrestee. This ensures an element of fairness and accountability.
16. Recently, in Prabir Purkayastha v. State (NCT of Delhi), this Court reiterated the aforesaid principles expounded in Pankaj Bansal (supra). The said principles were applied to the pari materia provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The Court explained that Section 19(1) of the PML Act is meant to serve a higher purpose, and also to enforce the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution. The right to life and personal liberty is sacrosanct, a fundamental right guaranteed under Article 21 and protected by Articles 20 and 22 of the Constitution.
Reference was made to the observations of this Court in Roy V.D. v. State of Kerala that the right to be informed about the grounds of arrest flows from Article 22(1) of the Constitution and any infringement of this fundamental right vitiates the process of arrest and remand. The fact that the chargesheet has been filed in the matter would not validate the otherwise illegality and unconstitutionality committed at the time of arrest and grant of remand custody of the accused. Reference is also made to the principle behind Article 22(5) of the Constitution. Thus, this Court held that not complying with the constitutional mandate under Article 22(1) and the statutory mandate of the UAPA, on the requirement to communicate grounds of arrest or grounds of detention, would lead to the custody or detention being rendered illegal.
28. Providing the written ―grounds of arrest‖, though a must, does not in itself satisfy the compliance requirement. The authorized officer's genuine belief and reasoning based on the evidence that establishes the arrestee's guilt is also the
- 59 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 legal necessity. As the ―reasons to believe‖ are accorded by the authorised officer, the onus to establish satisfaction of the said condition will be on the DoE and not on the arrestee.
100. Further the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of V. Senthil
Balaji v. Director, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2626 has again
considered the issue of Section 19(1) of the Act 2002. The
factual aspect of the case is like that between 2011 and 2016,
the appellant was holding the post of Transport Minister in
the Government of Tamil Nadu. Broadly, the allegation
against the appellant is that while discharging his duties as a
Minister, in connivance with his personal assistant and his
brother, he collected large amounts by promising job
opportunities to several persons in various positions in the
Transport Department. This led to the registering of three
First Information Reports against the appellant and others.
The said First Information Reports are FIR no. 441 of 2015
dated 29th October 2015 (CC Nos. 22 and 24 of 2021), FIR No.
298 of 2017 registered on 9th September 2017 (CC No. 19 of
2020) and FIR no. 344 dated 13th August 2018 (CC No. 25 of
2020).
101. In the first FIR, six charge sheets have been filed. More
than 2000 accused have been named in the charge sheets.
550 witnesses have been named. In the case of the second
FIR, there are 14 accused named in the chargesheet. In
connection with this FIR, 24 witnesses have been cited. In the
- 60 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 third FIR, 24 accused have been named in the charge sheet
and 50 prosecution witnesses have been cited. The offences
alleged in the aforementioned crimes are mainly under
Sections 120B, 419, 420, 467 and 471 of the Penal Code,
1860 and Sections 7, 12, 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(d) of
the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Section 34 of
the Penal Code, 1860 has been invoked.
102. These offences are scheduled offences within the
meaning of Section 2(y) of the PMLA. Therefore, relying on the
final reports filed in aforementioned scheduled offences, for
an offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA
punishable under Section 4, the Enforcement Directorate
(ED) registered an Enforcement Case Information Report (for
short ―ECIR‖) bearing ECIR No. MDSZO/21/2021 on
29th July 2021.
103. Consequently, the appellant was arrested on 14th June
2023 in connection with the said ECIR and was remanded to
judicial custody. A complaint was filed for the offence under
Section 3 of the PMLA Act, which is punishable under Section
4, on 12th August 2023. The appellant is the only accused
named in the complaint. Cognizance has been taken based on
the complaint by the Special Court under the PMLA. The
scheduled offences cases have been transferred to the learned
Assistant Sessions Judge, Additional Special Court for Trial of
- 61 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Criminal Cases related to Elected Members of Parliament and
Members of Legislative Assembly of Tamil Nadu (Special
MPMLA Court), Chennai.
104. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking note of the settled
principle that the stringent provisions regarding the grant of
bail, such as Section 45(1)(iii) of the PMLA, cannot become a
tool which can be used to incarcerate the accused without
trial for an unreasonably long time has allowed the appeal
and direction has been passed that the appellant shall be
enlarged on bail till the final disposal of the case.
105. Consequent to the aforesaid judgments recently the
Hon'ble Apex Court has expressed its view in the case of
Vihaan Kumar v. State of Haryana (supra) wherein the
judgment and order dated 30th August 2024 passed by the
learned Single Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court has
been assailed. The appellant of the said case was arrested in
connection with first information report no. 121 of 2023
dated 25th March 2023 registered for the offences under
Sections 409, 420, 467, 468 and 471 read with Section 120-
B of the Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‗IPC'). According to the
appellant's case, he was arrested on 10th June 2024 at about
10.30 a.m. at his office premises on the 3rd-5th floor of HUDA
City Centre, Gurugram, Haryana. He was taken to DLF Police
Station, Section 29, Gurugram. He was produced before the
- 62 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 learned Judicial Magistrate (in charge) at Gurgaon on
11th June 2024 at 3.30 p.m.
106. It had been contended that there was a violation of
Article 22(2) of the Constitution and Section 57 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short, ‗CrPC'). The
allegation is that neither in the remand report nor in the
order dated 11th June 2024 passed by the learned Magistrate
was the time of arrest mentioned. The FIR was registered at
the instance of the 2nd respondent.
107. Further, in the aforesaid case a vital issue was emerged
when the learned counsel appearing for the appellant
produced photographs which showed that while he was
admitted to the hospital, he was handcuffed and chained to
the hospital bed. Therefore, a notice was issued on
4th October 2024 to the Medical Superintendent of PGIMS,
calling upon him to file an affidavit stating whether the
appellant was handcuffed and chained to the hospital bed.
The order dated 21st October 2024 records the admission of
the Medical Superintendent of PGIMS that when the
appellant was admitted to the hospital, he was handcuffed
and chained to the bed.
108. The Hon'ble Apex Court while taking in to consideration
the mandate of Article 22 of the Constitution of India has
held that the requirement of informing the person arrested of
- 63 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 the grounds of arrest is not a formality but a mandatory
constitutional requirement. Article 22 is included in Part III of
the Constitution under the heading of Fundamental Rights.
Thus, it is the fundamental right of every person arrested and
detained in custody to be informed of the grounds of arrest as
soon as possible. The Hon'ble Apex Court has further
observed as under:
15. We have already referred to what is held in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1. This Court has suggested that the proper and ideal course of communicating the grounds of arrest is to provide grounds of arrest in writing. Obviously, before a police officer communicates the grounds of arrest, the grounds of arrest have to be formulated. Therefore, there is no harm if the grounds of arrest are communicated in writing. Although there is no requirement to communicate the grounds of arrest in writing, what is stated in paragraphs 42 and 43 of the decision in the case of Pankaj Bansal1 are suggestions that merit consideration. We are aware that in every case, it may not be practicable to implement what is suggested. If the course, as suggested, is followed, the controversy about the non-compliance will not arise at all. The police have to balance the rights of a person arrested with the interests of the society. Therefore, the police should always scrupulously comply with the requirements of Article 22.
109. It is, thus, evident that in all these judgments the issue
at the time of arrest was the primary factor, which was
questioned before the Hon'ble Apex Court and the same has
been dealt with by the Hon'ble Apex Court in those
judgments.
- 64 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
110. The applicability of these judgments in the touchstone of
remand order dated 09.06.2023 is now being considered by
this Court by delving upon the factual aspect involved in the
present case.
111. Herein the undisputed fact is that the writ petitioner
was arrested on 07.06.2023 where the grounds of arrest was
handed over to the petitioner, upon which he put his
signature. For ready reference, the ‗Grounds of Arrest' dated
07.06.2023, is quoted as under:
"Grounds of arrest of Amit Kumar Agarwal, S/o Vijay Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh, S/o Nitya Gopal Ghosh, under section 19 of PMLA, 2002 in ECIR/RNZO/18/2022.
1. Brief facts of the case-
1.1 An ECIR No RNZO/18/2022 was recorded on 21.10.2022 based on FIR No. 141 of 2022 dat1ed 04.06.2022, registered by the Bariatu Police Station, Ranchi under section 420, 467 and 471 of IPC against one Pradip Bagchi, Resident of ward no. 21, Lotus Garden Complex Block B, PS Bariatu, Dist. Ranchi based on a complaint of Shri Dilip Sharma, Tax Collector, Ranchi Municipal Corporation. The complainant stated that the said Pradip Bagchi submitted forged papers i.e., Aadhaar Card, Electricity Bill and Possession Letter for obtaining the holding number 0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A5. The abovesaid holding numbers were verified by him and it was found that the Pradip Bagchi has submitted forged and fictitious documents to obtain the holding numbers.
1.2 Since offences under sections 420, 467 and 471 of IPC are scheduled offences under Part A of Schedule of PMLA, 2002 and the offence of money laundering under Section 3 of the PMLA, 2002 which is punishable under section 4 of PMLA, appeared to have been made out, an ECIR bearing No. RNZO/18/2022 was therefore recorded on 21.10.2022 and Investigation under the
- 65 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 provisions of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act (PMLA) was initiated.
1.3 Investigation revealed that the above stated two holding Nos. 0210004194000A1 and 0210004031000A were obtained for property plot no. MS 557, Morabadi Mouza, ward no. 21/19, having an area of 455.00 decimals at Ranchi. It also revealed that the above stated property was later sold by the said Pradeep Bagchi (Aadhaar no. 511337882315, PAN AMBPB1317J) to one company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd (PAN AABCJ3705F, represented by Its Director Dilip Kumar Ghosh having Aadhaar no. 912605787465). This deed for acquiring the property in possession of defence was_executed on 1st October, 2021 and the consideration amount of the property was shown as Rs. 7 crores, the government value/Market Value of the said property as declared in deed was Rs. 20,75,84,200/-. The accused Dilip Ghosh representing M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd paid purported amount of 7 crores by issueing 11 cheques of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 to Pradeep Bagchi to purchase the property in possession of defence. 1.4 On the scrutiny of the bank account statement of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 of M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd., it reveals that only one payment amounting to Rs 25,00,000/- was made into the account of Pradip Bagchi by HDFC Cheque No. 461153 and rest of the money was falsely shown to be paid in the deed no. 6888 of 2021 through above sald cheques. Although no further payments were done, the purchasers and sellers mentioned In the sale deed that - "यह भी विवित हो वि प्रवतफल िी िुल रावि मोिवलग 7,00,00, 000/- (सात
िरोड़ रूपया) मात्र प्राप्त विये है । विसिी प्राप्तप्त विक्रेता स्वीिार ि समपुष्ट िरते हैं । अब विक्रय संपवि िे मूल्य में विसी भी प्रिार िी प्राप्तप्त विक्रेता िो खरीिार से िेष नहीं रहा ।"
Thus, it is evident that the declaration of payment of full amount of Rs 7 crores by the purchaser and its receipt by the seller was deliberate, thoughtful and planned to give a legitimate appearance to the bogus transactions recorded in the sale deed for acquiring the above property in order to project the acquisition of proceeds of crime in the form of landed property as an untainted property.
- 66 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Scrutiny of IDFC First Bank account No 10060532973 has revealed that during the period from 16.10.2020 to 25.07.2022, an amount of Rs 4,69,80,000/- has been deposited in cash and out of which Rs 4,13,87,000/- is transferred to Rajesh Auto Merchandise Pvt. Ltd.
Dilip Ghosh, the director and accomplice of Amit Kumar Agarwal has its office at FMI House, F3, Block GP, Sector-V, P.S Bidhannagar, Kolkata, West Bengal - 700091 which is the office premises of Amit Agarwal and his companies. 1.5 Statement of Bikash Jana and Dilip Shah, the person depositing cash in the above said bank account was recorded under section 50 of PMLA, 2002. It revealed that they are the employees of Amit Kumar Agarwal. Thus, the above facts and the sequence of the cash deposits in the above bank account of M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estite's Pvt. Ltd shows that Amit Agarwal is the beneficial owner of the company M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd and subsequent transfers of the cash deposits into the bank account of M/s Aurora Studio Pvt. Ltd & M/s Rajesh Auto Merchandise Pvt. Ltd testifies that M/s Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd is just a front company of Amit Kumar Agarwal and the company is an instrument for acquiring and laundering his proceeds of crime and Dilip Kumar Ghosh is his associate. 1.6 Investigation has revealed that accused persons namely Afshar Ali, Pradip Bagchi and his accomplices prepared fake deed of the above mentioned Morabadi property of 4.55 acres from the office of the Registrar of Assurances, Kolkata in name of Prafulla Bagchi F/o Pradip Bagchi. It was projected that his father Prafulla Bagchi had given the land orally to the Army and as on day Pradeep Bagchi Is the rightful claimant of the property. These persons contacted one Prem Prakash. Prem Prakash, Chhavi Ranjan, the Ex-DC Ranchi, Dilip Ghosh and Arnit Kumar Agarwal hatched conspiracy to acquire property in name of accused company Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. In connivance with Prem Prakash and Amit Kumar Agarwal, Mr. Chavi Ranjan influenced the officials of Circle office and District Sub Registrar, Ranchi and managed to procure favorable report for Pradeep Bagchi and the property was subsequently acquired in a
- 67 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 dishonest manner in the name of Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt. Ltd. The property worth several crores of rupees was acquired by paying only Rs 25 lakhs commission.
2. Investigation reveals that the company M/s. Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. has no such business which can justify such huge deposits in its account.
3. Investigation has revealed that Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh both are the part of conspiracy to acquire the land in possession of defence. Amit Kumar Agarwal Is the beneficial owner of the company M/s Jagatbandhu tea Estates Pvt. Ltd and he is actually involved in the activity connected with acquisition of proceeds of crime in form of landed property measuring 4.55 acres (455 decimals) at MS Plot no. 557, Mauja Morabadi on strength of fake deed prepared by the accused persons earlier arrested by this office. Dilip Ghish assisted Amit Kumar Agarwal and both were knowingly party with accused Afshar Ali, Chaavi Ranjan and Pradeep Bagchi to acquire the above said proceeds of crime. Amit Kumar Agarwal managed the business activities of the company Jagatbandhu Tea Estates Pvt Ltd and he acquired the land in name of this beneficially owned company by paying only a commission of Rs. 25 lacs to Pradeep Bagchi. The market value of the land was Rs. 20,75,84,200 but the consideration amount was shown as 7 crores in the deed. The accused persons Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh attempted to conceal the non- payment of Rs. 6.75 crores in the deed no. 6888 of 2021 dated 01.10.2021. and acquired the proceeds of crime in name of Jagatbandhu Tea Estate Pvt. Ltd. which was a criminal activity relating to schedule offences under PMLA, 2002.
4. The above discussions, lead to a reasonable belief that an offence of Money Laundering under section 3 of PMLA, 2002 has been committed by the accused persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh as stated above. As per Section 3 of PMLA, 2002, whosoever directly or indirectly attempts to indulge or knowingly assists or knowingly is a party or is actually involved in any process or activity connected with the [proceeds of crime including its concealment, possession, acquisition or use
- 68 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 and projecting or iaiming] it as untainted property shall be guilty of offence of money laundering.
5. The above said persons are hand in gloves with each other and with the accused persons earlier arrested by this office in this case who were collectively indulged in acquiring and disposing the landed properties in illegal manner. I have reasons to believe that Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh are actually and knowingly Involved in the process and activity connected with the acquisition, concealment, possession and use and projecting proceeds of crime as untainted property, and as such both are guilty of the offence of money laundering as defined under section 3 of PMLA and they are liable to be arrested under section 19 of PMLA, 2002 to cause their custodial interrogation for the purpose of Investigation and taking further actions as warranted under the provisions of PMLA, 2002.
As such, I Deovrat Jha, Assistant Director, Directorate of Enforcement, Ranchi Zonal Office, am arresting the above two persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh under section 19 of PMLA, 2002.
112. Thereafter, the petitioner was produced before the Court
on 08.06.2023 within 24 hours. The writ petitioner was
remanded to the judicial custody on 08.06.2023. For ready
reference, order dated 08.06.2023 is quoted as under:
―I.O.-cum-Assistant Director Deovrat Jha has arrested the accused persons namely 1) Amit Kumar Agarwal, S/o Vijay Kumar Agarwal, R/o- HB-165, Sector-III, Salt Lake, Kolkata, PIN-700106 and 2)Dilip Ghosh, S/o Nitya Gopal Ghosh, R/o- P-162, C.I.T. Road, Scheme-VII M, Kankurgachi, Kolkata, West Bengal- 700054 for the offence u/s 3 PML Act punishable u/s 4 PML Act and produced before the court today. He has filed (1) arrest memo (2) order of arrest vide case no.- ECIR/RNZO/18/2022 dated 21.10.2022 issued by L.O. cum Assistant Director Deovrat Jha (3) Ground of arrest (4) Medical report with COVID-ve and (5) Search Memo (u/s 51 Cr.P.C.).
- 69 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Para-2 to 13 of the application filed u/s 167 Cr.P.C. r/w section 65 and 19(3) of PML Act reveals that the huge amount of proceeds of crime is involved with larger conspiracy to illegally sale the Army land, area-4.55 acre by manipulation of official record and thereafter they acquiring the said land on meager price. Various incriminating documents are seized during search. It shows that accused persons are the members of a racket which involved in transfer of land illegally.
Accused persons have no complaint about any ill- treatment against arresting escort parties and information of arrest has been given to their family also. Ld. Lawyers on behalf of the accused persons namely Bidhyut Chourasia and Abhishek Agarwal were also present at the time of remand. They are taken into the judicial custody and remanded in this case and send to B.M.C. Jail Hotwar, Ranchi. O/c is directed to issue custody warrant at once. Produce the accused persons through video conferencing on 19.06.2023.
Put up the record on 09.06.2023 for hearing on application filed u/s 167 Cr.P.C by investigating Officer ED to give him on remand to the accused persons for interrogation.‖
113. Thereafter, on the application filed on behalf of
respondent-ED, the investigating agency, under Section 167
Cr.P.C to give the accused persons on remand for
interrogation, the concerned Court has passed order on
09.06.2023 based upon that the custody of writ petitioner
was handed over to the investigating agency for the purpose
of custodial interrogation. The relevant portion of order dated
09.06.2023 is quoted as under:
".....The petition filed on behalf of the L.O. (ED) is within first 15 days from the date of remand of accused persons hence
- 70 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 well within time. The investigating agency has also succeeded to make out a strong case that without the custodial interrogation, further investigation is not possible.
Therefore, considering the aforesaid facts for proper and just investigation of this case, the accused persons namely Amit Kumar Agarwal and Dilip Ghosh are given in custody of ED for total period of 72 hours, the time period will be started when the accused persons handed over to custody in ED by the Jail authority.
It is hereby made clear that prior to taking the accused persons in custody, they shall be medically examined and further will not be subjected to force/violence and before returning the above named accused persons to judicial custody, they will be again medically examined. Investigating officer of this case is further directed to intimate this court about medical examination of accused at the time of sending them to judicial custody. Further, the above named accused persons may be permitted to meet their lawyer once a day -If they so wish during interrogation, though not throughout the interrogation. Accordingly, in the light of discussion made herein above, the petition filed on behalf of LO. (ED) is hereby allowed.
Let an extract copy of this order be given to
Investigating Officer (ED) and Jall Superintendent, BMC, Jail
Hotwar, Ranchi for information and needful. ―
114. This Court has scrutinized order dated 09.06.2023 in
order to consider as to whether the order dated 09.06.2023 is
the actual order of remand immediately after arrest or it is
different to that.
115. It needs to refer herein that this Court in the aforesaid
backdrop of the facts has examined the relevant provisions of
the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as the
‗Code') related to remand thoroughly. Sections 167, 209 and
- 71 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 309 of the Code deal with the remand of an accused. The
relevant clauses contained in those sections are quoted
below:--
Sec. 167 ........
―(2) The magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:
Provided that--
(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding:--
(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten days.
(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence.
Sec. 209--........ (b) subject to the provisions of this Code relating to bail, remand the accused to custody during and until the conclusion of, the trial.‖ Sec. 309--........ (2) If the Court, after taking cognizance of an offfence, or commencement of trial, finds it necessary or advisable to postpone the commencement of, or adjourn, any inquiry or trial, it may, from time to time, for reasons to be recorded, postpone or adjourn the same on such terms as it thinks fit, for such time as it considers reasonable, and may by a warrant remand the accused if in custody; Provided that no Magistrate shall remand an accused person
- 72 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 to custody under this section for a term exceeding fifteen days at a time.‖
116. The provisions of Section 167(2) of the Code deals with
both types of remand i.e. ―judicial remand‖ and
―police remand‖. The police have been given a right to
apply before the Magistrate concerned for giving the
accused in police custody and on being satisfied of
adequate grounds the Magistrate may grant police remand
of the accused for a specific period not beyond first fifteen
days and later on, he can authorise only judicial detention
of the accused till 90 to 60 days, as the case may be.
Sections 209 and 309 of the Code deal with judicial
custody during inquiry and trial.
117. So far as authorisation of police custody of accused
under Section 167(2) is concerned it is legislative mandate
that in no way the detention of the accused in police
custody can be authorised for any time after expiry of the
period of first fifteen days' remand. The Magistrate may
allow detention other than custody in police till 90/60
days, as the case may be.
118. The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Central Bureau
of Investigation, special investigation cell-I Vs.
Anupam J. Kulkarni (1992 Cri LJ 2768) has observed
that the Magistrate is competent to authorise detention of
any accused in police custody for a specific period on
- 73 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 adequate grounds only for the first fifteen days and that
detention in police custody or judicial custody or vice versa
can be authorised only within first fifteen days. After fifteen
days' detention the accused cannot be sent to police
custody at all except in other cases in which remand of
first fifteen days has not yet started. The Hon'ble Supreme
Court in the aforesaid case approved the rule laid down by
the Delhi High Court in the case of the State (Delhi
Administration) v. Dharam Pal, reported in 1982 Cri LJ
1103 that the words ―from time to time‖ occurring in
section show that several orders can be passed under
Section 167(2) and that the nature of custody can be
altered from ―judicial custody‖ to ―police custody‖ and vice
versa during the first period of 15 days mentioned in
Section 167(2) of the Code and that after fifteen days the
accused could only be kept in judicial custody or in any
other custody as ordered by the Magistrate but not in the
custody of the police.
119. Further this Court is conscious with the fact that the act
of directing remand of an accused is fundamentally a
judicial function. The Magistrate does not act in executive
capacity while ordering the detention of an accused. While
exercising this judicial act, it is obligatory on the part of
the Magistrate to satisfy himself whether the materials
- 74 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 placed before him justify such a remand or, to put it
differently, whether there exist reasonable grounds to
commit the accused to custody and extend his remand.
120. The purpose of remand as postulated under Section 167
is that investigation cannot be completed within 24 hours.
It enables the Magistrate to see that the remand is really
necessary. This requires the investigating agency to send
the case diary along with the remand report so that the
Magistrate can appreciate the factual scenario and apply
his mind whether there is a warrant for police remand or
justification for judicial remand or there is no need for any
remand at all. It is obligatory on the part of the Magistrate
to apply his mind and not to pass an order of remand
automatically or in a mechanical manner, reference in this
regard may be taken from the judgment rendered by the
Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Manubhai Ratilal Patel
v. State of Gujarat, (2013) 1 SCC 314 .
121. Now adverting to the facts of the instant case it appears
from order dated 09.06.2023 that by virtue of said order
the remand of the present writ petitioner has been given to
the police for interrogation. If both the order dated
08.06.2023 and 09.06.2023 will be considered together
then it would be evident that the arrest is dated
07.06.2023 and thereafter within 24 hours the writ
- 75 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner was produced before the concerned Court for the
purpose of remand and he was remanded vide order dated
08.06.2023 as referred and quoted herein above, by
sending him to the Birsa Munda Central Jail, to remain in
judicial custody. While order dated 09.06.2023 is on the
application filed under Section 167(1) Cr. P.C. by the
investigating agency seeking police custody for taking
remand of the writ petitioner for interrogation.
122. Admittedly, the writ petitioner has challenged order
dated 09.06.2023 but has not questioned the illegality and
propriety of order dated 08.06.2023 meaning thereby the
writ petitioner is having no grievance with respect to the
issue of remand dated 08.06.2023 otherwise said order
would have been challenged by the writ petitioner. It
means, the writ petitioner has accepted the remand order
and has not challenged the order of remand rather he has
chosen to prefer application under Sections 439 and 440
Cr.P.C before the Court of Sessions on merit by denying
the allegation as referred in the ECIR by filing Misc. Cri.
Application No. 1915 of 2023 for grant of bail, which was
dismissed vide order dated 07.07.2023 by learned Special
Judge, CBI-cum-Special Judge under PMLA, Ranchi.
123. Submission has been made on behalf of petitioner that
the ground of arrest ought to have been supplied along
- 76 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 with the document at the time of remand and according to
the petitioner the same having not been supplied hence the
order of remand is illegal and as such not sustainable in
the eye of law.
124. We have also referred hereinabove that the applicability
of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 is not available at the time
of remand it is obvious for the reason that at the time of
arrest it is the police who has to arrest and as such
keeping the mandate of Article 22(1) of the Constitution of
India and in order to have the abundant precaution that
the person who is going to be taken into custody by the
investigator, then such person must know the reason for
arrest since it is the curtailment of the personal liberty and
that is the reason the provision of Section 19(1) has been
considered to be a power which has been taken into
consideration by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the series of
judgments right from the judgment rendered in the case of
Pankaj Bansal (Supra).
125. But there is no stipulation of fulfilment of condition, as
required to be fulfilled at the time of arrest as per the
mandate of Section 19(1) of the Act, 2002 said to be
applicable at the time of remand. There cannot be any
dispute that at the time of remand also the application
which is filed for the purpose of seeking remand must
- 77 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 contain the specific reason along with the grounds of arrest
and reasonable materials warranting the person concerned
to be remanded at the appropriate stage i.e., after arrest.
126. We have considered the grounds of arrest dated
07.06.2023, as has been appended as Annexure R-3 to the
counter affidavit and found therefrom that on each and
every page the writ petitioner has put his signature with
date and endorsed to the effect that ‗Read and under
understand' ... ‗I have read my ground of arrest completely
and also communicated to Mr. Dilip Ghosh.' and below
therein has put his full signature with date as 07.06.2023.
127. It is, thus, evident that the moment the petitioner has
shown no grievance with respect to any of the issues even
the issue of arrest by raising the ground that he is not
knowing as to on what ground he has been arrested rather
he in each and every page has endorsed by putting his
signature and gave note that he read over the content of
the ground of arrest and did not shown any dissatisfaction.
128. It is apparent from the record that separate arrest Order
was passed vide order dated 07.06.2023 and the writ
petitioner was arrested and at the time of arrest he was
served with the grounds of arrest upon which he put his
signature on each and every page with date and endorsed
that he read over the matter. Immediately, within 24 hours
- 78 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 of arrest, the writ petitioner-accused was produced before
the concerned Court and accordingly remanded in this
case and he shown no complaint whatsoever. For ready
reference, the relevant portion of order dated 08.06.2023
passed by the learned Court is quoted as under:
―Accused persons have no complaint about any ill- treatment against arresting escort parties and information of arrest has been given to the their family also. Ld. Lawyers on behalf of the accused persons namely Bidhiyut Chourasia and Abhishek Agarwal were also present at the time of remand. They are taken into the judicial custody and remanded in this case and sent to B.M.C Jail, Hotwar, Ranchi. O/C is directed to issue custody warrant at once.‖
129. Therefore, this Court is not hesitant in coming to
the conclusion that the writ petitioner was having no
grievance with respect to the issue of remand order dated
08.06.2023. Had the remand order dated 08.06.2023 have
any infirmities, the writ petitioner would have made
objection to that effect showing his dissatisfaction in the
application which was filed before the Court having the
jurisdiction for the purpose of remand of the present
petitioner but admittedly that has not been done.
130. Further herein the writ petitioner has shown his
satisfaction with respect to the issue of remand, which is
very much evident from the face of the order passed by the
- 79 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 Court vide order dated 08.06.2023, whereby the petitioner
has been sent for remand to the Birsa Munda Jail.
131. It is evident from order dated 08.06.2023 that the
accused persons were directed to be produced through
video conferencing on 19.06.2023, however, the record
was directed to be put up on 09.06.2023 for hearing on
application filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C by the
investigating officer to give the accused persons on
remand for interrogation.
132. Accordingly, the concerned Court has taken up the
matter on 09.06.2023 to pass order on the petition dated
08.06.2023 filed under Section 167 Cr.P.C by the
investigating agency- ED and after hearing the parties the
learned Court has passed order on 09.06.2023 based
upon that the custody of writ petitioner was handed over
to the investigating agency for the purpose of
interrogation.
133. From the content of order dated 08.06.2023 and
09.06.2023 it appears that the original order of remand is
dated 08.06.2023 but the same is not under challenge.
134. The same could not have been challenged reason
being that the writ petitioner has gone through the ground
of arrest which was supplied to him on the same dated
i.e., on 07.06.2023, bearing the signature of the writ
- 80 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 petitioner endorsing that he is having no dissatisfaction of
the impugned order of arrest. The moment the writ
petitioner has shown no dissatisfaction after going
through the grounds of arrest and therefore, he has
chosen not to challenge the order of remand dated
08.06.2023.
135. It is evident from material available on record and
also it has been contended by the learned counsel for the
ED that learned senior counsel for the writ petitioner has
chosen not to challenge order dated 08.06.2023 which is
actually the order of remand and confined his prayer
limited to the order dated 09.06.2023 by which the court
has allowed the investigating agency-ED to remand the
petitioner for custodial interrogation.
136. Although, during course of argument, learned
senior counsel for the petitioner has said it to be a hyper-
technical ground.
137. We are not impressed with such argument of writ
petitioner reason being that when we are exercising the
power conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, wherein the principle which is
applicable is of strict principle of pleading along with
specific prayer and in absence thereof no direction can be
- 81 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 passed even by moulding the prayer in absence of any
pleading to that effect.
138. It needs to refer herein that the writ petitioner has
not chosen to challenge order of remand at its inception
rather he has approached to the competent Court for the
purpose of consideration of prayer for regular bail by filing
application before the learned Special Judge, the same
having been rejected, thereafter the bail application has
been filed before this Court by filing B.A. No. 7343 of
2023, which was dismissed on 01.03.2024. After dismissal
of the bail application of the petitioner, he moved before
the Hon'ble Supreme Court by filing SLP (Cr.) No. 6584 of
2024, which was dismissed as withdrawn.
139. Thereafter, again the petitioner has renewed his
prayer for bail by filing B.A. No. 8321 of 2024, which is
pending consideration before this Court.
140. However, after his prayer for bail having been
rejected, in B.A. No. 7343 of 2023, he moved before this
Court by filing the instant writ petition and while
argument the learned confining the prayer to challenge the
order dated 09.06.2023, stated to be order of remand.
141. The issue has also been raised showing the
innocence of the writ petitioner by carving out the ground
as noted in the written note of argument. The same has
- 82 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 seriously been disputed by learned counsel for the ED on
the ground that when order dated 09.06.2023, by which
the court has allowed the investigating agency-ED to
remand the petitioner for custodial interrogation, is under
challenge then where is the question to raise the issue
showing the writ petitioner to be innocent said to not
commit any culpability.
142. We are in agreement with the submission advanced
by learned counsel for the respondent-ED since while
considering the issue of legality or propriety of the order
dated 09.06.2023 there is no question of taking in to
consideration the culpability said to be committed by the
accused person(s) at the stage of remand.
143. Furthermore, learned counsel for the writ
petitioner has also taken the ground of long incarceration
of the writ petitioner of about 22 months. But we are of
view that the issue of period of custody is not proper to be
considered at the time of consideration of propriety of
order of remand.
144. This Court in the entirety of the facts and
circumstances, as has been discussed herein above, is of
the view that in view of confinement of prayer, the writ
petition is required to be considered only with respect to
the propriety/impropriety of order dated 09.06.2023 and
- 83 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024 in view of discussions made hereinabove we are further of
the view that the petitioner has not been able to make out
a case for showing interference in order dated 09.06.2023.
145. Accordingly, Issue Nos. II and III are answered and
decided against the writ petitioner.
146. In the result, the present writ petition lacks merit
and accordingly dismissed.
147. Pending Interlocutory Application(s), if any, stands
disposed of.
I Agree (Sujit Narayan Prasad, J.)
(Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.) (Pradeep Kumar Srivastava, J.)
Alankar/-
A.F.R.
- 84 - W.P.(Cr.) No. 793 of 2024
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